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Abstract.
The purpose of this study is to examine and explain the impact of British business interests, 
outside of China, on Anglo-Japanese foreign relations and whether these business pressures 
contributed to the destablisation or amelioration of political tensions. Between 1933 and 
1937 there were a series of major commercial disputes between Britain and Japan, in the 
cotton and shipping industries and over the Japanese treatment of British oil interests in 
Japan and Manchukuo, which following Japan’s pursuit of an aggressive and unilateral 
policy in East Asia complicated an already strained Anglo-Japanese relationship. Thus the 
scale of Anglo-Japanese commercial friction offered substantial scope for political 
repercussions. In order to assess the impact of business pressure this study will focus upon 
the relationship between business groups and the British government, which provides the 
basis for determining the impact of business interests upon British policy towards Japan. By 
detailing the interaction between government and business this study hopes to establish 
which factors were most prominent in shaping the govemmenfs response to the demands of 
business and the needs of Anglo-Japanese relations. This requires the examination of the 
economic and political factors that motivated business demands for government support, 
and the economic, political and foreign policy factors that guided the response of the British 
government. However, it also requires the examination of relationships within business 
groups and the government as a means of establishing the constraints upon business and 
govemmenfs response to Anglo-Japanese commercial friction. Conclusions are drawn 
which indicate that because of an ingrained 'conservatism' to commercial questions both the 
business community and government avoided exacerbating commercial tensions with 
Japan, and consequently business interests had only a limited impact upon Anglo-Japanese 
relations.
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Preface.
In accordance with Japanese custom, Japanese names are written with the family name first 
and the given name last. Macrons indicate long vowels, except in the case of names, such as 
Tokyo and Osaka, which are familiar to English speakers as written above.
In regard to units of measurement, no attempt has been made to establish a consistent 
presentation of this data throughout the text. However, in cases where statistical 
comparisons are made, every attempt has been made to ensure that similar units of 
measurement are used. For example, the difference between square yards and linear yards is 
relatively small, less than 2%, which allows for effective statistical comparison without the 
need to convert such data into one unit of measurement.
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Introduction
Introduction.
The interdependence of economic and foreign policy has become an increasingly important 
theme in modem historical research.1 The drive to maximise political, economic, and 
foreign policy goals in the international arena has increased attention upon the relationship 
between economic pressure groups and foreign policy formulation. In this relationship there 
are two critical aspects; the attempt by economic interest groups to maximise economic 
opportunities in the international arena, through pressure for cooperation with foreign 
countries or protection and probable confrontation; and attempts by foreign policy makers to 
reduce foreign policy tensions, through pressuring business groups into economic 
cooperation with third parties. Naturally, within this debate British foreign policy in the 
1930s has not escaped such analysis, particularly since this period represented one of 
adjustment in both foreign and economic policy. In an age of protectionism and economic 
bilateralism, economic factors became more important for foreign policy, as was readily 
acknowledged by contemporary opinion.2 During the 1930s Britain switched from the 
championing of laissez faire to a protectionist and bilateralist economic and commercial 
policy, whilst the rise of Nazism in Germany and Fascism in Italy, and the decline of France, 
challenged Britain’s previous aloofness in European politics and security arrangements.3 
Nor were economic and political adjustments limited to Britain's relationship with Europe. 
Increased self-confidence and political nationalism within the British Empire were reflected 
in demands for greater political and - where relevant - economic autonomy from Britain.4 
Relations with America and the countries of East Asia were also seriously affected by the 
unstable interplay of economic and political factors.
During the interwar period the continued political and economic rise of Japan 
challenged Britain’s political and economic interests within East Asia, and British 
commercial interests both within and without East Asia. Anglo-Japanese political and 
economic rivalries, whilst part of a world wide phenomenon, had their own momentum,
1. Wurm C., Business, Politics and International Relations: Steel, Cotton and International Cartels in
British Politics, 1924-1939 (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge; 1993), p. 1.
2. Minute by Ashton-Gwatkin, 7 March 1933, F0371/17166,F1571/1571/23.
3. Mommsen W. J., and Kettenacker L. (eds.), The Fascist Challenge and the Policy o f Appeasement
(George Allen & Unwin, London; 1983); Trotter A., Britain and East Asia, 1933-1937 (Cambridge 
University Press, London; 1975).
4. See especially chapter 3.
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which demanded an effective British response in the defence of Britain’s interests. 
Moreover, since the Japanese challenge occurred in both the political and economic spheres, 
the linkage between political and economic questions was an obvious one. As the 1930s 
progressed the Japanese menace to British economic and political interests became more 
serious. A combination of increased Japanese economic, political, and military strength, 
coincided with the relative decline of British political authority and military strength in East 
Asia, and commercial readjustment.5 Japan’s abandonment of international cooperation, as 
exemplified by its invasion of Manchuria in September 1931 and departure from the League 
ofNations in March 19336 made the task of protecting British interests in East Asia, at a time 
of increased Japanese strength and relative British weakness, all the more difficult to 
resolve.
Between the dramatic events of the Manchurian crisis and the outbreak of the Sino- 
Japanese war, British policy-makers struggled to define Britain's aims in East Asia 
and her policy in China and Japan. It was necessary in 1933 to reassess British policy 
in the light of Japan's success in Manchuria and her departure from the League of 
Nations; to take account of Japanese commercial competition in China and 
elsewhere; and to consider British East Asia policy in the wider context of imperial 
defence problems.7
Faced by an aggressive and unilateral Japanese foreign policy in East Asia, British policy 
makers could either cooperate with or confront Japan. However, between 1933 and 1937 
this dilemma was never effectively resolved, as British policy makers found that their 
relative weakness in the region meant they were incapable single-handedly of shaping 
events to suit their interests.8
Within this deep-seated predicament, Anglo-Japanese economic friction in the 
international arena emerged during the Depression as another factor in Anglo-Japanese
5. Trotter A., p. 2; Louis W. R., The Road to Singapore: British Imperialism in the Far East, 1932-42’, in
Mommsen W. J., and Kettenacker L. (eds.), The Fascist Challenge and the Policy o f Appeasement 
(George Allen & Unwin, London; 1983), p. 353.
6. Trotter A., Britain in East Asia, p. 3; Louis W. R., The Road to Singapore', p. 352.
7. Trotter A., Britain in East Asia, p. 1.
8. Lowe P., Great Britain and the Origins o f the Pacific War: A Study o f British Policy in East Asia, 1937-
1941 (Clarendon Press, Oxford; 1977); Louis W. R., The Road to Singapore’; Trotter A., Britain and 
East Asia, 1933-1937; Endicott S. L., Diplomacy and Enterprise, British China Policy, 1933-1937 
(Manchester University Press; 1975); Louis W. R., British Strategy in the Far East, 1919-1939 
(Clarendon Press, Oxford; 1971).
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political relations. The aim of this study is to assess the impact from a British perspective of 
these commercial questions upon this relationship, and to complement the already existing
chosen because it divorces Anglo-Japanese relations from the complexities of Japan's 
involvement in the Manchuria incident - which was effectively terminated with the signing 
of the Tangku Truce between Japan and China in 1933 - and the outbreak of the Sino-Japan 
War in July 1937. During this period the main commercial disputes between Britain and 
Japan centred upon the cotton piece-good market,10 the British oil industry in Japan, and the 
shipping industry.11 In chapter 1 as a prelude to Anglo-Japanese friction in the cotton piece- 
good market, I look at the inability of the Lancashire cotton industry to compete with the 
Japanese cotton industry, and its consequent demand for trade protection from Japanese 
competition. Following the development of this campaign for trade discrimination, chapter 
2 studies the debate within the British government over the introduction of trade 
discrimination against Japan in the British Crown Colonies, subsequent attempts to readjust 
this trade discrimination, and British involvement in trade discrimination outside the Crown 
Colonies. Chapter 3 ri ils the more complex situation that existed in India, between the
conflicting demands o lian cotton industry for trade protection against both British and 
Japanese competition in the Indian market, and Lancashire’s demand for trade preference in 
the Indian market. In chapter 4, the contrasting question of Japanese 'discrimination' against 
Britain focuses upon the impact of Japan's petroleum policy upon Royal Dutch Shell's 
operations in Japan and Manchukuo, attempts to coordinate an Anglo-American response, 
and the subsequent continuation of Royal Dutch Shell’s operations in Japan and withdrawal 
from Manchukuo. Finally, chapter 5, describes the demands of the British shipping industry 
for government support against subsidised Japanese competition in the Pacific, which was 
integrated with similar campaigns of the British shipping industry for government support 
against other subsided shipping competition. Thus during the 1930s not only was there a
9. Trotter A., Britain and East Asia-, Endicott S. L., Diplomacy and Enterprise; Bennett G., British Policy
in the Far East: Treasury and Foreign Office, 1933-1936', Modem Asian Studies (1992).
10. Cotton piece-goods were by far the most important cotton textile export and the key good in friction 
between the Lancashire and Japanese cotton industries. For example in 1932 cotton piece-good exports 
represented nearly 70% of Britain's total exports of manufactured cotton textiles (including yam 
exports), Statistical Abstract fo r the United Kingdom, 1933 (HMSO, London; 1935), pp. 386-389.
11. In regard to Anglo-Japanese financial relations, in the 1930s the Japanese government's conscious 
turning away from international financial commitments limited the scope for Anglo-Japanese financial 
relations. Consequently, Japan's avoidance o f such commitments resulted in very little friction, outside 
of China, over financial affairs between Britain and Japan, Warner F., Anglo-Japanese Financial 
Relations: A Golden Tide (Basil Blackwell, Oxford; 1991), chapter 8.
works on Anglo-Japanese economic friction in China.9 The period 1933 to 1937 has been
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wide-ranging series of Anglo-Japanese trade disputes, all these disputes involved a potential 
interplay between foreign policy, trade policy, and government business relations.
With the arrival of demands for protection against Japanese competition, British 
policy makers faced the difficult task of balancing the need to protect Britain’s commercial 
interests from Japanese encroachment and defend ailing British industries threatened by 
Japanese competition, and yet balance these needs with the aims of British foreign policy. 
Despite domestic pressure to confront Japanese economic expansion, contemporaries 
recognised that Japanese commercial competition was a legitimate aspect of Japanese 
economic progress, and a phenomenon that would not disappear.12 British officials accepted 
that for an island state with an expanding population and few raw materials, economic 
expansion was a vital necessity.13 "To provide for the growing population, Japan must either 
reduce her already low standard of living, or develop her industries and her export trade”.14 
Given these circumstances, to hinder this expansion could court a violent Japanese reaction, 
which was especially dangerous with a country ’’which is armed to the teeth”.15 However, 
while British policy makers could agree on the dangers of confronting Japanese economic 
expansion there was a significant difference of view on how to combine British industries' 
demands for trade protection with British foreign policy to Japan: between those who saw 
the need to manage trade rivalries to prevent a further destabilisation of Anglo-Japanese 
relations, and those who saw the resolution of commercial friction as a means of improving 
Anglo-Japanese relations.
Within the British government it was the Foreign Office - and in particular the Far 
Eastern Department that dealt with Anglo-Japanese relations - that was most concerned over 
the need to manage the conflicting requirements of British demands for trade protection and 
Japanese demands for economic expansion. Officials such as Charles Orde, the Head of the 
Far Eastern Department, and Frank Ashton-Gwatkin, the economic expert at the Foreign 
Office,16 realised that while the British government could no longer ignore demands for trade
12. The President of the Board of Trade and the Colonial Secretary to the Foreign Office, 31 March 1933, 
F0371/17153/F583/2334/23; Gregory T. E., ’Japanese Competition in World Markets’, International 
Affairs (1934).
13. Uyeda T., The Recent Development o f Japanese Foreign Trade’, Journal o f the Institute o f Pacific 
Relations (1936).
14. Minute by Ashton-Gwatkin, 5 December 1933, F0371/17166,F6674/1571/23.
15. Minute by Ashton-Gwatkin, 7 March 1933, F0371/17166,F1571/1571/23.
16. Endicott S. L., p. 22.
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protection it would be a mistake to oppose Japanese trade expansion. In particular these 
officials were concerned that excessive trade discrimination against Japan could provoke a 
violent Japanese reaction against Britain's important commercial interests in China.17 In 
September 1933, Orde summed up this problem: "it will be a mistake to oppose her trade 
expansion, except where it comes into serious conflict with our own trade’’.18 If Britain did 
embark upon measures of trade discrimination against Japan, the foreign policy 
consequences of such action would have to be carefully thought out before such measures 
were implemented. However, while these officials, and important figures outside the Far 
Eastern Department such as Sir Robert Vansittart, the Permanent Under-Secretary at the 
Foreign Office, remained unwilling to provoke Japan or take an anti-Japanese stance,19 they 
remained convinced of the limitations of commercial factors in Anglo-Japanese relations. 
On the one hand they believed that cooperation with Japan could not be bought at the price of 
unilateral British concessions to Japan:20 on the other they were convinced that the economic 
imperatives and the nationalist aspect of Japanese economic expansion prevented Japan 
from cooperating with demands for Japanese trade restraint.21 Trade friction was a 
destabilising element in Anglo-Japanese relations that needed to be treated with caution, and 
yet one that offered little room for either economic or political cooperation. However, in 
contrast to the Foreign Office a second group of British politicians and officials perceived 
that the resolution of economic rivalries, especially in China and Manchuria, presented the 
opportunity for cooperation between Britain and Japan. In particular the Treasury Group' 
led by Neville Chamberlain, the Chancellor of the Exchequer, and Sir Warren Fisher, the 
Permanent Secretary at the Treasury, and which included Sir John Simon, the Foreign 
Secretary, saw Anglo-Japanese economic and political cooperation as a means of improving 
political relations between the two countries, which would free British resources to focus 
upon the unstable situation in Europe.22 Both Chamberlain and Fisher were keen upon taking
17. Orde to Twentyman (Treasury), 19 September 1933, cited in Wurm C., p. 226.
18. Memorandum Respecting Our Relations with Japan’, by Orde, CAB 24 CP. 77(34); Minute by Ashton- 
Gwatkin, 7 March 1933, F0371/17166,F1571/1571/23.
19. Memorandum by Wellesley, 18 January 1934, Documents on British Foreign Policy. Second Series,
Volume X X (HMSO, London; 1984), pp. 149-153; Louis W. R., 'The Road to Singapore', pp. 356-360.
20. Minute by Vansittart, 28 July 1935, FO371/19287.F4881/84/10.
21. Memorandum by Sansom, 29 October 1934, CAB 24 CP. 8(35).
22. Trotter A., Britain in East Asia, especially chapter 12; Endicott S. L., Diplomacy and Enterprise; Louis 
W. R., British Strategy in the Far East, Bennett G., British Policy in the Far East*.
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active steps to court Japanese friendship in order to free British resources to meet the 
German threat.23 Fisher in particular was totally alarmed by the German threat and reasoned 
that Britain must take steps to ease tensions with Japan, even at the risk of alienating 
American support, since "we cannot simultaneously fight Japan and the strongest European 
Naval Power".24 Thus for this group Anglo-Japanese economic friction offered the 
possibility of simultaneously converting this trade friction into economic cooperation and 
improved political relations.
However, although foreign policy considerations placed important constraints upon 
British policy towards Japan, it would be wrong to see British policy towards Japan as being 
solely dominated by foreign policy considerations. British trade policy and the international 
commercial environment also imposed significant constraints upon British commercial 
policy towards Japan. Indeed, it has been suggested that the intrusion of economic priorities 
in Britain’s overseas policy led to the virtual eclipse of the Foreign Office by the Board of 
Trade and Treasury in foreign policy formulation.25 However, while economic priorities 
might have undermined the importance of the Foreign Office this does not necessarily mean 
that the needs of commercial policy resulted in radically new foreign policy initiatives. 
Although the British government introduced domestic protection, through the Abnormal 
Importations Act of November 1931, and the extension of imperial preference, through the 
Ottawa Conference of August 1932, it remained committed to orthodox and conservative 
fiscal and economic policies. In the mid-1930s faced by sluggish recovery and continuing 
high levels of unemployment the government rejected radical solutions, such as deficit 
financing, and championed orthodox policies, such as export led growth, as the solution to 
current economic problems.26 Such orthodoxy carried over into trade policy where the 
Board of Trade, the dominant government department in trade policy, fought long and hard 
to limit Britain’s departure from orthodox trade practices. In particular, Sir Walter
23. Memorandum by Fisher, 19 April 1934, Documents on British Foreign Policy. Second Series, Volume 
XIII, appendix I, (HMSO, London; 1973), pp. 924-930; Watt D. C., 'Britain, and the United States and 
Japan in 1934', in Watt D. C. (ed.), Personalities and Policies: Studies in the Formation o f  British 
Foreign Policy in the Twentieth Century (Longmans, London; 1965).
24. Memorandum by Fisher, 19 April 1934, Documents on British Foreign Policy. Second Series, Volume 
XIII, appendix I, p. 928.
25. Boyce R , 'World Depression and World War: some economic origins of the Second World War', in 
Boyce R , and Robertson E. M. (eds.), Paths to War: new essays on the origins o f the Second World 
War Macmillan, Basingstoke; 1989), p. 74.
26. Wurm C., p. 129.
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Runciman, the President of the Board of Trade between 1931 and 1937, who had a 
background in the free trade shipping industry and was a former free trade liberal MP and
radicalism. In 1932, led by the Federation of British Industries, British industry, including 
cotton and shipping interests, demanded the unconditional denunciation of the most­
favoured-nation clause, so that foreign countries who relied upon the British market would 
be forced to offer Britain preferential access to their own markets in order to retain equality 
of access to the British market. However, the Board of Trade succeeded in stymying this 
movement, as it appreciated that the wholesale denunciation of the most-favoured-nation 
clause would prove a greater danger to Britain’s export trade.28 As one Board of Trade 
official noted in July 1932, "the risk of disaster to our export trade by a wholesale 
denunciation of these instruments must be very serious".29 Thus in assessing demand for 
trade discrimination against Japan it is important to note that the British government took an 
extremely conservative stand on trade policy. From the point of view of the whole British 
economy, extreme measures were seen as counterproductive. Consequently, trade 
discrimination against Japan, even if it did not run the risk of Japanese political retaliation, 
was frowned upon because it risked economic retaliation.
Although the British government rejected unconditional measures of trade 
protection, this did not mean that in regard to trade policy it abandoned attempts to seek trade 
preferences through bilateral negotiation. Even Runciman accepted that the British 
government should seek to improve tariff preferences with specific countries.30 Thus 
bilateral negotiations with third countries offered the possibility of improving Britain’s 
access to overseas markets yet without openly courtingtrade discrimination against Japan. 
This policy had particular appeal to both the cotton and shipping industries since they 
viewed foreign dependence upon the British market as a source of considerable leverage for 
the British government in bilateral trade negotiations. However, despite the importance of 
the British market to certain trading partners, particularly primary producers, bilateral trade 
negotiations imposed different series of potential constraints upon British attempts to
27. In 1931 Runciman joined the National government as a , but remained a reluctant
protectionist, Wurm C., p. 176.
28. Rooth T., British protectionism and the international economy: overseas commercial policy in the 
1930s (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge; 1993).
29. RoothT., p. 111.
30. Rooth T„ pp. 109-111.
leader of the free trade movement,27 proved a formidable adversary to advocates of trade
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protect its commercial interests from Japanese competition. As the Ottawa Conference of 
August 1932 had already revealed, general trade preferences for Britain in the Dominion 
markets might prove insufficient to protect specific British industries from Japanese 
competition. In a similar fashion, extending or initiating| trade preferences against Japanese 
competition might prove equally difficult since: the trade partner might want to protect 
domestic industry from British as much as Japanese competition, as in the case of the 
Canadian cotton industry;31 trade preferences for British products could undermine 
favourable trade relations with Japan; and extended trade preferences with one trade partner 
obtained through reciprocal trade preferences in the British market would have to be paid for 
by the curtailment of access to the British market for other trade partners, which could put at 
risk British trade preferences in these markets.32 Therefore while bilateral trade negotiations 
offered the possibility of improving trade protection against Japanese competition, these 
same international factors also acted as a constraint upon Britain’s pursuit of trade 
discrimination against Japan.
The final factor in British trade discrimination against Japan was the nature of 
govemment-business relations. Although there was a close relationship between business 
and the government, this did not mean that on any specific question these interests 
overlapped. Demands by business for trade protection might not coincide with government 
policy - or could be beyond the govemmenfs ability - and thus both the government and 
business interests would endeavour to bend the other to its will.33 In this conflict business 
pressure on the government was dependent upon the effectiveness of the respective business 
lobbies, and the willingness of government officials to respond to this lobbying. In regard to 
lobbying the government over trade policy, divisions within the business community 
presented the most serious threat to the leverage of individual business interests over the 
government. In particular both the cotton and shipping industries, who had both emerged in 
the 1930s from strong free trade traditions, were divided over the need to engage, and the 
extent of, government support in their fight against Japanese competition. Both industries 
included radical sections that sought extreme measures of government aid, export and 
commercial subsidies and treaty denunciation, as the means of combating Japanese
31. See chapter 2.
32. Rooth T., pp. 309-312.
33. Miliband R , The State in Capitalist Society: the analysis o f  the Western system ofpower (Quartet 
Books, London; 1984); Nettl J. P., 'Consensus or Elite Dominations: The Case of Business', in Rose R  
(ed.), Studies in British Politics: a reader in political sociology (Macmillan, London; 1976).
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competition. However, other sections realised that in a complex political and trade 
situation, excessive demands on the British government could be unfulfillable and even 
counterproductive. The Manchester Chamber of Commerce, respected by the government 
as the voice of the Lancashire cotton industry,34 worried that demands for radical trade 
discrimination against Japan could undermine the influence of the Chamber on the 
government. Thus industry had to be concerned that in demanding excessive trade 
protection against Japan they did not undermine its influence, because this loss of influence 
over the government could prove more disastrous in the long-run. Finally, business pressure 
on the government could also be significantly affected by the relationships between business 
leaders and government officials. Narrow departmental specialisation coupled with 
hostility to business interference within the British government could offer significant 
obstacles to attempts by business leaders to obtain government support for their industry. As 
Raymond Streat, the respected Secretary of the Manchester Chamber of Commerce, noted, 
government officials could be dismissive of the complaints of industrialists. In March 1931 
a deputation from the Chamber proved incapable of convincing Board of Trade and Foreign 
Office officials that British diplomacy was letting down Lancashire's trade with China. "We 
did not succeed in establishing our case that diplomacy in China was letting trade down. Sir 
John Pratt of the Foreign Office was clever and convincing. Our people were outwitted and 
apt to be over-awed”.35 However, this was not always the case. Streat also confessed to his 
diary that "most deputations ask for more than they can be given in the very nature of things”; 
consequently, business leaders could expect to be frequently rebuffed by the government.36 
Thus both intra-business and govemment-business relations were a critical factor in the 
adoption and course ofBritish trade discrimination against Japan.
While economic friction was obviously one aspect of Anglo-Japanese difficulties in 
the 1930s, traditional’ diplomatic histories have tended to pay only minor attention to 
commercial rivalry in the Anglo-Japanese relationship. Anglo-Japanese problems are 
portrayed as a result of circumstances, political antagonism and political misunderstanding, 
relative military strength, and British imperial decline.37 In spite of concern over the role
34. Wurm C., p. 198.
35. Dupree M. (ed.), Lancashire and Whitehall. The Diary o f Sir Raymond Streat Volume I, 1931-1939 
(Manchester University Press, Manchester; 1987), entry 15 March 1931, p. 42.
36. Dupree M. (ed.), entry 14 February 1933, p. 210.
37. Lowe P., Great Britain and the Origins o f  the Pacific War, Louis W. R , British Strategy in the Far 
East, and, The Road to Singapore’; Trotter A., Britain and East Asia-, Endicott S. L., Diplomacy and 
Enterprise-, Nish I. H., 'Japan in Britain's view of the International System, 1919-37', and Hosoya C.,
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economic factors played in Japanese foreign policy making and the role economic 
nationalism played as a destabilising factor in international political relations,38 
Anglo-Japanese economic conflict, derived from commercial competition, is treated in 
traditional diplomatic histories as only a side issue in Anglo-Japanese relations. While many 
works attach some importance to economic rivalry as a factor in Anglo-Japanese 
relations, almost the sole focus of attention is on Anglo-Japanese political and economic 
rivalry in China.39 Little attention is paid to Anglo-Japanese commercial friction in the wider 
world. Indeed Hosoya Chihiro in his essay, Britain and the United States in Japan’s view of 
the International System, 1919-41’, even suggests that British trade discrimination against 
Japan could have ameliorated Anglo-Japanese political friction, because in order to improve 
their trade prospects, some Japanese officials began to view political cooperation with 
Britain as an economic necessity.40 Where Anglo-Japanese economic rivalry outside of 
China does receive attention it is seen at best as a side issue that influenced British attitudes 
to Japan, but did not influence British policy. As Ian Nish boldly states, ’’These commercial 
factors were probably of minor importance when it came to policy-making; but they did 
affect the atmosphere in which the Japanese problem was debated in London”.45 However, 
the attitude of traditional diplomatic histories to Anglo-Japanese economic rivalry outside 
of China is best summed up by W. N. Medlicott’s preface to Documents on British Foreign 
Policy 1919-1939,
While these attitudes coloured the important trade negotiations..., the weightier
problems of Britain's overall political and military strategy in the whole Far Eastern
and the United States in Japan's view of the International System, 1919-41', in Nish I. H. (ed.), 
Anglo-Japanese Alienation;, 1919-1952: papers o f the Anglo-Japanese conference on the history of 
the Second World War (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge; 1982).
38. Carr W., Poland to Pearl Harbor: The Making o f the Second World War (Edward Arnold, London;
1985); Barnhart M., Japan Prepares fo r  Total War: The Search fo r  Economic Security, 1919-1941 
(Cornell University Press, London; 1987); Louis W. R., 'The Road to Singapore'; Iriye A., After 
Imperialism: the search for a new order in the Far East, 1921-1931 (Harvard University Press, 
Cambridge, Massachusetts; 1965), The Failure o f Military Expansionism', in Morley J. W. (ed.), 
Dilemmas o f Growth in Prewar Japan (Princeton University Press, Princeton; 1971), and The Failure 
of Economic Expansionism, 1918-1931', in Silberman B., and Harootunian H. D. (eds.), Japan in 
Crisis: essays on Taisho democracy (Princeton University Press, Princeton; 1974); Boyce R , World 
Depression and World War: some economic origins o f the Second World War’.
39. Trotter A., Britain and East Asia-, Lowe P., Great Britain and the Origins o f the Pacific War, Endicott
S. L., Diplomacy and Enterprise; Louis W. R , British Strategy in the Far East, and The Road to 
Singapore'; Nish I. H., 'Japan in Britain's view of the International System'; Hosoya C., Britain and the 
United States in Japan's view of the International System'; Bennett G., British Policy in the Far East'.
40. Hosoya C., Britain and the United States in Japan's view of the International System', pp. 22-23.
41. Nish I. H., 'Japan in Britain's view of the International System', p. 53.
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theatre were under discussion in London, both in the Foreign Office and in 
interdepartmental and Cabinet enquires.42
Thus, outside China, it would seem that Anglo-Japanese commercial rivalries coloured 
British attitudes to Japan but did not influence British foreign policy with Japan.
However, while 'traditional' diplomatic works stress the importance of political and 
military rivalries, and present commercial rivalry as an appendage to the central Anglo- 
Japanese political relationship, several recent works have challenged this approach. In 
Shimizu Hiroshi's study, Anglo-Japanese Trade Rivalry in the Middle East in the Inter-War 
Period, the author notes that competition between Lancashire's and Japan's cotton textiles in 
the Middle East has been virtually ignored by previous authors.43 However, other authors are 
more scathing of diplomatic histories. Ishii Osamu states, in his unpublished thesis, 'Cotton 
Textile Diplomacy: Japan, Great Britain, and the United States, 1930-1936', that since 
traditional and diplomatic histories are preoccupied with the more dramatic military and 
political events in East Asia, little attention has been paid to Anglo-Japanese textile rivalry.44 
Clemens Wurm in Business, Politics and International Relations: Steel, Cotton and 
International Cartels in British Politics, 1924-1939, is equally critical of diplomatic 
histories. Several histories of Anglo-Japanese relations are taken to task for underestimating 
the importance of commercial rivalry upon Anglo-Japanese relations.45 Ian Nish’s essay, 
'Japan in Britain's view of the International System, 1919-37', is admonished for merely 
regarding commercial antagonism as one factor influencing the 'atmosphere' in which 
London debated ’the Japanese problem', since this seriously underestimates ''the importance 
of economics in general, and of the cotton dispute in particular, for Anglo-Japanese 
relations”.46 Like Ishii, Wurm believes that diplomatic histories have ignored Anglo- 
Japanese commercial rivalry, since "diplomatic studies,..., tend to underestimate the 
significance of economic conflicts for the political rivalry between Britain and Japan".47
42. Documents on British Foreign Policy, 1919-1939. Second Series, Volume XX, p. v.
43. Shimizu H., Anglo-Japanese Trade Rivalry in the Middle East in the Inter-War Period (Ithica Press, 
London; 1986), pp. 24-25.
44. Ishii O., 'Cotton Textile Diplomacy: Japan, Great Britain, and the United States, 1930-1936', 
(Unpublished thesis, Rutgers University; 1977), p. 2.
45. The books which are singled out for criticism are, Christopher Thome’s The Limits o f Foreign Policy, 
Ann Trotter's Britain and East Asia, 1933-1937, and FuSCl Luw^^Bntish Strategy and the Far East 
1919-1939, Wurm C., p. 6.
46. Wurm C., p. 298.
47. Wurm C., p. 6. Wurm also notes that in Anglo-Japanese Alienation 1919-1952, in their concluding
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Thus these works claim that because traditional diplomatic histories avoid economic and 
commercial questions they have missed the importance of commercial friction upon Anglo- 
Japanese relations.
In contrast to traditional diplomatic histories, authors of works that focus upon 
Anglo-Japanese commercial rivalry insist, to varying degrees, that commercial rivalry was 
of central importance to Anglo-Japanese political relations. Shimizu portrays Anglo- 
Japanese commercial rivalry as a contributory factor to the severing of Anglo-Japanese 
relations in the Second World War.48 However, Ishii views Anglo-Japanese commercial 
rivalry as a more significant factor in Anglo-Japanese political relations. In his account, 
British and American trade discrimination against Japan’s textile exports was a major factor 
in the increased Japanese hostility towards the two Anglo-Saxon powers:
the Japanese, on their part, were extremely suspicious that the western powers were 
forming an economic bloc in order to exclude have not1'nations from the world 
market. Consequently, economic rivalries became a destabilising factor in relations 
between Japan and the western industrial powers.49
Following on from these arguments Wurm claims that Anglo-Japanese commercial rivalry 
was in fact central to Anglo-Japanese political relations. In particular he presents the failed 
Anglo-Japanese cotton cartel negotiations of 1934 as a critical turning point in Anglo- 
Japanese relations. On the one hand he cites Joseph Frankel’s dictum that the desire for 
economic cooperation was central to British foreign policy formulation, ’’the guiding 
principles of British foreign policy": "Co-operation instead of conflict, profitable trade and 
cheap diplomacy instead of costly and wasteful warfare, peace rather than war".50 Following 
this axiom the clear aim of the Foreign Office and Board of Trade was to keep the Anglo- 
Japanese cotton trade rivalry within the broad context of a stable Anglo-Japanese political 
relationship; the aim being to avoid political and economic confrontation with Japan, as a
remarks to the Anglo-Japanese conference on the history of the Second World War, both Hosoya 
Chihiro and Donald C. Watt, regretted the fact that the significance of economic conflicts in Anglo- 
Japanese political relations had been either overlooked or neglected, Hosoya C., 'Some Reflections of 
the Conference from the Japanese side', in Nish I. H. (ed.), pp. 281-282; Watt D. C., Work Completed 
and Work as yet unknown', in Nish I. H. (ed.), pp. 294-295, cited in Wurm C., footnote 19, p. 298.
48. Shimizu H., pp. 27-28.
49. Ishii O., pp. 1-2.
50. Frankel J., The intellectual framework of British foreign policy', in Kaiser K., and Morgan R. (eds.), 
Britain and West Germany: changing societies and the future offoreign policy (Oxford University 
Press, London; 1971), p. 92, cited in Wurm C., p. 286.
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means of ensuring Japan's adherence to naval limitation agreements, and strengthening the 
moderate and cosmopolitan forces within domestic Japanese politics.51 This aim was broken 
once pressure from British cotton textile manufacturers, unable to meet Japanese 
competition,52 led to demands for "vigorous measures against Japanese trade regardless of 
the consequences for British foreign policy and Britain's relations with Japan”.53 
Consequently, the collapse of the cotton trade talks and Britain’s imposition o f’offensive’54 
trade discrimination against Japanese cotton textiles within the British Crown Colonies 
marked a significant turning point in Anglo-Japanese relations.
Britain’s adoption of quotas was of symbolic importance in confirming the Japanese 
conviction, already strengthened by the Ottawa Agreements, that they were 
ultimately to be shut out of the markets of the [British] Empire, ffirra) Britain could 
then scarcely object if Japan pursued the expansion of its own economic bloc in the 
Far East and thus accelerated the disinte|gration of the international economy.55
Thus, from this viewpoint, the Anglo-Japanese economic relationship was critical to Anglo- 
Japanese foreign relations. Furthermore, the British pursuit of their own protectionist 
agenda was central to the Japanese pursuit of their own autarkic ambitions. British 
protectionism not only justified Japanese protectionism, but also justified Japanese 
economic aggression in East Asia.
Within the debate over the role and importance of Anglo-Japanese rivalry in Anglo- 
Japanese relations, this study hopes to contribute by giving a more wide ranging analysis of 
these commercial problems than has previously been offered. Anglo-Japanese trade rivalry 
of the 1930s between the declining Lancashire cotton industry and its emerging East Asia 
rival Japan has already been widely commented upon. However, while this issue has 
provoked widespread academic interest there have been limitations in the work so far 
produced.36 The main failing of these works is that while they have concentrated upon the
51. Wurm C., p. 286.
52. Rose M. B., International Competition and Strategic Response in the Textile Industries since 1870', in 
Rose M. B. (ed.), International Competition and Strategic Response in the Textile Industries since 
1870 (Frank Cass, London; 1990), p. 5.
53. Wurm C., p. 295.
54. Wurm C., p. 295.
55. WunnC.,p. 287.
56. Wurm C., Business, Politics and International relations; Ishii O., 'Cotton Textile Diplomacy';
Yamamoto M., 'Nichi.In (Ei) Mengyo Funso (1933-34nen)' [The Japan-India (British) cotton industry
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critical years of the early 1930s, and in particular the crisis years of 1933 to 1934 which saw 
the introduction of British colonial and Indian trade discrimination against Japanese cotton 
textiles, the subsequent development of this policy has been largely ignored.57 This failure 
results in a serious distortion of this trade question which only sees Lancashire-Japan trade 
rivaliy in terms o f’crisis', and British and Indian trade discrimination against Japan. In an 
attempt to circumvent this concentration upon the early 1930s, chapters 2 and 3, while 
looking at the introduction of British and Indian trade discrimination against Japan, also 
look at the subsequent development of these policies. If Lancashire-Japan trade rivalry was 
an important aspect of Anglo-Japanese relations, then it is imperative to study British and 
Indian trade discrimination against Japan beyond 1934, in order to assess the subsequent 
impact of continued British trade discrimination against Japan on Anglo-Japanese relations.
The second problem with previous studies of Anglo-Japanese trade rivalries is that 
they have focused solely upon the cotton textile question. Once again this distorts Anglo- 
Japanese trade problems. In the 1930s there were several other trade questions between 
Britain and Japan which had radically different outcomes to the cotton textile question. 
These other trade questions focused upon Japanese 'discrimination' against the Anglo-Dutch 
oil company, Royal Dutch Shell, in both Japan and Manchuria, and Anglo-Japanese rivalry 
in the shipping industry. The oil question, discussed in chapter 4, presents a totally different 
picture because it was a reversal of the cotton dispute as the British government sought to 
defend British oil interests from Japanese encroachment. The shipping question, discussed 
in chapter 5, also presents noticeable differences from the cotton dispute. On the one hand 
the British government was again confronted by another British industry demanding 
assistance from superior Japanese competition, however, such an analysis fails to do justice
dispute (1933-34)], in Hosoya C. (ed), TaiheiyoAjiaken no Kokusai Keizai Funsdshi, 1922-1945 [A 
history of international economic disputes in the Pacific-Asia region, 1922-1945] (Tokyo Daigaku 
Shuppankai, Tokyo; 1983); Nishikawa H., Indo Mengyd Hogo (1930nen) no Seiritsu to Nippon 
Mengyo' [The formation of Indian cotton industry protection (1930) and the Japanese cotton industry], 
Hokkai Gakuen Daigaku Keizai Ronshu (1984), and Nippon Teikoku Shugi to Mengyd [Japanese 
imperialism and the cotton industry] (Minerva Shobo, Kyoto; 1987); Sugiyama S., Nippon no 
Menseihin Yushutsu to Boeki Masatsu' [Japan’s cotton goods exports and trade friction’, in Brown I.
G., and Sugiyama S. (eds.), Senkanki Tonan Ajia no KeizaiMasatsu: Nippon no Nanshin to Ajia.OBei 
[South East Asian economic friction in the interwar period: Japan's southward advance and Asia,
Europe and America] (Dobunkan Shuppan Kabushiki Kaisha, Tokyo; 1990).
57. The only notable exception is Shimizu who gives a comprehensive survey of Lancashire-Japan rivalry in 
the Middle East up to the eve of the Pacific War. In the case of Dominion trade relations with Japan, 
Ishii does extend his analysis of Lancashire-Japan rivalry beyond 1934. However, he does not look at 
the continuation of British colonial trade discrimination and Indian trade discrimination against Japan 
beyond 1934.
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to the complexities of the situation.5* Unlike the cotton question British complaints against 
foreign subsidised shipping competition were not focused solely upon Japanese 
competition. Throughout the 1930s the British shipping industry sought government 
support to meet the competition of various subsidised international competitors. 
Consequently, British complaints about subsidised Japanese competition was part of an 
established concern within the shipping industry, and not a unique response to the 
emergence of Japanese competition.
However, in one respect this study does not differ from previous studies of Anglo- 
Japanese commercial problems. As with previous studies, it recognises the importance of 
structural economic relationships in Anglo-Japanese trade friction. The inability of British 
industries to compete with its Japanese counterparts led both the cotton and shipping 
industries to seek political support in order to meet Japanese competition. Chapter 1 in 
particular underscores the relationship between the Lancashire cotton industry’s competitive 
failure and its demands for trade protection against Japanese competition. A similar lack of 
competitiveness with its Japanese rivals underlay the British shipping industry’s demands 
for government assistance. Although Royal Dutch Shell did not seek alleviation from 
Japanese competition from the British government, economic factors lay at the root of its 
commercial problems in Japan and Manchuria, The structure of the international oil market 
and Royal Dutch Shell's pattern of historic development within the Japanese and 
Manchurian oil markets made its operations vulnerable to 'discriminatory1 Japanese import 
substitution policies, and resulted in its demands for government support in its confrontation 
with Japanese oil policy. However, while the structure of economic relationships imposed 
important limits upon political action, this study does not argue that underlying economic 
structures predetermined political responses. Policy is analysed as the result of the 
interaction between British government policy and industry with Japanese trade and foreign 
policy, and not as a function of economic factors.
The main source of material for this study has come from the Foreign Office.
58. In Kosmas Tsokhas’ article on the Eastern & Australian Shipping Line's fight against Japanese
competition, the author argues this was atypical o f several Anglo-Japanese shipping rivalries. However, 
this fails to mention that such shipping rivalries were not unique to Anglo-Japanese shipping relations, 
and that the British shipping industry had numerous other examples of fierce commercial competition 
were they sought government support against other international rivals, Tsokhas K., The Eastern & 
Australian Steamship company and the Shipping Dispute between Australia and Japan, 1936-39’, 
Business History (1992), p. 51; Burley K., British Shipping and Australia, 1920-1939 (Cambridge 
University Press, London; 1968), p. 259.
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Obviously, since British domestic business interests mainly dealt with the Board of Trade, 
the predominant use of Foreign Office material could present a potentially skewed picture of 
business and government relations. However, where trade policy and foreign policy 
overlapped the Board and other departments proved scrupulous in forwarding material to the 
Foreign Office. Therefore the Foreign Office files present an accurate record of the debate 
within the British government over the effects of trade policy on specific foreign policy 
issues. Thus between late 1932 and 1934 when both the Board and the India Office 
contemplated extensive trade discrimination against Japan, the Foreign Office received 
excellent information on the activities of the two departments. Even after the immediate 
crisis had passed the Foreign Office still received regular information from both 
departments on trade questions with Japan. Nor is there any evidence that the Foreign Office 
was concerned that, in regard to Anglo-Japanese trade friction, it was not receiving relevant 
information from any government department. Finally, although this study has made no 
attempt to utilise official Japanese sources it has still been possible to draw inferences as to 
the impact of commercial friction upon Anglo-Japanese relations. The extensive 
information collected by the Foreign Office on official and unofficial Japanese responses 
and attitudes to commercial questions, provides a reliable, if biased, contemporary 
assessment of political relations. While this may not provide the true picture of Japanese 
attitudes, as held in official sources, it does provide an accurate record of Japan’s public 
response to Anglo-Japanese commercial questions.
In regard to the statistics used in this study a variety of contemporary and modem 
sources have been used, although where possible preference has been given to contemporary 
sources. The main reason for this is that although contemporary sources may be less 
accurate, they represent the data on which government officials and industrialists debated 
trade and economic problems. In this study of political responses to economic and 
commercial questions contemporary perceptions of economic reality are critical to any 
understanding of how economic factors affected political decision making. Consequently, 
contemporary sources provide the more acctirate historic framework in which 
contemporaries studied political and economic problems.
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The Lancashire cotton industry and the rise of Japanese competition.
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Introduction.
In the 1930s the Lancashire cotton industry, one of the great staple export industries of the 
Victorian and Edwardian eras, faced a serious economic crisis. After years of neglect and 
complacency the cotton industry found itself ill-equipped to meet the new challenges of the 
contemporary market place. Confronted by a shrinking export market, due to increased 
protectionism and the rise of native cotton producers, Lancashire found that its industrial 
organisation, equipment, and labour practices were outdated, and unable to sustain its huge 
export volumesjprevious years. Furthermore, Lancashire's position as the preeminent 
exporter of cotton textiles was under challenge from a new and dynamic competitor. In the 
interwar years, aided by an efficient industrial organisation, state of the art technology, and a 
cheap labour supply, Osaka emerged from under Manchester's shadow to reap the rewards of 
patient development, and grab the premier spot as the world’s leading exporter of cotton 
textiles. Thus the collapse of world export markets during the Depression confronted the 
Lancashire cotton industry with an economic crisis that was unparalleled in recent memory. 
Moreover, the success of Japanese exports during the Depression underlined the fact that 
Lancashire's problems did not merely stem from the collapse of world trade and 
protectionism. If Japan's exports could increase while Lancashire’s exports declined, then it 
was impossible not to conclude that there was something seriously wrong with the 
Lancashire cotton industry.
To meet the new situation in the world cotton market, and to solve the economic 
crisis in Lancashire, the Lancashire cotton industry had two options. It could embark upon a 
process of industrial reform in order to re-establish its competitiveness in world markets, or 
it could look to support from the British government in order to gain tariff preferences in its 
export markets. In practice Lancashire chose both options. However, in the early 1930s it 
was apparent that Lancashire's economic problems were so deep seated that industrial 
reform would be a long term process, and therefore could not ameliorate the current 
economic crisis within the industry. Consequently, the former 'Vatican of free trade' turned 
to trade protection as the second means of securing some relief from the current economic 
crisis.
However, while domestic tariff protection and a measure of imperial preference, 
through the Ottawa agreements of 1932, were easy to secure, these measures alone were
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obviously inadequate for Lancashire. As a global export orientated industry faced with 
fierce competition from Japanese goods, Lancashire required more extensive trade 
protection within and beyond the British Empire. In order to secure wider trade protection 
Lancashire recognised that it would be vital to obtain British government support. However, 
while Lancashire remained clear on the need for government support it was divided over the 
means of achieving this support. On the one hand the moderates, especially within the 
Manchester Chamber of Commerce, sought to influence the government through the 
traditional method of private representations. In a complex political and economic situation 
the Chamber moderates believed that public pressure on the issue could be 
counterproductive, as the government might not be able to balance the conflicting needs of 
Lancashire within an unstable political and economic relationship with Japan. However, in 
contrast to this moderate approach an increasingly radical minority perceived that only a 
virulent public campaign would force the government into action: the intensity of Japanese 
competition demanded unorthodox measures to save the Lancashire cotton industry. Thus 
Japanese competition not only threatened Lancashire’s economic interests, it also provoked 
conflict within the industry over the best means to secure government support for trade 
discrimination against Japan.
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The Lancashire and Japanese cotton industries in the world market.
During the interwar period the positions of the Lancashire and Japanese cotton industries 
were dramatically reversed. At the turn of the century Lancashire had a vast well organised 
cotton industry that was the premier export industry of Britain. Over 50% of Lancashire's 
output was sold for export* and between 1900 and 1913 these exports earned an average of 
£95.4 million per annum, which equalled one quarter of all Britain's earnings from the 
export of manufactured goods.1 The contrast with the Japanese cotton industry could not 
have been more dramatic: for the same period Japanese exports of cotton piece-goods by 
volume amounted to under 3% of Lancashire's exports.2 Thus prior to World War One not 
only did the position of the Lancashire cotton industry as the leading exporter of cotton 
piece-goods appear unassailable, the Japanese cotton industry appeared to offer no serious 
threat to the Lancashire cotton industry.
Even after World War One and until the mid-1920s the challenge of the Japanese 
cotton industry to Lancashire's huge export volumes was unclear. Despite Lancashire's loss 
of cotton piece-good export volume during World War One only a limited amount of this 
loss was captured by Japanese exports. Between 1915 and 1919 Lancashire’s annual export 
of cotton piece-goods fell by some 2,000 million yards on their 1910-1913 average. 
However, these losses were not all Japan's gains, since Japanese exports increased by only 
500 million yards between 1915 and 1919. The substitution of Japan's for Lancashire's 
products seemed merely part of the temporary phenomenon of Lancashire's inability to 
supply large volumes for exports during World War One. Further, although there was a 
substantial decline in Lancashire's exports of cotton piece-goods between the immediate 
prewar and postwar periods, Lancashire still maintained large volumes of cotton piece-good 
exports throughout the 1920s. Throughout the 1920s Lancashire continued to export an 
average of 4,000 million yards per annum of cotton piece-goods. In contrast to the 
resurgence of the Lancashire cotton industry after World War One, the wartime growth of 
the Japanese cotton industry was immediately halted in the post-War period, and it was not 
until 1924 that Japanese exports of cotton piece-goods exceeded their 1918 peak.3
1. Robson R., The Cotton Industry in Britain (Macmillan, London; 1957), p. 334; Mitchell B. R., Abstract
o f British Historical Statistics (Cambridge University Press; 1962), pp. 60, 188, 284, 305.
2. Seki K., The Cotton Industry o f Japan (Japan Society for the Promotion of Science, Tokyo; 1956), pp.
306-307.
3. See table 1.1.
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Even the post-1925 revival of Japanese cotton piece-good exports in the world 
market was not a critical threat to the Lancashire cotton industry. So long as the world 
market for cotton piece-goods remained large - world per capita consumption of cotton 
textiles was considerably larger than any other type of textile4 - there remained sufficient 
demand for large volumes of both Lancashire’s and Japan’s exports of cotton piece-goods. 
Further, while the world market remained largely unprotected, any losses suffered by 
Lancashire due to Japanese competition could be offset by Lancashire against other foreign 
competitors. However, during the 1920s these favourable market conditions for Lancashire 
were slowly eroded: and were finally swept aside during the Depression.
The changes in the world market for cotton piece-goods resulted from the combined 
effects of the decline in per capita consumption of cotton piece goods in Lancashire’s main 
East Asian export markets; the growth of native cotton industries behind increasingly 
’protective’ tariff barriers; and the rise of substitute products for cotton piece-goods. 
Although global per capita consumption of cotton textiles continued to increase during the 
1920s,3 due to the impoverishment of native consumers there was a noticeable decline in per 
capita consumption of cotton textiles in Lancashire’s main prewar export markets. For 
example one British report in 1923 stated that the current Indian per capita consumption of 
cotton piece-goods was less than half prewar levels.6 Thus the impoverishment of 
consumers in the large East Asian markets acted as a drag upon demand for Lancashire's 
cotton piece-good exports. The second factor, namely the successful competition from 
native cotton industries, also substantially reduced the size of the cotton piece-good export 
market. Between 1910 and 1913 31% of the world production of cotton piece-goods was 
exported. However, successful import substitution reduced the total of world production of 
cotton piece-goods for exports to 23% between 1926 and 1928 with a further fall to only 18% 
between 1936 and 1938/ For example production of Indian milled cotton piece-goods 
nearly doubled between 1919 and 1929.® Moreover, the increases in Indian production
4. See table 1.2.
5. See table 1.2.
6. Manchester Chamber o f Commerce, Monthly Record, October 1923, p. 339; Daniels G. W. and Jewkes
J., 'The Comparative Position of the Lancashire Cotton Industry and Trade', Transactions o f the 
Manchester Statistical Society, (1926-27), pp. 72-8.
7. See table 1.3.
8. See table 3.4.
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occurred against a background of successive increases in 1917, 1921, and 1925 of tariff 
protection for Indian producers.9 However, the real benefits for the Indian cotton industry 
appeared after the dramatic post-1930 increases in the level of protection for the Indian 
cotton industry. The result was that the share of Indian consumption of mill produced cotton 
piece-goods actually produced in India increased from 54.8% in 1929 to 73.6% in 1930.10 In 
a similar fashion the growth of Chinese production of cotton textiles behind increased tariff 
barriers and anti-foreign boycotts, squeezed imports out of this important mass market." 
Even in the 1920s the increase of native production of cotton piece-goods behind increasing 
tariff barriers had a substantial impact upon Lancashire's export volumes of cotton piece- 
goods. For example, if the 1910-1913 ratio of world exports to world production of cotton 
piece-goods had been maintained between 1926-1928 - and the Lancashire cotton industry 
had maintained their same historic share o f the world export trade - then between 1926 and 
1928 the Lancashire cotton industry would have exported an additional 1.4 million linear 
yards per annum, a 35% increase on Lancashire’s historic level of total exports for the 
period.12 Naturally, given the lower level in the ratio between world cotton piece-good 
exports and world cotton piece-good production this trend in the decline of Lancashire's lost' 
exports is even more exaggerated for the 1930s. Unfortunately, for Lancashire, the third 
factor, the emergence of substitute materials for cotton piece-goods, also came into play 
during the interwar period. Of these materials the most important new product in the 
interwar period was the development of rayon goods. In 1920 the world production of rayon 
amounted to only 0.4% of the world consumption of raw cotton. However, this ratio 
continued to rise throughout the 1920s and 1930s -to 1.6% in 1925,4.27% in 1930,8.16% in 
1935 - and reached 16.44% by 1939.13 Thus although the substitution of rayon goods for 
cotton piece-goods was minimal before 1930, after the Depression the growth of production 
in rayon goods significantly retarded the revival of the world cotton industry.
9. See table 3.6.
10. See table 3.4.
11. Kraus R. A., Cotton and Cotton Goods in China, 1918-1936 (Garland Publishing, New York; 1980), 
especially chapter 5; Chao K., The Development o f Cotton Textile Production in China (Harvard 
University Press, Cambridge Massachusetts; 1977), especially chapter 8; International Labour Office, 
World Textile Industry: Economic and Social Problems (International Labour Office, Geneva; 19370, 
tables 11 A, and 1 IB, p. 125, and, pp. 109, 124-125; Pearse A. S., The Cotton Industry o f Japan and 
China (The International Federation of Master Cotton Spinners' and Manufacturers' Associations, 
Manchester; 1929), pp. 175-222.
12. See table 1.3.
13. Robson R., p. 354.
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Although the 1920s were a time of stagnation for the Lancashire cotton industry the 
critical period of decline came with the onset of the Depression. The sudden and dramatic 
collapse in the world export market for cotton piece-goods marked the end of the era when 
the world cotton piece-good market had been characterized by high export volumes. 
Between 1929 and 1930 world exports of cotton piece-goods fell by 25.5%, nearly 2,000 
million square yards, from which there was only a limited recovery in the 1930s.14 Between 
1936 and 1938 world exports of cotton piece-good remained some 2,000 million yards, over 
20% below the 1926-1928 average.15 For the Lancashire cotton industry which had been 
geared towards this high volume export market the effect was catastrophic: between 1929 
and 1931 exports of cotton piece-goods fell by 52%, and throughout the 1930s export 
volumes remained significantly below even the 1920s levels.16 In contrast the Japanese 
cotton industry quickly recovered from its 21% contraction in cotton piece-good exports 
between 1929 and 1931, and aided by the 40% devaluation of the yen to sterling after 
December 193117 Japanese exports continued to increase until 1935. However, the ‘closed’ 
world market for cotton piece-goods in the 1930s was considerably different from the 'open' 
world market which Lancashire had dominated in its heyday. The Japanese peak export 
figure for cotton piece-goods in 1935 was nearly 40% less than Lancashire's 1913 export 
peak for cotton piece-goods.18
14. See table 1.4.
15. See table 1.3.
16. See table 1.1.
17. The Financial and Economic Journal o f  Japan (The Government Printing Office, Tokyo; various years); 
Lockwood W. W., The Economic Development o f Japan (Princeton University Press, New Jersey; 
1968), pp. 62-5; Robertson A. J., 'Lancashire and the Rise o f Japan, 1910-1937, in Rose M. B. (ed.), 
International Competition and Strategic Response in the Textile Industries since 1870 (Frank Cass, 
London; 1991), p. 97.
18. See table 1.1.
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The Lancashire and Japanese cotton industries in the interwar period.
While the world market for cotton piece-goods was undergoing dramatic changes during the 
interwar period, so too did the positions of the leading exporting nations. The relative 
decline of Lancashire was all too self-evident, when in 1933 the Japanese cotton industry 
overtook Lancashire as the leading exporter of cotton piece-goods.19 The success of the 
Japanese cotton industry was due to a number of comparative advantages that rendered 
Lancashire impotent in the face of Japanese competition. These advantages stemmed from 
the Japanese dominance of the most demand-inelastic coarse cotton piece-goods market, the 
superiority in organisation and equipment of their cotton industry, and the low wage 
structure of the Japanese economy. In contrast the Lancashire cotton industry was burdened 
by poor organisation, outdated equipment and a comparatively high wage structure and thus 
was unable to compete with the Japanese in the contracted 1930s world market.
Japanese dominance of the mass market for cheap coarse cotton piece-goods aimed 
at native consumers was a major factor in its postwar commercial success. During World 
War One Japan had emerged as the premier exporter of cheap cotton textiles to native 
markets in East Asia, and despite the re-emergence of Lancashire's competition it was a 
position Japanese exporters retained throughout the 1920s. This meant that the Japanese 
cotton industry - unlike Lancashire - obtained the cost advantages of using cheaper short 
staple Indian raw cotton for the production of coarse cotton piece-goods for the East Asian 
markets.20 However, in the 1920s Japanese dominance of this market was less of a threat to 
Lancashire since Lancashire manufacturers switched exports to the still voluminous fine 
cotton piece-good export markets in which Lancashire enjoyed a distinct competitive 
advantage.2’ Further, a comparative wage deflation between the Lancashire and Japanese
19. See table 1.4.
20. Ellinger B. and Ellinger H., 'Japanese Competition in the Cotton Trade', Journal o f  the Royal Statistical 
Society (1930), pp. 201-206. However, this cost advantage evaporated once the Japanese produced 
finer cotton piece-goods and like the Lancashire cotton industry was forced to use the more expensive 
long staple raw cotton, Hubbard G. E., Eastern Industrialization and its Effect on the West (Oxford 
University Press, London; 1935), pp. 85-7; Pearse A. S., p. 45.
21. In the early 1920s the Egyptian spinning section which produced finer yams performed much better than 
the depressed American spinning section that spun coarser yams, Jones O., 'Lancashire Cotton 
Industry’, Harvard Business Review (1924), p. 448. Further, in an attempt to overcome the problems in 
Lancashire's exports of coarse cotton textiles in the mid-1920s the American section started to spin 
much finer yams, Robson R., p. 68. Kirby M. W., The Lancashire cotton industry in the Inter-War 
years: a study in organizational change’, Business History (1974), p. 147; Daniels G. W. and Jewkes J, 
The Comparative Position of the Lancashire Cotton Industry and Trade', pp. 64-72; Daniels G. W. and 
Jewkes J., 'The Post-War Depression in the Lancashire Cotton Industry1, Journal o f the Royal
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cotton industries allowed the Lancashire cotton industry to curb increases in production 
costs and enabled Lancashire’s exports to remain competitive with Japanese exports on the 
margins of the cheap mass produced cotton piece-good market.22 Unfortunately for 
Lancashire the Depression had a dramatic impact upon consumer demand that worked to the 
advantage of the Japanese cotton industry and the disadvantage of the Lancashire cotton 
industry. Impoverished consumers switched to the low priced coarse mass produced 
product of the Japanese cotton industry and abandoned the quality but more expensive 
product of the Lancashire cotton industry. Thus the fine volume markets which Lancashire 
dominated in the 1920s contracted, while the success of the Japanese cotton manufacturers 
became self-reinforcing, as high output volumes maintained both high levels of productivity 
and profitability.
The success of the Japanese export ’strategy* was based upon the rapid advance of the 
Japanese cotton industry to relatively high levels of international industrial efficiency. For 
international competitors the most significant development in the interwar period was the 
emergence of the Japanese cotton textile producers as technically efficient organisations. 
This movement was part of the long-term development of the Japanese cotton textile 
industry, whose first notable success was the virtual elimination of imported cotton piece- 
goods into Japan by the mid-1890s.23 This development continued throughout the early 
twentieth century, as Japanese firms improved their capital stock through successive 
investments in advanced foreign and increasingly domestic production technology. The net 
result was a sustained increase in the efficiency of the Japanese cotton industry. For 
example, in the spinning sector of the Japanese cotton industry between 1914 and 1929, 
output of yam per workday increased by 10%, with a further increase of 60% between 1919 
and 1936.24 In the weaving sector the gains in labour productivity were as dramatic: between 
1914 and 1930 output per workday more than doubled, with a further increase of 20% 
between 1930 and 1936.25 The dramatic improvement in labour productivity after 1929-30
Statistical Society, (1928), pp. 162-165, 166.
22. See tables 1.5, 1.6, and 1.7.
23. Takamura N., Nippon Bosekishi Josetsu [History of the Cotton Industry in Japan] (Haniwa Shobo, 
Tokyo; 1971), Volume /., p. 30; Otsuka K , Ranis G., and Saxonhouse G., Comparative Technology 
Choice in Development: the Indian & Japanese Cotton Textile Industries (Mjacmillan, Basingstoke; 
1988), p. 27; Minami R., The Economic Development o f Japan: a quantitative study (Macmillan, 
Basingstoke; 1991), pp. 234-235.
24. See table 1.8.
25. See table 1.9.
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was the result of new Japanese investment in plant and machinery and the introduction of 
new labour practices. Following the 1927 financial crisis and the 1923 Factory Law 
Amendment that banned night work for female operatives from 1929 the Japanese cotton 
manufacturers vigorously rationalised their organisations to compensate for the effects of 
the financial crisis and the loss of night shift production.28 The lack of readily available 
comparable evidence between the Lancashire and Japanese cotton industries renders 
difficult exact comparisons of industrial efficiency between the Lancashire and Japanese 
cotton industries. However, it appears clear from contemporary evidence that between the 
late 1920s and early 1930s, the Japanese cotton industry obtained parity or even a lead over 
Lancashire, in terms of labour productivity, and that the Japanese cotton industry could 
manufacture cotton piece-goods at considerably less cost than their Lancashire rivals.27 
Further, it can be clearly demonstrated that improvements in labour productivity in the 
Japanese cotton industry in the interwar period far outstripped any improvements in the 
Lancashire cotton industry. According to a 1945 estimate, output per man-hour in the 
Japanese cotton industry increased nearly 2.5 times between 1923 and 1933, while for the 
Lancashire cotton industry even over the much longer period o f1907 to 1937 output per-man 
hour increased by only 1.4 times.2*
The technical and organisational progress of the Japanese cotton industry was 
further enhanced by the relative technical stagnation of the Lancashire cotton industry.29 For
26. Inahara K. (ed.), The Japan Year Book, 1933 (The Kenkyusha Press, Tokyo; 1934), pp. 550-551; Allen 
G. C., 'Recent Changes in the Organisation of the Japanese Cotton Industry', Transactions o f the 
Manchester Statistical Society, (1936-37), pp. 15-19, 21; Robertson A. J., pp. 96-7; Hubbard G. E., pp. 
119-120; Ellinger B. and H., p. 187; Pearse A. S., pp. 103-111; Patrick H. T., The Economic Muddle 
of the 1920s-’, in Morley J. W., Dilemmas o f Growth in Prewar Japan (Princeton University Press, 
Princeton; 1971), pp. 211-266; Hunter J., Textile factories, tuberculosis and the quality of life in 
industrializing Japan', in Hunter J. (ed.), Japanese Working Women (Routledge, London; 1993), p. 86.
27. See tables 1.10, and 1.11.
28. See table 1.12.
29. The causes and nature of the decline of the Lancashire cotton industry have been widely debated, see 
Kirby M. W., 'The Lancashire Cotton Industry in the Inter-War Years: a Study in Organisational 
Change’, Business History Review (1974); Sandberg L., Lancashire in Decline: A Study in 
Entrepreneurship, Technology and International Trade (Ohio State University Press, Columbus; 1974); 
Lazonick W., 'Competition, Specialisation, and Industrial Decline', Journal o f Economic History 
(1981), Pactor Costs and the Diffusion of Ring Spinning Prior to World War I', Quarterly Journal o f  
Economics (1981), Production Relations. Labor Productivity, and Choice of Technique: British and US 
Cotton Spinning' Journal o f Economic History (1981), Industrial Organisation and Technological 
change: The Decline of the British Cotton Industry1, Business History Review (1983); Sandberg L., 
'American Rings and English Mules: The Role of Economic Rationality', Quarterly Journal o f  
Economics (1983); Lazonick W., and Mass W., The Performance o f the British Cotton Industry, 1870- 
1910', Research in Economic History (1984); Sandberg L., The Remembrance o f Things Past: Rings 
and Mules Revisited', Quarterly Journal o f Economics (1984); Lazonick W., Rings and Mules in
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even the prewar boom conditions of Lancashire’s export trade concealed emergent 
competitive problems. Unlike the Japanese cotton industry - and some other foreign rivals - 
Lancashire was slow to abandon outdated machinery and practices. The most notable failure 
on Lancashire’s part, was its slow abandonment of mule spinning and powered loom for the 
more efficient ring spinning and automatic loom. As early as the mid-1880s over 50% of the 
Japan’s cotton spindles were ring spindles, while in contrast even in 1913 only 19% of 
Lancashire’s cotton spindles were rings.30 The contrasting trends of Lancashire’s and Japan’s 
adoption of ring spinning technology continued into the interwar period, as the Japanese 
spinning industry fully converted to ring spinning, by 1936 only 27% of Lancashire's 
installed spindles were rings.31 In a similar fashion the Japanese were far quicker than 
Lancashire in adopting automatic loom technology. While there was little use of the 
automatic loom in either the Lancashire or Japanese cotton industry prior to the First World 
War,32 the interwar period witnessed the quicker adoption of this technology by the Japanese 
cotton industry. By 1934 12.5% of all Japanese looms were automatic while in contrast only 
2.4% of installed looms in Lancashire were automatics.33 Japan’s technological lead over 
Lancashire was reinforced, during the interwar period, by the development of their own 
advanced cotton spinning and weaving equipment, which included the world famous 
Toyoda automatic loom.34 Furthermore, Lancashire’s growing technological backwardness
Britain: Reply1, Quarterly Journal o f Economics (1984); Saxonhouse G., and Wright G., ’New Evidence 
on the Stubborn English Mule and the Cotton Industry, 1878-1920’, Economic History Review (1984); 
Lazonick W., 'The Cotton Industry', in Elbaum B., and Lazonick W. (eds.), The Decline o f the British 
Economy (Clarendon Press, Oxford; 1987); Lazonick W., 'Stubborn Mules: Some Comments', 
Economic History Review (1987); Saxonhouse G., and Wright G., 'Stubborn Mules and Vertical 
Integration: The Disappearing Constraint?', Economic History Review (1987); Clark G., Why Isn't the 
Whole World Developed?: Lessons from the Cotton Mills', Journal o f Economic History (1987); 
Wilkins M., 'Efficiency and Management: A Comment on Gregory Clark's "Why Isn't the Whole World 
Developed?"’, Journal o f Economic History (1987); Clark G., 'Can Management Develop the World?: 
Reply to Wilkins', Journal o f Economic History (1988); Lazonick W. and Mass W., The British Cotton 
Industry and International Competitive Advantage: The State of the Debates', in Rose M. (ed.), 
International Competition and Strategic Response in the Textile Industries since 1870 (Frank Cass, 
London; 1991).
30. Otsuka K., Ranis G., and Saxonhouse G., figures 2.1, and 2.2, pp. 9, 10; Lazonick W., The Cotton 
Industry', p. 19, and, Industrial Organisation and Technological Change’, p. 198; Singleton J., 
Lancashire on the Scrapheap: the cotton industry, 1945-1970 (Oxford University Press, Oxford; 1991), 
p. 7.
31. Otsuka K., Ranis G., and Saxonhouse G., figures 2.1, and 2.2, pp. 9, 10; International Labour Office,
The World Textile Industry, tables 3 and 4, pp. 49, 51.
32. Lazonick W., The Cotton Industry*, p. 19; Otsuka K., Ranis G., and Saxonhouse G., table 5.20, p. 143.
33. International Labour Office, The World Textile Industry, tables 5 and 6, pp. 54, 55; Otsuka K., Ranis G.,
and Saxonhouse G., table 5.20, p. 143.
34. Pearse A. S., pp. 58, 61, 64, 74, 78, 79-83; Otsuka K., Ranis G., and Saxonhouse G., tables 5.19, and
5.20, pp. 142, 143; MinamiR, pp. 234-235.
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was compounded by its outdated labour practices. In 1929 the Japanese industry average 
was to have one operative in control of 5.5 power looms - and in some cases 24 to even 50 
automatic looms - whereas in Lancashire the standard industry practice was to have one 
operative in control of only 4 power looms.35 A major problem for the Lancashire cotton 
manufacturers was the resistance of the labour force to new labour practices. The 
Lancashire cotton operatives proved hostile to new labour practices that would cause 
increased industry wide unemployment and would result in insufficient remuneration for 
increased individual workloads.36
The technical superiority of the Japanese cotton industry was compounded by the 
superior organisation of the Japanese cotton firms over their Lancashire rivals that enabled 
the Japanese firms to benefit from internal economies of scale. The principal exporting 
firms of the Japanese cotton industry - the 9 major combines of the Japan Cotton Spinners 
Association - were dominated by large vertically organised industrial combines that 
controlled most of the processes of textile manufacture from the purchase of raw cotton to 
the export and selling of the finished product.37 In contrast despite belated attempts at 
industrial amalgamation the Lancashire cotton industry maintained its traditional 
preference for a vertically and horizontally fragmented industry. One commentator 
observed that the Lancashire average of 67,000 operational spindles per factory was well 
below the 90,000-100,100 spindles per factoiy considered optimum for efficient economic 
operation.38 The industrial divisions within the Lancashire cotton industry were acute; 
spinners complained that they were forced to sell unprofitably to weavers, while in their turn 
weavers complained that finishers', shippers', and merchants’ margins were too high, 
rendering Lancashire's goods uncompetitive in overseas markets.39 However, these
35. Holyrod F., preface in Pearse A. S., p. 5; Pearse A. S., pp. 65, 75, 79.
36. Kirby M. W., pp. 153-154; Hilton J. and Mallon J. (eds.), Are Trade Unions Obstructive? (Victor 
Gollancz, London; 1935), p. 78; Turner H. A., Trade Union Growth, Structure and Policy: A 
Comparative Study o f  the Cotton Unions (George Allen & Unwin, London; 1962), pp. 258-263, 328; 
Grey J. H., The Weavers Wage: Earnings and Collective Bargaining in the Lancashire Cotton Weaving 
Industry (Manchester University Press, Manchester; 1937), pp. 11-6; University of Manchester, 
Industrial Survey o f the Lancashire Area (HMSO, London; 1932), pp. 137-145.
37. Pearse A , pp. 18, 25-9; Utley F., Lancashire and the Far East (George Allen & Unwin, London; 1931), 
pp. 83-5; Allen G. C., ’Recent Changes in the Organisation o f the Japanese Cotton Industry*, p. 18; 
Robertson A  J., p. 90; Ellinger B. and H., pp. 206-207.
38. Wisselink J., The Present condition of the English Cotton Industry', Harvard Business Review, (1930),
pp. 160-161.
39. Ellinger B. andH., pp. 196-201, 207-218; Ryan in Ellinger, Lancashire's Declining Trade with China';
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industrial divisions probably were not the cause of Lancashire’s uncompetitiveness and 
merely reflected the inability of any large ’western1 cotton industry to compete with Japanese 
cotton piece-goods in the open market. In the face of Japanese competition the unprofitable 
and debt-ridden Lancashire cotton industry could not afford the risk of re-equipping their 
clapped out machinery and outdated organisational structure. Instead the Lancashire cotton 
industry adopted a piecemeal approach to reform and concentrated upon the finer cotton 
piece-goods markets to which Lancashire’s machinery and production methods were more 
suited and in which Japanese competition was less intense.40 Further, despite the fact that the 
American cotton industry has been portrayed as a model of organisational efficiency,41 the 
American cotton industry proved as unsuccessful as Lancashire in combating Japanese 
competition. In the 1930s not only was the American cotton industry unsuccessful in export 
markets, it also needed extensive tariff and quota protection from Japanese competition in 
the domestic market.42 Thus, given the American example, there was no guarantee that 
organisational reform would have enabled Lancashire to compete with Japan in the cotton
Manchester Guardian Commercial, 12 January 1928, p. 41; Wisselink J., pp. 152-168; Robertson A., p.
98.
40. In 1936 The Economist - usually highly critical of the Lancashire cotton industry - recognised that since 
the Lancashire cotton industry aimed at specialised export markets Japanese competition no longer 
posed a threat, The Economist, 28 November 1936, p. 402. Kirby M. W., pp. 151-154; Ryan J., 
'Machinery Replacement in the Cotton Trade', The Economic Journal (1930), pp. 568-580; MacGregor 
D. H., 'Problems of Rationalization', The Economic Journal (1930), pp. 351-368; Learned E. P., 
Mergers in the Cotton Industry’, Harvard Business Review, (1930), pp. 501-512; The Economist, 8 
October 1932, p. 635; Clay H., Lord Norman (Macmillan, London; 1957), p. 337; Vitokovich B., The 
UK Cotton Industry, 1937-54', Journal o f Industrial Economics (1954-5), pp. 247-265; Sutherland A., 
The Diffusion o f and Innovation in Cotton Spinning', Journal o f Industrial Economics (1959), p. 32: 
Sandberg L., ’American Rings and English Mules: The Role of Economic Rationality’, pp. 25-43;
Jewkes J., 'Localization in the Cotton Industry', Economic History (1950), p. 76; Jewkes J., "Factors in 
Industrial Integration', Quarterly Journal o f Economics (1930), p. 36; Daniels G. W. and Jewkes J.,
The Post-War Depression in the Lancashire Cotton Industry', pp. 167-182.
41. Lazonick W., 'The Cotton Industry', p. 20.
42. In 1931 F. Utley predicted that because of the slump in domestic demand in America there would be a 
big expansion o f American cotton piece-good exports. However, not only did this expansion fail to 
materialise in the 1930s, American cotton piece-good exports declined almost as sharply as 
Lancashire's, Utley F., p. 63; See table 1:3. Further, despite the already extensive tariff protection of the 
American cotton piece-good market - in 1922 a 40% duty was established for cotton piece-goods which 
was increased to 46.33% under the 1930 Smoot-Hawley tariff legislation - American cotton producers 
still needed to force the Japanese industry into a 'Gentleman's Agreement to limit Japanese exports of 
cotton piece-goods to America. The 'Gentleman's Agreement' concluded in 1937 limited Japanese 
exports to 155 million yards in 1937, and subsequently 100 million yards in 1938, Taussig F. W., The 
Tariff History o f the United States, (Capricorn Books, New York; 1964), 30, 193, 243, 263, 266, 355, 
371, 387, 432, 466, 513; Lake D. A., Power, Protection, and Free Trade: International Sources o f  
U.S. Commercial Strategy, 1887-1939 (Cornell University Press, London; 1988), p. 195; Clive (Tokyo) 
to the Foreign Office, 16 February 1937, F0371/21032,F1563/231/23.
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piece-good export market.43
Despite the improvements in productivity of the Japanese cotton textile industry, 
superior production and organizational methods did not guarantee a sustained competitive 
advantage over other advanced international rivals. However, in the interwar period the low 
wage structure of the Japanese cotton industry provided the Japanese cotton industry with a 
unique advantage over all their other advanced international competitors. For example, 
Amo S. Pearse, who conducted an investigation into the cotton industries of Asia in 1929 on 
behalf of the Manchester based International Federation of Master Cotton Spinners' and 
Manufacturers’ Associations, ranked lower labour costs as Japan's second major advantage 
over Lancashire.44 In cotton textile production wage costs were a significant factor. In 1930 
Bernard Ellinger estimated wage costs at between 16.5-21.1% of the total cost of selling 
Lancashire cotton piece-goods in the Indian market and recommended the immediate 
revision of the prevailing wage lists.45 For the interwar period, estimates of relative wage 
costs are subject to controversy but it is evident that the Japanese cotton industry enjoyed a 
substantial competitive advantage over the Lancashire cotton industry. Measured in 
sterling, between 1920 and 1936, nominal Japanese wages per worker in the cotton industry 
averaged some 60.4% less than those for workers in the Lancashire cotton industry.46 Thus 
the Japanese cotton manufacturers enjoyed a significant wage cost advantage over the 
Lancashire manufacturers and this coupled with comparable levels of industrial efficiency 
converted into a significant competitive advantage. Indeed Ellinger’s later study, 'Japanese 
competition with Lancashire: Comparisons of Cotton T rade Costs', observed that wage costs 
were the main competitive advantage Japanese manufacturers enjoyed over their Lancashire 
rivals.47 Therefore even if the Lancashire cotton industry adopted Japanese production and
43. Indeed contemporary British commentators were impressed not by the organisation of the American 
cotton industry but by the flexibility o f American labour practices, Pearse A. S., 'Efforts to Rationalize 
the Cotton Industry o f the U.S.A.', Transactions o f the Manchester Statistical Society (1928-29), pp. 
81-92.
44. Pearse A, S., The Cotton Industry o f Japan and China, p. 142.
45. Ellinger B. and Ellinger H., p. 188; Committee o f Industry and Trade, Further Factors in Industrial and 
Commercial Efficiency, Part II (HMSO, London; 1928), tables A, B, 17, and 18, pp. 77, 79,145, 146. 
In recent years it has been argued that Lancashire's problems with regard to Japanese competition 
stemmed primarily from the superior organisation o f the Japanese cotton industry, and not as a result of 
the comparative wage cost advantage o f the Japanese cotton industry, Mass W. and Lazonick W., The 
British cotton industry and international competitive advantage: the state of the debates', pp. 33-9.
46. See tables 1.5, and 1.13.
47. Ellinger B., 'Japanese competition with Lancashire. Comparisons of Cotton Trade Costs', Manchester 
Commercial Guardian, 1 July 1933, p. 3; tables 1.14, 1.15, and 1.16.
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organizational methods, due to lower wage costs, the Japanese cotton industry would still 
maintain a significant competitive advantage over Lancashire.
The only threat to the competitive wage advantage of the Japanese cotton industry 
was if the comparative wage inflation of the 1920s eroded these advantages. However, this 
wage inflation proved insufficient to undermine the wage cost advantage of the Japanese 
cotton industry. Indeed after the start of the Depression Japanese cotton manufacturers 
instituted substantial wage cuts that improved their comparative advantage in wage costs 
over the Lancashire cotton industry. From 1929 compared to the Lancashire cotton industry 
the fall in wages in the Japanese cotton industry was dramatic. Between 1929 and 1935 the 
nominal yen wage rate in the Japanese weaving sector of the cotton industry fell by nearly 
40%, compared with a mere 8% fall in nominal sterling wages in the Lancashire cotton 
industry.48 Further, these wage reductions in the Japanese cotton industry were compounded 
by the increased labour productivity derived from the reduction of labour input for similar 
work. Therefore not only did the Japanese manufacturers reduce wage rates, they also 
increased work loads at the same time.
The downward wage movement of the Japanese cotton operatives is usually cited as 
evidence of either the greater flexibility and economic realism of the Japanese work-force, 
or the lack of flexibility and realism of the Lancashire work-force in refusing to accept wage 
cuts or a rationalisation of work practices at a time of acute economic distress.49 A further 
suggestion is that the institutional rigidity of the unionized Lancashire work-force 
compounded the inflexibility of the Lancashire cotton operatives. However, such accounts 
fail to explain how the relatively non-unionized labour force in the Japanese cotton industry 
gained a fourfold increase in nominal wages between 1914 and the mid-1920s, while over 
the same period nominal wages in the unionized labour force in the Lancashire cotton 
industry merely doubled.50 Further, the dramatic decline of wages in the Japanese cotton 
industry after 1929 were not only a result of the lack of labour militancy and unionization but 
also resulted from the totally different labour supply situations that pertained in the Japanese
48. See tables, 1.5, 1.6, and 1.7.
49. Lazonick W., The Cotton Industry*, pp. 20-21, 24-30.
50. For example see, Lazonick W., The cotton industry', pp. 24-30. There was some labour militancy within 
the Japanese cotton textile industry, however, the institutional framework in which it operated 
prevented the successful application o f labour force pressure in industrial disputes, see Gordon A.,
Labor and Imperial Democracy in Prewar Japan (University of California Press, California; 1991), pp. 
225-226, 243-245.
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and Lancashire cotton industries. In the quest for competitive wage advantage and work­
place labour flexibility the Japanese cotton manufacturers benefited considerably from a 
national labour supply market that was remarkably elastic in the supply of inexpensive 
labour. In particular in the 1930s the Japanese cotton industrialists benefited from the influx 
of inexpensive female labour from the depressed agrarian sector.31 Furthermore, two 
characteristics of the Japanese cotton textile industry enabled the cotton industrialists to 
utilise this labour source even more effectively. Firstly, the Japanese cotton textile industry 
paid higher wages than other large scale industrial employers of female labour in Japan; and 
secondly since 1914 the real income gains of the Japanese cotton textile workers had been so 
substantial that even short term reductions in real income still left intact significant long 
term gains in real income.
In contrast with the Lancashire cotton industry, Japanese cotton operatives - 
particularly female workers - remained at the upper end of wage scales for the various 
Japanese textile industries. In Japan, wages for female operatives in the cotton spinning 
industry between 1926 and 1935 were some 20-25% higher than wages for female operatives 
in the silk-reeling industry. In contrast in the Lancashire cotton industry, for the same period, 
wages for operatives lagged some 10-13% behind wages for operatives in the woollen & 
worsted and nylon & rayon industries.52 Therefore, even after the post-1928 wage reduction 
in the Japanese cotton industry, in contrast with the Japanese silk-reeling industry, wages in 
the cotton industry remained relatively high thus ensuring a ready supply of female labour. 
However, in Lancashire the wage rate for cotton operatives had become relatively so low 
that the current wage rates offered - not to mention the even lower wage rates necessary for 
effective competition with the Japanese cotton industry - were no longer attractive for 
potential employees. The second advantage that the Japanese cotton manufacturers held 
over Lancashire was the totally different postwar patterns of real income that obtained in the 
Lancashire and Japanese cotton industries. These different patterns of real income account 
for the inability of the Lancashire manufacturers to substantially reduce wage levels even at
51. Ouchi T., 'Agricultural depression and Japanese villages', The Developing Economies (1967), pp. 597- 
627; Patrick H. T., pp. 216-220; Waswo A , ’Origins of tenant unrest’, in Silbermann B. S., and 
Harootunian H. D. (eds.), Japan in Crisis: essays on Taisho democracy (Princeton University Press, 
Princeton; 1974); Minami R , pp. 286-287; Hunter J., Women in the Japanese Economy of the 1920s 
and 1930s', in Nish I. H. (ed.), Interwar Japan (International Studies; 1989), pp. 30-31; Watanabe H., 
The Agricultural Problem in Japan - Historical Perspectives -’, in Hunter J. (ed.), Aspects o f the 
Relationship Between Agriculture and Industrialisation in Japan (International Studies; 1986), pp. 22-
23.
52. See table 1.17.
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a time of high unemployment. In Japan, the period 1914 to 1929 not only witnessed a 
considerable inflation of nominal wages but also a significant rise in the real incomes of the 
Japanese cotton operatives. From 1914 to 1929 the real income of Japanese cotton 
operatives increased by some 70-90%. Moreover, these gains in real income were so 
substantial that despite the post-1928 wage reduction and fall in real income, Japanese 
cotton operatives still preserved a 40% real income gain over the prewar period.53 In contrast 
the post-1914 progress of real income gains for operatives in the Lancashire cotton industry 
was extremely limited, and after the postwar economic boom real incomes stagnated. Thus 
by 1928 Lancashire cotton operatives had witnessed only a 10-11% gain over 1914 levels of 
real income, while the post-1930 wage reductions in the Lancashire cotton industry saw 
operatives real income in 1930 fall below the 1914 level of real income.54 Therefore in the 
1920s Lancashire operatives were foregoing gains in real income in order to keep the 
Lancashire cotton industry competitive in international markets. However, by 1930 real 
income levels were so low in the Lancashire cotton industry that it proved difficult for the 
Lancashire manufacturers to reduce wages and real income any further without risking 
substantial labour unrest.
Thus in the Lancashire cotton industry the stagnation of real income in the 1920s 
proved a serious obstacle for the Lancashire textile owners when they subsequently pressed 
for further wage cuts. In the post-1929 depression period Lancashire operatives strenuously 
resisted further cuts in both real income or labour practices that would increase work 
burdens without any compensatory financial reward.55 Further, although unionization is 
blamed for the militancy of labour in Lancashire it appears that the labour unions merely 
benefited or acted as vehicles of labour discontent. Operatives in Lancashire demanded a 
level of real income consistent with workers in other industries in Britain. In theory the 
Lancashire cotton industry might have escaped relatively high labour costs by moving to a 
populous but non-industrial part of the UK, as the North American cotton industry had 
transferred to the Southern states of America to escape such problems. However, such 
geographical variations in the labour supply market were scarcely available within the 
limited confines of the UK. Thus it was impossible for a large organized British industry to
53. See tables 1.6, and 1.7.
54. See particularly table 1.7 but also table 1.6 for data which suggests that at its 1929 trough real income 
for Lancashire cotton operatives remained above the 1914 level.
55. Lazonick W., 'The Cotton Industry', p. 29.
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obtain the ’developing world’ wage rates of the Japanese cotton industry, its chief 
international competitor, in order to compete with Japanese cotton piece-goods in the 
international market.
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Lancashire and the rise of Japanese competition.
In the early twentieth century the Lancashire cotton industry like cotton industries elsewhere 
did not view Japanese competition as a serious potential threat. To the Victorian and 
Edwardian cotton men of Lancashire it was inconceivable that Japan could pose a threat to 
Lancashire's pre-eminence in the export of cotton piece-goods. The Osaka industry was 
patronised as 'the Manchester of Japan' but it was not thought that Lancashire could learn 
anything from the fledgling Japanese cotton industry.56 However, even before 1914 some 
Japanese were explicit over the long-term ambition of the Japanese cotton industry to 
overhaul Lancashire as the leading cotton industry in the world. In the early 1890s the 
Japanese Vice-Minister for Agriculture and Commerce, Kaneko Kentaro, warned a 
Lancashire audience that because of the development of the Japanese cotton industry, 
"Lancashire is doomed". Indeed before World War One some opinion in Lancashire 
recognised the threat of the Japanese cotton industry. In June 1911 The Manchester 
Guardian published a warning that the Japanese cotton industry was "the most important 
and the most dangerous competitor to Lancashire".57 However, given the prewar export 
boom of the Lancashire cotton industry such warnings were ignored in Lancashire.
The prewar utopia of the Lancashire cotton industry was interrupted by the outbreak 
of the Great War: Lancashire's exports of cotton piece-goods declined while Japanese 
exports to East Asia soared. Suddenly, the Lancashire cotton industry appreciated the 
commercial threat of its political ally Japan, particularly in the China market.58 While 
Lancashire was wrapped-up in the British war economy Japanese exports of cotton piece- 
goods surged, and Lancashire opinion became more critical of its erstwhile ally. In February 
1918, R. B. Stoker, the President of the Manchester Chamber of Commerce, complained of 
the penetration Japanese cotton goods had made in the world market as a result of its low 
wage economy:
German competition... I do not fear so much as that of certain other nations [Japan], 
are we going to allow free access at homejfti our dominions to the products of those
56. The Manchester Guardian, 14 July 1891, cited in Checkland O., Britain’s Encounter with Meiji Japan, 
1868-1912 (Macmillan, Basingstoke; 1989), p. 31.
57. Robertson A. J., pp. 90-1; Checkland O., p. 31.
58. The Manchester Chamber o f Commerce, Monthly Record, March 1915, p. 70; Redford A , Manchester 
Merchants and Foreign Trade, 1850-1939, Volume II (Manchester University Press, Manchester;
1956), p. 200.
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nations who command labour at a tithe of the wages prevalent in our country] ...The 
inevitable result of such a policy would be beggary for producers, for workers, and 
for merchants.59
Such comments over the threat of Japanese competition remained a regular feature of The 
Manchester Chamber o f Commerce Monthly Record - the recognised voice of the 
Manchester Chamber of Commerce and the Lancashire cotton industry - until 1920.60 
However, the dramatic decrease in Japanese cotton-piece good exports during the postwar 
slump temporarily allayed Lancashire's fears of Japanese competition. The slump affected 
both the Lancashire and Japanese cotton industries: however, between 1918 and 1921 
Lancashire’s exports of cotton piece-goods fell a mere 18% while Japanese exports - 
hindered by an exchange rate nearly 1/3 above its prewar parity - fell by 31%.61 Moreover, 
Japanese exports were not only handicapped by the relative appreciation of the yen, 
competitiveness was also retarded by a significant decline in labour productivity in the 
immediate postwar years.62 Optimism returned in Lancashire with the belief that foreign 
competition posed no obvious threat, as the Japanese, American, German and Italian cotton 
industries were fully occupied in supplying domestic demand and had little spare capacity to 
supply overseas markets or compete with Lancashire's goods.63 Further, Japanese 
competition in overseas markets had so abated that in Lancashire it was widely believed 
Japan had squandered the opportunity of the Great War. In February 1920, E. F. Stockton, 
the President of the Manchester Chamber of Commerce, boldly condemned the Japanese, 
"for instead of doing themselves credit they have done their trade enormous injury... they 
have so often failed to deliver the standard quality for which they have contracted”, and he 
concluded that in contrast to the wartime view of the advantage of cheap labour, "The 
sweated condition of labour in Japan is not a real advantage to them”.64
59. The Manchester Chamber o f Commerce, Monthly Record, March 1918, p. 75; Redford A , p. 200.
60. On 26 November 1920, Sir J. S. Rhodes MP, who had recently returned from East Asia, warned the 
Manchester Chamber of commerce o f Japanese mercantile ambition, The Manchester Chamber o f  
Commerce, Monthly Record, December 1920, p. 365.
61. The Financial and Economic Journal o f Japan.
62. See tables 1.8, and 1.9.
63. The Manchester Chamber o f Commerce, Monthly Record, December 1921, p. 427.
64. The Manchester Chamber o f Commerce, Monthly Record, February 1920, p. 57. In a similar vein, T.
M. Ainscough, the Senior British Trade Commissioner for India, told the Manchester Chamber of 
Commerce that the Japanese exports to India had reached their high-water mark and were now in 
decline, since Indian importers had no desire to deal with the Japanese as their contractual arrangements 
were subject to constant mistakes, The Manchester Chamber o f Commerce, Monthly Record, July 
1920, p. 216. A view shared by the US Tariff Board o f 1921, cited in Hubbard G. E., p. 53.
48
The Lancashire cotton industry and the rise o f Japanese competition
Despite the hopes of the early 1920s the cotton export trade scarcely recovered. 
Lancashire businessmen recognised the relative stagnation of their export trade. However, 
they preferred to blame political and economic instability in the global market, increasing 
protectionism, domestic industrial unrest, and high levels of taxation for the problems of 
their export trade. In 1923, W. Clare-Lees, the President of the Manchester Chamber of 
Commerce, denounced the unsettling effects of the French occupation of the Ruhr and stated 
that the key to the recovery of Lancashire was the return of Europe to trade stability. For 
Lancashire political and economic instability in Europe resulted in lower demand for Asian 
produce and the consequent decline in Asia's income was reflected in lower consumption of 
Lancashire cotton piece-goods.65 Lees| aside, however, Lancashire was far more disturbed 
by the effects of political unrest, protectionism, and currency instability in East Asia, and the 
consequent decline of Lancashire’s exports to its two most important prewar markets China 
and India.66 To many in Lancashire the effect of this political unrest in disrupting market 
stability in East Asia - associated with the development of native cotton industries - had been 
responsible for the majority of Lancashire's lost' postwar trade. One estimate suggested that 
in 1925 Lancashire's exports to all world markets exceeded their 1913 level, the only 
exceptions were the markets of the Far East. These markets had contracted by some 2,400 
million linear yards since 1913, which represented the exact difference between 
Lancashire's prewar and postwar export performances.67 Lancashire was greatly concerned 
that the development of 'protected' native industries would result in substantial import 
substitution of cotton piece-goods and lead to a complementary decline in their export trade. 
Lancashire was particularly vexed that within the huge Indian market a 'protected' Indian 
cotton industry was being established. At the height of the nineteenth century Britain 
imposed an 'open' tariff regime in India: in 1895, the Lancashire cotton industry insisted that 
when a 3% revenue tariff - lower than the 5% revenue tariff on all other manufactured goods 
- was established, there would be no tariff protection for the native cotton industry, and 
consequently a complementary 3% excise duty was established on all native mill produced 
cotton piece-goods. However, in 1917 and 1921 the import duty on cotton piece-goods was
65. The Manchester Chamber o f Commerce, Monthly Record, July 1923, and February 1924, pp. 60-1.
66. Manchester Guardian Commercial, Annual Review, 26 January 1928, p. 36 (India), p. 43 (China); The 
Manchester Chamber o f Commerce, Monthly Record, February 1923, p. 61, July 1923, p. 244, and 
December 1924, pp. 443-445; Robertson A  J., p. 92.
67. Armitage G. W., Probing the Wound in Lancashire's Trade', Manchester Guardian Commercial, 12 
January 1928, p. 33; Robertson A. J., p. 91.
49
The Lancashire cotton industry and the rise o f Japanese competition
increased first to 7.5% and then 11% without any increase on the excise duty. Thus the 
native cotton industry obtained some measure of tariff protection. The 1921 tariff increase 
was roundly condemned in Lancashire as not only dislocating world trade but also as being a 
direct threat to the future of the Lancashire cotton industry. Sir E. F. Stockton, the President 
of the Manchester Chamber of Commerce, stated "Those who promoted the duties may 
think it is easy to transform the grain producing areas of the Bombay Presidency into cotton 
mills, but who can transform the cotton mills of Blackburn into wheat fields".68 Thus 
Lancashire feared that not only was their export trade threatened by stagnant world demand 
but also by increasing protectionism in their former overseas markets.
Further, Lancashire complained that its exports had been undermined by the postwar 
disequilibrium between the demand and supply of cotton piece-goods. Despite the postwar 
fall in per capita consumption of cotton piece-goods in East Asia, Lancashire argued that 
demand for cotton piece-goods remained high and only the high postwar price of raw cotton 
prevented Lancashire from supplying cotton piece-goods to native consumers at affordable 
prices. In 1924 Dr. A  Ree, the President of the Manchester Chamber of Commerce, 
lamented that "there is plenty of evidence that the world wants Lancashire goods, but it is not 
willing just yet to pay the prices which, owing to the high cost of raw material, Lancashire 
has now to charge".69 Thus, according to contemporaries, the export problems of the 
Lancashire cotton industry were not due to industrial inefficiency but resulted from the high 
price of American raw cotton. As late as 1928 Lancashire still believed that the recovery of 
Lancashire’s export trade depended solely upon a recovery in world demand for cotton piece- 
goods. In 1928, Sir Ernest Thompson, the President of the Manchester Chamber of 
Commerce, stated that once world demand picked-up Lancashire's export trade would be 
secure for the next 6-7 years at a level of c.6,000 million yards per annum.70 This was a 
staggering assertion since Lancashire had not remotely achieved these prewar export levels 
since 1914.
The final concern of the Lancashire cotton industry for its poor postwar export 
performance was the effects of industrial strife and high domestic taxation on the Lancashire 
cotton industry. In particular both the 1921 coal strike and 1926 General Strike were
68. The Manchester Chamber o f Commerce, Monthly Record, July 1921, p. 253; See chapter 3.
69. The Manchester Chamber o f Commerce, Monthly Record, July 1924, p. 253.
70. The Manchester Chamber o f Commerce, Monthly Record, July 1928, pp. 210-211.
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considered to have severely disrupted Lancashire’s export trade. The 1926 General Strike 
witnessed a sharp decline in Lancashire’s exports of cotton piece-goods, as Lancashire 
cotton mills were reduced to a 24 hour week.71 Further, Lancashire regularly and roundly 
condemned the effects of high taxation - though surprisingly not the return to gold - upon 
industrial output. In July 1922 W. Clare-Lees, the President of the Manchester Chamber of 
Commerce, demanded reductions in taxation otherwise the government risked the future of 
Britain’s trade and enterprise.72
Despite the resurgence of Japanese competition in the mid-1920s the Lancashire 
cotton industry remained ambivalent to the threat Japanese competition posed. Lancashire 
was conscious of both the strengths and weaknesses of the Japanese cotton industry, and that 
the Japanese cotton industry still had a substantial headway to make-up if it was to overtake 
Lancashire. After the immediate postwar threat of Japanese competition had receded the 
further developments of the Japanese cotton industry were largely ignored. A proposed 
mission ofFebruary 1919 to examine wartime development in the East Asian cotton markets 
and cotton industries, despite previous assertions in Lancashire over the importance of the 
mission, was quietly abandoned in 1921 because of disagreements between the T reasury and 
the Manchester Chamber of Commerce on the scale, cost and respective funding of the 
mission.73 Lancashire opinion remained obdurate in its contention that Japanese low wages 
and labour organisation gave them no advantage in production costs over Lancashire.74 In 
1925 C. W. Macara, the President of the Federation of Master Cotton Spinners' and 
Manufacturers' Associations' between 1894 and 1916 and a senior figure in the Lancashire 
cotton industry, stated that current and future developments in the Japanese cotton industry 
posed no threat to Lancashire.75 Attitudes to Japanese competition changed slowly. The first 
real recognition of the re-emergence of Japanese competition was in January 1924 when the 
Manchester Chamber of Commerce and the Department of Overseas Trade established a 
joint committee to study the effects of Japanese competition in the British East African
71. The Manchester Chamber o f Commerce, Monthly Record, July 1926, pp. 198, 205.
72. The Manchester Chamber o f Commerce, Monthly Record, July 1922, p. 229.
73. The Manchester Chamber o f Commerce, Monthly Record, July 1919, pp. 186-187, August 1919, p.
237, October 1919, pp. 267-267, 278, September 1920, p. 263, February 1921, p. 63.
74. Grey J. H., 'Memorandum in Relative Costs o f Manufacture in Lancashire and Japanese Weaving Sheds’, 
in Ellinger B., 'Lancashire's Declining Trade with China', Transactions o f the Manchester Statistical 
Society (1928), pp. 45-9.
75. Macara C. W., Trade Stability and how to Obtain it (Sheratt and Hughes, Manchester; 1925), p. 37; 
Lazonick W., 'The Cotton Industry', p. 31.
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colonies.76 However, the following year the East Africa Committee reported that there was 
no serious cause for concern over the future threat of Japanese competition in the region.77 In 
1925 and 1926 there were further alarms over the competitiveness of cheap Japanese cotton 
goods in India and East Africa. However, leading Lancashire authorities discounted the 
Japanese threat which was attributed to temporary Japanese advantages resulting from the 
fall in the value of the yen and the exceptionally low price of the Indian raw cotton crop in the 
preceding year. In practice, it was claimed, Japanese goods competed more with Indian 
production than Lancashire's cotton piece-good exports.78 Still these worries soon passed as 
Lancashire's exports recovered after the General Strike whilst the Japanese cotton industry 
was mired in the effects of the 1927 financial crisis, the abolition of night shifts for women 
and child operatives, and the effects of the appreciation of the yen.79 The Manchester 
Chamber o f Commerce Monthly Record observed, in February 1927 that the appreciation of 
the yen had led to a slump in Japanese exports, and in response to this trade crisis the Japan 
Cotton Spinners’ Association had imposed a 15% production curtailment rate upon all its 
members.80 Thus towards the end of the 1920s it appeared that the Japanese cotton industry 
faced greater economic problems than its Lancashire rival.
However, such complacency over the threat of Japanese competition was not 
confined to the Lancashire cotton industry. In 1925 Sir Edward Crowe, the British 
Commercial Counsellor in Tokyo between 1918 and 1925,81 told the Manchester Chamber 
of Commerce that the Japanese were suffering as much as Lancashire from Chinese 
competition in China, domestic wage inflation, and high capital costs for land and 
machinery. To counter these effects, particularly Chinese competition, the Japanese were 
now building factories in China, a move he recommended to his Lancashire audience.82 The
76. The Manchester Chamber o f Commerce, Monthly Record, January 1924, pp. 12-3.
77. The Manchester Chamber o f Commerce, Monthly Record, January 1925, pp. xxii-xxiii; Robertson A. J., 
p. 92.
78. The Manchester Chamber o f Commerce, Monthly Record, June 1925, pp. 174-177, July 1925, p. 202, 
April 1926, p. 114, July 1926, p. 205, and February 1927, p. 42; Robertson A. J., pp. 92-3.
79. Allen G. C.,A Short Economic History o f Modem Japan (Macmillan, Basingstoke; 1988), pp. 105-108; 
Lockwood W. W., pp. 56-9.
80. The Manchester Chamber o f Commerce, Monthly Record, February 1927, May 1927, The Presidential 
address of W. E. Thompson, February 1928; Robertson A. J., pp. 93-4.
81. Wurm C., Business, Politics and International Relations: Steel, Cotton and International Cartels in 
British Politics, 1924-1939 (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge; 1993), p. 240.
82. The Manchester Chamber o f Commerce, Monthly Record, July 1925, p. 219; Robertson A. J., pp. 92-3.
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British Consul in Osaka, W. B. Cunningham, confirmed Lancashire's opinion that the 1927 
financial crisis had led to severe problems in the Japanese cotton industry and that these 
problems had continued into 1928. He reported that the Japan Cotton Spinners Association 
had both increased the level and duration of curtailment amongst its members and that there 
was widespread anxiety in the Japanese cotton industry about its own future.83 However, 
such negative assessments of the Japanese cotton industry were not confined to British 
commentators. In 1929 using data from the 1921 and 1924 American Tariff Inquiries the 
American commentator, D. J. Orchard, put forward the increasingly anachronistic view that 
cheaper labour costs were of no advantage to the Japanese cotton industry. Compared to 
American mills, the author claimed, Japanese mills required 3 times as much labour for the 
same output, so that even the high wage American cotton industry could produce 
significantly cheaper yam per pound that the low wage Japanese cotton industry.84
However, from the mid-1920s many observers appreciated that the Japanese cotton 
industry posed an enormous threat to Lancashire.85 Initially, commentators in Lancashire 
challenged the prevailing assumption that the poor export performance of Lancashire 
resulted solely from disturbed postwar economic conditions.86 However, the first public 
affirmation of the economic efficiency of the Japanese cotton industry came with the 
publication in 1927 of the Department of Overseas Trade's Report on the Cotton Spinning 
and Weaving Industry in Japan, 1925-26 by the British Consul in Osaka, W. B. 
Cunningham.87 The publication of this report broke through much of the contemporary
83. The Manchester Chamber o f Commerce, Monthly Record, April 1928, pp. 112-113.
84. The 1921 US Tariff Commission was particularly critical o f  the immaturity and inefficiency o f the 
Japanese cotton industry, US Tariff Commission, The Japanese Cotton Industry and Trade, (1921), 
cited in Hubbard G. E., p. 53. Orchard D. J., 'An Analysis of Japan's Cheap Labor', Political Science 
Quarterly (1929); Orchard J. E., Japan's Economic Position: The Progress o f Industrialisation 
(McGraw-Hill, London; 1930), chapters XIX and XX.
85. One o f the first categorical warnings over the potential threat o f Japanese competition delivered to the 
Manchester Chamber of Commerce came from Sir Maneckji Dadabhoy, a member of the Indian council 
of State, in June 1925. However, the Chamber chose to ignore this warning since they considered it 
irrelevant to the Lancashire cotton industry, The Manchester Chamber o f Commerce, Monthly Record, 
July 1925, pp. 174-177.
86. Daniels G. W. and Jewkes J., The Comparative Position of the Lancashire Cotton Industry and Trade*.
87. Cunningham W. B., Report on the Cotton Spinning and Weaving Industry in Japan, 1925-26 (HMSO, 
London; 1927). The British government could not be accused of neglecting British trade with Japan or 
economic and industrial developments in Japan. Moreover, the British government maintained an 
extensive consular network throughout Japan, unlike the French government which as one commentator 
lamented did not even maintain a permanent representative in Osaka, 'the seventh largest city in the 
world', Levy R , French Interests and Policies in the Far East (Institute o f Pacific Relations, New 
York; 1941), footnote 2, p. 41. The role of the Department of Overseas Trade and the Foreign Office
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complacency in Lancashire over the inefficiency of the Japanese cotton industry. Bernard 
Ellinger relied extensively on Cunningham’s description of the organisation of the Japanese 
cotton industry to support his contention on the need of the Lancashire cotton industry to 
rationalise its organisation.88 Further praise for the Japanese cotton industry came from Amo 
Pearse, the respected authority on the cotton industry, and Freda Utley after their separate 
and independent studies of the Japanese cotton industry. Moreover, despite initial resistance 
in the case of Utley’s research, both Utley and Pearse clearly demonstrated that the Japanese 
cotton industry could manufacture cotton piece-goods at considerably lower cost than 
Lancashire.89 In the preface to Pearse's work on the Japanese and Chinese cotton industries, 
F. Holroyd, the President of the Federation of Master Cotton Spinners' and Manufactures’ 
Associations, recognised both the efficiency of the Japanese cotton industry and the fact that 
Japan could manufacture cotton piece-goods at considerably less cost than Lancashire.90 
The start of the Depression marked the beginning of Lancashire’s acceptance of the 
superiority of Japanese production costs and the recognition of the threat of Japanese 
competition to Lancashire’s export trade. In August 1930 the Manchester Chamber of 
Commerce established a special committee to monitor and disseminate information on 
Japanese competition.91 Moreover, in tacit recognition of the superiority of the Japanese 
cotton industry the British Consul in Osaka made representations to the Japanese over the 
possibility of a Lancashire-Japan cotton cartel.92
was critical in the 1920s in providing accurate information on the development o f the Japanese cotton 
industry, Pearse paid tribute to the consular reports from Japan in informing him of developments in the 
Japanese cotton industry, Pearse A. S., The Cotton Industry o f Japan and China, pp. 11, 16.
88. Ellinger B., 'Lancashire's Declining Trade with China'; Utley F., p. 51.
89. F. Utley was vigorously attacked for stating that Japan's cheap labour did give them an advantage in 
production costs over Lancashire, Manchester Commercial Guardian, 24 May - 9 May 1929. Further, 
prior to the publication of Cunningham's, Pearse's, and Utley's work opponents of the view that 
Japanese had no advantage over Lancashire had little concrete evidence to support their case. In 1928 
Sir K. D. Stewart, a leading Lancashire cotton merchant, was highly suspicious of J. H. Grey's figures of 
Japanese cotton piece-goods manufacturing costs. Stewart believed Grey's figures o f Japanese 
manufacturing costs were inflated but could only cite his personal impression, from visits to Japanese 
cotton mills in Osaka, as evidence of the efficiency of Japanese cotton mills in criticism of Grey's 
figures, in Ellinger, Lancashire's Declining Trade with China', pp. vii-viii; Robertson A., pp. 95-6.
90. Holroyd F., in Pearse A. S., The Cotton Industry o f Japan and China, pp. 3-7, also see tables 1.14, and
1.15 where Holroyd calculates the difference in wage costs between Lancashire's and Japan's 
manufacturing costs o f cotton piece-goods.
91. The Manchester Chamber o f Commerce, Monthly Record, August 1930, pp. 242-243; Robertson A  J., 
p. 97.
92. Ishii O., 'Cotton Textile Diplomacy: Japan, Great Britain and the United States' (Unpublished thesis, 
Rutgers University; 1977), pp. 65-66; See chapter 2.
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The final misconception of Lancashire with regard to the Japanese cotton industry 
was the constantly repeated claim that Japanese competition was unfair because it received 
state subsidies. Throughout the 1920s various experts had lectured Lancashire that this 
belief was incorrect. As early as November 1920, Sir J. S. Randles MP, who had recently 
returned from East Asia, firmly told his Lancashire audience that the Japanese government 
did not subsidise the Japanese cotton industry.93 This view was repeated by Sir E. Crowe in 
1925, who, although generally dismissive of the threat of Japanese competition, was at pains 
to discredit the view that the Japanese did not run a commercial cotton industry. He stated 
that it was incorrect to see the industry as state subsidised, or even that its special shipping 
rates with the Indian Shipping Conference as another form of subsidy.94 Moreover, as 
Lancashire’s fears of Japanese competition increased towards the end of the 1920s and were 
used as a justification for trade discrimination against Japanese cotton exports, numerous 
commentators still insisted that any suggestion that there was any form of subsidy to the 
Japanese cotton industry was incorrect. Pearse stated that in his investigations into the 
Japanese cotton industry he found no evidence that the Japanese engaged in unfair 
competition.95 The final salvo in this campaign came in 1933 when George Sansom, the 
British Commercial Counsellor in Japan and regarded as the greatest foreign expert of 
Japan, listed Japanese state subsidies to industry which conspicuously did not include the 
cotton industry. He pointed out that the scale of state subsidy to Japanese industry as a whole 
was relatively small, from his experience not only did the Japanese cotton industry run a 
commercial operation, and he could find no evidence of secret state subsidies to the 
Japanese cotton industry.96 The authority of Sansom’s report was sufficient to kill off all but 
the most diehard believers in an organised conspiracy between the Japanese government and 
cotton industry to destroy the Lancashire cotton industry. For example in May 1933 The 
Manchester Chamber o f Commerce Monthly Record accepted Sansom's report as an 
’authoritative report’ on the Japanese cotton industry and the question of subsidies to the 
Japanese cotton industry.97
93. The Manchester Chamber o f Commerce, Monthly Record, December 1920, p. 365.
94. The Manchester Chamber o f Commerce, Monthly Record, July 1925, p. 219.
95. Pearse A. S., The Cotton Industry o f Japan and China, pp. 12-3.
96. Sansom to the Foreign Office, 8 February 1933, F0371/17156,F1517/1517/23.
97. The Manchester Chamber o f Commerce, Monthly Record, May 1933, pp. 143-145.
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Economic crisis in the Lancashire cotton industry and economic decline.
The Depression had a dramatic impact on the Lancashire cotton industry, as the slump in 
Lancashire cotton exports threatened the very fabric of this export oriented industry. Not 
only did exports fall in successive years from 1927 to 1931, the brief recovery in export 
volumes in 1931-32 proved illusory when export volumes again declined in 1932.9S All 
aspects of the Lancashire cotton industry entered a crisis period. Gross profits in the 
Lancashire cotton industry fell from £9.9 million in 1928 to a mere £1.1 million in 1930." In 
1931 the average dividend for 225 cotton firms capitalised at £32,528,405 was a paltry 1.3%, 
and of these companies 194 paid no dividend.100 Employment contracted sharply as the 
insured work-force of over 500,000 shrank by some 46,000 between 1930 and 1932.101 
Further, as employment contracted unemployment rose throughout the cotton textile 
industry; between 1929 and 1931 the percentage of insured workers increased by more than 
threefold, a greater proportionate rise than any other of the major ’declining’ industries in 
Britain.102 Finally, the need to reform wage structures and work-practices to meet foreign 
competition spilled over into a series of industrial disputes between December 1930 and the 
end of 1932.103 In the summer of 1932 some 200,000 cotton spinners were on strike over 
attempts by the cotton manufacturers to cut wages and increase workloads. An event that 
aroused widespread interest in the Japanese cotton industry.104 Thus in the early 1930s the
98. See table 1.1.
99. See table 1.18.
100. The Economist, 2 January 1932, p. 14.
101. See table 1.18.
102. See table 1.19.
103. Lazonick W., The Cotton Industry', pp. 29-30; Fowler A. and Fowler L., The History o f the Nelson 
Weavers Association (Burnley, Nelson, Rossendale and District Textile Workers Union, Nelson; 1984), 
Chapters 5 and 6.
104. The Economist, 27 August 1932, p. 386; Dai Nippon Boseki Rengokai Geppo, January 1932, Rikoku 
Mengyokai Roshi Kakushitsu Mondai' [The labour-capital discord problem in the British cotton 
industry], February 1932, Rikoku Mengyo Gaikyd' [The general condition of the British cotton 
industry], March 1932, Rikoku Banrei Shokka no Dfimeihigyo' [The weavers strike in British Banrei], 
July 1932, Rankashia Orinunobu Roshi Funs 6 ni Kansuru Kudan' [An example o f the labour capital 
dispute in the Lancashire weaving section], August 1932, Rikoku Orimonobu Sohigyd Keikaku no Jijo' 
[The circumstances of the British weaving sections general strike plan], September 1932, 'Eikoku 
Bosekigyo no Sogi Keii' [Details o f the troubles in the British spinning industry], October 1932, 
Rankashiya Menorinunobu Sogi Tenmetsu' [The circumstances of the troubles in the Lancashire cotton 
weaving section], November 1932, Rankashiya Bosekigyo Sogi Tenmetsu' [The circumstances of the 
troubles in the Lancashire spinning industry], December 1932, Rankashiya Bosekibu Sogi Tenmetsu 
Zokuho' [Further news o f the circumstances o f the troubles in the Lancashire spinning section], January 
1933, Rankashiya Bosekibu Sogi Tenmetsu Shuho' [The final news of the circumstances of the troubles 
in the Lancashire spinning industry],
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situation of the Lancashire cotton industry appeared desperate.
Lancashire's response to the economic crisis was to reform and rationalise the cotton 
industry and to seek political support from the British government in protecting Lancashire’s 
overseas markets. However, the prime aim of industrial reform in the Lancashire cotton 
industry was not to make Lancashire competitive with Japan, but to manage financial and 
industrial dislocation in the Lancashire cotton industry. In the 1920s efforts at reform in the 
Lancashire cotton industry to improve the overall efficiency of the industry proved 
ineffective and in reality were simply aimed at maintaining price levels. The Federation of 
Master Cotton Spinners’ and Manufacturers’ Associations, an important business 
association of Lancashire cotton manufacturers,105 own short-work scheme broke up in 1926 
due to price undercutting by nonmembers. A similar Federation of Master Cotton Spinners’ 
Association plan fora production quota and price support scheme for the American spinning 
section failed after 10 months in 1927 again due to price cutting by nonmembers. 
Subsequent plans for a minimum yam price-list recognised by Parliament and to allow the 
expansion of efficient firms and the contraction of inefficient firms were abandoned due to 
opposition from within the cotton industry.106
The next attempt at industrial reform came from the Bank of England as a result of its 
worries over the over exposure of the Lancashire regional banks to the debt ridden cotton 
industry.107 The 1929 plan was to amalgamate some 200 firms with 20 million spindles in the 
American spinning section. By 1930 the newly formed Lancashire Cotton Corporation had 
coerced 96 firms with 9.3 million spindles (almost 20% of the Lancashire total) into its fold. 
However, this apparent success could scarcely hide the underlying failure of the Lancashire 
Cotton Corporation. In the first place Lancashire cotton manufacturers, many of whom had 
only joined after being threatened with termination of credit by their bankers, proved 
unwilling to cooperate with the management of the Lancashire Cotton Corporation.108
105. Wurm C., p. 198; Goodwin J. H., The Politics o f the Manchester Chamber of Commerce, 1921 to 
1951* (Unpublished thesis, University o f Manchester; 1982), pp. 189, 194-195.
106. Lazonick W., The Cotton Industry', pp. 31-2.
107. Bamberg J. H., The Rationalization of the British Cotton Industry in the Interwar Years', Textile 
History (1988), p. 88.
108. Lazonick W., The Cotton Industry', p. 33; Kirby M. W., pp. 149-151; Hannah L., The Rise o f the 
Corporate Economy: The British Experience (Methuen, London; 1976), p. 84.
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Secondly, the Lancashire bankers used the Lancashire Cotton Corporation as a vehicle to 
off-load their most indebted cotton firms from their books.109 Thirdly, the Lancashire Cotton 
Corporation was not turned into an integrated spinning and weaving combine, since it was 
only a spinning firm and in any case lacked effective central control over its member firms. 
In 1932 the chief executives resigned from the Lancashire Cotton Corporation when the 
Board of Directors decided that the mill managers should be given more autonomy.no 
Finally, by the mid-1930s Lancashire no longer saw industrial reform as a viable means of 
combating Japanese competition in the mass overseas markets. In 1934, Sir W. Preston, 
Chairman of Platt Brothers, the Oldham textile engineering firm, unveiled a plan to restore 
Lancashire’s fortunes. He believed that through the re-equipping of the Lancashire cotton 
industry with high-draft ring frames and automatic looms, Lancashire could market cloth in 
India at a profit and at lower prices than those charged by Japanese cotton manufacturers. 
However, the Federation of Master Cotton Spinners’ and Manufacturers’ Associations 
challenged the validity of Preston’s proposal, and after a period of theorizing and 
experimentation, in 1936, Preston admitted defeat.111
However, the Lancashire Cotton Corporation did result in some success for the 
whole of the Lancashire cotton industry by its successful scrapping of surplus machinery. 
This process was continued by the various Parliamentary schemes for the scrapping of 
machinery in the Lancashire cotton industry that resulted from proposals originating within 
the Lancashire cotton industry. By 1939 the Lancashire Cotton Corporation had scrapped 
some 4.5 million spindles,112 and again by 1939 the 1936 Spindles Act had forced the 
compulsory scrapping of some 6.2 million surplus spindles.113 Thus as a consequence of the 
contraction in the Lancashire cotton industry total spindlage contracted by 28.2% between
109. Bamberg J. H., pp. 90-4.
110. Lazonick W., The Cotton Industry', pp. 32-3; Robertson A  J., pp. 95-6; Lucas A , Industrial 
Reconstruction and Control o f Competition. The British Experiment (Longmans, London; 1937), pp. 
156-159; Hannah L., pp. 84-5; Kirby M  W., p. 152; The Economist, 8 October 1932, p. 635, Dai 
Nippon Boseki Rengokai Geppo, July 1932, 'Rankashia. Kotton.Koporeshiyon Kaicho no Jinin' [The 
resignation of the chairman of the Lancashire Cotton Corporation],
111. Robertson A  J., pp. 102-103. A similar proposal was put forward by Mr. Lennox Lee, the Chairman 
of Calico Printers, in 1934, see The Economist, 10 March 1934, p. 512.
112. Pollard S., The Development o f the British Economy, 1914-1967 (Edward Arnold, London; 1969), p.
122.
113. Robson R., pp. 229-230, 340; Hughes H. G. and Saunders C. T., 'The Cotton Industry', in British 
Association, Britain in Recovery (Sir Issac Pitman & Sons, London; 1938), pp. 449-450, 456-457.
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1928 and 1937, and the total number of looms contracted by 37.6%.1,4 Further, this steady 
contraction of the Lancashire cotton industry undermined the sense of crisis in the 
Lancashire cotton industry. Although the work-force in the Lancashire cotton industry 
continued to shrink throughout the 1930s so too did the level of insured unemployed cotton 
workers. The fall in the unemployment rate amongst insured workers in the cotton industry, 
from 33.8% in 1932 to 22.4% in 1933, meant that its unemployment rates were now 
substantially below those in the other ’declining’ industries of coal, shipbuilding, and iron 
and steel.115 Some measure of profitability actually returned to the cotton industry after 
1934.116 However, the most noticeable feature within the Lancashire cotton industry was 
that, while its industrial leaders continued to adhere to the rhetoric that Lancashire should 
remain a world leader, the continued disinvestment out of the Lancashire cotton industry 
indicated that in practice few shared these beliefs. From 1929 there was a consistent net 
disinvestment in gross fixed capital in the Lancashire cotton industry117 as Lancashire 
rejected industrial reform schemes to meet foreign competition and adopted the previously 
outlined strategy of piecemeal reform and concentration on specialist export markets. Thus 
the abandonment of the Lancashire cotton industry by its investors gradually lessened the 
pressure on the British government to continue to actively intervene on behalf of the cotton 
industry.
114. See table 1.18.
115. See tables 1.18, and 1.19.
116. See table 1.18; The Economist, 17 February 1934, p. 357, and 2 November 1935, p. 869.
117. See table 1.18.
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Lancashire and the campaign for trade discrimination against Japan.
Despite the decline of the Lancashire cotton industry from the mid-1920s, it was in the early 
1930s that the economic and political situation appeared most critical. In this state of acute 
economic difficulty Lancashire abandoned its traditional laissez faire trade policy and 
endorsed domestic tariff protection, imperial preference, and the negotiation of bilateral 
trade pacts. Moreover, the fear of Japanese competition heightened Lancashire's demands 
for strong government intervention in the international arena. Furthermore, the emergence 
of a radical protectionist lobby in Lancashire challenged the established moderate 
leadership of the Lancashire cotton industry, as exemplified by the Manchester Chamber of 
Commerce which was still dominated by pro-free trade merchant interests.118 The Chamber 
worried that not only would the question of trade protection diminish its leadership of the 
industry, any explicit division of the industry between free traders and protectionists would 
destroy Lancashire's political influence in Whitehall.119 However, in the early and mid- 
1920s Lancashire remained a bulwark of the free trade lobby.120 In 1922 Bolton cotton 
spinners and MPs protested against the proposed 33.5% anti-dumping duty on German 
cotton glove imports. The Bolton spinners complained that since they supplied cotton yam 
to the German glove manufacturers their export trade would suffer if the domestic duty was 
increased.121 Even as late as 1927, despite growing antagonism to free trade within 
Lancashire the Chamber remained not only a keen advocate of free trade but also a harsh 
critic of dissent within the Chamber. In 1927 Sir Ernest Thompson, the President of the 
Manchester Chamber of Commerce and a leading cotton merchant,122 championed the 
Geneva World Economic Conference as an attempt to help world trade by reducing trade 
barriers.123 The Manchester Chamber o f Commerce, Monthly Record not only praised 
Thompson’s efforts in Geneva, it also condemned an anonymous letter writer who dared to 
suggest that in the face of increased world wide protectionism the Geneva Conference was a
118. Wurm C., p. 198; Goodwin J. H., 252. In regard to the Manchester Chamber o f Commerce's 
moderation, in 1927, the Chamber only added its name to a letter to The Times, that demanded there 
should be no further surrender of British extraterritorial privilege in China, after they had sought 
Foreign Office consent, Redford A., p. 231.
119. Wurm C„ p. 207.
120. Blank S., Industry and Government in Britain. The Federation o f British Industries in Politics, 1945- 
65 (Saxon House, Westmead; 1973), pp. 15-16.
121. The Manchester Chamber o f Commerce, Monthly Record, July 1922, pp. 225, 232, 239.
122. Wurm C., p. 398.
123. The Manchester Chamber o f Commerce, Monthly Record, July 1927, p. 210.
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miserable charade.124
However, by the late 1920s, the continued stagnation in the Lancashire cotton 
industry undermined support for laissez faire. The Manchester Chamber of Commerce 
found that growing internal dissent to free trade threatened to end its leadership of the cotton 
industry. In 1929 the European and United States Section of the Manchester Chamber of 
Commerce complained that:
It is evident that some countries have been inspired by a narrow economic policy, 
which is but part of the deplorably general tendency to increase rather than diminish 
barriers to international trade”....’’Your Executive feels that the policy hitherto 
pursued by this country has not resulted in any improvement in the prospects of the 
British textile export trade in the markets falling under its purview, and that the 
failure of most countries to bring into operation the sentiments expressed at the 
World Economic Conference at Geneva in May, 1927, merits the most serious 
consideration.125
From 1929 while free trade sentiment slowly ebbed in Lancashire the Chamber still fought to 
maintain unity to trade policy in the cotton industry through upholding Lancashire's 
commitment to free trade. In early 1929 the Directors of the Chamber rebuffed a call from a 
group of cotton manufacturers headed by R. Waddington, a cotton manufacturer and the 
Conservative MP for Rossendale, for the Chamber to end its support of free trade. However, 
this rejection of trade protection no longer stemmed from a principled commitment to free 
trade, but because the Directors feared the divisive effect of such a proposal within the 
Chamber.126 Yet despite the election of a free trade Labour government in 1929 increased 
protectionist sentiment forced the Chamber to abandon its defence of free trade. In October 
1929 only the Blackburn delegates opposed a protectionist resolution at the Association of 
Chambers of Commerce, while the Manchester delegates maintained a discreet silence on 
the issue.127 Finally, between 1930 and 1931 in the midst ofthe trade slump the Chamber and 
Lancashire abandoned free trade and endorsed both protectionism and bilateral trade
negotiation. As a reflection of the growing support for protectionism within the Chamber, in
124. The Manchester Chamber o f Commerce, Monthly Record, July 1927, pp. 205-206.
125. The Manchester Chamber o f Commerce: Annual Reports o f the Board o f Directors and Trade 
Sections, 1928, p. xviii; Redford A., pp. 235-236.
126. Redford A , p. 247; Goodwin J. H., pp. 280-281.
127. The Manchester Chamber o f Commerce, Monthly Record, October 1929, pp. 304-305; Redford A., p. 
237.
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January 1930 the Directors of the Chamber, dominated by cotton interests,128 voted by a 
majority of 2 to 1 to oppose the removal of certain protective duties by the Labour 
government:129 while a poll of Chamber members, again dominated by cotton interests,130 in 
the spring of 1930 revealed that only a quarter were in favour of the continuation of free 
trade.131 The decisive break with the laissez faire trade policy came in October 1930 when 
the Chamber welcomed the Canadian offer to introduce a preferential tariff on British 
manufactured goods,132 which was later followed by the wholehearted endorsement of 
British tariff protection, imperial tariff preference and the Ottawa Conference, and 
negotiated bilateral trade arrangements.133 Moreover, the move of the Chamber to 
protectionism was mirrored in Lancashire. In the 1929 election out of 50 Parliamentary 
seats Lancashire returned only 14 Conservative MPs. However, in the 1931 election the 
Conservative Party adoption of protectionism resulted in an electoral landslide, with the 
return of some 43 Conservative MPs and only 6 Labour and Liberal free trade MPs.134
In contrast to the complacency that had pervaded the Lancashire cotton industry over 
the threat of Japanese competition in the 1920s the 1930s witnessed near hysteria over the 
threat of Japanese competition in the Lancashire cotton industry. In 1932-33, while 
Lancashire witnessed the aborted revival of its export trade Japanese exports of cotton piece- 
goods continued to grow.135 Lancashire was so bewildered by the competitiveness of 
Japanese cotton piece-goods exports that it became difficult to view Japanese competition in 
rational terms. In December 1932 Raymond Streat, the respected Secretary of the 
Manchester Chamber of Commerce, wrestled witl|nature of Japanese competition and had 
some difficulty in not accepting Japanese competition as unnatural. ’’Perhaps ’Bogey' is the
128. Redford A., p. 300; Goodwin J. H., pp. 185, 196; Tippett L. H. C., A Portrait o f the Lancashire 
Textile Industry (Oxford University Press, London; 1969), p. 20.
129. The Manchester Chamber o f Commerce, Monthly Record, January 1930, p. 11; Redford A., pp. 238- 
239.
130. Redford A., p. 299; Goodwin J. H., p. 185; Tippett L. H. C., p. 20.
131. The Manchester Chamber o f Commerce, Monthly Record, June 1930, pp. 172-174; Redford A., p.
239.
132. The Manchester Chamber o f Commerce, Monthly Record, p. 299.
133. The Manchester Chamber o f Commerce, Monthly Record, September 1931, pp. 260-263, May 1932, 
pp. 129-130, June 1932, pp. 5-7, July 1932, pp. 189-190, 193-196, September 1932, pp. 249-250; 
Redford A., pp. 240-245, 247-248.
134. Craig F. W. S., British Parliamentary Election Results, 1918-1949 (Macmillan, London; 1977).
135. See table 1.1.
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wrong word. It customarily implies an object of unjustified apprehension, and Japanese 
Competition seems only too likely to prove a real menace. But I use it in the sense of 
something which had got everybody scared stiff".126 However, even if Lancashire was 
confused by the success of Japanese competition it was even more fearful of the threat 
Japanese competition posed to both Lancashire and Britain. In 1933 T. D. Barlow, a former 
President of the Manchester Chamber of Commerce, stated that Japanese competition could 
destroy Lancashire, while Streat worried that, "The competition of Japanese standards of life 
could reduce industrial Britain to a shambles".137 Further, by the early 1930s the fear of 
Japanese competition was no longer confined to Lancashire. In May 1933 the Federation of 
British Industries, the dominant mouthpiece of British industry, condemned the Japanese 
devaluation of the yen as both ’reckless' and part of a deliberate national sales policy that had 
been disastrous for British traders.138 In a similar vein to Streat’s worries over Japanese 
competition on industrial Britain, Ramsay MacDonald, the current Prime Minister and 
former Prime Minister of the previous free trade Labour administration, told the Cabinet in 
March 1933 that Japanese competition could be the possible harbinger of a struggle between 
East and West arising out of the great difference in respective standards of living.139 Indeed 
such was the atmosphere with regard to the threat of Japanese competition that Sansom felt 
obliged - given his consistent defence of Japanese commercial practices - to write to Sir E. 
Crowe to repudiate any charge of being pro-Japanese.140
Given the fear of Japanese competition in the Lancashire cotton industry the 
Manchester Chamber of Commerce pressed the British government to take active steps to 
restrain Japanese competition in overseas markets. However, even though the Chamber had 
adopted trade protection it remained apprehensive over the question. Uncertain of the 
British government’s response to demands for trade protection in the colonies the Chamber 
refused to launch a public campaign for trade discrimination against Japan. Nevertheless, in 
private the Chamber demanded strong measures from the British government to defend
136. Dupree M. (ed.), Lancashire and Whitehall. The Diary o f Sir Raymond Streat. Volume 1, 1931-1939 
(Manchester University Press, Manchester; 1987), entry December 1932, pp. 199-200; Robertson A. J., 
p. 97.
137. The Manchester Chamber o f Commerce, Monthly Record, February 1933, p. 36; Dupree M. (ed.), p. 
xviii; Robertson A. J., p. 98.
138. Cited in Hubbard G. E., p. 97.
139. Cabinet Conclusions, 29 March 1933, CAB 23 22(33)4.
140. Sansom to Crowe, 10 June 1933, F0371/17154,F4628/583/23.
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Lancashire’s trade from Japanese competition. In September 1932 the Manchester Chamber 
of Commerce called on the British government to denounce the 1911 Anglo-Japanese Trade 
Treaty.141 Yet in public it maintained a less radical stance on trade protection. In November 
1932 the Chamber sponsored and then endorsed the moderate protectionist resolution of the 
Association of British Chambers' of Commerce, that rejected calls for the denunciation of 
trade treaties and merely called for the British government to negotiate new bilateral trade 
agreements with consenting governments.142
However, by 1932 sections of the Lancashire cotton industry were dismayed by the 
efforts of the British government and the Manchester Chamber of Commerce to defend 
Lancashire’s overseas markets from Japanese commercial penetration. In contrast to the 
moderate public stance of the Manchester Chamber of Commerce they demanded a much 
more radical response to the question of Japanese competition. In late November 1932 a 
small group of Lancashire MPs started a campaign in Parliament that switched from 
complaining about Japanese trade practices to demands for trade protection from Japanese 
competition in the British colonies.543 Then in December 1932 the Cotton Trade League was 
formed to pressure both the Chamber and the British government into greater activity on 
behalf of the Lancashire cotton industry. The Chamber was not at all pleased by the 
formation of the Cotton Trade League, since it threatened to undermine its private efforts 
with the government for trade protection against Japan, through a public insistence on 
protective measures which the government could not fulfil.544 While Streat regarded the 
Cotton Trade League as a 'hot headed' response to the question of Japanese competition, he 
was highly critical of the aims and ambitions of its leadership:545 he later condemned Alan 
Chorlton, the Conservative MP for Manchester Platting and the driving force behind the 
Cotton Trade League, as "that nice, but deluded die-hard, ... convinced that a strong 
government could put everything right in five minutes and that only agitation will make the
141. The Manchester Chamber o f Commerce, Monthly Record, July 1933, pp. 206-207; Dupree (ed.), p.
207.
142. The Manchester Chamber o f  Commerce, Monthly Record, November 1932, p. 313; The Manchester 
Chamber o f Commerce: Annual Report o f  the Board o f Directors, 1932, pp. vii-viii; The Presidential 
address ofT. D. Barlow, The Manchester Chamber o f Commerce, Monthly Record, February 1933, p. 
38.
143. Parliamentary Debates: Official Report. Fifth Series (HMSO, London; 1933), Volume 269, pp. 1598- 
1599, Volume 272, pp. 22-23, 618, 1217, Volume 273, pp. 330-331, 503-504.
144. Wurm C , p. 207.
145. Dupree M. (ed.), entry December 1932, pp. 199-200.
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government take a strong line"; and as a man who was singularly unable to grasp the 
complexities of the modem world, "I tried to make poor Chorlton realise the complexity of 
things ... [but] you can do nothing with him".146 In response to this challenge, the Chamber 
mounted its own public campaign to underline their past attempts to achieve some measure 
of trade protection for Lancashire, and re-establish its credentials as the champion of 
Lancashire with the public.147 Consequently, on 12 December 1932 a Special General 
Meeting of the Manchester Chamber of Commerce was convened to denounce Japanese 
competition and to organise stronger public and Parliamentary pressure for greater 
governmental assistance to Lancashire in overseas markets.148 This movement was 
eventually formalised as the ’Special Committee on Japanese Competition’ which 
represented all the elements, save the trade unions, of the Lancashire cotton industry, but 
retained strong links with the Chamber.149
The new public campaign of the Lancashire cotton industry focused on the need for 
the immediate protection of the Lancashire cotton industry from Japanese competition 
within British imperial markets. However, the Manchester Chamber of Commerce’s public 
adherence to the cause of trade protection against Japan did not lead to any moderation of the 
demands from the Lancashire radicals. In particular the Parliamentary supporters of the 
Cotton Trade League still insisted upon the need for drastic action by the British government 
to deal with Japanese competition. For example Samuel Hammersley, the Conservative MP 
for Stockport and 41 the chairman of several cotton spinning firms, who had previously 
demanded either tariff preference for Lancashire’s goods or trade discrimination against 
Japanese goods in the British colonies, now advocated the immediate denunciation of the 
1911 Anglo-Japanese Trade Treaty.150 In support of these demands, throughout 1933 this 
small group of Lancashire MPs initiated a series of somewhat disorganised debates151 in the
146. Dupree M. (ed.), entries 22 January 1933, p. 208, and 3-8 January 1934, pp. 286-287.
147. Dupree M. (ed.), entry December 1932, pp. 199-200.
148. The Manchester Chamber o f Commerce, Monthly Record, December 1932, p. 337; The Manchester 
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House of Commons that condemned Japanese competition in highly colourful language and 
called on the British government to come to the aid of the Lancashire cotton industry.152 
Furthermore, in public these Lancashire MPs maintained this radical stance. In January 
1933 Chorlton called for the removal of all duties on British manufactured goods - except for 
revenue purposes - in both India and the colonies, while new duties should be imposed on 
foreign goods to give British goods a fair chance of competition.153 Thus by early 1933 the 
Lancashire cotton industry, led by a radical fringe, demanded and expected strong action by 
the British government to combat Japanese competition in British imperial markets.
152. Debate in the House of Commons, 2 June 1933, F0371/17154,F3756/583/23.
153. The Manchester Guardian, 14 January 1933.
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Conclusion.
The 1930s proved that the Lancashire cotton industry was ill-equipped to meet the new 
challenges of the world cotton textile market. The combination of a shrinking world market, 
protectionism, native industrialisation, and the rise of Japanese competition, doomed a 
substantial slice of the Lancashire cotton industry to extinction.154 Moreover, in Japan their 
emerged a new competitor whose aggressiveness towards establishing industrial efficiency 
and export success destroyed the arrogant complacency of the Lancashire industrialists. The 
combination of high levels of industrial efficiency and substantially lower wage costs 
shattered Lancashire's belief that they could meet Japanese competition through its 
established industrial and labour practices. Industrial reform became vital. However, by the 
mid-1930s so great was Japanese competitive advantage that reform offered little hope of 
giving Lancashire even the semblance of competitive parity, "the competitive margin 
enjoyed by Japanese producers makes it virtually impossible to conceive of any 
organisational changes which would have benefited the industry in Eastern markets".155 Like 
many other cotton industries, in the 1930s Lancashire simply found the Japanese cotton 
industry too competitive. Thus industrial reform in Lancashire became a process not to 
restore Lancashire's competitive fortunes but a means of reducing political strain while 
managing the economic decline of this once great industrial area.
While Lancashire wrestled with the problems of industrial reform trade protection 
offered both a more realistic and more immediate method of dealing with the problems of 
economic decline. Once Lancashire had abandoned free trade, it immediately turned to the 
protectionist British government in order to establish better trade protection for Lancashire 
in its overseas markets. However, trade protection for Lancashire could no longer be 
divorced from trade discrimination against Japan, and therefore could not be separated from 
British foreign policy. Nevertheless, in keeping with its moderate tradition, in regard to 
industrial-govemment relations, the Manchester Chamber of Commerce refused publicly to 
pressure the British government over the question of trade discrimination against Japan. The 
Chamber believed that given the complexity of British trade policy and the sensitivity of 
Anglo-Japanese relations, following Japan’s invasion of Manchuria in September 1931, the 
unrealistic expectations of the Lancashire public could disrupt conversations with the
154. Sandberg L., Lancashire in Decline, chapter 10.
155. Kirby M. W., p. 158.
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government. Unfortunately, for the Chamber its attempt to keep the question of Japanese 
competition within the traditional bounds of industry-govemment relations proved abortive. 
Fear of Japanese competition in Lancashire broke the already fragile political unity within 
the cotton industry. A radical section of the Lancashire cotton industry believed that only 
public agitation would force the government into adopting measures to combat Japanese 
competition. Confronted by this radical campaign for trade discrimination against Japan, 
the moderates within the Chamber, fearful of losing its leadership over this issue, joined this 
public campaign. Thus the failure of the Chamber to make any progress in its private talks 
with the British government led to the radicalisation of opinion in Lancashire. 
Consequently, the question of Lancashire-Japan textile competition could no longer be 
decided without reference to the demands of these radicals, and so Britain's already unstable 
relationship with Japan now had to be constructed to accommodate these new and publicly 
articulated demands.
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Table 1.1: Britain and Japan’s total cotton piece-good exports, 1911-1936 (millions of 
yards).
Year Britain's exports of cot­
ton piece-goods 
(millions of linear yards)
Japan's exports of cotton 
piece-goods (millions of 
square yards)
1911 6,653.7 229.9
1912 6,912.9 290.5
1913 7,075.3 235.1
1914 5,737.7 337.3
1915 4,748.5 403.3
1916 5,254.2 535.0
1917 4,978.2 794.4
1918 3,699.3 1,006.4
1919 3,523.7 882.9
1920 4,435.4(i) 826.8
1921 3,038.2 689.2
1922 4,312.7 780.5
1923 4,328.7 881.5
1924 4,585.1 1,008.6
1925 4,636.7 1,297.5
1926 3,922.8 1,424.9
1927 4,989.1 1,482.9
1928 3,968.2 1,418.7
1929 3,764.9 1,790.6
1930 2,490.5 1,571.8
1931 1,790.2 1,413.8
1932 2,302.7 2,031.7
1933 2,116.7 2,090.2
1934 2,059.7 2,577.2
1935 2,013.4 2,725.1
1936 1,993.1 2,709.8
[Sources: Seki K., The Cotton Industry o f Japan (Japan Society for 
the Promotion of Science, Tokyo; 1956), pp. 302-303; Robson R., 
The Cotton Industry in Britain (Macmillan, London; 1957), pp. 
332-333 ]
Note : (i) in millions of square yards.
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Table 1.2 : World produciton and consumption of textile fibres, 1909/13-1928/29.
World production of textile fibres 
(thousands of metric tons)
World per capita consumption of tex­
tile fibres 
(kilos per capita)
1909-13 1925-26 1928-29 1909-13 1925-26 1928-29
Cotton 4,583 5,247 5,593 2.56 2.72 2.85
Wool 1,392 1,582 1,765 0.78 0.82 0.90
Flax 578 581 573 0.32 0.30 0.29
Silk 29 50 60 0.016 0.026 0.031
Rayon 11 91 180 0.006 0.047 0.092
[Source: International Labour Office, World Textile Industry: Economic and Social Problems. 
Volume I (International Labour Office, Geneva; 1937), table 6, p. 164.]
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Table 1.3 : Lancashire's percentage of world production and the world export trade in 
cotton piece-goods (thousands of square yards).
Year World pro­
duction
World ex­
ports
World ex­
ports as a 
percentage 
of produc­
tion
Lanca­
shire's total 
exports
Lanca­
shire's ex­
ports as a 
percentage 
of world 
production
Lanca­
shire's ex­
ports as a 
percentage 
of world 
exports
Lanca­
shire's ex­
ports if 
1910-13 
ratio of 
world ex­
ports of 
world pro­
duction 
had been 
maintained
1882-84 12.0 5.4 45%
1910-13 32.5 9.9 31% 6.6 20.3% 66.7%
1926-28 38.0 8.6 23% 3.9 10.3% 45.3% 5.3
1936-38 37.5 6.5 18% 1.7 4.5% 26.1% 3.0
[Source: Robson R , The Cotton Industry in Britain (Macmillan, London; 1957), pp. 358-359.1
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Table 1.4: British, Japanese, and American exports of cotton textiles, 1927-1933 (millions 
of square yards).
Year 1927 1928 1929 1930 1931 1932 1933
Total world exports 7,970 7,787 7,877 5,868 4,798 5,582 5,372
Index of exports 100 97.7 98.8 73.6 60.0 70.0 67.7
Britain's exports 4,117 3,886 3,672 2,407 1,716 2,198 2,032
Index of exports 100 94.4 89.2 58.5 41.7 53.4 49.3
Share of world exports 51.6% 59.9% 46.6% 41.0% 35.8% 39.4% 37.8%
Japan's exports 1,364 1,419 1,791 1,572 1,414 2,032 2,089
Index of exports 100 104.0 133.0 115.0 103.7 149.0 153.1
Share of world exports 17.1% 18.2% 22.7% 26.8% 29.5% 36.4% 38.9%
US exports 545 526 543 404 375 367 295
Index of exports 100 96.5 99.6 74.1 65.5 67.3 54.1
Share of world exports 6.8% 6.7% 6.9% 6.9% 7.4% 6.6% 5.5%
Others exports 1,944 1,976 1,871 1,485 1,311 985 936
Index of exports 100 101.6 96.2 97.2 67.4 50.7 48.1
[Sources: Lawrence O. L., ’Competition in the world textile market’, Pacific Affairs (1934), pp. 170-171; 
Hubbard G. E., Eastern Industrialization and its Effect on the West (Oxford University Press, London; 
1935), p. 5; Statistical abstract o f  the United States (United States Printing Office, Washington; various 
years).]
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Table 1.5: Comparison of average annual nominal wages for operatives in the British cotton 
textile industry and the Japanese cotton spinning industry, 1914-1936 (in sterling).
Year Britian (i) Percentage that 
Japanese wages 
were less than 
British wages
Japan (ii)
1914 £48.8 £12.4
1920 146.4 56.1
1921 124.3 1921-1925 48.7
1922 98.5 57.9% 45.0
1923 90.4 43.4
1924 90.4 39.8
1925 90.4 36.7
1926 90.4 1926-1930 42.7
1927 90.4 51.9% 43.4
1928 90.4 44.8
1929 89.0 39.6
1930 82.4 42.7
1931 83.2 1931-1935 40.3
1932 83.2 69.9% 25.2
1933 79.6 23.4
1934 80.5 16.8
1935 80.0 16.6
1936 80.0 15.6
[Sources: Chapman A. L, Wages and salaries in the United Kingdom, 
1920-1938 (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge; 1953), table 47, p. 
105; Statistical Abstract o f  the United Kingdom (HMSO, London; 
various years); Fujiro S., Fujino S., and Ono A., Estimates o f long-term 
economic statistics o f Japan since 1868. Volume 11 (Toyo Keizai 
Shiposha, Tokyo: 1979), table 34, p. 278.]
Notes: (i) For cotton spinners, 
doublers, etc., and cotton
weavers. Annual wage rate
calculated on the basis that the 
1914 piece rate was +5% of the 
basic uniform list, and assuming 
that the +215% addition to the 
piece-rate list of 1920 was
equivalent to £146.4 per annum.
(ii) Calculated from the average 
daily money wage rate in the 
Japanese cotton weaving sector, 
on assumption of a six day week 
for 52 weeks per year (therefore 
this maximizes both wages and 
wage cost for the Japanese 
operatives and manufactures).
Converted by the annual average 
rate of exchange.
(iii) Further, wage costs for the 
Lancashire cotton manufacturers 
would be increased by the higher 
health and social security 
contributions that a British 
employer had to make compared 
to a Japanese employer. Also the 
actual income of some Lancashire 
cotton operatives could have been 
lower than the figures stated given 
the practice in the Lancashire 
cotton industry of operatives 
investing in the mills in which they 
worked. Given the poor 
performance of the Lancashire 
cotton industry in the interwar 
period it is difficult to believe that 
such investments made a positive 
contribution to the operatives net 
income.1
1. Kirby M. W., The Lancashire cotton industry in the Inter-War years: a study in organizational change', 
Business History (1974), pp. 147-148; Ellinger B., 'Lancashire's Declining Trade with China', 
Transactions o f the Manchester Statistical Society (1928), pp. 20-1; Grey J. H., Memorandum on 
Relative Costs of Manufacture in Lancashire and Japanese Weaving Sheds', in Ellinger B., Lancashire's 
Declining Trade with China', pp. 45-9; Utley F., Lancashire and the Far East (George Allen & Unwin, 
London; 1931), pp. 43-52; Jones O., 'Lancashire Cotton Industry', Harvard Business Review (1924), p. 
448; Bamberg J. H., The Rationalisation of the British Cotton Industry in the Inter Avar Years', in 
Textile History (1988), p. 84.
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Table 1.6: Comparison of average earnings between female Japanese cotton weavers daily 
wage rates in the cotton spinning industry, and the Lancashire piece-rate lists, 1914-1936.
Year Japan Lancashire
Nominal Index of Index of Modifica­ Index of Index of
earning earnings real in­ tions to the earnings real in­
(Yen) (i) (1914 = come piece-rate (1914 = come
100) (ii) (1914 = lists (iv) 100) (v) (1914 =
100) (iii) 100) (vi)
1914 0.391 100.0 100.0 +5 100.0 100.0
1915 0.430 109.9 118.2
1916 0.411 105.1 104.1
1917 0.458 117.1 94.4
1918 0.561 143.5 82.5
1919 0.978 250.1 115.2
1920 1.362 348.3 148.2 +215 300.0 122.4
1921 1.249 319.4 153.6 +145 233.3 103.2
1922 1.333 340.9 152.9/ +95 185.7 101.5
158.6
1923 1.301 332.7 162.3 +95 185.7 106.7
1924 1.337 341.9 164.4 +95 185.7 106.1
1925 1.388 354.9 165.8 +95 185.7 105.5
1926 1.411 368.5 177.2 +95 185.7 107.9
1927 1.423 363.9 178.4 +95 185.7 110.9
1928 1.495 382.3 192.1 +95 185.7 111.9
1929 1.459 373.1 193.3 +82.5 173.8 105.9
1930 1.349 345.0 197.1 +82.5 173.8 110.0
1931 1.171 299.5 191.9 +82.5 173.8 117.8
1932 0.996 254.7 162.2 +67 159.0 110.4
1933 0.940 240.0 149.1 +67 159.0 113.6
1934 0.895 228.9 +67 159.0 112.8
1935 0.876 224.0 +67 159.0 111.2
1936 0.855 218.7 +76.5 168.1 114.3
[Sources: Fujiro S., Fujino S., and Ono A., Estimates o f long-term economic statistics o f  
Japan since 1868. Volume 11, Textiles (Toyo Keizai Shiposha, Tokyo; 1979), table 39, p. 
278; The Cotton Year Book {Textile Mercury; 1938); Statistical Abstract o f  the United 
Kingdom (HMSO, London; various years); Uyeda T., The Small Industries o f  Japan: 
Their Growth and Development (Oxford University Press, Oxford; 1938), p. 298.]
Notes: (i) An 
average of the 
daily money 
rate of wages in 
the Japanese 
cotton weaving 
sector.
(ii) An index of 
the average 
daily money 
rate of wage in 
the Japanese 
cotton weaving 
sector.
(iii) An index of 
the real income
of the average 
daily money 
rate of wages 
for operative in 
the Japanese 
cotton weaving 
sector.
(iv) Additions 
to the piece- 
rate lists for 
spinners and 
weavers in the 
Lancashire 
cotton industry, 
expressed as a 
percentage 
change upon 
the established 
piece-rate lists 
(spinners were 
on the Oldham 
and Bolton lists, 
while the 
weavers were
on the Uniform List).
(v) An index of the uniform wage lists for spinnersand weavers.
(vi) An index of real income for operatives in the Lancashire cotton and weaving sectors, on the Oldham, Bohon, 
and Uniform List, piece-rate lists.
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Table 1.7: Comparison of earnings of female Japanese machine cotton weavers with earn­
ings by female operatives in the Lancashire cotton textile industry, 1914-1936.
Year Japan Lancashire (i)
Nominal Index of Index of Nominal Index of Index of
earnings 
(Yen per 
day)
earnings 
(1914 = 
100)
real in­
come 
(1914 = 
100)
earnings 
(schillings 
per week)
earnings 
(1914 = 
100)
real in­
come 
(1914 = 
100)
1914 0.29 100.0 100.0 20.0 100 100.0
1915 0.30 103.4 111.2
1916 0.32 110.3 109.2
1917 0.35 120.7 97.3
1918 0.50 172.4 99.1
1919 0.68 134.5 108.1
1920 0.95 327.6 139.4
1921 0.97 334.5 160.8
1922 0.99 341.4 153.1/
158.8
1923 0.95 327.6 159.8
1924 0.94 324.1 155.8 35.5 178 101.4
1925 0.97 334.5 156.1 36.9 185 104.8
1926 1.03 355.2 170.8 34.7 174 101.4
1927 1.01 348.3 170.7 36.8 184 109.8
1928 1.01 348.3 175.0 36.5 183 109.9
1929 0.99 341.7 176.9 36.1 180 110.1
1930 0.89 306.9 173.4 31.3 156 99.0
1931 0.76 262.1 168.0 32.1 161 108.8
1932 0.79 272.4 173.5 32.6 163 113.2
1933 0.67 231.0 143.5 31.3 157 111.8
1934 0.67 231.0 31.7 158 112.4
1935 0.73 251.7 31.9 160 111.5
1936 0.68 243.5 33.1 165 112.6
[Sources: Financial and Economic Journal o f Japan (The Government Printing Office,
Tokyo; various years); Bowley A. L., Wages and Income Since 1860 (Cambridge Universi­
ty Press, Cambridge; 1937), pp. 23-4; Uyeda T., The Small Industries o f  Japan: Their 
Growth and Development (Oxford University Press, Oxford; 1938), p. 298; Statistical Ab­
stract o f  the United Kingdom (HMSO, London; various years).]
Note: (i) For 'certain firms' though the nature and sample of is not specified in the Bowley 
text.
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Table 1.8: Changes in labour output per unit of wage and per workday in the spinning sector 
of the Japanese cotton spinning industry, 1914-1936.
Year Output of yam 
(lbs) per work­
day
Index of output 
of yam per 
workday (1914 
= 100)
Output of yam 
(lbs) per unit of 
wage (Yen)
Index of output 
of yam per unit 
of wage (1914 
= 100)
1914 2.2338 100.0 6.2099 100.0
1915 2.4738 109.1 6.8864 110.9
1916 2.3914 105.5 6.4560 103.9
1917 2.452 108.2 6.0391 97.2
1918 2.4553 108.3 4.6855 75.4
1919 2.3316 102.8 2.2861 36.8
1920 2.1080 92.9 1.4920 24.0
1921 2.2814 100.6 1.7909 28.8
1922 2.0814 91.8 1.5136 24.4
1923 2.2460 99.1 1.6734 26.9
1924 2.4013 105.9 1.7391 28.0
1925 2.4395 107.6 1.7533 28.2
1926 2.4628 107.3 1.7684 28.5
1927 2.6131 115.3 1.8841 29.7
1928 2.6283 115.9 1.8082 29.1
1929 2.5900 114.2 1.8618 29.9
1930 3.0727 135.5 2.3786 38.3
1931 3.5318 155.8 3.1521 50.7
1932 3.7209 164.1 3.9083 62.9
1933 3.9909 176.0 4.4627 71.9
1934 4.1154 181.5 4.7743 76.9
1935 4.1065 181.1 4.9771 80.1
1936 4.2437 187.2 5.2055 83.8
[Source: Fujiro S., Fujino S., and Ono A., Estimates o f long-term economic statis­
tics o f  Japan since 1868. Volume 11, Textiles (Toyo Keizai Shiposha, Tokyo; 
1979), tables 1, 3, 18, and 27, pp. 293,241,257, 266.]
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Table 1.9 : Changes in labour output per unit of wage and perwork day in the weaving 
sector of the Japanese cotton spinning industry, 1914-1936.
Year Output of cloth 
per unit of la­
bour per work­
day (yards)
Index of output 
of cloth per 
unit of labour 
per workday 
(1914=100)
Output of cloth 
in yards per 
unit of wage 
(yen)
Index of output 
of cloth per 
unit of wage 
(1914=100)
1914 56.3418 100.0 144.0553 100.0
1915 62.1744 110.3 144.7351 100.5
1916 65.0147 115.4 158.1259 109.8
1917 64.5146 114.5 140.9871 97.9
1918 60.8123 107.9 108.5663 75.4
1919 53.7993 95.5 55.0343 38.2
1920 51.8399 92.0 38.0744 26.4
1921 57.8782 102.7 46.3395 32.2
1922 60.6070 107.6 45.4603 31.6
1923 66.8278 118.6 51.3553 34.6
1924 64.4873 114.4 48.2413 33.5
1925 66.7428 118.5 48.0794 33.4
1926 70.3716 124.9 45.8763 34.6
1927 81.6486 144.9 57.3600 39.8
1928 102.4149 181.8 68.5203 47.6
1929 110.4149 195.6 75.5278 52.4
1930 125.3389 222.5 92.9094 64.5
1931 156.9034 178.5 134.0016 93.0
1932 160.0931 284.1 160.6924 111.5
1933 154.0234 273.4 163.8317 113.7
1934 155.6507 276.3 173.0075 120.1
1935 156.5534 277.9 178.6835 124.0
1936 150.2887 266.7 175.8114 122.0
[Source: Fujiro S., Fujino S., and Ono A., Estimates o f long-term economic statistics o f  
Japan since 1868. Volume 11, Textiles (Toyo Keizai Shiposha, Tokyo; 1979), tables 2, 4, 
21, and 30, pp. 240, 242, 260, 269.]
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Table 1.10: Comparison of worker output between the American, British and Japanese cot­
ton spinning industries, in 1929.
Country Amount of yam 
produced per 
spindle per 
hour 
(morame)
Number of 
spindles per 
operative
Amount of yam 
produced per 
worker per 
hour 
(momme)
America (South) 4.5 1,120 5,000
Britain (Lancashire) 5.0 600 3,000
Japan 5.4 400 2.100
[Source: Takamura N., Kindai Nippon Mengyd to Chugoku [The Modem Japa­
nese Cotton Industry and China] (Tokyo Daigaku Shuppukai, Tokyo; 1982), p. 
81]
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Table 1.11: Comparison of wages and output in the Japanese, American, Indian and British 
cotton spinning industries for operatives engaged in spinning yams of up to 40 counts, in 
early 1932.
Country Wages per 
week 
(Yen)
Number of 
workers per 
1,000 spindles
Wages per 
week per 1,000 
spindles (Yen)
Output per 
week per 1,000 
spindles (bales)
Wages per bale 
of output 
(Yen)
Japan 5.8 6.1 35.5 2.7 13.2
America 35.0 3.4 119.0 2.4 49.6
India 5.5 15.0 82.5 2.4 34.4
Britain 18.0 4.0 72.0 2.3 31.4
[Sources: survey by the Fuji Gas Spinning Company, cited in Mitsubishi Economic Research Bureau, Japan’s 
Trade and Industry; Present and Future (Macmillan, London; 1936), table 69, p. 103; International Labour 
Office, The World Textile Industry: Economic and Social Problems (International Labour Office, Geneva; 
1937), Volume 1, table 13, p. 208.]
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Table 1.12 : Indices of change in output per-man hour between the British, American, and 
Japanese cotton textile industries.
Year Britain America Japan
Spinning Weaving Total out­ Output per Output per Output per
output per ouput per put per op­ man-hour man-hour man-hour
operative operative erative (1907 = (1909 = (1923 =
(1924 = (1924 = (1907 = 100) 100) 100)
100) 100) 100)
1907 100 100
1909 100
1923 126 100
1924 100 100 93
1925 139
1929 159
1930 102 94 91
1931 158
1933 120 119 111 169 240
1934 121 118 111
1935 125 120 113 185
1937 137 134 126 146 195
1939 227
[Source: Rostas L., 'Productivity of labour in the cotton industry1, The Economic Journal 
(1945), p. 199 ]
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Table 1.13: Comparison between Japanese and Lancashire operatives' wages for ten hours 
work, and the same comparison includingPearse's estimate of additional Japanese welfare 
costs, c. 1928/29 (in pence).
Class of opera­
tive
Japan Lancashire Japanese rates 
plus 7d. addi­
tional welfare 
costs (i)
Percentage Jap­
anese wage 
costs (including 
welfare costs) 
were less than 
Lancashire's 
wage costs (ii)
Blowing room 
men
20-25 150 27-32 80.3%
Men on cards 35 150 42 72.0%
Cardroom ten­
ders
33-36 80-95 40-43 52.6%
Ring spinners: 
800 spindles on 
32's
18 91 25 72.5%
Winders 30-36 88 37-43 54.5%
Beamers 52 100 59 41.0%
Weavers 33-51 96-148 40-58 59.8%
[Source: Holroyd F., in Pearse A. S., The Cotton Industry o f Japan and China (The Inter­
national Federation of Master Cotton Spinners' and Manufacturers' Associations, Manches­
ter; 1929), p. 5.]
Notes :(i) Pearse estimated that additional welfare payments were equivalent to 6-7d. per ten 
hour shift.
(ii) The percentage figures utilise the median figure were a range of payments are cited.
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Table 1.14 : Comparison of piece-wage rates paid in Japan and Lancashire for winding 
100 lbs. of ring yam on to warpers’ bobbins, c. 1928/29 (in pence).
Yam counts
20's 30's 32's 40's
Japanese mills
Number 7 
Number 8 
Number 9 18.48
15.672
16.368
22.32 28.8
An average of 
four modem 
Lancashire 
mills
40.847 51.344 53.413 63.793
[Source: Holroyd F., in Pearse A. S., The Cotton Industry in Japan and China (The 
International Federation of Master Cotton Spinners* and Manufacturers' Associations, 
Manchester: 1929), p. 5.]
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Table 1.15: Comparison of weavers wages per yard of cloth output between Japan and 
Lancashire, c. 1928/29.
Country Cost of cloth
(pence per yard)
Japan 0.161-0.225
Britain 0.75
[Source: Holroyd F., in Pearse A. S., The Cotton Industry o f Japan and China 
(The International Federation of Master Cotton Spinners' and Manufacturers' As­
sociations, Manchester; 1929), pp. 5-6.}
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Table 1.16 : Breakdown of Japan(i) and Lancashire’s manufacturing costs for selected 
types of cotton piece-goods in 1931 (in pence per piece).
Manufacturing Type of piece-good
Dragon C Soldier 2 Geese Tiger in Bam­
boo
Lanca­
shire
Japan Lanca­
shire
Japan Lanca­
shire
Japan Lanca­
shire
Japan
Raw cotton (ii) 63.5 63.5 72.0 72.0 56.0 56.0 42.5 42.5
Labour (iii) 27.9 9.9 35.2 14.4 25.2 9.2 23.0 9.9
Other 25.0 22.5 29.2 26.7 25.5 21.8 19.9 18.8
Total 116.4 95.6 136.4 113.1 107.0 87.0 85.4 71.2
Lancashire's 
manufacturing 
costs as a per­
centage of Jap­
anese
manufacturing
costs
121.4 120.6 123.0 120.2
Sources: Ellinger B„ 'Japanese competition with Lancashire: Comparisons of Cotton Trade 
Costs', Manchester Guardian Commercial, 1 July 1933, p. 3; International Labour Office,
The World Textile Industry: Economic and Social Problems (International Labour Office,
Geneva; 1938), table 16, pp. 211.1
Notes : (i) Japanese costs converted into sterling at 24d. to the yen.
(ii) Cotton for Dragon C and 2 Geese in Fine Bengal, price A Ad. per lb., 15% waste loss, 
6% regain.
(iii) Lancashire labour costs are for a 6-loom system in weaving, and exclude labour costs 
in sizing, cloth-carrying etc., in weaving which are included in ’other’ costs. Japanese la­
bour costs include all processes up to weaving.
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Table 1.17: Comparison of annual nominal wages between the British cotton textile indus­
try with the British woollen & worsted and nylon & rayon industries: and a comparison of av­
erage daily wages between the spinning and weaving sectors of the Japanese cotton industry 
with the Japanese silk-reeling industry, 1920-1937.
Britain 
(pounds per annum)
Japan 
(yen per day)
Cotton (i) Woollen&wor 
sted (ii)
Nylon&rayon
(iii)
Spinning sec­
tor (iv)
Weaving sec­
tor (v)
Silk-reeling
(vi)
1920 146.6 145.0 109.4 1.31 1.29 0.89
1921 124.3 142.5 115.5 1.17 1.17 0.93
1922 98.5 107.8 99.3 1.30 1.32 1.02
1923 90.4 102.5 95.3 1.26 1.24 0.93
1924 90.4 102.2 94.3 1.29 1.29 0.96
1925 90.4 102.6 94.3 1.30 1.33 0.97
1926 90.4 102.2 94.3 1.30 1.35 0.98
1927 90.4 102.1 95.3 1.33 1.36 0.93
1928 90.4 102.1 96.2 1.35 1.42 0.92
1929 89.0 102.1 99.0 1.29 1.37 0.98
1930 82.4 95.0 100.7 1.16 1.24 0.86
1931 83.2 91.8 98.1 0.99 1.05 0.75
1932 83.2 87.3 96.2 0.85 0.89 0.67
1933 79.6 88.9 97.1 0.79 0.84 0.67
1934 80.5 87.9 99.0 0.77 0.80 0.62
1935 80.0 92.9 102.8 0.74 0.79 0.64
1936 80.0 92.9 102.8 0.74 0.79 0.64
1937 85.0 97.1 102.8 0.84 0.85 0.68
[Sources: Chapman A. L., Wages and salaries in the United Kingdom, 1920-1938 (Cambridge University Press, 
Cambridge; 1953), table 47, p. 105; Fujiro S., Fujino S., and Ono A., Estimates o f  long-term economic statistics 
o f Japan since 1868. Volume 11 (Toyo Shiposha, Tokyo; 1979), tables 35,38, and 59, pp. 274,211,302.]
Notes: (i) The annual wages for the British cotton spinning, doubling etc., and cotton weav­
ing industries.
(ii) The annual wages for the British woollen and worsted industries.
(iii) The annual wages for the British nylon, rayon, etc., and silk industries.
(iv) The female workers average daily money rate of wage in the Japanese cotton spinning 
sector of the Japanese cotton spinning industry.
(v) The female workers average daily money rate of wage in the Japanese cotton weaving 
sector of the Japanese cotton spinning industry.
(vi) The daily rate of money wage for female workers in the Japanese silk-reeling industry.
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Table 1.18 : Selected statistics of the British cotton industry, 1924-1937.
Year Raw cotton 
consumption 
(millions of 
lbs.)
Spindles
(millions)
Looms
(thousands)
Insured em­
ployees 
(thousands)
Gross fixed 
capital for­
mation 
(£ millions)
Gross profit 
in 1930 pric­
es
(£ millions)
1924 1,369 60.0 792 572 +1.5 8.2
1925 1,609 60.0 788 573 +4.5 7.6
1926 1,509 61.0 786 575 +2.6 2.2
1927 1,557 61.0 768 562 +1.2 10.1
1928 1,520 61.0 755 554 +0.3 9.9
1929 1,498 60.0 740 555 -0.8 4.1
1930 1,272 58.0 704 564 -0.9 1.1
1931 985 58.0 658 550 -1.4 3.3
1932 1,257 55.5 625 518 -2.3 3.9
1933 1,177 53.6 602 500 -2.6 7.3
1934 1,322 50.0 560 467 -2.5 6.3
1935 1,262 47.1 516 442 -2.1 6.3
1936 1,391 44.7 500 421 -0.8 7.0
1937 1,431 43.8 471 409 -1.4 9.9
[Source: Kirby M. W., The Lancashire Cotton Industry in the Inter-War Years: a Study in Organizational 
Change', Business History (1974), p. 159 ]
86
The Lancashire cotton industry and the rise of Japanese competition
Table 1.19 : Percentage of unemployed insured workers in selected Brtish industries, 
1923-1938.
Year Coal-mining
Ship­
building
Cotton
textiles
Wool
textiles
Iron and 
steel
Chemi­
cals
Cars 
and air­
craft
Gas,
water,
and
electric­
ity
Electri­
cal en- 
gineerin 
g
1923 3.0 43.6 21.6 9.5 21.2 11.8 9.7 7.2 7.3
1923 5.8 30.3 15.9 8.4 22.0 9.9 8.9 6.3 5.5
1925 11.5 33.5 8.8 16.9 25.0 9.1 7.1 6.2 5.6
1926 9.5 39.5 18.3 17.4 40.4 10.9 8.2 6.0 7.5
1927 19.0 29.7 15.4 11.0 19.4 7.2 8.1 5.4 5.9
1928 23.6 24.5 12.5 12.0 22.4 6.1 8.1 5.8 4.8
1929 19.0 25.3 12.9 15.5 20.1 6.5 7.1 6.1 4.6
1930 20.6 27.9 32.4 23.3 28.2 10.0 12.1 7.0 6.6
1931 28.4 51.9 43.2 33.8 45.5 17.6 19.3 8.9 14.1
1932 34.5 62.0 30.6 22.4 47.9 17.3 22.4 10.9 16.8
1933 33.5 61.7 25.1 17.0 41.5 15.2 17.6 11.0 16.5
1934 29.7 51.2 23.7 17.8 27.3 11.3 10.8 10.1 9.6
1935 27.2 44.4 22.3 15.5 23.5 11.0 9.0 10.4 7.0
1936 22.8 33.3 16.7 10.3 17.4 9.2 6.9 9.7 4.8
1937 16.1 24.4 10.9 8.8 11.4 6.8 5.0 8.3 3.1
[Source: Garside W. R_, British Unemployment, 1919-1939: a study in public policy (Cam­
bridge University Press, Cambridge; 1990), table 5, p. 13.]
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Introduction.
Despite the introduction between 1931 and 1932 of domestic protection and imperial 
preference these measures proved insufficient to reverse the decline of the Lancashire cotton 
industry. In the 1930s the Japanese cotton industry proved too competitive in export markets 
for the Lancashire cotton industry. Therefore even after the adoption of domestic protection 
and imperial preference, Lancashire desperately sought to widen both the degree and area of 
British trade discrimination against Japanese goods. For the Lancashire cotton industry the 
British colonies were the ideal place to extend trade discrimination against Japanese goods, 
since these markets were under direct British control. But Lancashire wanted to extend trade 
discrimination against Japanese goods beyond the British colonies and into the British 
Dominions and other third markets. Industry leaders believed that access to the British 
market should be used as the bargaining counter to increase Lancashire’s preferential access 
to these markets, and conversely increase trade discrimination against Japanese goods.
The demands of the Lancashire cotton industry for increased global trade 
discrimination against Japanese goods placed an important economic and political dilemma 
before Britain’s National government formed in August 1931. Many in the British 
government were both sympathetic to Lancashire’s demands for trade preference and fearful 
of the domestic political consequences if the government did not support Lancashire. 
However, they were also conscious of the risks and limitations of increased trade 
preferences for Lancashire’s goods at the expense of Japanese competition. In the British 
colonies the problem lay in the social and economic impact of depriving native colonial 
consumers of cheap Japanese cotton piece-goods. The potential trade preferences 
Lancashire could receive beyond the British colonies were limited by the trade concessions 
Britain could offer these states and the desire of trade partners to accept these trade 
concessions. Further, in trade negotiations the British government had to consider the whole 
of British industry and not just the sectional interests of Lancashire.
The other concern of the British government was that trade discrimination against 
Japan would provoke Japanese commercial and political retaliation. This was particularly 
dangerous for the British government since the British Empire ran a substantial trade surplus 
with Japan, and thus any trade discrimination in favour of Lancashire could easily be negated 
by more substantial Japanese economic retaliation. Following Japan’s invasion of
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Manchuria and the eve of its withdrawal from the League ofNations, the British government 
increasingly feared the effect of trade discrimination on a politically isolated Japan. Given 
British military weakness in East Asia, the British government had no desire to increase 
Japan's sense of political isolation through increased economic discrimination against 
Japanese goods. Thus the greater the trade discrimination against Japan the greater the risk 
of Japanese economic and political retaliation* Therefore the problem confronting the 
British government was to achieve a balance between the divergent claims of Lancashire for 
trade protection, the willingness of Britain's overseas partners to grant trade preferences to 
Lancashire, and the risks of Japanese retaliation.
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The introduction of trade discrimination against Japan in Britain’s West African 
colonies.
The 1932-33 campaign by the Lancashire cotton industry for trade discrimination against 
Japanese competition confronted the British government squarely with the problems of the 
Lancashire cotton industry. In particular Lancashire focused upon increased Japanese 
competition within British colonial markets. The contrast between the faltering post-1931- 
32 recovery of Lancashire's global exports with the strong recovery of Japanese exports had 
been repeated within the British colonial markets. The introduction of imperial preference 
in 1932 had not halted the inroads made by Japanese exports or the decline of Lancashire’s 
exports to British colonial markets. Between 1932 and 1933 Japanese exports to the British 
colonial markets increased by 27.6% while Lancashire's exports fell by 28.1%.1 However, 
while Lancashire sought widespread colonial trade discrimination against Japan, opinion 
was particularly angered by the Japanese domination of Britain’s East African colonial 
markets and the threat of Japanese competitionto Britain's West African colonies. In 1932 
Japanese exports accounted for fully 63.2% of Britain's East African imports of cotton 
textiles while between 1932 and 1933 Japanese exports to Britain's West African colonies 
increased fourfold.2 Furthermore, Lancashire was incensed at the ineffectualness of the 
British government in expelling Japanese goods from the East African colonies and 
protecting the West African colonies from Japanese competition.3 For the radical wing of 
the Lancashire cotton industry the fate of the East and West African colonial markets had 
become an infamous example of the indifference of the British government to the fate of 
Lancashire's overseas exports. Alan Chorlton, the firebrand MP of the Cotton T rade League, 
complained that, "although the Government were warned as far back as last January of the 
fact that the West African market was being captured by the Japanese, no action had yet been 
taken to denounce the clause (i.e. the most favoured nation clause of the 1911 Anglo- 
Japanese Trade Treaty)".4 Thus the fate of Lancashire's goods in the British colonies, and in 
particular Britain's East and West African colonies, had become the litmus test of the 
government’s commitment to Lancashire.
1. See table 2.1.
2. See table 2.2; Hubbard G. E., Eastern Industrialisation and its effect on the West (Oxford University
Press, London,: 1935), p. 327; Redford A., Manchester Merchants and Foreign Trade. Volume II, 
1850-1939 (Manchester University Press, Manchester; 1956), p. 250.
3. The Manchester Chamber o f Commerce: Annual Report o f  the Board o f  Directors, 1932, pp. xv-xvi.
4. The Manchester Guardian, 14 January 1933.
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However, in contrast to the belief of this Lancashire MP, there was in fact a 
consensus within the British government over the need to do something for Lancashire.5 
Alarmed at political and economic developments in Lancashire, the government had moved 
hastily to debate three schemes of trade discrimination against Japanese cotton piece-goods 
within the British colonial markets. Both the President of the Board of Trade, Sir Walter 
Runciman, and Sir Philip Cunliffe-Lister, the Colonial Secretary, the two ministers most 
directly concerned with colonial trade policy, clearly appreciated the need to placate 
Lancashire and avoid a potential political and economic crisis.6 Cunliffe-Lister, the arch 
protectionist, primed several colonial governors of the need for discriminatory measures 
against Japanese cotton piece-goods by informing them of the dire situation in Lancashire, "I 
have been in Lancashire myself, and I have never seen the trade so genuinely alarmed”.7 
However, these sentiments were not confined to the Board of Trade and Colonial Office. 
Even the Far Eastern Department of the Foreign Office, which had most to fear from the 
repercussions of trade discrimination against Japan, recognised that the situation in 
Lancashire demanded government action. Charles Orde, the cautious Head of the Far 
Eastern Department in the Foreign Office, recognised that "I share Mr. Gwatkin's 
misgivings, but we can hardly sit still and do nothing”.8 Thus by early 1933 the case for trade 
discrimination against Japanese cotton piece-goods within the British colonies had been 
easily won by Lancashire. Public agitation proved an effective tool in forcing the 
government to recognise Lancashire's problems. However, this victory did not mark the end 
of Lancashire's battle because the important question of the extent of British colonial trade 
discrimination against Japan still remained unresolved.
In early March 1933, in order to meet demands from Lancashire, both Cunliffe-Lister
5. Cunliffe-Lister, the Colonial Secretary, had first raised the issue of increased tariff preferences for
Lancashire in the colonies as a means o f combating Japanese competition with Runciman, the President 
of the Board of Trade, in November 1932, Cunliffe-Lister to Runciman, 18 November 1932,
F0371/16250,F8773/8773/23.
6. Streat recorded in his diary that the depiction of the situation in Lancashire by T. E. Barlow, the President
of the Lancashire 'Special Committee on Japanese Competition', had greatly alarmed two Board of 
Trade officials on a feet finding mission in Lancashire, Dupree M. (ed.), Lancashire and Whitehall. The 
Diary o f  Sir Raymond Streat. Volume I, 1931-1939 (Manchester University Press, Manchester; 1987), 
entry December, 1932, pp. 199-200.
7. The Secretary of State for the Colonies, to Governors of various colonies, 24 January 1933, in appendix
of CAB 24 CP. 54(33).
8. Minute by Orde, 28 February 1933, F0371/17153,F1256/583/23.
92
The British government and trade discrimination against Japan
and Runciman presented before the cabinet schemes for trade discrimination against 
Japanese cotton goods in the British colonies. Both ministers appreciated the complexities 
of the situation, and while Cunliffe-Lister was in favour of immediate and widespread 
colonial discrimination against Japanese goods, like Runciman he preferred to avoid the 
denunciation of the 1911 Anglo-Japanese Trade Treaty. Both Cunliffe-Lister’s schemes had 
been prepared in cooperation with the Manchester Chamber of Commerce and the first was 
the most radical. It envisaged either the denunciation of the Trade Treaty so that trade 
discrimination could be introduced against Japanese cotton piece-goods in the British 
colonies - through either a quota system or by introducing a penal tariff on Japanese goods - 
or after Treaty denunciation, during the twelve month notification period, the threat of trade 
discrimination could be used to force the Japanese into voluntary export restraint. However, 
this radical plan was not his preferred course of action. In contrast with the above Cunliffe- 
Lister believed that effective colony wide discrimination could be obtained without Treaty 
denunciation, through the introduction of a quota system on imports of cotton piece-goods 
into British colonies. In this second proposal quotas would be based upon the annual average 
of a five-year period that was favourable to Lancashire and unfavourable to Japan. Cunliffe- 
Lister argued that the quota system had many advantages: it avoided the need to denounce 
the Anglo-Japanese Trade Treaty, there would be no year long delay, there would be no need 
to levy penal duties on Japanese goods, it would be simple to administer, and it would 
encourage the Japanese to raise their export prices to the British colonies.9 Thus despite his 
reputation as an aggressive protectionist, the Colonial Secretary appreciated that in dealing 
with trade discrimination some subtlety was required.10
In contrast Runciman's proposal was more modest, which reflected his and the Board 
of Trade’s fear of the economic repercussions from Treaty denunciation and extensive trade 
discrimination. Added to this innate liberalism on trade policy Runciman had already been 
in contact with the Foreign Office over the implications of trade discrimination against 
Japan on Anglo-Japanese relations. In reply Sir John Simon, the Foreign Secretary, warned 
Runciman that given the current unstable political situation in Japan, any measure of trade
9. Memorandum by the Colonial Secretary, 'Japanese Competition in the Textile Trade', 3 March 1933, CAB
24 CP. 54(33); Dupree M. (ed.), entry 8 March 1933, p. 220.
10. Clemens Wurm is wrong to imply that as a committed protectionist Cunliffe-Lister was only concerned 
with protecting Lancashire’s trade and had lost sight of the potential problems of abrogating the 1911 
Anglo-Japanese Trade Treaty, Wurm C., Business, Politics, and International Relations: Steel, Cotton 
and International Cartels in British Politics, 1924-1939 (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge; 
1993), p. 220.
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discrimination would be unwelcome and should be delayed by some two months." 
However, after the lapse of two months Runciman now placed his scheme before the 
cabinet. Unlike Cunliffe-Lister Runciman not only refused to consider Treaty denunciation, 
he also had no desire to extend trade discrimination beyond Lancashire's immediate 
demands for the defence of its East and West African markets. Moreover, within this limited 
context he only proposed trade discrimination in West Africa,12 which accounted for only an 
insignificant 6.9% of Lancashire’s total cotton piece-good exports in 1932.13 Trade 
discrimination in East Africa was ruled out because Japanese penetration there was so 
thorough that native consumers were already totally dependent upon cheap Japanese cotton 
piece-good imports. Runciman doubted, ’’whether any preference ... which would be 
regarded as sufficient to reinstate Lancashire... would not be regarded as imposing too great 
a burden on the native population". Furthermore, trade discrimination in West Africa could 
be introduced without the abrogation of the 1911 Anglo-Japanese Trade Treaty. In order to 
achieve this goal Britain’s West African colonies would simply denounce the most favoured 
nation clause in the 1911 Anglo-Japanese Trade Treaty. Once removed from the burden of 
granting Japanese goods tariff equality, after the twelve month period of notification of 
termination, the West African colonies could impose penal rates of duty on Japanese goods. 
Behind this tortuous reasoning lay Runciman’s desire of avoiding extensive British colonial 
trade discrimination against Japan, preventing the abrogation of the Anglo-Japanese Trade 
Treaty, and heading off even more radical demands from Lancashire. The Board regarded 
the Trade Treaty as the only legal safeguard against Japanese retaliation against British and 
British Empire trade with Japan, an important concern since it was acutely aware that this 
trade was more vulnerable to Japanese retaliation.14 Therefore the selective removal of the 
West African colonies from a specific part of the 1911 Anglo-Japanese Trade Treaty offered 
the possibility of both introducing discrimination against Japanese goods in West Africa, 
and yet upholding the 1911 Anglo-Japanese Trade Treaty. Furthermore, given the limited 
amount of Japanese trade involved with Britain’s West African colonies, under 1% of Japan’s
11. Simon to Runciman, 20 January 1933, FO371/16250.F8773/8773/23.
12. These colonies were Nigeria (including the Protectorate of the Cameroons under British mandate), the 
Gold Coast (including Ashanti, Northern Territories, and Togoland [under British Mandate]), Gambia, 
and Sierra Leone.
13. See table 1.1, and 2.2.
14. Memorandum of the President o f the Board of Trade, Japanese Competition in the Textile Trade*, 6 
March 1933, CAB 24 CP. 55(33); Drummond I. M., British Economic Policy and the Empire, 1919- 
1939 (George Allen, London; 1972), p. 133; Dupree M  (ed.), entry 8 March 1933, p. 220; The British 
Dominions and India ran a substantial trade surplus with Japan, see table 2.3.
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cotton piece-good exports in 1932,15 the Board discounted the possibility of Japanese 
retaliation.16
However, although the Foreign Office had objected to the immediate introduction of 
trade discrimination against Japan, this did not indicate a fundamental opposition to such 
measures. As noted earlier the Far Eastern Department was aware of and to some extent 
sympathised with feeling in Lancashire. The real concern of the Foreign Office was that the 
scale and timing of trade discrimination against Japan could inflame an already unstable 
political situation. The recent course of events in Japan meant that the Foreign Office could 
not ignore the repercussions of an inopportune announcement of British colonial trade 
discrimination against Japan. Following Japan’s invasion of Manchuria and the withdrawal 
of the Japanese delegation from the Chamber of the League of Nations the Foreign Office 
was deeply concerned over the short term stability of Japanese foreign policy and public 
opinion. 7 A mistimed announcement of colonial trade discrimination could have a 
catastrophic effect on an already excited and xenophobic Japan. Prior to the cabinet debate 
on colonial trade discrimination, Frank Ashton-Gwatkin, of the Economic Relations Section 
^ ^ ^ ^^TTTnr-rrf-NgtgBB|-and the Western Department of the Foreign Office, recorded his 
apprehension over the issue as he looked upon) "this economic skirmishing with Japan with 
considerable misgiving", since it added to the complexities of the Far Eastern situation.18 
Furthermore, as a result of British policy, Foreign Office officials had particular reason to 
worry over an immediate announcement of trade discrimination against Japan. In keeping 
with a League of Nation's resolution and in response to domestic pressure, much to the 
annoyance of Japan, between 27 February and 13 March 1933 Britain had imposed a two 
week arms embargo on both China and Japan.19 Thus when Cunliffe-Lister and Runciman's 
schemes for trade discrimination against Japan were debated by the cabinet on 8 March 
1933, objections raised by Simon, based on the current state of Anglo-Japanese relations,
15. See tables 1.1, and 2.2.
16. Memorandum o f the President o f the Board o f Trade, 'Japanese Competition m the Textile Trade', 6 
March 1933, CAB 24 CP 55(33).
17. Lindley (Tokyo) to Orde, 2 March 1933, F0371/17153,FI437/583/23; Simon, in Cabinet Conclusions, 8 
March 1933, CAB 23 15(33)3.
18. Minute by Ashton-Gwatkin, 27 February 1933, F0371/17153,F1256/583/23.
19. The British had withdrawn the arms embargo because they received no support from any other power, 
Thorne C., The Limits o f  Foreign Policy: The West, the League and the Far Eastern Crisis o f  1931- 
1933 (Macmillan, London; 1972), pp. 337-342, and 'The quest for arms embargoes, failure in 1933', 
Journal o f  Contemporary History (1970), pp. 129-149.
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proved sufficient to postpone the immediate adoption of any of the proposals. However, the 
cabinet, including Simon, the Foreign Secretary, also recognised that the situation in 
Lancashire was too critical to allow for a lengthy postponement of the issue. The whole issue 
would be placed before the cabinet again within three weeks, while Runciman was 
authorised to inform Lancashire that the government would undertake 'appropriate action' as 
soon as the international situation permitted. Furthermore, clarification of the Japanese 
reaction to the three schemes would be sought from the British Ambassador in Japan.20
The response from Sir Francis Lindley, the British Ambassador in Tokyo, on 13 
March 1933, had a critical impact on British plans for trade discrimination against Japan. 
Lindley told the Foreign Office that the political situation in Japan was now more stable and 
could tolerate limited British trade discrimination. In this regard, given the small scale of the 
markets involved; trade discrimination in the British colonies in West Africa would not 
cause 'undue resentment’ in Japan. However, any policy of comprehensive colonial 
preference for Lancashire, deliberately directed against Japan, might lead to an extreme 
Japanese reaction: either the closure of the 'Open Door’ in Manchukuo, or the intensification 
of the Japanese offensive in China.21 The Foreign Office welcomed this telegram and 
accepted that with respect to trade discrimination in West Africa previous objections over 
the political situation in Japan no longer applied.22 Furthermore, Lindley’s assessment 
coincided with opinion in the Foreign Office that Japanese military victories in Manchuria 
had eased Japanese anxiety. In reference to an earlier comment by Lindley on the need for 
the atmosphere in Japan to clear,23 on 20 March 1933, Orde concluded that the atmosphere in 
Japan had become much clearer now the Japanese, as part of their ongoing Manchurian 
campaign, had taken the strategically important city of Jehol.24 Consequently, towards the 
end of March 1933 the Foreign Office recognised that the political situation in Japan had so 
cleared that it removed their earlier objections to the immediate introduction of trade 
discrimination against Japan.25
20. Cabinet Conclusions, 8 March 1933, CAB 23 15(33)3.
21. Lindley (Tokyo) to the Foreign Office, 13 March 1933, F0371/17153,FI 720/583/23.
22. Minute by Orde, 20 March 1933, FO371/17153,F1720/583/23.
23. Lindley (Tokyo) to Orde, 2 March 1933, F0371/17153,F1437/583/23.
24. Minute by Orde, 20 March 1933, F0371/17153,FI 720/583/23.
25. Minutes by Vansittart, 25 March 1933, FO371/17153,F1720/583/23, and FO371/1760,F1493/1203/23.
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However, while the cabinet debated the nature and timing of colonial trade 
discrimination against Japan, Lancashire became incensed at the apparent refusal of the 
British government to endorse trade discrimination. Even the usually moderate Raymond 
Streat was bewildered by the fact that "whilst Lancashire trade is disappearing before their 
eyes!", due to opposition from the Board of Trade and the Foreign Office, the government 
had dropped plans for colonial trade discrimination.26 Once again demands from the 
Manchester Chamber of Commerce for the abrogation of the 1911 Anglo-Japanese Trade 
Treaty impelled Runciman, on 29 March 1933, to seek an immediate cabinet decision of the 
question of trade discrimination against Japan in West Africa.27 However, unlike the earlier 
cabinet meeting this time the cabinet agreed to Runciman's proposal that the West African 
colonies should ’remove' themselves from the Trade Treaty as a prelude to tariff 
discrimination against Japanese imports. The two proposals of Cunliffe-Lister were not 
debated. Aside from the renewed pressure from Lancashire the critical factor was the 
Foreign Office conviction that the political situation in Japan was stable enough to tolerate 
trade discrimination in West Africa. Ramsay MacDonald, the Prime Minister, took 
particular comfort from Lindley's 13 March telegram that the introduction of trade 
discrimination in West Africa would cause little resentment in Japan. No dissent to this view 
was offered by Simon or any other minister. Furthermore, by the time the cabinet debated 
this issue for the second time, events in India underlined the unimportance of trade 
discrimination in West Africa. At the same meeting the cabinet endorsement of the Indian 
government's demand for the abrogation of the 1904 Indo-Japanese Trade Treaty underlined 
the triviality of British trade discrimination against Japan in West Africa.28 Thus one small 
part of Lancashire's objective, trade discrimination against Japanese goods in West Africa, 
had been achieved. Pressure from Lancashire, the relative small scale of the markets 
involved, and the Foreign Office belief that trade discrimination in West Africa would not 
disrupt Anglo-Japanese relations removed any lingering hesitancy within the cabinet to 
authorise this measure.
One of the main factors in the British government's acceptance of trade
26. Dupree M. (ed.), entry 8 March 1933, p. 220.
27. The President of the Board of Trade reported to the cabinet that since the 8 March 1933 discussion the 
Board of Trade had been visited by a Manchester Chamber o f Commerce deputation that demanded a 
reopening of the Trade Treaty position with Japan, Cabinet Conclusions, 29 March 1933, 22(33)4.
28. In 1932 Japanese exports of cotton piece-goods to India were some 131 times larger than its exports to 
the British West African colonies, see tables 2.2, and 3.1. See also chapter 3.
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discrimination against Japan was the conviction that the Japanese would not retaliate against 
British trade. This Foreign Office view of Japanese reactions to trade discrimination in West 
Africa proved correct. On being informed of their introduction the Japanese Ambassador, 
Matsudaira Tsuneo, made no comment and merely sought clarification of the proposed 
increase of the British silk and artificial silk duty, and then stated his desired hope for an 
approach from the Indian government on its proposed tariff increase.29 Later Matsudaira 
commented to Cunliffe-Lister that the British action would create a bad impression at the 
World Economic Conference,30 which was due to meet in the summer of 1933 in London, 
with the express intention of reviving the world economy through the reduction of trade 
barriers. However, this criticism and Japanese public reaction to British actions were mild 
when compared with Japanese reactions over the denunciation of the 1904 Indo-Japanese 
Trade Treaty.31 Thus because of the lack of reaction in Japan, British trade discrimination in 
West Africa made virtually no impact upon Anglo-Japanese relations.
29. Interview of the President of the Board of Trade with the Japanese Ambassador and the Japanese 
Commercial Attache, 25 April 1933, F0371/17153,F2755/583/23.
30. Interview of the Colonial Secretary with the Japanese Ambassador, 9 May 1933, 
F0371/17153JF2991/583/23.
31. Snow (Tokyo) to the Foreign Office, 7 May 1933, F0371/17153,F3205/583/23; See chapter 3.
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The failure of the Lancashire-Japan cartel negotiations.
As part of the process of the introduction of West African trade discrimination, and in order 
to pre-empt the more radical demands of Lancashire, Runciman and Cunliffe-Lister actively 
canvassed the need for an Anglo-Japanese cotton textile agreement. Both ministers believed 
that the British government could do little to defend the Lancashire cotton industry from 
Japanese competition, especially Lancashire’s cotton trade in third markets. Consequently, 
only voluntary trade restraint by Japan, especially the result of a Lancashire-Japan cartel 
agreement, offered Lancashire respite from Japanese competition. The possibility of a 
Lancashire-Japan cartel agreement had been discussed since the 1930 British cotton textile 
mission to the Far East. However, the lukewarm reception of the trade mission in Japan had 
killed off any belief that a cartel arrangement was feasible.32 Nevertheless, despite this 
failure the question of a Lancashire-Japan cotton cartel was again raised in November 1932 
by Cunliffe-Lister. Aware of the pressure Runciman was under from Lancashire, Cunliffe- 
Lister suggested to a somewhat sceptical President of the Board of Trade, that a cotton cartel 
offered the best means of relief for Lancashire from Japanese competition.33 The case for 
purging a Lancashire-Japan cotton cartel received a further boost when Lindley told the 
Foreign Office that an approach from Lancashire would no longer be unwelcome in Japan, 
and even if the chances of a negotiating a successful cartel were slim, it was still well worth 
the attempt.34 At the second cabinet meeting on 29 March 1933 to discuss colonial trade 
discrimination against Japan both Runciman and Cunliffe-Lister championed the idea of a 
Lancashire-Japan cotton cartel. Runciman was adamant that the only hope for Lancashire 
lay in agreement with Osaka: Lancashire could not meet Japanese competition in open 
markets and thus needed some measure of voluntary trade restraint from the Japanese. The 
cabinet welcomed this suggestion, in effect it cost them nothing to pursue, and authorised 
Runciman to approach the Japanese ambassador.35 The plan for a Lancashire-Japan cotton 
cartel received a strong boost when Matsudaira told Runciman that his government 
welcomed the idea of Lancashire-Japan cotton trade talks in London.36
32. Department of Overseas Trade to the Foreign Office, 1 May 1930, FO371/14754,F2493/650/23; Wurm 
C., p. 216.
33. Cunliffe-Lister to Runciman, 20 November 1932, F0371/16250,F8773/8773/23; Wurm C., pp. 216-217.
34. Lindley (Tokyo) to Orde, 13 March 1933, FO371/17153,F1720/583/23.
35. Cabinet Conclusions, 29 March 1933, CAB 23 22(33)4.
36. Interview between Simon and Matsudaira, 16 May 1933, F0371/17153,F2991/583/23.
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However, the task of persuading Lancashire over the utility of the cotton trade talks 
proved more difficult. Lancashire appeared totally unwilling to consider the possibility of 
talks with its Japanese counterparts. Cunliffe-Lister's suggestion of November 1932 for a 
Lancashire-Japan cartel had been forcibly rebuffed by the Manchester Chamber of 
Commerce. The Chamber felt that because of the strong local anti-Japanese sentiment and 
the uncompromising attitude of the Japanese, talks between the respective industries would 
be 'quite useless'.37 However, once Runciman had cabinet support to pursue trade talks 
between Lancashire and Japan, Lancashire and the Chamber quickly discovered the limits of 
its influence upon British policy. On 3 April 1933 a delegation from the Chamber arrived at 
the Board of Trade to demand both export subsidies and the abrogation of the 1911 Anglo- 
Japanese Trade Treaty. However, after informingthem of the West Africa decision, not only 
did Runciman reject both proposals, he told the delegates that before the government 
undertook any further action against Japan Lancashire would have to enter trade talks with 
Osaka.38 Thus while trade discrimination in West Africa had been easily won, from now on 
Lancashire would have to defer to government policy before any extension of trade 
discrimination against Japan was contemplated. Nevertheless, even after Lancashire had 
been cajoled into participation tremendous internal problems bedevilled its preparations for 
the cotton trade talks. The demand by every cotton interest to participate in the talks led to an 
unwieldy delegation. Furthermore, the Special Committee to service the delegates was 
equally inefficient. On his return from the Indian tripartite negotiations Streat was scathing 
about the effectiveness of the committee which, "once more showed itself to be the worst 
committee I have ever had anything to do with", while all the internal divisions "tinge the 
atmosphere with acid".39 Consequently, Lancashire's reluctant participation in the cotton 
trade talks was seriously undermined by ineffectual preparation.
Although the Japanese government had welcomed the suggestion of Lancashire- 
Japan cotton trade talks, as expected, like their Lancashire counterparts, the reaction of the 
Japanese manufacturers was less enthusiastic. Lindley, who had endorsed the cathartic 
effects of talks between the cotton manufactures, expected that little positive could be
37. Cunliffe-Lister to Runciman, 18 November 1932, and Runciman to Simon, 19 November 1932, 
F0371/16250,F8773/8773/23.
38. Wurm C., p. 223.
39. Dupree M. (ed.), entries 6 January 1934, p. 279, and 3-8 January 1934, pp. 268-278.
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achieved. On cotton trade talks he stated that he did not think Osaka would make any 
important sacrifices to Manchester, and saw little that could be gained from them.40 This 
proved to be a correct assessment. The British consul in Osaka, Oswald White, reported that 
the Japanese were neither concerned nor optimistic of the success of any market sharing 
agreement. Leading Japanese cotton manufacturers commented unfavourably upon both 
the proposed talks and the Lancashire cotton industry: they had nothing to gain from talks 
and nothing to fear from Lancashire. The Chairman of Showa Menka, Sugimoto Nobukizu, 
offered a wide ranging critique of why he expected the cotton trade talks to fail. In particular 
he stated that Japan had little to gain from both a market sharing agreement and export 
restraint, since the Lancashire cotton industry offered no effective competition, and the 
British had few worthwhile commercial concessions to grant Japan. The President of 
Kanegufuchi Spinning Company, Tsuda Shingo, was even more dismissive of the cotton 
trade talks. He similarly stated that Japan had nothing to fear from Lancashire.41 In keeping 
with this disregard for the London negotiations, only a second rate delegation was appointed 
by the Japanese cotton industry.42 Furthermore, indifference to the cotton trade talks 
extended beyond the cotton industry. At the insistence of Lancashire, the rayon industry - an 
important substitute for cotton goods - was included in the talks. However, the Japanese 
found great difficulty in appointing any rayon industry delegate.43 Right up to the eve of the 
London talks in January 1934, due to the non-appointment of any Japanese rayon delegates, 
the composition of the Japanese delegation remained incomplete. It was only after some last 
minute pleading by Okada Gentaro, the leader of the Japanese delegation, that the Japan 
Rayon Association nominated its delegate. Even then, as a tribute to its indifference, all the 
Japan Rayon Association did was to instruct the London representative of Mitsui Bussan 
Kaisha to act as its representative at the cartel negotiations.44 Thus both the Japanese cotton 
and rayon industries, while paying lip service to the formalities of the cotton trade talks, 
showed no indication that they took these talks seriously.
40. Lindley to Orde, 21 March 1933, F0371/17153,F2686/58323.
41. The only optimistic note White could report was a rumour that the Minister of Commerce was in Osaka 
as part of a prelude to the introduction of government imposed export restraint, Sansom (Tokyo) to 
Farrer (Department o f Overseas Trade), 30 March and 10 April 1933, F0371/I7153,F3295/583/23.
42. Wurm C„ p. 257.
43. Matsudaira to the Foreign Office, 8 August 1933, FO371/17155,F5305/583/23.
44. Matsudaira to the Foreign Office, 29 January 1934, F0371/18177JF535/347/23; Report o f interview at 
the Board of Trade with Matsudaira and the Japanese textile delegation, 6 September 1933, 
FO371/17156,F6058/583/23; Ishii O., 'Cotton Textile Diplomacy: Japan, Great Britain, and the United 
States, 1930-1936', (Unpublished thesis, Rutgers University; 1977), pp. 160-161.
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However, despite the antipathy of both business communities to the cotton trade 
talks, both the Board of Trade and Foreign Office endeavoured keep the talks on track. To 
achieve this the main concern of both departments was not to strengthen Lancashire’s hand 
for the negotiations, but to ensure the participation of the Japanese cotton manufacturers. 
Lancashire’s attempt|to strengthen its hand for the forthcoming cotton talks were vigorously 
rebuffed by the Board of Trade. A demand from the 'Special Committee on Japanese 
Competition' that prior to the talks the Japanese should be informed that in the event of 
failure the British government would respond with strong measures was rejected by the 
Board of Trade. Sir Horace Wilson, the Chief Economic Advisor to the Cabinet, told 
Lancashire that such a statement would cause an unfavourable reaction in Japan, and 
therefore could not be endorsed by the government.45 Thus once again Lancashire 
discovered the limits of its influence on British policy. Similarly, the Foreign Office was 
concerned that for the duration of the cotton trade talks British tariff policy should be 
managed so as not to antagonise the Japanese business community. To this end the Foreign 
Office agreed to the Japanese demand to review any British tariff rise that the Japanese 
might find objectionable. The most pressing case was the proposed increase in the silk and 
artificial silk duty by the Import Duty Advisory Committee. The Foreign Office was 
concerned that given the importance of the silk industry to Japan's economy and culture, and 
its current depressed state, any increase on the British duty on silk imports - as recently 
recommended by the Import Duty Advisory Committee - would be seen as insensitive by 
Japanese opinion.46 Nevertheless, despite the protests of the British silk and artificial silk 
industry and the Board of Trade - especially since the new duty was primarily aimed at 
European and not Japanese imports -47 in October 1933 the Foreign Office ensured the 
suspension of this duty increase for the duration of the cotton trade talks.48 Still, there were
45. Board of Trade memorandum, Meeting at Preston with ’Special committee on Japanese Competition', 11
September 1933, F0371/17156,F5995/583/23.
46. The Foreign Office was very specific on the potential impact o f the increase of the silk and artificial silk 
duty on Japanese opinion, and in particular upon the Japanese silk industry. They informed the Board 
of Trade that if the proposed increase in the silk duty was suspended they had no objection to an 
immediate increase in the artificial silk duty; or that they had no objection to the immediate increase o f  
the silk duty if the proposed specific duty on silk was replaced by and ad valorem duty, which would 
not appear to be directed at cheaper Japanese silk imports, Foreign Office to the Board of Trade, 15 
August 1933, F0371/17155,F5526/583/23; Orde to Twentyman (Treasury), 14 September 1933, 
F0371/17156,F5997/583/23.
47. Report o f the between the President of the Board of Trade and the Silk Association, 5 October 1933, 
F0371/17156,F6419/583/23.
48. Letter from Mr. Farrel, President of the Silk Association of Great Britain and Ireland and President of
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limitations to the willingness and ability of the British government to meet Japanese requests 
over British tariff policy. The British ignored Japanese protests that tariff rises in certain 
colonies violated the terms of the March 1930 TariffTrace,49 and despite Japanese requests it 
insisted that for the duration of the cotton trade talks they could not prevent increases in 
Dominion tariffs.50
However, even the skilful management of Japanese opinion by the British 
government could not mask the growing irrelevance of the Lancashire-Japan cotton trade 
talks, and the fundamental differences between the two cotton industries. The Indian 
denunciation of the 1904 Indo-Japanese Trade Treaty, and the decision of the respective 
governments to hold formal cotton trade negotiations in India, dramatically undermined the 
significance of the Lancashire-Japan talks.51 As Alec Randall, the First Secretary of the Far 
Eastern Department, noted, following this announcement the effect would be to make the 
Lancashire-Japan talks even less important to the Japanese, since the separation of the India 
market from the London talks removed Lancashire's only bargaining counter.52 This view 
was rapidly confirmed when Kadono Chokyuro, the advisor to the Japanese delegation at the 
World Economic Conference in London, candidly informed Wilson that for Japan the Indian 
market was the real bone of contention.53 In this vein the Japanese delegation in London 
were only granted full powers of negotiation in late January 1934, after the successful 
conclusion of the Indo-Japan cotton trade negotiations.54 However, while the Indo-Japan 
cotton dispute undermined Japanese interest in the London negotiations, the inability of
Grout and Company, to the Chancellor o f the Exchequer, 8 September 1933,
F0371/17156,F5997/583/23; Memorandum of the Board of Trade on the suspension of the increase of 
the silk and artificial duty, 5 October 1933, F0371/17156,F6562/583/23.
49. Minute by Orde, 11 May 1933, F0371/17153,F2991/583/23; Cabinet Conclusions, 19 July 1933, CAB 
23 47(33)5.
50. Stacy (Board of Trade) to Randall, 26 May 1933, FO371/17154,F3570/583/23; Board of Trade 
memorandum of interdepartmental meeting o f, the Board o f Trade, Department o f Overseas Trade, 
India Office, Dominion Office, and Colonial Office, 29 May 1933, F0371/17154,F3617/583/23; Randall 
to Stacy (Board of Trade), 8 June 1933, F0371/17154,F3617/583/23. Further, in the period prior to 
the cotton trade talks the British government was unable to prevent tariff increases in Fiji, the Federated 
States o f Malaya, and the Indian state of Johore, see the Colonial Office to the Foreign Office, 12 
October 1933, FO371/17156,F6508/583/23.
51. In 1932 Japan's exports o f cotton piece-goods to India were three times larger than her exports to the 
British colonies, see tables 2.1, and 3.1; See also chapter 3.
52. Minute by Randall 21 June 1933, FO371/17154,F4096/583/23.
53. Meeting between Wilson, Matsudaira, and Kadono, 22 June 1933, F0371/17154,F4275/583/23.
54. Meeting between the Board of Trade and the Japanese cotton textile delegation, 6 September 1933, 
F0371 /17156,F6058/583/23; Minute by Allen, 19 January 1934, F0371/18177,F347/347/23.
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Lancashire and Japan to establish any ground rules for the forthcoming negotiations 
significantly weakened any chance of success. The fundamental problems were 
geographical scope and the inclusion of the rayon industry. The Japanese sought to limit the 
negotiations to those markets in which Britain had commercial jurisdiction and to cotton 
textiles, which naturally excluded Dominion and third markets, and the rayon industry.53 In 
contrast, and with the firm support of the Board of Trade,56 Lancashire insisted that there 
could be no geographical limitations and that the Japanese rayon industry must be 
represented at the cotton trade negotiations. Furthermore, the British government's 
willingness to act as a tacit guarantor of any cotton agreement elicited no similar response 
from the Japanese.57 This failure to agree a basis for the negotiations carried over into the 
actual discussions. When negotiations began in late February 1934 they were almost 
immediately adjourned, and effectively terminated by 14 March 1934, as the delegates still 
could not resolve the question of geographical scope. The Japanese insisted the negotiations 
should be confined to areas under direct British control, i.e. Britain and the British Crown 
Colonies; while Lancashire demanded that the global market must be included in the 
discussions. However, the fundamental problem was that Lancashire saw Japanese trade 
restraint in terms of Japan reducing exports - or at least Japanese exports remaining static 
until there was either an increase in world trade or an increase in Lancashire's exports of 
cotton piece-goods - while the Japanese found this proposal totally unacceptable.58
Faced by the impasse between the delegates, both the British and Japanese 
governments backed their own cotton industries. No attempts were made to pressure either 
delegations to back down and accept a compromise agreement. Barlow, the leader of the 
Lancashire delegation and President of the 'Special Committee on Japanese Competition', 
informed the British government that there was no prospect of the talks succeeding because 
of the unwillingness of the Japanese to extend the geographical scope of the talks beyond the 
British Crown Colonies.59 The Board ofTrade and the Foreign Office already supported this
55. Matsudaira to the Foreign Office, 8 August 1933, FO371/17155,F5305/583/23.
56. The Board ofTrade to Matsudaira, 11 August 1933, F0371/17155,F5416/583/23; Meeting between 
Wilson, Matsudaira, and Kadono, 22 June 1933, F0371/17154,F4272/583/23.
57. Meeting of Sir H. Wilson, Matsudaira, and Kadono, 22 June 1933, F0371/17154,F4275/583/23.
58. Wilson to Vansittart, 8 March 1934 and 14 March 1934, F0371/18177,F1382, F1464/347/23; Beer 
(Board ofTrade) to the Foreign Office, 22 February 1934, FO371/18177,F1012/347/23; Dupree M. 
(ed.), various entries, pp. 279-313; The Manchester Chamber o f Commerce, Monthly Record, February 
1934, p. 32, and March 1934, pp. 69-75.
59. On 8 March 1934 the Lancashire delegation wanted to terminate the cotton trade talks but was
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viewpoint, that a solution to the Anglo-Japanese cotton dispute required a worldwide 
agreement, since any agreement limited solely to the British Crown Colonies would only 
result in intensified Anglo-Japanese competition outside the area of the cotton trade 
agreement.60 In a similar fashion the Japanese government refused to force the Japanese 
cotton industry into a compromise and in order to terminate negotiations put forward no 
counter proposals after the 14 March adjournment.61 Lindley stated that since the Japanese 
cotton industry was under attack from Lancashire, the Japanese government was unable to 
pressure the cotton manufacturers into a compromise with Lancashire. He continued, that 
the Japanese government did not fear the breakdown of the negotiations, or the denunciation 
of the Japanese Trade Treaty, so long as some suitable legal framework was established in 
which to conduct trade.62 Further, there were strong objections within the Japanese 
government to increased trade restrictions on Japanese exports. Lindley stated that the 
overriding objection within the Japanese government to a continuation of the cotton trade 
negotiations arose from the hostility of the Japanese Treasury to any new export restriction 
that would decrease the foreign earnings capacity of the Japanese cotton industry.63 Thus the 
cotton trade negotiations broke down, having made no headway in solving Lancashire-Japan 
trade friction, and disproved Runciman's and Cunliffe-Listefs belief in a Lancashire-Japan 
cartel as the solution to Japanese competition. However, given the evident Japanese 
preference for trade discrimination in the British Crown Colonies over an Anglo-Japanese 
cotton trade agreement, the way was now clear for further British trade discrimination 
againstJapan.
persuaded by the President of the Board ofTrade to make one further proposal to the Japanese, Wilson 
to Vansittart, 8 March 1934, F0371/18177,F1382/347/23; Wilson to Foreign Office, 14 March 1934, 
F0371/18177,F1464/347/23.
60. This position had been stated to the Japanese by the Board ofTrade in April 1933, Beer (Board of 
Trade) to the Foreign Office, 22 February 1934, FO371/18177,F1012/347/23. For Foreign Office 
concurrence see, Orde to Lindley, 8 March 1934, F0371/18177,F1329/347/23.
61. Matsudaira to Wilson, 31 March 1934, F0371/18177,F1841, F1904/347/23.
62. Lindley (Tokyo) to Foreign Office, 4 March, 13 March, and 19 March, FO371/18177,F1203, F1431,
FI 938/347/23; Report o f the Committee on Japanese Trade Competition, April 1934, CAB CP. 
106(34). A further consideration for the Japanese government was that, in January 1934, they had 
already forced the Japanese cotton industry into a considerable climb down over the Indo-Japanese 
Cotton Trade Agreement.
63. Lindley (Tokyo) to Foreign Office, 19 March, F0371/18177,F1938/347/23.
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The introduction of Colonial quotas on cotton piece-goods.
When the cabinet debated the introduction of trade discrimination against Japan for the first 
time on 8 March 1933, the Secretary of State for the Colonies pressed for the safeguarding of 
Lancashire’s cotton piece-good exports throughout the British colonies. Cunliffe-Lister was 
anxious to appease opinion in Lancashire by giving in to demands for substantial colonial 
trade preference.64 However, the case for widespread colonial trade discrimination was 
halted by Runciman's insistence that prior to the adoption of any such measures Lancashire 
should pursue cartel negotiations with Japan Nevertheless, the poor prospects of 
Lancashire in both the India and London negotiations, and the continued criticism of the 
government in Lancashire,65 indicated that, in the event of the failure in London, the 
government would have to meet these demands. In anticipation, in December 1933, even 
before the London negotiations had begun, the Board ofTrade prepared the ground,66 in the 
full knowledge that the Foreign Office had no objection to extending trade discrimination 
against Japan.67 This was developed into a paper, in March 1934, which reflected 
Runciman’s strong view that while colonial trade discrimination against Japan would have to 
be conceded to Lancashire, this could not be at the expense of the 1911 Anglo-Japanese 
Trade Treaty. The Board remained convinced that without Treaty safeguards the potential 
losses to British and British imperial economic interests from Japanese retaliation 
outweighed the benefits to Lancashire of Treaty denunciation.6* In this paper the Board of 
Trade strongly endorsed Cunliffe-Lister's colonial quota scheme, as it offered the prospect of 
colonial trade protection for Lancashire without the abrogation of the Trade Treaty. In only 
one respect did the Board’s quota scheme differ from the earlier proposal, since it envisaged 
a slightly larger import quota for Japanese piece-goods in order to meet the needs of native
64. Memorandum of the Secretary of State for the Colonies, 'Japanese Competition in the Textile Trade', 3 
March 1933, CAB 24 CP. 54(33).
65. Wurm C., pp. 257-260. Lancashire was particularly critical of the government for failing to secure 
adequate trade concessions from the India tripartite cotton talks, The Manchester Chamber o f 
Commerce, Monthly Record, December 1933, pp. 335-337; See chapter 3.
66. Memorandum by the Board ofTrade, 'Japanese Trade Competition’, 11 December 1933, 
FO371/17157/,F7706/583/23.
67. Foreign Office memorandum 14 December 1933, F0371/17152,F7824/128/23.
68. In addition to the trade surplus of the Dominions and India with Japan, the Board ofTrade noted that 
without Treaty safeguards some 8.5 million tons of British shipping engaged in Japan's overseas trade, 
and some £63 million o f British investment in Japan, were vulnerable to Japanese retaliation. 
Furthermore, in March 1934 the Japanese Diet had passed a bill which strengthened its government's 
ability to retaliate against foreign economic discrimination, memorandum of the President of the Board 
ofTrade, March 1934, CAB 24 CP. 81(34).
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consumers for cheap Japanese cotton textiles, and reduce Japanese resentment against the 
quota scheme. Furthermore, in respect to Japanese reactions, and again echoing Cunliffe- 
Listefs earlier proposal, the Board argued that the quota scheme had advantages over Treaty 
denunciation, since it avoided the need to impose penal import duties on Japanese goods, 
and therefore would be less offensive to Japanese opinion.69 Thus even prior to the 
breakdown of the Lancashire-Japan cotton trade talks, through the endorsement of Cunliffe- 
Lister's 1933 proposal, the Board had prepared its case for colonial discrimination against 
Japan yet without the denunciation of the T rade T reaty.
The subsequent breakdown of the cotton trade negotiations confirmed that the 
British government now had to meet Lancashire’s demand for some form of widespread 
colonial trade discrimination against Japan. Runciman, supported by the Foreign Office, 
informed the cabinet that the Manchester Chamber of Commerce was totally opposed to the 
continuation of the talks. In the opinion of the Chamber any attempt to prolong the talks 
would be a waste of time.70 Runciman now presented the colonial quota scheme to the 
cabinet as the only means of ensuring colonial trade protection for Lancashire without the 
necessity for Trade Treaty abrogation. He warned that the government must now forestall 
the outcry of Lancashire for the denunciation of the 1911 Anglo-Japanese Trade Treaty, by 
offering an alternative policy of trade discrimination against Japan, otherwise, ”we shall be 
asked to embark on what amounts to a commercial war with Japan, with the help of such 
allies as we can muster”.71 On the recommendation of Runciman a cabinet committee was 
established to assess the question of British trade discrimination against Japan.72 However, 
within the cabinet committee there was little dissent from Runciman’s clear conviction that 
only the quota scheme could meet the requirements of trade protection for Lancashire 
without the denunciation of the Trade Treaty. As already noted the Foreign Office had told 
the Board ofTrade that they had no objections to further trade discrimination against Japan. 
In a memorandum of 12 March 1934, which reflected Lindley’s confident belief that the 
Japanese both expected and would not overreact to colonial trade discrimination, the
69. Memorandum of the President o f the Board ofTrade, March 1934, CAB 24 CP. 81(34).
70. Dupree M. (ed.), entries 6, 8, and 14 March 1934, pp. 306-308; Report o f the Cabinet committee on 
Japanese Trade Competition, 12 April 1934, CAB 24 CP. 106(34).
71. Memorandum of the President of the Board ofTrade, 'Japanese trade competition', 9 March 1934, CAB 
24 CP. 67(34).
72. Memorandum of the President of the Board ofTrade, 'Japanese trade competition', 9 March 1934, CAB 
24 CP. 67(34).
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Foreign Office once again reaffirmed this view. Compared to 1933 the political situation in 
Japan was stable, and so long as there was no Treaty abrogation, there was no need to "refrain 
from measures of self-defence in [the] colonies".73 Indeed during the course of the cabinet 
committee's deliberations Lindley reinforced the established conviction that British colonial 
trade discrimination was acceptable to Japan. On 6 April 1934 he telegraphed the Foreign 
Office to state that the Japanese could tolerate a reduction of their trade by some 200 million 
yards,74 an amount that almost equalled Japan’s exports of cotton piece-goods to the British 
colonies.75 Thus with the firm backing of the Board ofTrade and Foreign Office the cabinet 
committee quickly endorsed the quota scheme. The committee did not disagree with the 
Board’s and Foreign Office's view on the need to avoid the treaty denunciation, while the 
objections of Neville Chamberlain, the Chancellor of the Exchequer, and Simon, to the 
abandonment of a cartel agreement with Osaka76 quickly evaporated once it was definite that 
the Japanese had no interest in resuming the Lancashire-Japan cotton trade negotiations. 
Thus the committee passed its recommendation on to the cabinet that the Colonial Office 
should prepare a quota scheme for imports into the British colonies that would reduce 
Japanese imports by 100 million yards.77 Consequently with the endorsement of the 
committee on 17 April the cabinet agreed to the introduction of Colonial quotas. Its only 
significant recommendation was that when the Japanese were informed of the scheme it 
should be done in as moderate a manner as possible.78 However, the actual quota scheme 
prepared by the Colonial Office, implemented in May 1934, resurrected Cunliffe-Lister's 
original demand for the basis of the import quota to be more favourable to Lancashire than 
the committee's recommendation, and the virtual exclusion of all Japanese imports from the 
British colonies.79
The introduction of colonial quotas had the desired political effect, and immediately 
eliminated the campaign of the Manchester Chamber of Commerce for any further drastic 
form of trade discrimination against Japanese cotton piece-goods. In a new less radical
73. Foreign Office memorandum, 12 March 1934, F0371/18177,F1278/347/23.
74. Lindley (Tokyo) to the Foreign Office, 6 April 1934, F0371/18178,F1938/347/23.
75. See table 2.1.
76. Cabinet Committee, 'Japanese Trade Competition', 27 March 1934, CAB 27/568.
77. 'Report of the Committee on Japanese Trade Competition', 12 April 1934, CAB 24 CP. 106(34).
78. Cabinet Conclusions, 18 April 1934, CAB 23 16(34)4.
79. Wurm C„ p. 280.
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mood the Chamber was prepared to accept colonial quotas as providing adequate protection 
from Japanese competition in the British colonies. Treaty denunciation was no longer a 
prerequisite for trade protection. Indeed radicalism on trade issues was on the wane in 
Lancashire. In January 1934 a 'ginger group’ of seven Conservative MPs who broke away 
from the main Lancashire campaign and demanded the abrogation of the T rade Treaty found 
themselves totally isolated and were quickly forced to abandon this stance.80 Thus by early 
1934 it was the moderates who had regained the initiative over trade issues in Lancashire. 
With the breakdown of the talks, while the government decided future policy, the majority of 
the Lancashire MPs overrode the demands of the 'ginger group' for the imposition of colonial 
trade discrimination against Japan,81 a proposition that was endorsed by both the Special 
Committee on Japanese Competition and the Federation of British Industries.82 To these 
moderates colonial quotas provided sufficient protection for Lancashire. After being 
informed by the Board ofTrade of the introduction of colonial quotas, Streat recorded in his 
diary the evident satisfaction of much of the Lancashire cotton textile community, "A 
thrilling and dramatic week”... "On the whole everybody was pleased with the prospect of 
action. I wonder what it will all lead to. The Japs will almost certainly take it very rough”.83 
However, in contrast to Streat’s opinion that Colonial quotas were a dramatic measure which 
was bound to upset Japanese opinion, there was a noticeable lack of reaction in Japan. The 
introduction of colonial quotas did not lead to any major strain in Anglo-Japanese relations. 
In fact Sansom speculated that the Japanese manufacturers were relieved the British 
government had taken action since it meant they could no longer be forced into an unwanted 
Anglo-Japanese cotton agreement by the Japanese government.84
Indeed for the British government, in contrast to the lack of reaction in Japan, 
colonial quotas presented by far the greater problem for its relationship with the colonies. 
For some time it had been expected that some ’nationalist’ colonial legislative bodies might 
refuse to implement the necessary legislation, since the discriminatory quotas on Japanese
80. Ishii O., pp. 165-166, 176-178; Pearce R. (ed.), Patrick Gordon Walker: Political Diaries 1932-1971 
(The Historians’ Press, London; 1991), entry 18 March 1934, pp. 62-63; Wurm C., p. 259.
81. The Manchester Guardian, 16 March 1934.
82. Wurm C., p. 276.
83. Dupree M  (ed.), entry 4 May 1934, p. 325. In contrast the Manchester Chamber of Commerce was 
more moderate in public, The Manchester Chamber o f Commerce, Monthly Record, May 1934, pp. 
129-130, 133-135.
84. Dodds (Tokyo) to Foreign Office, 19 May 1934, F0371/18178,F2929/347/23.
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cotton piece-good imports would deprive impoverished native consumers of a source of 
cheap cotton textiles. While Lancashire worried at the possible dissipation of colonial 
quotas, the British government, and Cunliffe-Lister in particular, was totally alarmed by this 
potential challenge to British authority in the colonies. However, while all the other British 
colonies passed the colonial quota legislation the Ceylonese Legislative Assembly refused 
to do so.85 On questions of trade protection for British goods the nationalist Ceylonese 
Legislative Council had already demonstrated its independence from British policy. In 
January 1933, and much to the horror of Lancashire, the Legislative Council had excluded 
cotton piece-goods from the Ottawa imperial preferences.86 However, over the question of 
Colonial quotas Cunliffe-Lister refused to allow the Legislative Council such license. He 
warned the British cabinet that if the Legislative Council did not pass the Colonial quota 
legislation then he was prepared to empower the Governor of Ceylon to override the 
Legislative Council through an Order-in-Council authorised by London.87 The anticipated 
opposition did arise in the Legislative Council and after several unsuccessful attempts 
between the British government and the Ceylon governor to reach a compromise on 25 July 
1934 Colonial quotas were introduced in Ceylon by Order-in-Council.88 Thus for the British 
government it was the bending of colonial opposition to British policy that provided a more 
acute problem than the moderate Japanese reaction to the introduction of Colonial quotas.
85. There had been some worries that Malta might also refuse to implement the colonial quota legislation but 
these fears proved to be untrue, the Colonial Office to the Foreign Office, 4 May 1934,
F0371/18178, F2581/347/23.
86. The Manchester Chamber o f Commerce, Monthly Record, February 1933, p. 47. The Manchester 
Chamber of Commerce complained that Ceylon was being flooded with Japanese goods 'offered at less 
than cost price', while between 1929 and 1932 exports o f Lancashire cotton piece-goods had fallen by 
nearly 50%. Moreover, while Lancashire's goods did not enjoy imperial preference, British imports of 
Ceylonese tea, which did enjoy imperial preference, had increased by 12.5% between 1929 and 1932, 
The Manchester Chamber o f  Commerce, Monthly Record, p. 31.
87. Report o f the Committee on Japanese Trade Competition, April 1934, CAB 24 CP. 106(34).
88. There was no opposition in the British government to the imposition o f Colonial quotas on Ceylon, 
although the Foreign Secretary did worry that in imposing an 'anti-Japanese' measure in a dependent 
territory it would set a bad example for Japan to follow in her dependent territories. Cabinet 
Conclusions, 27 June 1934 CAB 23 26(34)11, 4 July 1934, CAB 27(34)7, 18 July 1934 CAB 23 
29(34)5, 25 July 1934, CAB 23 30(34)9.
110
The British government and trade discrimination against Japan
Colonial quotas and Anglo-Japanese relations, 1935-1937.
Following the introduction of Colonial quotas the policy was reviewed to see if a modified 
version might be more effective in furthering Lancashire’s trade interests and Anglo- 
Japanese relations. Within the British government doubts were raised over the effectiveness 
of Colonial quotas in switching Japanese trade to Lancashire. These concerns coincided 
with suggestions that the easing of British colonial trade restriction on Japanese goods could 
improve Anglo-Japanese relations. In particular the Foreign Office worried that British 
trade discrimination against Japan was having an adverse effect upon Anglo-Japanese 
relations. Furthermore, these British fears coincided with tentative Japanese moves to ease 
Anglo-Japanese tension through an Anglo-Japanese economic understanding. However, 
any successful review of Colonial quotas depended upon the willingness of the Lancashire 
and Japanese cotton industries to reach a prior commercial understanding which had so far 
eluded them.
In late 1935, over a year after the implementation of the Colonial quotas, the 
Colonial Office raised some doubts over the effectiveness of the quota system in diverting 
lost Japanese trade to Lancashire. The first analysis of the effect of Colonial quotas 
indicated that although Lancashire’s trade had increased as a result of discrimination against 
Japan, much of the lost Japanese trade had been diverted to third countries. In a comparison 
of Nigerian cotton textile imports, between the first six months of 1934 and the same period 
of 1935 following the imposition of cotton quotas, the Colonial Office concluded that whilst 
Japanese textile exports had fallen from £55,000 to £15,000 neither Britain nor third 
countries had been able to fill the gap of this lost Japanese trade. The native consumers who 
could only afford cheap Japanese textiles prior to the introduction of Colonial quotas could 
no longer afford the more expensive British and non-Japanese substitutes. Moreover, 
although the Colonial Office welcomed the increase ofLancashire’s exports it was clear that 
exporters other than Lancashire and Japan had benefited most from the quota system.89 The 
Colonial Office concluded that this discrepancy in the quota system allowed the potential of 
a revision that either secured Lancashire a greater share of the lost Japanese trade, or 
modified discrimination against Japan if it resulted in no negative counterbalancing effect 
for Lancashire.90 However, this did not challenge the need for trade discrimination against
89. See table 2.4.
90. Colonial Office memorandum, 'Japanese Textile Competition in the Colonial Empire', 29 November
1935, FO371/19359,F7670/546/23.
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Japan but raised the possibility of an improved administrative system. The British 
government remained acutely aware of the importance of Colonial quotas to Lancashire, and 
that Lancashire would not easily tolerate interference in the system.91 The Board ofTrade 
described Colonial quotas as the "one bright spot in Lancashire's export markets",92 while the 
Colonial Office was in no doubt of the importance of Colonial quotas to Lancashire, and that 
"the quotas are therefore responsible not only for an increase in British trade but for 
preventing a decrease”.93 Thus even if a revised quota system could deliver both trade 
protection to Lancashire and an increased volume of Japanese exports, the prior suspicions 
of Lancashire inhibited further investigation.
However, slightly after the Colonial Office considered the possible revision of the 
quota system there was a second impetus for change. Both Sir Frederick Leith-Ross, the 
Chief Economic Advisor to the British government and head of the British Economic 
Mission to China, and Yoshida Shigeru, the newly appointed Japanese Ambassador to 
Britain, came to see the revision of Colonial quotas as a means of easing Anglo-Japanese 
political tension in China. Leith-Ross had been sent to China by the British government as 
part of an initiative intended to foster British, Chinese and Japanese cooperation through a 
British sponsored stabilisation of the Chinese currency. However, the mission's objective of 
encouraging Anglo-Japanese cooperation had floundered on the suspicion, hostility and 
indifference of the Japanese to his activities in China. Still, Leith-Ross was unprepared to 
see his mission fail, and saw Japanese resentment against British Colonial quotas as the 
possible key to reducing Anglo-Japanese tension.94 Textiles remained Leith-Ross’s last hope 
of reaching an Anglo-Japanese economic understanding. Therefore in March 1936 he asked 
the Board of Trade, given Japanese resentment, whether Colonial quotas and the Indian 
quota on Japanese cotton piece-good imports could be modified, and in return what
91. The Presidential address of R. Bond, The Manchester Chamber o f Commerce, Monthly Record, 
February 1935, p. 44; The Presidential addresses ofW. E. Clucas, The Manchester Chamber o f  
Commerce, Monthly Record, July 1935, pp. 220-221, and July 1936, pp. 278-279; The Manchester 
Chamber o f Commerce, Monthly Record: annual Report o f  the Board o f Directors, 1935, pp. viii-ix; 
See table 2.5.
92. Draft letter to Leith-Ross, Overton (Board ofTrade) to Orde, 5 May 1936, FO371/20290,F2575/89/23.
93. Colonial Office memorandum, 'Memorandum on Japan's trade with the Colonial Empire',
F0371/20279/,F7639/89/23.
94. Trotter A., chapters 9 and 10.
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assurances would the British and Indian cotton industrialists want from the Japanese.95 In a 
similar fashion to Leith-Ross, Yoshida quickly used his appointment to London to advocate 
an Anglo-Japanese rapprochement, by removing economic friction. Prior to his departure 
for London, he manipulated Hirohito's known pro-British sentiments to advocate an Anglo- 
Japanese economic understanding. Yoshida told Sir Robert Clive, the British Ambassador 
in Japan, that while the Emperor was basically pro-British he remained anxious over various 
Anglo-Japanese trade difficulties. Therefore, Yoshida suggested, an Anglo-Japanese trade 
understanding would be beneficial to Anglo-Japanese relations.96 On his arrival in Britain, 
Yoshida continued vigorously to press the case for an Anglo-Japanese economic 
understanding, and on 26 October 1936 presented his first proposal to the Chancellor, 
Neville Chamberlain, for the settlement of Anglo-Japanese political tensions in China. In 
regard to the settlement of Lancashire-Japan trade friction, Yoshida stated that there should 
be a reasonable quota for Japanese goods in the British colonies, in return for which the 
Japanese would accept voluntary control of cotton textile exports to the British colonies. 
"Such a proposal might include the acceptance by the British Government, on their side, of 
the quantities of textiles and rayon exported by Japan during 1935 as a basis, less a reduction 
on the Japanese side of 20 per cent" Finally, the agreement would last for five years and 
include similar arrangements with the British Dominions.97 Thus both Leith-Ross and 
Yoshida believed that a settlement of Lancashire-Japan trade friction could improve Anglo- 
Japanese relations in China.
Despite Leith-Ross and Yoshida’s optimism over the possible political rewards from 
a revision of Colonial quotas, the British government had no desire to reopen the quota 
question. In fact so strong were the objections of the Foreign Office and the Board ofTrade 
to Leith-Ross raising the issue of Colonial quotas in negotiations with the Japanese that both 
departments immediately forbade him to do so.98 They both agreed that there was little hope 
of Lancashire and Japan making the necessary compromises for a cotton agreement. 
Lancashire would be unwilling to accept any modification of the colonial quota system
95. Leith-Ross (Shanghai) to the Board ofTrade, 9 March 1936, FO371/20290,F1391/1391/23.
96. Clive (Tokyo) to the Foreign Office, 21 May 1936, FO371/20279,F3476/89/23.
97. Draft o f Yoshida’s proposal to Chamberlain, 26 October 1936, F0371/20279,F6511/89/23; Dower J.
W., Empire and Aftermath: Yoshida Shigeru and the Japanese Experience, 1878-1954 (Harvard 
University Press, Cambridge Massachusetts; 1988), pp. 149-153.
98. The Foreign Office to Sir J. Brenan (Shanghai) for Leith-Ross, 30 May 1936,
F0371/20290,F3095/1391/23.
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without some substantial concession from the Japanese. It was accepted as a matter of faith 
that, ’’Any proposal to relax Colonial quotas (without our cotton industry receiving an 
adequate quid pro quo) would certainly meet with the strong opposition from Lancashire”." 
Further, the Foreign Office stated that Leith-Ross could not discuss Indian restrictions on 
Japanese imports, since the Indian government pursued its own commercial policy.100 
Finally, the Foreign Office believed that Leith-Ross’s discussions with the Japanese officials 
about any commercial understanding were irrelevant because for any Anglo-Japanese 
economic talks to be successful the initiative for the talks had to come from Japanese 
industry, otherwise the Japanese government would be unable to pressure the industrialists 
into any agreed compromise.101 This last point was borne out when, in response to a general 
suggestion by Leith-Ross on the need for an Anglo-Japanese economic understanding, the 
Japanese Vice Minister of Foreign Affairs responded that Japanese industry was in no mood 
for any Anglo-Japanese economic talks.102
As with Leith-Ross’s proposal, the British government remained sceptical of the 
prospects of translating the Yoshida proposal into a successful Anglo-Japanese commercial 
understanding. The fundamental British objection lay with Yoshida’s plans for China, which 
if implemented would seriously undermine British influence in China. Sir John Pratt, of the 
China Section of the Far Eastern Department, stated that Yoshida’s proposal would turn 
China into, "a vassal state of Japan”.103 Foreign Office objections to Yoshida’s plans for 
China were so extreme that it killed off interest in a possible Lancashire-Japan trade 
agreement. Particularly, since Yoshida stated that any trade agreement depended upon the 
prior settlement of the China question.104 However, once again the British still doubted if any 
Lancashire-Japan agreement was practicable.10S The continued reluctance of the Lancashire
99. Draft o f letter to Leith-Ross, Overton (Board ofTrade) to Orde, 5 May 1936,
FO371/20290,F2575/l 391/23.
100. Minute by Orde, 4 April 1936, F0371/20290,F1563/1391/23.
101. Foreign Office memorandum, 'Note of the 1934 cotton trade talks', FO371/20290,F1391/1391/23.
102. Clive (Tokyo) to the Foreign Office, 12 June 1936, FO371/20290,F3387/1391/23.
103. Minute by Pratt, 28 October 1936, FO371/20279/,F6511/89/23.
104. Draft of Yoshida memorandum to Chamberlain, 26 October 1936, FO371/20239,F6511/89/23; Dower 
J. W., pp. 153-160.
105. The Colonial Office was in favour of replacing Colonial quotas with a voluntary Lancashire-Japan 
agreement on the grounds that it would be easier to administer and better for Anglo-Japanese relations. 
However, they also conceded that Yoshida's proposals for China were unacceptable and doubted if the 
Dominions would accept Yoshida's arrangements for trade restraint, Ormsby-Gore (Under Secretary of 
State for the Colonies) to the Foreign Office, 11 December 1936, FO371/20279,F7639/89/23.
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and Japanese cotton industries to contemplate any cartel agreement, and the inability of the 
British and Japanese governments to force their respective cotton industries to compromise, 
indicated that there was only a limited chance of obtaining a Lancashire-Japan agreement. 
Anti-Japan sentiment remained so strong in Lancashire that in the summer of 1936 Raymond 
Streat even cautioned against Yoshida’s proposed visit to Manchester.100 Then in January 
1937 the Manchester Chamber of Commerce rejected the discreet enquiries of Yoshida and 
Matsuyama Shinjiro, the Japanese Commercial Counsellor, over the possibilities of a 
Lancashire-Japan trade agreement. Streat told Matsuyama that the experience of the 1934 
cotton trade talks meant that the Chamber would only take Japanese proposals seriously if 
the Japanese cotton industrialists tabled realistic proposals before any new cotton trade talks 
began.107 Thus on 18 January 1937, as part of an unfavourable British reply to the Yoshida 
proposal, the Foreign Office gave a lukewarm response to the question of a Lancashire- 
Japan trade agreement. The British replied that given the experience of 1934 there would 
have to be a global settlement, and not one simply confined to the British Colonies and 
Dominions,108 a reply that contradicted the thrust of Yoshida’s proposal for a Lancashire- 
Japan trade agreement specifically limited to the British Colonies and Dominions.
Despite the failure of the Anglo-Japanese cotton trade talks, given the right 
economic circumstances, there remained the theoretical possibility of the formation of an 
Anglo-Japanese cotton cartel. The British believed that if Japan’s trade expansion showed 
signs of difficulty, the Japanese might be more willing to consider a Lancashire-Japan trade 
agreement. Yet in 1935, although it was predicted that the growth in Japan's exports would 
stagnate, there was precious little evidence that the Japanese faced any substantial economic 
difficulties.109 However, in response to substantial evidence in 1936 that Japanese export 
growth had halted110 not only did they believe that the Japanese would be more amenable to a 
trade understanding, they also worried that it could lead to additional political strains. In 
particular the Foreign Office and the Department of Overseas Trade were concerned that the
106. Minute by Ashton-Gwatkin, 27 August 1936, FO371/20290,F4978/1391/23.
107. Dupree M. (ed.), entry 28 January 1937, p. 473.
108. AideMemorie o f Eden, to Yoshida, 18 January 1937, FO371/21029,F357/28/23; Dower J. W., pp. 
160-162.
109. On Sansom’s, Report on the Economic Conditions in Japan, 1933-34*, Orde minuted, "It is comforting 
to hear that Japanese exports are not expected to increase much this year. But the problem of Japanese 
competition will retrain", 19 March 1935, F0371/19361,F1116/1116/23.
110. See table 1.1.
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Japanese would hold British trade restrictions responsible for the problems faced by 
Japanese exports.111 Sir Edward Crowe, the Head of the Department of Overseas Trade, was 
concerned that in Japanese eyes Britain and the British Empire were seen as responsible for 
every setback of Japanese trade, and that whilst the Soviet Union was regarded as Japan's 
enemy Britain was the "dangerous rival, conspiring all along the line against Japan".112 These 
concerns gelled with the growing desire of the British government to move away from a 
bilateral trade regime. Increasingly, the British government and industry frowned upon 
bilateral trade arrangements and restrictive trade practices, since it was not only a perceived 
impediment to economic recovery but also contributed to international tensions.113 Frank 
Ashton-Gwatkin, the Economic Advisor to the Foreign Office, minuted that it was important 
to get rid of all quotas, "and to get rid of the idea of checking other countries trade by this 
ruthless method".114 However, while these British concerns over trade policy did not 
translate into a British initiative towards Japan, it did make British officials receptive to 
Japanese hints, over the summer and autumn of 1936, that they intended to send an important 
economic missionto Britain in order to foster better Anglo-Japanese relations.115
However, while the British welcomed the announcement in March 1937 that the 
Japanese government intended to send an important economic mission under Kadono 
Chokyuro, a senior director of the Japan Economic Federation, to America, Germany and 
Britain, with the objective of cementing better mutual economic relations116 given past 
failures, it remained difficult to see how the mission could ease Lancashire-Japan trade
111. The Economic and Statistical Department of the Joint Committee of Cotton Trade Organisations, of 
the Lancashire cotton industry, reported on the importance o f trade restrictions in halting the expansion 
of Japanese exports o f cotton piece-goods. In June 1936 they stated that Japanese cotton piece-good 
exports faced restrictions in 56 out of the 106 export markets distinguished in the official Japanese 
export statistics, which effected some 67% of Japanese exports. Further, British trade preferences were 
a noticeable component o f  these trade restrictions. Some 16 o f the restrictions on Japanese goods were 
in the form of tariff preferences granted to Lancashire, the Japanese cotton industry's number one rival, 
The Manchester Chamber o f Commerce, Monthly Record, September 1936, pp. 369-370; Bokyo 
Hyakunenshi, Bosekikyokai Soritsu lOOnen Kinen [Hundred Year Commemoration of the Establishment 
of the Cotton Spinners’ Association] (Nippon Bosekikyokai; 1987), pp. 43-45.
112. Crowe (Department o f Overseas Trade) to Cadogan (Foreign Office), 13 August 1936, 
FO371/20290,F4978/1391/23.
113. The Manchester Chamber o f Commerce, Monthly Record, October 1936, pp. 414-419.
114. Minute by Ashton-Gwatkin, 12 March 1937, FO371/21039,F277/277/23.
115. Crowe to Cadogan, 13 August 1936, FO371/20239,F4878/1391/23; Ainscough, the British Trade 
Commissioner in Indian, to the Department of Overseas Trade, 22 October 1936,
F0371 /20239,F7090/1391/23.
116. Dupree M. (ed.), entry 2 March 1937, p. 486.
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friction. Raymond Streat recognised that the Kadono mission was a substantial gesture by 
the Japanese, and enthused over the beneficial effect of a Lancashire-Japan agreement on 
Anglo-Japanese relations. Nevertheless, he still appreciated that from Lancashire's 
perspective any trade agreement depended upon the willingness of the Japanese cotton 
interests to accept some form of export restraint."7 Unfortunately there was little evidence 
that the Japanese cotton industry would adopt any form of export restraint. Even before 
details of the mission had emerged, the Foreign Office had grave doubts over the possibility 
of a Lancashire-Japan trade agreement. Robert Scott-Fox, the Third Secretary of the Far 
Eastern Department, did not doubt the interest of the Japanese government in an Anglo- 
Japanese trade agreement, he simply found it difficult to imagine that the Japanese cotton 
industry had any incentive to put forward proposals sufficiently attractive to Lancashire."8 
Once again reports from Osaka confirmed that the Japanese cotton industry was reluctant to 
participate in trade talks with Lancashire. A director of one Japanese cotton firm told 
Oswald White, the British Commercial Counsellor in Osaka, that no cotton delegate had 
been appointed to the Kadono mission because the Japanese cotton industry believed there 
was no prospect of a Lancashire-Japan cotton trade agreement, since Lancashire could not 
accept any voluntary agreement that allowed for the increase of Japan's cotton exports, 
whilst the Japanese could nojaccept an agreement that did not. White recorded that, "His 
reply was that so long as Great Britain’s sole aim was to maintain the status quo, Japan had 
nothing to gain by negotiation". White believed that it was only after Kadono's personal 
intervention that a cotton delegate was appointed to his mission. Yet even the appointment 
of an influential delegate was used to signal the Japanese cotton industry's lack of interest in 
an agreement with Lancashire. Not only was Kodaira, the President of the Dai Nippon 
Boseki Company and a senior figure in the Japanese cotton industry, a noted member of the 
school that did not favour reaching an agreement with Lancashire, he was also given no 
powers of negotiation by the Japanese cotton industry authorities."9 With this gloomy 
summation of the Japanese cotton industry's interest in the Kadono mission, Clive too had 
great difficulty in contradicting White's assessment. The only optimistic note he could 
suggest was that at least Japanese opinion was not hostile to the departing Kadono mission, 
and although the Japanese expected no concrete achievements from the mission it might
117. Streat to Brown (Board ofTrade), 4 February 1937, FO371/21039,F277/277/23; Streat to Hughes
(Chairman of the Committee of the Cotton Trade Organisations), 4 March 1937,
F0371/21039,F277/277/23.
118. Minute by Scott-Fox, 12 March 1937, FO371/21039,F277/277/23.
119. White (Osaka) to Tokyo, 19 August 1937, F0371/21039,F2859/277/23.
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clear the ground for future negotiations.120
The Kadono mission visited Lancashire in late July 1937, and as expected made no 
concrete contribution to the easing of Lancashire-Japan commercial rivalries. The mission's 
talks in Manchester amounted to little more that a public relations exercise, which was all 
the more effective because no detailed economic talks tookplace.121 Thus as in 1934 cotton 
trade talks between Lancashire and Japanese industrialists proved incapable of reducing 
economic friction, and showed no sign of easing Anglo-Japanese tensions. Indeed as an 
indication of the true importance of the Kadono mission in Japanese foreign policy, with the 
outbreak of the Sino-Japanese War in July 1937, the mission was quickly recalled, since it no 
longer had an obvious function in these dramatically changed circumstances.122
120. Clive (Tokyo) to the Foreign Office, 22 April 1937, FO371/21039,F2313,F2859/277/23.
121. The Manchester Chamber o f Commerce, Monthly Record, August 1937, pp. 347-352.
122. Holland R_, 'The Federation of British Industries and the International Economy, 1929-1939', 
Economic History Review (1981), p. 296.
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Trade discrimination against Japan in Dominion and third markets.
After the introduction of Colonial quotas Lancashire continued demanding either trade 
restrictions against Japanese cotton piece-goods or that trade preferences in favour of 
Lancashire to be extended to both the British Dominions and other third markets. Lancashire 
believed that British economic leverage and Empire sentiment should be manipulated for 
the benefit of Lancashire's exports. However, the British government had only very limited 
influence over the Dominions’ commercial policies. The Ottawa Conference demonstrated 
that even in the Depression the Dominions placed their own economic self-interest before 
British imperial economic interest and sentiment. Obviously, the pursuit of economic self- 
interest would be even more pronounced in third countries, even those politically dependent 
upon Britain. A further weakness in this bilateral approach was that if the relevant market 
was more dependent upon the Japanese market for its exports then the country or British 
Dominion concerned was as likely to grant trade preferences to Japanese goods. Moreover, 
in bilateral trade negotiations the British government had to contend with the needs of other 
economic interests aside from Lancashire. Therefore the British government was unlikely to 
pursue trade negotiations for the benefit of Lancashire that jeopardised a similar amount of 
trade in another sector. Finally, although the Dominions remained politically and militaj^ 
dependent upon Britain they were aware that their own foreign interests diverged from 
British interests. In relation to Japan, the geographically isolated Dominions of Australia 
and New Zealand had a greater concern over the political consequences of any trade 
restrictions placed upon Japanese goods.
Following Britain's introduction of domestic protection Lancashire feared that the 
British government had wasted opportunities in granting preferences to exporters to the 
British market for similar reciprocal trade preferences. Bilateral negotiations with the 
Dominions for improved preferences for Lancashire cotton piece-goods had failed, the most 
notable being prior to the Ottawa Conference when the Canadian cotton industry rejected a 
Lancashire-Canada market sharing agreement of the Canadian cotton textile market.123 In a 
similar fashion little headway had been made with third countries. Lancashire feared that 
unless the British government negotiated favourable trade preferences, Lancashire would 
lose Dominion and various third markets that had not already been subject to substantial 
Japanese export penetration Lancashire feared that a concerted push by the Japanese cotton
123. The Manchester Chamber o f Commerce, Monthly Record, July 1932, pp. 193-196.
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exporters backed by the Japanese government could force them out of these remaining 
markets. For example, it was widely rumoured in 1933 that the Japanese government 
intended to facilitate increased exports of cotton piece-goods to South America through 
increased purchases of South American produce.524
However, within the British government there was only limited support for 
Lancashire's demands to extend trade preferences for Lancashire or trade discrimination 
against Japanese goods. The British government recognised that widespread global 
discrimination against Japanese cotton textile exports orchestrated by Britain would place a 
tremendous strain on Anglo-Japanese relations. Only Cunliffe-Lister, the Colonial 
Secretary, favoured the British government’s pursuit of trade discrimination against Japan 
beyond the British Colonies. In March 1933, when he outlined his proposals for trade 
discrimination against Japanese goods in the British Colonies, he stated that the introduction 
of trade discrimination against Japan would act as an example that could be copied by India 
and the Dominions.525 However, he found no support within the British government. 
Runciman, the President of the Board ofTrade, in particular feared the consequences of 
extending trade discrimination against Japan beyond the British Colonies. No matter how 
much pressure there was from Lancashire, Runciman believed that the excessive restriction 
of Japanese exports would provoke a dangerous reaction in Japan. When the cabinet 
debated the introduction of Colonial quotas in March 1934 Runciman stated that any attempt 
to extend Colonial quotas was dangerous since: "It is probable,..., that any concerted attempt 
by any large section of the world to prevent or substantially restrict such expansion would 
have grave political consequences".126 There was already extensive trade discrimination 
against Japanese goods in the Dominions and third countries,127 and Runciman had no desire 
for the British government to promote this trend. However, he had no objection to legitimate 
bilateral negotiations where third countries proposed trade preferences for Lancashire’s 
cotton piece-goods in return for British trade concessions, so long as it did not involve
124. The Manchester Ship Canal Company to the Department of Overseas Trade, 9 September 1933, 
F0371/17156,F1571/1571/23; Memorandum of the British Commercial Secretary in Lima to the 
Department o f Overseas Trade, 13 October 1933, F0371/17157,F6873/583/23; The British Legation in 
Lima to the Department o f Overseas Trade, 13 October 1933, F0371/17157,F6997/583/23.
125. Memorandum by the Colonial Secretary, ’Japanese Competition in the Textile Trade', 3 March 1933, 
CAB 24 CP. 54(33).
126. Memorandum of the President of the Board ofTrade, 'Japanese Trade Competition', CAB 24 CP. 
81(34).
127. See table 2.6.
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Britain in the active promotion of trade discrimination against Japan in these markets.128 
Indeed so adamant was the opposition of Runciman that the Foreign Office did not have to 
voice any concerns over the globalisation of trade discrimination against Japan. The 
warnings of Lindley, the British Ambassador in Tokyo, that the Japanese would only accept 
limited trade discrimination were scrupulously adhered to by Runciman. Thus when the 
issue of Colonial quotas came before the cabinet in April 1934 the issue of pursuing trade 
discrimination beyond the British Colonies was not discussed.129 Furthermore, the 
abandonment of radicalism on trade questions by the main Lancashire cotton interests 
significantly reduced pressure on the British government for the active pursuit of trade 
discrimination against Japan outside the British colonies. The introduction of Colonial 
quotas had witnessed the demise of radicalism and this process continued in 1934 when both 
the Manchester Chamber of Commerce and the Federation of British Industries rejected the 
radical idea that the British government should threaten the withdrawal of most favoured 
nation treatment from third countries in order to establish trade discrimination against 
Japanese competition.130 In falling back upon this 'orthodox' posture they accepted that the 
British government only had limited room for improving bilateral trade without the willing 
cooperation of reciprocating partners. However, this did not stop criticism of the British 
government for failing to pursue bilateral trade agreements with suitable vigour.
In keeping with the decision of the cabinet the British government did not seek to 
actively extend trade discrimination against Japan. Indeed even at times of heightened trade 
friction between Japan and certain Dominions, in particular during the Canada-Japan and 
Australia-Japan trade wars, the British government was reluctant to actively promote 
Lancashire's interest at the expense of Japan. Canadian-Japanese trade friction exploded in 
May 1935 when the Canadian-Japanese renegotiation of the Canadian Exchange Dumping 
Duty’ on Japanese imports was rejected by the Canadian government.131 This rejection led to
128. Memorandum by the President o f the Board ofTrade, 'Japanese Trade Competition', 9 March 1934, 
CAB CP. 67(34); Memorandum by the President of the Board ofTrade, March 1934, CAB CP. 81(34).
129. Cabinet Conclusions, 18 April 1934, CAB 23 16(34)4.
130. The Federation of British Industries Report on Japanese Competition, 13 June 1934, 
F0371/18172,F3923/159/23; The Manchester Chamber o f Commerce, Monthly Record, June 1934, p. 
167.
131. The surtax was initially levied against Japanese goods in December 1931 in order to protect domestic 
Canadian producers from cheap Japanese imports. However, it was not intended to benefit the 
Canadian cotton textile industry or Lancashire's exports of cotton textiles to Canada, because in 1931 
Japanese exports o f cotton goods to Canada remained negligible, The Canadian High Commissioner to 
the Dominion Office, 16 April 1935, 16 April 1935, and 1 May 1935, 
FO371/19358/F2508,F3414/456/23; Ishii O., pp. 364-366.
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a brief ’trade war1, as the immediate Japanese boycott of Canadian lumber imports was 
bolstered by the imposition in July 1935 of a Japanese surtax upon eight Canadian imports 
under the 1934 Trade Protection Law;132 and the Canadian government retaliated with its 
own surtax on Japanese imports in August 1935. However, the ’trade war’ was ended by 
mutual consent in December 1935, when the newly elected Canadian Liberal Party Prime 
Minister, Mackenzie King, abandoned the protectionist policy of the preceding 
Conservative government and settled Canadian trade relations with both Japan and 
America.133 However, during the whole period of the Canada-Japan Trade war' there was no 
attempt by the British government or Lancashire to exploit the situation to Lancashire's 
advantage.
In contrast to Canada, in 1933-34 Australia appeared to encourage trade relations 
with Japan and East Asia. In 1934 Sir John Latham, the Minister of External Affairs and 
Industries, was dispatched on a goodwill tour of East Asia, and in February 1935 Australia- 
Japan trade talks aimed at developing trade relations opened in Canberra.134 However, the 
mood for improved trade relations with Japan dramatically changed in Australia. Australian 
manufacturers started to voice fears over Japanese competition,133 while Joseph Lyons, the 
Australian Prime Minister, on a tour to Britain in 1935 promised to help the Lancashire 
cotton industry.136 In January 1936, the trade negotiations in Canberra reached an impasse, 
as the Australians now repudiated previous promises to lower tariffs against Japanese goods, 
and threatened a cotton and rayon quota on Japanese exports to Australia unless the Japanese
132. Clive (Tokyo) to the Foreign Office, 11 May 1935 and 23 July 1935,
F0371/19358,19359,F3554,F5389/456/23; However, the Japanese government did not impose the 
surtax upon vital Canadian imports, e.g. nickel, lead, zinc etc., The Canadian High Commissioner to the 
Dominion Office, 26 July 1935, F0371/19358.F5381/456/23.
133. The Japanese boycott of Canadian lumber had led to strong protests from British Colombia, the main 
exporter of lumber to Japan, that the interests of British Colombia were being sacrificed by the Canadian 
government, The British High Commissioner in Canada to the Dominion Office, 16 August 1935, and 
10 December 1935, F0371/19358,19359,F5381,F7797/456/23; Ishii O., pp. 364-370.
134. Lyons to the Dominion Secretary, 4 February 1935, F0371/19360,F805/805/23; Shepherd J., 
Australia's Interests and Policies in the Far Elast (Institute of Pacific Relations, New York; 1940), pp. 
24-29, 34-35; Hubbard G. E., pp. 354, 357; Ishii O , pp. 371-377.
135. Statement of the President of the Associated Australian Chambers of Manufacturers, The Times, 1 
February 1935.
136. The Australian Association of British Manufacturers to the Dominion Secretary, 28 February 1935, 
FO371/19360,F1432/805/23; The Australian Association of British Manufacturers to Gullett, 14 
February 1935, F0371/191360,F1740/805/23; The Manchester Chamber o f Commerce, Monthly 
Record, June 1935, p. 183.
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introduced some measure of voluntary restraint on Japanese cotton exports to Australia. In 
April 1936 the Australian-Japanese trade negotiations broke down,137 and on 22 May Henry 
Gullett, the Minister for Trade and Treaties, announced Australia's new trade diversion 
policy: Australian trade was to be diverted away from Japan and America and towards 
Britain. In keeping with this policy Gullett introduced higher tariffs on Japanese textile 
imports and lower tariffs on British textile imports.138 The abandonment of the pro-Japanese 
and East Asian trade policy of 1933-34 reflected Australian concern that improved Japanese 
access to the Australian market, particularly in cotton textiles, would jeopardise reciprocal 
economic relationships with the British market.139 Although the Japanese market was 
important for Australian wool and wheat exports, the British market was far more important 
for a whole range of Australian primary exports. Therefore if British manufactured exports 
to Australia were threatened by Japanese competition Australians feared that Britain would 
have no incentive to offer Australian goods preferential access to the British market. On 
introducing the new textile tariffs on Japanese and British products, Gullett emphasised the 
need to maintain good relations with the British manufacturers for the maintenance of 
Australian exports to Britain:
At the moment there is no immediate prospect of recapturing our old position for 
primary produce in foreign markets. If we are not to come to a national standstill, 
primary production must be increased, and the only way it can be increased is by 
selling more of our rural output in the British market.140
In a similar fashion trade was to be diverted from America and towards Britain because the 
American government had refused to improve the access of Australian primary produce to 
the American market.141
137. Whiskard, the Australian High Commissioner to the Dominion Office, 27 April 1936, 
FO371/20281,F3087/l 19/23.
138. Whiskard to the Dominion Office, 19 May 1936, FO371/20282,F3303/l 19/23; Shepherd J., p. 44.
139. The Dominion Office to the Foreign Office, 30 January 1936, FO371/20281,F586/l 19/23.
140. The Manchester Guardian, 23 May 1936.
141. Sir Henry Whiskard, the Senior British Trade Commissioner in Australia, stated that the trade diversion 
policy had been applied to Australia-America trade because the American government had refused to 
enter into trade negotiations with Australia, Whiskard to the Dominion Office, 19 May 1936, 
FO371/20282,F3303/l 19/23; Drummond I. M., Imperial Economic Policy, 1917-1939 (George Allen 
& Unwin, London; 1974), pp. 394-395, 401. However, the Australian Trade Diversion Policy did not 
reap major reciprocal benefits in the British market. British official noted that the limitations of prior 
bilateral treaties meant Britain could offer Australia few trade concessions without offending other trade 
partners. One British official complained that Hhowever anxious Australia may be to increase her 
exports to the U.K., it is far from certain that we can take increased supplies o f the sort of commodities 
which Australia produces, and indeed increased shipments [from Australia] of such things as meat
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The abrupt reversal in Australian tariff and trade policy did not result from British 
pressure on the Australian government to extend trade discrimination against Japan. Ishii 
speculates that when Australian meat quotas to Britain were discussed during Lyons and 
Gullett's tour of Britain in 1935, the Dominion Office did pressure the Australians for the 
improved access ofLancashire’s textiles to the Australian market.142 However, such pressure 
for reciprocal trade benefits was typical of contemporary trade practice, and indeed the basis 
for the 1935 Australia-Japan trade talks. Otherwise the British government had no direct 
involvement in the Australian introduction of the trade diversion policy of May 1936. 
Within Whitehall the Board of Trade welcomed Australia's trade policy, and although 
privately the Foreign Office worried about the foreign policy repercussions of Australian 
trade discrimination against Japan, it informed the Dominion Office that the Australian 
tariff action caused no foreign relations complications with Japan.143 Indeed British officials 
were critical of the Australian government’s invitation to Japan to trade talks to improve 
Australia-Japan trade, and feared that Britain would be blamed by the Japanese for the 
subsequent Australian reversal of this policy.144 In contrast to British officials Lancashire 
sought to undermine any negotiated improvement in Australia-Japan trade, and in March 
1936 sent a trade mission to Australia in order to spoil the Australia-Japan negotiations. 
However, despite some offensive references by members of the Lancashire delegation, 
suggesting the importation of Japanese textiles manufactured by 'coloured labour' was a 
breach of the White Australia' policy,145 there was little evidence that their activities had any 
impact on the Austral ian introduction of the trade diversion policy. The Senior British Trade 
Commissioner to Australia noted that the change in the Australian governments attitude to 
trade with Japan predated the arrival of the Lancashire delegation.146
involves us in continual difficulties with Argentina and other suppliers", Department o f Overseas Trade 
to the Foreign Office, 5 May 1936, and 23 May 1936, F0371/20281,F2552/119/23. In response to 
Australia's Trade Diversion Policy Britain made some minor concessions over Australia's meat exports 
to Britain at the expense of Argentina's meat exports to Britain, Drummond I. M., Imperial Economic 
Policy, 1917-1939, pp. 402-403; Shepherd J., p. 65.
142. Ishii O., p. 394.
143. Overton (Board of Trade) to the Foreign Office, 11 February 1936, FO371/20281,F781/l 19/23;
Minute by Orde, 3 February 1936, FO371/20281,F568/l 19/23; Orde to the Dominion Office, 20 
February 1936, FO371/20281.F857/119/23.
144. Dominion Office to the Foreign Office, 13 February 1936, Minute by Henderson, 17 February 1936, 
FO371/20281,F857/l 19/23.
145. Dalton to the Dominion Office, 2 April 1936, FO371/20281,F2552/l 19/23.
146. Department of Overseas Trade to the Foreign Office, 5May 1936, FO371/20281,F2552/l 19/23.
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However, the increase in tariff preference for Lancashire’s textiles was undermined 
by the Japanese tariff retaliation to the Australian trade diversion policy, which forced the 
Australian government to abandon the May 1936 duties on Japanese cotton and rayon 
textiles. After a brief trade war trade negotiations were resumed in July 1936.147 In 
December 1936 both governments agreed to abandon all retaliatory tariff restrictions, and to 
implement new duties and quotas. The Australian government reduced the duty on Japanese 
textiles to permit the entry of Japanese textiles into the Australian market at 1935 volumes, 
while the Japanese government permitted the entry of Australian wool and wheat into the 
Japanese market at 1935 levels of duty.148 In contrast with Lancashire's favourable reception 
to the Australian tariff revisions of May 1936 the Lancashire cotton industry regarded the 
new Australian tariffs as a blow to its economic position in Australia.149 Thus for Lancashire 
bilateral trade relations proved to be a difficult issue. Access to the British market and 
imperial sentiments did not guarantee Lancashire effective long-term discrimination against 
Japanese goods within the Australian market.
In a similar fashion to trade relations with the Dominions, bilateral trade 
negotiations with third countries for improved preferences for Lancashire’s textiles yielded 
ambivalent results. The two main regions of Lancashire-Japan trade rivalry were the Middle 
East and South America. In the Middle East British commercial diplomacy proved 
inadequate to halt and reverse Japanese commercial penetration in the region. Japanese 
exports of cotton piece-goods to the region rose from 118,131,000 square yards (for Egypt 
and Turkey only) in 1929 to 494,542,000 square yards by 1935; in contrast Lancashire’s 
exports to the same region fell from 355,164,000 square yards in 1929 to 93,515,000 by 
1935.150 However, despite Britain’s continued political dominance of the region, the British 
government found it impossible to convert this political dominance into a substantial 
commercial advantage. By the early 1930s most governments in the region had achieved
147. Clive (Tokyo) to the Foreign Office, 30 June 1936, FO371/20282,F4667/l 19/23; Ishii O., pp. 406-408.
148. The Dominion Office to the Foreign Office, 29 December 1936, FO371/20282,F8058/l 19/23; 
Shepherd J., pp. 60-64.
149. The Manchester Chamber o f Commerce, Monthly Record, June 1936, pp. 233-235, and January 1937, 
pp. 15-16; Presidential address of W. E. Clucas, Manchester Chamber o f Commerce, Monthly Record, 
July 1936, p. 276; Redford A., pp. 258-259.
150. Shimizu H., Anglo-Japanese Trade Rivalry in the Middle East in the inter-war period (Ithaca Press, 
Oxford; 1986), table 8, p. 61.
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political and/or economic independence151 and proved jealous guardians of their own 
commercial policy. Thus trade discrimination against Japan arose not from direct British 
pressure but from concern arising over the threat of Japanese competition to domestic 
industries, or the failure of Japan to take sufficient domestic agricultural exports.
For example in 1930 Egypt achieved tariff autonomy, and from 1930 to 1937 used 
this new tariff freedom to benefit its own domestic cotton growers and cotton textile 
industry. Despite Egyptian fears of Japanese competition against their infant cotton industry 
the Lancashire cotton industry derived little benefit from Egyptian tariff discrimination 
against Japanese cotton textile imports. In 1934 and 1935 successive British government 
proposals for Lancashire's increased preferential access to the Egyptian market, through the 
institution of a cotton quota system similar to the Colonial quota system, were rejected by the 
Egyptian government. The Egyptians objected to the British proposal because it did little for 
poor Egyptian consumers who depended upon cheap Japanese textile imports and did little 
to promote the Egyptian raw cotton industry,152 a point recognised by the Lancashire cotton 
industry.153 In regard to discriminating against Japanese competition the Egyptian 
government had a clear strategy: it was prepared to act, but only for the benefit of the 
domestic economy and not so that one foreign competitor could gain an advantage over 
others. In July 1935 the Egyptian government denounced the 1930 Egyptian-Japanese 
Commercial Agreement and in September 1935 introduced an exchange depreciation surtax 
upon Japanese imports. However, the Egyptians told the British that the intention of these 
moves was part of a negotiating strategy to force the Japanese cotton industry to take more 
Egyptian raw cotton.154 Although the October 1935 to June 1936 Egypt-Japan trade talks 
proved fruitless,155 and Japanese cotton textile exports to Egypt declined dramatically as the 
depreciation surtax remained in place, the Lancashire cotton industry gained little benefit. 
While Japanese exports of cotton piece goods to Egypt fell from 142.1 million square metres 
in 1935 to 66.6 million square metres by 1937, Lancashire's exports of cotton piece-goods 
only rose from 30.3 million square metres in 1935 to 51.2 million square metres in 1936,
151. Shimizu H., p. 66.
152. Foreign Office minute by Somers-Cocks, 7 November 1934, F0371/17987,F2694/43/16; Shimizu H., 
pp. 108-109.
153. Dupree M. (ed.), entry 9 November 1934, pp. 336-337.
154. St. Quintin Hill (Board of Trade) to Campbell (Foreign Office), 3 February 1936,
FO371/20139,Fl 111/608/16; Shimizu H., p. 109.
155. Shimizu H., pp. 110, 112-113.
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then fell to 43.4 million square metres in 1937.’56 The main beneficiaries of Egyptian tariff 
discrimination against Japan were the Italian and Egyptian cotton textile industries. Italian 
exports of cotton piece-goods to Egypt rose from 15.9 million square metres in 1935 to 66.6 
million square metres in 1937, while Egyptian production of cotton piece-goods rose from 
34.5 million square metres in 1935 to 66.5 million square metres in 1937.157 In contrast to the 
Middle East Japan's economic penetration of South America proved unsuccessful. In 
bilateral trade negotiations with the independent South American governments, unlike the 
British and American governments, the Japanese were unable to offer a substantial market 
for South American agricultural produce in return for the continued access of their 
manufactured goods into these markets.158 Moreover, exports of cotton piece-goods to this 
region were further handicapped by the determination of numerous South American 
governments to foster their own cotton textile industries behind tariff barriers.159
156. Shimizu H., table 15, p. 99.
157. Shimizu H., tables 15 and 17, pp. 99,116. The case of Iraq also reveals the limitations of British 
commercial diplomacy in the Middle East. Not only were British proposals for an Iraqi quota on cotton 
and rayon textiles rejected by the Iraqi government, but also the introduction in May 1936 of trade 
restrictions on Japanese cotton and rayon textiles did not lead to a revival of Lancashire's exports to 
Iraq. Lancashire's exports o f cotton piece-goods to Iraq fell from 495,000 Iraqi dinars in 1931/32 to 
89,000 Iraqi dinars in 1935 and 69,000 Iraqi dinars in 1937. In contrast Japanese exports o f cotton 
piece-goods rose from 66,000 Iraqi dinars in 1931/32 to 950,000 Iraqi dinars in 1935 and despite the 
introduction of trade restrictions in 1936 continued to rise to 874,000 Iraqi dinars in 1937. Japanese 
cotton piece-good exports to Iraq continued to rise because the aim of Iraqi trade restrictions on 
Japanese goods was to increase Japanese purchases o f Iraqi produce. In response to the May 1936 
trade restrictions the Japanese successfully increased purchases o f Iraqi produce and so maintained 
access to the Iraq market, Shimizu H., table 22, p. 130, and pp. 137-148.
158. Ishii O., pp. 288-332.
159. International Labour Office, World Textile Industries: Economic and Social Problems (International 
Labour Office, Geneva; 1937), p. 110.
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Conclusion.
In the period 1933-37, despite strong business pressure for trade discrimination against 
Japan, these forces were effectively managed by the British government. A mixture of 
political and economic considerations led the British government to reject excessive 
business demands and to avoid implementing extreme measure^of trade discrimination 
against Japan. After the failure of the London cartel talks the introduction of Colonial quotas 
in 1934 marked the limit of the British governments active participation in increasing trade 
discrimination against Japan Colonial quotas proved the watershed in stifling Lancashire's 
criticism of the government, as Lancashire recognised the limits of British economic policy. 
Moreover trade discrimination did not spill over into a trade war', as the Japanese cotton 
industry willingly accepted trade discrimination in the British colonies in preference to any 
global Anglo-Japanese cartel agreement. This process continued after the introduction of 
Colonial quotas as both the Lancashire and Japanese cotton industries accepted trade 
restraint in the British colonies as the price for its non-involvement in any global cartel 
agreement with Lancashire. Further, attempts to improve Anglo-Japanese relations by 
reducing British trade restraint floundered as neither the Lancashire nor Japanese cotton 
industries wanted or expected to reach a cotton trade agreement. As Clive stated in 1937, 
prior to the departure of the Kadono mission, he expected the Japanese cotton industry 
would not agree to voluntary trade restraint since, "in principle they dislike [trade restraint] 
but... they are reconciled [to it]".160 Finally, the importance of Anglo-Japanese trade friction 
over cotton piece-goods had been surpassed by Anglo-Japanese tensions in China. Tensions 
in China had reduced cotton friction to a footnote in Anglo-Japanese relations. For example 
when Yoshida sought to improve Anglo-Japanese relations through an economic 
understanding the provisions for voluntary Japanese export restraint to the British colonies 
and Dominions were tied to the prior settlement of Anglo-Japanese friction in China. 
Consequently, because the settlement of the cotton issue depended upon the prior settlement 
of the China issue, it clearly revealed that the latter was far more important than the former in 
Japanese eyes.
In contrast to the easy management of Anglo-Japanese friction over cotton piece- 
goods in the British colonies, the patterns of Anglo-Japanese competition outside this area 
were far more unstable. However, the intricacies of these trade tensions did not result from
160. Clive (Tokyo) to the Foreign Office, 22 April 1937, FO371/21039,F2313/277/23.
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British demands for trade discrimination against Japan but merely reflected unstable 
economic patterns of bilateral trade relations. Any British success in extending trade 
preferences did not result from political dominance over the respective trade partner, but 
stemmed from the British ability to offer reciprocal trade preferences in the British market. 
However, this policy had its limitations. For example, the case of Australian tariff 
preferences to Lancashire in May 1936 proved, that any British trade preferences to one 
trading partner necessarily were at the expense of another trade partner. Moreover the 
Japanese were effective participants in the bilateral trade negotiations: restricted access to 
the Japanese domestic market caused both the Canadian and Australian governments to 
reduce tariff discrimination against Japanese goods.
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Table 2.1: Total imports of British and Japanese cotton textiles into the British Colonial 
Empire, 1929-1933.
Year Quantitiy 
(millions of yards)
Distribution 
(per cent)
Total Britain Japan Britain Japan Others
1929 514.3 283.4 73.5 55.1 14.3 30.6
1930 446.1 219.8 105.2 49.3 23.6 27.1
1931 389.4 157.9 125.2 40.5 32.1 27.4
1932 532.8 262.5 191.9 49.3 36.0 14.7
1933 502.2 188.7 244.9 37.6 48.8 13.6
[Source: Hubbard G. E., Eastern Industrialization and its Effect on the West (Oxford University 
Press, London; 1935), table XTV, p. 38.]
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Table 2.2 : Imports of British and Japanese cotton textiles into specific regions of the 
British Colonial Empire, 1929-1933.
Market and 
year
Quantity 
(millions o f linear yards)
Distribution 
(per cent.)
Total Britain Japan Britan Japan Others
East African 
Markets (i)
1929 109.4 23.6 32.6 21.6 29.8 48.6
1930 92.8 19.3 35.5 20.8 38.2 41.0
1931 96.5 13.0 50.5 14.1 52.4 33.5
1932 95.0 14.6 60.0 15.4 63.2 21.4
1933 104.0 11.7 78.2 11.3 75.2 13.5
West African 
Markets (ii)
1929 141.4 124.4 88.0 22.0
1930 143.2 126.4 88.2 21.8
1931 97.2 86.4 1.0 88.9 1.3 9.8
1932 176.5 159.6 4.4 90.5 2.5 7.0
1933 148.1 113.5 15.6 76.6 10.5 12.9
Ceylon
1929 56.9 27.5 8.2 48.4 14.4 37.2
1930 50.6 19.7 13.4 32.2 25.6 36.2
1931 54.9 16.0 23.7 29.2 43.2 27.6
1932 68.6 15.8 40.4 23.0 58.9 18.1
1933 60.7 9.6 41.4 15.8 68.2 16.0
Malaya
1929 166.5 86.0 34.7 51.6 20.8 27.6
1930 118.0 32.1 56.3 27.2 47.7 25.1
1931 99.9 21.6 49.8 21.8 50.4 27.8
1932 150.0 39.1 85.8 26.1 57.3 16.6
1933 145.9 25.9 99.5 17.8 68.2 14.0
West Indian 
Markets (iii)
1929 41.1 21.9 53.3 46.7
1930 41.5 22.3 53.7 46.3
1931 40.9 20.9 0.2 51.1 0.5 48.4
1932 42.7 33.1 1.3 77.6 3.1 19.1
1933 43.5 28.0 10.2 64.4 23.5 12.1
[Source: Hubbard G. E., Eastern Industrialization and its Effect on the West (Oxford University 
Press, London: 1935), table XTV, p. 38.}
Notes : (i) Kenya, Uganda, Nyasaland, Somaliland, Tanganyika, Zanzibar.
(ii) Gambia, Gold Coast, Nigeria, Sierra Leone (in millions of square yards).
(iii) Barbados, Jamacia, Trinidad, Tobago, British Guiana.
131
The British government and trade discrimination against Japan
Table 2.3 : Japan’s balance of trade with the British Dominions and India, 1931-1933 
(thousands of yen).
Year Australia New Zeaand Canada South Africa India Total
1931 +94,930 -527 +22,606 -17,950 +22,798 +121,857
1932 +97,382 -2,846 +30,943 -13,782 -75,625 +36,072
1933 (Janu­
ary to Au­
gust)
+90,426 -2,399 +27,214 -14,238 +48,778 +149,781
[Source: Board of Trade memorandum, 'Japan's commercial relations with India and the Dominions', 29 No­
vember 1933, FO371/17157,F7600/583/23.]
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Table 2.4 : Effect of Colonial quotas on Nigeria’s imports of selected cotton textiles.
January-June
1934
January-June
1935
Percentage
change
Shirts Total 123,000 37,500 -65.9
Japanese 97,000 2,500 -97.4
British 25,000 30,000 +20.0
Others 1,000 5,000 +400.0
Pullovers Total 70,000 37,000 -47.1
Japanese 59,000 2,000 -96.6
British 11,000 33,500 +204.5
Others -0- 1,500
Singlets Total 1,221,000 269,000 -77.9
Japanese 1,189,000 192,000 -83.8
British 30,000 56,000 +86.7
Others 2,000 20,000 +900.0
Socks Total 40,600 69,600 +71.4
Japanese 21,000 450 -97.8
British 15,000 37,000 +146.7
Others 4,600 32,000 +595.6
[Source: Colonial Office memorandum, 'Japaense Textile Competition in the Colonial 
Empire', 29November 1935,FO371/F19359,F7670/456/23.]
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Table 2.5 : Lancashire’s exports of cotton piece-goods to selected British colonies after 
the introduction of Colonial quotas (millions of linear yards).
Colony 1934 Percentage increase between 
the 1st and 3rd quarters after 
the introduction of Colonial 
quotas.1st Quarter 3rd Quarter
Bahamas (i) 73,499 300,139 308.3
Barbados 632,487 3,273,770 423.6
Jamacia 1,402,202 6,308,243 349.9
Trinidad (i) 1,007,520 3,153,256 212.9
Windward Islands 272,274 1,316,442 383.5
Cyprus 277,724 755,093 171.9
Nigeria (i) 9,048,128 13,970,764 54.4
Gold Coast (i) 3,372,224 10,648,241 215.8
Sierra Leone (i) 1,066,517 1,382,272 29.6
Gambia (i) 413,885 749,023 80.9
Ceylon 1,792,768 5,996,835 234.5
Malaya 6,826,000 6,625,000 (ii)
[Source: The Manchester Chamber o f Commerce, Monthly Record, March 1935, p. 86.]
Notes : (i) in square yards.
(ii) For first two months only.
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Table 2.6 : Abstract of trade discrimination against Japan in the British Dominions 
(excluding India) and third countries, in December 1933.
1) T ariff treatment of Japanese goods in the British Dominions.
Canada:
South Africa: 
Australia:
New Zealand:
Newfoundland: 
South Rhodesia:
A tariff against depreciated currencies levied mainly 
against Japanese goods.
An Exchange Dumping Duty, mostly levied against 
Japanese goods.
The Tariff Board had been asked to make a report on 
the introduction of a dumping duty, mainly intended 
to counter Japanese imports.
No action, but the Board of Trade believed it would 
follow any British lead.
An Exchange Dumping Duty.
No specific action.
2) A list of countries that had taken some form of specifically anti-Japanese 
trade or tariff measures.
China, Egypt, Germany, Greece, America, and France.
3) Restrictive trade or tariff measures that worked to Japan’s disadvantage, by
industry.
Cotton: 11 countries Handkerchiefs: 10 countries
Rayon: 11 Wool: 12
Cement: 9 Rubber boots: 12
Iron and steel: 10 Pottery: 10
Electric lamps: 10
[Source: Board of Trade memorandum, 'Japanese Trade Competition', 11 December 1933, 
FO37l/17157,F7706/583/23.]
135
Chapter 3.
Lancashire and the Indo-Japanese trade negotiations, 1933-1937,
136
Lancashire and the Indo-Japanese trade negotiations, 1933-1937
Introduction.
In the 1930s Indian trade discrimination against Japanese cotton piece-goods was one of the 
most important sources of trade friction between Britain and Japan. India was the most 
important market for both Lancashire’s and Japan’s cotton piece-good exports, consequently, 
given continued Indian political dependence upon Britain, the Japanese cotton 
manufacturers held the Lancashire cotton industry and the British government responsible 
for Indian trade discrimination against Japanese goods. Thus Indo-Japanese trade friction 
raises two questions in regard to British business and Anglo-Japanese relations: the role of 
the Lancashire cotton industry in the introduction of trade discrimination against Japanese 
goods, and the impact between 1933 and 1937 of Indo-Japanese trade friction on Anglo- 
Japanese relations.
In regard to commercial pressures the British and Indian governments had to balance 
the competing demands of the Lancashire and Indian cotton industries in a political context 
that, since the end of World War One, was increasingly hostile to direct British control of 
Indian commercial policy. While the British government, through the India Office and the 
British appointed Indian executive, still retained both direct and indirect control of India's 
economic and commercial policy, the rise of Indian nationalism in the interwar years 
severely limited the indiscriminate exercise of this authority. British demands for trade 
protection for specific industries had to be balanced against wider British economic and 
strategic interests in India. In order to ensure native Indian cooperation, as exemplified by 
the series of postwar constitutional reforms, the British government was increasingly 
prepared to sacrifice specific British economic interests, as the means of reducing native 
Indian hostility to continued British rule. Thus Lancashire’s demand for trade protection 
from Japanese competition in the Indian market occurred against a background in which the 
British government was no longer prepared to champion the cause of any British economic 
interest group which threatened to destabilise overall Anglo-Indian relations.
However, despite the British government's caution over antagonising Indian 
nationalist opinion the demands of Lancashire for trade discrimination against Japanese 
imports and improved access for Lancashire’s imports into India threatened to do precisely 
this. While both the Lancashire and native Indian cotton industries wanted protection from 
Japanese competition, they diverged considerably as to how this could be achieved in the
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Indian market. Lancashire wanted India to discriminate against Japanese imports while 
maintaining British access to the Indian market; the Indian cotton industry wanted 
protection from both Japanese and Lancashire competition. Consequently, in order to 
balance the demands of the Lancashire and the Indian cotton industries, tariff preference was 
used as the means to discriminate against Japanese competition whilst giving Lancashire 
preferential access to the Indian market. However, in practice, by the early 1930s, the Indian 
cotton manufacturers secured a level of tariff preference for Lancashire that provided them 
with an adequate level of protection from Lancashire's competition. Thus Lancashire 
increasingly saw cooperation with the Indian cotton manufacturers against Japanese 
competition, backed by the threat of sabotaging Indian constitutional reform, as the only 
means of securing its access to the Indian market.
Finally, Indian trade discrimination raised the spectre of Japanese political and 
commercial retaliation against India and/or the British Empire. The threat of such 
retaliation was heightened by the fact that the Indian market was far more important to 
Japanese cotton manufacturers than the British Crown Colonies. Furthermore, while the 
Indian government could not easily contemplate Japanese economic retaliation that 
jeopardised India's substantial exports to Japan. Thus the demands of the native Indian 
cotton manufacturers for substantial trade protection against Japan added another 
destabilising factor in Anglo-Indian relations. The British desire to appease Indian 
nationalism through specific commercial gestures ran counter to the British government's 
firmly held desire to avoid any extreme measure of trade discrimination against any third 
party. Thus the British government confronted the nearly hopeless task of meeting India’s 
and Lancashire's demands for the framing of Indian tariff policy to suit their respective 
interests whilst minimising the threat of Japanese retaliation.
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Lancashire and the Indian market in the 1920s.
Before 1914 India was the world’s most important market for cotton piece-goods, and even 
after the disruptions of the war India’s primacy as the world’s most important cotton piece- 
good import market was not affected. Between 1927-29 Indian imports of cotton piece 
goods were some 30 times greater than America's, and the India market accounted for some 
25% of the world’s exports of cotton piece-goods.1 For Lancashire, even after the tightening 
of world trade after World War One, India remained the largest export market. In the 1920s 
over a quarter of Lancashire's total cotton piece-good exports went to India, which 
represented between 30-40% of British manufactured exports to India.2 Thus the Lancashire 
cotton industry depended heavily upon the Indian cotton piece-good market for its survival 
as a large scale export orientated industry. Therefore it could not countenance the 'loss' of 
the Indian market as the result of foreign competition or the closing of the Indian market due 
to domestic protectionism.
In the 1920s, despite some recovery of exports to India, Lancashire’s export volumes 
remained sharply down on the prewar period. As noted in chapter one, Indian per capita 
consumption of cotton piece-goods declined sharply between the prewar and postwar 
periods, while at the same time Indian production of cotton piece-goods had increased 
sharply. Further, the ’poverty' of the Indian market limited Lancashire's ability to export 
greater quantities of fine cotton piece-goods. However, for Lancashire the greatest 
challenge to its volume of exports to India was the increased duties placed upon cotton 
piece-goods by the Indian government. In Lancashire’s phase as the exemplar of Victorian 
laissez faire capitalism, the Lancashire cotton industry had forced the British and Indian 
governments in 1896 to introduce an internal 3.5% excise duty on Indian mill produced 
cotton piece-goods as a countervailing duty to the 3.5% tariff imposed on Indian cotton 
piece-good imports.3 However, British laissez faire capitalism virtually ended during World 
War One, when in order to raise revenue to meet a budget deficit, the Indian government 
ignored Lancashire’s protests and in 1917 raised the duty on cotton piece-good imports to
1. See tables 1:3, and 3:1; Statistical abstract o f the United States (United States government printing
office, Washington; 1930).
2. See table 1:1.
3. Hametty P., The Indian Cotton Duties Controversy, 1894-6', English History Review (1962), pp. 684-
702; Hubbard G. E., Eastern Industrialisation and its Effect on the West (Oxford University Press,
London; 1935), pp. 260-261.
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7.5% without any corresponding increase in the countervailing excise duty on Indian mill 
production.4 British control of India tariff policy was further weakened when in response to 
wartime commitments to Indian ’responsible government’ the British government adopted 
the Montague-Chelmsford reforms in 1919,5 and granted the Indian government sovereignty 
in tariff matters through the Fiscal Autonomy Convention of 1919: which was enforceable 
from 1921.6 Under the auspices of the Fiscal Autonomy Convention the Indian ad valorem 
duty on cotton piece-good imports was increased to 11% in 1921, again with no 
complementary increase in the countervailing excise duty. Protection for the domestic 
cotton industry was again increased through the suspension in December 1925, and abolition 
in March 1926 ofthe excise duty on Indian mill produced cotton piece-goods.7
Lancashire was deeply disturbed by the rise of the Indian cotton industry behind 
increased tariff protection, and was only partially successful in hindering successive rises in 
the effective rate of tariff protection for the Indian cotton textile industry. In 1921 
Lancashire protested against the rise of the Indian tariff on cotton piece-goods, and 
demanded that the British government utilise the clause in the Fiscal Autonomy Convention 
that allowed the British government to overrule the Indian Legislative Assembly.* However, 
the British government proved unwilling to antagonise Indian opinion through such a direct 
intervention in Indian commercial affairs and rejected Lancashire's demand out of hand.9
4. Nishikawa H., Nippon Teikoku Shugi toMengyo [Japanese Imperialism and the Cotton Industry]
(Minerva Shobo, Kyoto; 1987), p. 290; Feamley A. C., 'The Manchester Chamber of Commerce, 
Lancashire Textiles and British Imperial Trade, 1919-1939' (Unpublished MLitt, Oxford University; 
1986), pp. 184-186; Redford A , Manchester Merchants and Foreign Trade, 1850-1939. Volume II 
(Manchester University Press, Manchester; 1956), pp. 278-279; Chatterji B., Trade, Tariffs, and 
Empire: Lancashire and British Policy in India, 1919-1939 (Oxford University Press, Delhi; 1992), p. 
199.
5. McIntyre W. D., The Commonwealth o f Nations (Oxford: 1977), pp. 209-212; Kulke H. and Rothermund
D ,,A  History o f India (Routledge, London; 1992), pp. 272-273; Chatterji B., pp. 202-204.
6. However, on the basis of both the British appointed Viceroy and his Executive Council disagreeing with
any legislation of the Indian Legislative Assembly, the British government did retain the right to veto 
this legislation, Hubbard G. E., p. 262; Chatterji B., pp. 14-15, 204.
7. See table 3:6; Nishikawa H., pp. 290, 292-295; Chatterji B., pp. 238-256.
8. The Manchester Chamber o f Commerce, Monthly Record, March 1921, p. 99, and April 1921, pp. 143-
148; Dai Nippon Boseki Rengdkai Geppo, June 1921, Indo Yunyuzei Hikiageru ni taisuru Rankasha 
Mengyosha no Hantai Undo' [The Lancashire Cotton Industrialists movement against the Indian Tariff 
Increase], and September 1921, Indo Menpu Yunyuzei Zocho Mondai' [The Indian cotton piece-good 
tariff increase problem] and 'Eikoku ni Okeru Menseihin Indo Yunyuzei Hikiageru Hantai Undo' [The 
movement in Britain against the increased tariff on cotton manufactures]; Nishikawa H., p. 290;
Redford A , pp. 279-280; Chatterji B., pp. 209-210.
9. The Secretary o f State for India rejected Lancashire's demand on the grounds that prevention of the tariff
increase required the vetoing of the whole finance bill, and that the whole of the Indian government's
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The British government’s refusal to intervene indicated that in order to sustain British 
control of India,10 Lancashire’s sectional interests could be sacrificed to appease Indian 
nationalists, and that in regard to tariff policy there would be no return to the prewar status 
quo. Lancashire recognised the decline of influence on India’s tariff policy, and made no 
further protests to either the British or Indian government over the suspension and abolition 
of the excise duty on Indian mill produced cotton piece-goods." However, despite the 
display of neutrality over Indian tariff questions Lancashire retained a deep-seated hostility 
to the development of the Indian cotton industry. It insisted that through a process of 
'balanced development', the Indian market should be exploited for the mutual benefit of both 
the Lancashire and Indian cotton industries.12 Lancashire would supply the fine piece-goods 
and India the coarse piece-goods to the Indian market.13 However, the native Indian 
millowners showed little enthusiasm for the policy,14 and any realistic chance of a balanced 
Anglo-Indian development of the Indian market was undermined by the successful Japanese 
penetration of the same market.
In the 1920s increased Japanese competition emerged as a new threat to Lancashire’s 
position as the leading exporter of cotton piece-goods to India. Japanese cotton
precarious finances could not be thrown into chaos merely for the benefit of Lancashire, the Secretary 
of State for India to the Manchester Chamber of Commerce, 23 March 1921, in The Manchester 
Chamber o f Commerce, Monthly Record, April 1921, pp. 148-154; Redford A., p. 279; Chatterji B.,
pp. 210-211.
10. In regard to Indian economic questions the British government’s overriding concern was to conduct 
Indian fiscal and monetary on terms that were advantageous to Britain and the British Empire, Chatterji
B., pp. 74-82, 87-92; Rothermund D., An Economic History o f India: From Pre-Colonial Times to 
1991 (Routledge, London; 1993), pp. 76-82.
11. The Manchester Chamber o f Commerce: Annual Report o f the Board o f  Directors and Trade Sections, 
1925, p. xiv; Nishikawa H., pp. 294-295; Redford A , p. 280; Chatterji B., pp. 257-260.
12. Dai Nippon Boseki Rengdkai Geppo, June 1921, Indo Yunyuzei Hikiageru ni taisuru Rankasha 
Mengyosha Hantai Undo’ [The Lancashire cotton industrialists movement against the India tariff 
increase], and September 1921, Indo Menpu Yunyuzei Zocho Mondai' [The Indian cotton piece-good 
tariff increase] and Eikoku ni Okeru Menseihin Indo Yunyuzei Hikiageru Hantai Undo' [The movement 
in Britain against the increased tariff on cotton manufactures]; Nishikawa H., p. 290.
13. The Manchester Chamber o f  Commerce, Monthly Record, December 1925, p. 384; Dai Nippon Boseki 
Rengdkai Geppo, January 1926, Indo Menpu Shohizei Teppai to Eikoku no Taido' [The withdrawal of 
the Indian consumption tax on cotton-piece goods and Britain's attitude], and February 1926, Indo 
Menpu Kokusanzei Chushi to Eikoku no Seiron' [The suspension of the Indian excise duty on national 
cotton piece-good production and British public opinion]; Nishikawa H., pp. 294-295; Redford A , p. 
280.
14. Dai Nippon Boseki Rengdkai Geppo, January 1926, Indo Menpu Shohizei Teppai to Eikoku no Taido'
[The withdrawal of the Indian consumption tax on cotton-piece goods and Britain's attitude]; Nishikawa 
H., p. 295.
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manufacturers had first taken advantage of the disruptions of World War One to penetrate 
the Indian market,15 and this export success survived both the postwar slump and the return of 
Lancashire's competition. Throughout the 1920s Japan's volume and share of the Indian 
market increased, so that by 1928 Japan exported over 350 million linear yards of cotton 
piece goods to India, amounting to 20% of India’s imports, and 25% of Japan's total cotton 
piece-good exports.16 However, Japan’s export success threatened not only Lancashire’s 
exports to India but also the Indian cotton industry, which by the mid-1920s became 
increasingly alarmed at the inroads of Japanese competition in the Indian market. The 
postwar intensification of Japanese competition resulted in Indian cotton manufacturers' 
demands for further domestic tariff protection. The crusade was led by the native Bombay 
millowners, who produced mainly cheap grey piece-goods, and were thus suffering most 
from Japanese competition.17 However, in recognition of Lancashire's continued hostility to 
further tariff protection for the Indian cotton textile industry, the Indian government refused 
to endorse another increase in the duty on cotton piece-good imports.1* Thus in order to 
circumvent Lancashire's Veto' on further tariff increases the Bombay millowners demanded 
that tariff discrimination should be introduced against Japanese goods.19
However, Bombay's case for a discriminatory tariff treatment of Japanese cotton 
textiles was undermined by the refusal of other native Indian business interests to endorse 
trade discrimination against Japan. Indian business interests feared Japanese retaliation 
against their exports,20 while the pro-nationalist native Ahmedabad millowners - who
15. Nishikawa H., pp. 284-285.
16. See table 3:2.
17. Markovits C., Indian Business and Nationalist Politics, 1931-1939 (Cambridge University Press,
London; 1985), pp. 20, 29-31, 37-39; Report o f  the Millowners' Association o f Bombay fo r  the year, 
1931 (1932); The Bombay Millowners* Association to the Indian Tariff Board, 31 May 1932, in The 
Indian Tariff Board. Cotton Textile Industry: Volume 1, The representations submitted to the India 
Tariff Board by the applicants fo r  protection (Manager of Publications, Delhi; 1934), p. 15; Dai 
Nippon Boseki Rengdkai Geppo, July 1925, Indo Menpu Shohizei Mondai (2)' [The Indian cotton 
piece-good consumption tax problem (2)]; Rothermund D., pp. 86-88; Nishikawa H., pp. 293-294.
18. For example in 1922 the general import tariff on manufactured goods was increased to 15% while the
11% tariff on cotton piece-good imports was still retained, Chatterji B., p. 163, footnote 193, and p.
215, and chapter 6.
19. The Manchester Chamber o f Commerce, Monthly Record, July 1926, pp. 209-212; Nishikawa H., pp. 
296-299; Chatterji B„ pp. 275, 277-278.
20. Dai Nippon Boseki Rengdkai Geppo, February 1926, Indo Menpu Kokusanzei Chushi to Eikoku no
Seiron' [The suspension of the Indian excise duty on national cotton piece-good production and British 
public opinion], and ’ Indo Sh6k6gy6sha Taikai’ [India Chambers’ of Commerce Meeting], and May 
1926, 'Bonbei Bosekigyosha no Nichi-In Tsusho Joyaku Haki Undo' [The Bombay Cotton Spinners' 
movement for the abrogation of the Indo-Japan Trade Treaty]; Nishikawa H., pp. 296-297.
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produced higher grades of cotton piece-goods and so were in more direct competition with 
Lancashire’s cotton piece-goods - rejected the need for discriminatory tariffs against Japan.21 
The divisions within the Indian cotton textile industry reinforced the Indian government’s 
prejudice against further tariff protection for the Indian cotton industry and tariff 
discrimination against Japanese imports. The Indian government rejected both the Bombay 
millowners’ request for discriminatory tariff protection against Japanese competition, and 
the recommendation of the Indian Tariff Board that the general cotton piece-good tariff 
should be increased from 11 % to 15%.22 Although the Indian TariffBoard recommended the 
increase of the general tariff on cotton piece-good imports, like the Indian government they 
also rejected as totally unacceptable Bombay’s request for tariff discrimination against 
Japanese imports.23 A final demand by the Bombay Millowners' Association for increased 
protection, through the introduction of a specific duty on cotton piece-good imports, was 
rejected in 1929.24 Thus the Bombay millowners’ attempt, from the mid-1920s, to curb 
Japanese imports through either an increase in the general tariff or tariff discrimination were 
hindered by Lancashire’s opposition to any further increases of the general tariff, and the 
unwillingness of the Indian government and Indian business to endorse tariff discrimination 
against Japan.
In the face of Indian demands for both tariff protection and tariff discrimination
against Japan, Japanese cotton manufacturers stuck to a rigid defence of their right - as
enshrined in the most favoured nation clause of the 1904 Indo-Japanese Trade Convention -
\
of equal access to the Indian market. As the most competitive suppjer to the Indian market, 
the Japanese had little to fear, so long as tariff equality was maintained and Lancashire 
pressure ensured that the Indian market remained 'open'. However, from the early 1920s the 
Japanese recognised the strength of Indian fears in regard to Japanese competition.25 The
21. Markovits C., pp. 20, 33, 37-39; Report o f  the Millowners’Association o f Bombay for the year, 1931 
(1932).
22. The Indian government to the Bombay millowners’ Association, 26 March 1926, in The Manchester 
Chamber o f Commerce, Monthly Record, July 1926, pp. 210-212; Anstey V., The Economic 
Development o f  India (Longmans, London; 1931), pp. 263, 277-278; Redford A., p. 281; Chatterji B., 
pp. 275, 281, 282-287.
23. The Manchester Chamber o f Commerce, Monthly Record, June 1927, pp. 182-185; Nishikawa H., p. 
299; Chatteiji B., p. 281.
24. The Manchester Chamber o f Commerce, Monthly Record, December 1929, pp. 381-384; Feamley A
C., p. 199; Redford A , p. 281; Chatteiji B., pp. 298-305.
25. Dai Nippon Boseki Rengdkai Geppo, February 1923, Tndo Menpu Kokusanzei Teppai Mondai' [The
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main fear of the Japanese was the introduction of preferential tariffs by the Indian 
government. In January 1921 the Dai Nippon Boseki Rengdkai Geppo (The Monthly Journal 
of the Great Japan Spinners' Association) stated that preferential tariffs for Lancashire 
would not aid Indian cotton manufacturers against Japanese competition, since Lancashire’s 
and Japan’s cotton piece-goods were not in direct competition.26 By the mid-1920s in the 
face of the continued campaign by the Bombay millowners for tariff protection against 
Japanese piece-good imports, the Japanese cotton manufacturers started to make a more 
principled defence of Japan’s right of equal access to the Indian market. In representations to 
the Indian Tariff Board the Japanese cotton manufacturers emphasized the legitimacy of 
their production methods,27 and that tariff discrimination against Japanese products would 
be both unjust and counterproductive for Indo-Japanese trade.28 The Japanese threatened 
that if tariff discrimination was introduced against Japanese cotton piece-goods, Japan 
would retaliate against their substantial imports of Indian raw cotton and pig iron.29 
Unfortunately for the Japanese, their insistence on equal access to the Indian market was 
increasingly at odds with the Indian cotton manufacturers’ demand for the effective control 
of Japanese imports.30
problem of the abolition o f the Indian excise duty on national cotton piece-good production!; Nishikawa 
H., pp. 292-293.
26. Nishikawa H., p. 315.
27. Dai Nippon Boseki Rengdkai Geppo, May 1926, 'Nichi-In Boseki no Kyoso' [Japan-India Spinning
Competition]; Nishikawa H., pp. 297-299.
28. Dai Nippon Boseki Rengdkai Geppo, February 1926, pp. 1-2, Indo Seifu ni Teishutsu no Chinjutsusho'
[A Declaration for Presentation to the Indian government] and pp. 2-10, 'Nippon Boseki jigy6 ni taisuru 
Indo no gikai ni kansuru Chinjutsusho' [A Declaration Regarding India's Misunderstanding o f Japan’s 
Cotton Spinning Operations]; Report o f  the Indian Tariff Board (Cotton Textile Enquiry): Volume 3, 
Evidence o f Local Governments, Official witnesses, Chambers o f Commerce, Labour Organisations 
and other Associations (Government o f India, Calcutta; 1927), pp. 193-206; Fletcher W. M., The 
Japanese Business Community and National Trade Policy, 1910-1937 (University of North Carolina 
Press, Chapel Hill; 1989), pp. 79-80.
29. Dai Nippon Boseki Rengdkai Geppo, September 1927, Indo Menshi Kanzei Hikiageru Jijo' [The 
circumstances for the increase in the Indian cotton yam tariff]; Nishikawa H., pp. 297-299, 315. The 
Japanese suspended a proposed increase in the duty on pig-iron imports as a means o f influencing the 
Indian decision o f the cotton piece-good tariff Dai Nippon Boseki Rengdkai Geppo, February 1927, 
Indo Seifu no Teishutsu no Chinjutsusho' [A Declaration for Presentation to the Indian government]; 
See table 3:3 for the importance of Japanese consumption of Indian raw cotton production.
30. Indeed the Japanese protest of 1921 that imperial preference would be o f no advantage to Indian cotton 
manufacturers since there was only a limited amount o f competition between Lancashire and Japanese 
goods underlined the point that Indian cotton manufacturers - particularly Bombay - were solely in 
competition with the Japanese. Thus it clearly indicated that if the Indian cotton manufacturers wanted 
tariff protection - as they did - the main target of this tariff protection should be Japanese imports.
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Despite the growth of the Indian cotton industry and Japanese competition in the 
1920s Lancashire still maintained a large export volume to India, and retained its position as 
the largest exporter of cotton piece-goods to India. Japanese competition in the Indian 
market did not prove an immediate disaster for Lancashire; until 1931 - and without any 
measure of tariff preference- Lancashire supplied over 50% of all Indian piece-good 
imports.31 Furthermore, because the Indian market remained ’open', even with a shrinking 
market share Lancashire still exported some 1.2-1.5 million linear yards of cotton piece- 
goods to India, which represented approximately 30-35% of Lancashire's total exports.32 
Within the Indian market, adjustments were taking place to Japan's advantage and 
Lancashire’s disadvantage, but in the long-term if the Indian market remained 'open' then 
both Lancashire's and Japan's export volumes could be absorbed, and it would be Indian 
cotton manufacturers who would suffer.33
31. See table 3:2.
32. See tables 3:1 and 3:2.
33. See table 1.11.
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The introduction of Imperial Preference.
The defeat of the campaign for increased tariff protection in 1929 did not stem the Indian 
millowners' demand for the control of cotton piece-good imports. However, the Bombay 
millowners only secured tariff protection when the Depression changed the international 
and national environment and resulted in the Indian government’s willingness to endorse 
tariff protection. The continued economic deterioration of all the Indian millowners' 
position, the growth of Indian nationalism, combined with an international environment in 
which tariff protection was no longer viewed as anathema, enabled the Indian millowners’ to 
secure increased tariff protection. In 1928-29 Indian mill produced piece-good output fell 
by nearly 20%, while imported cotton piece-goods again surged to nearly a 50% share of 
domestic consumption of mill produced cotton piece-goods.34 This time imported cotton 
piece-goods threatened both the Bombay and Ahmedabad millowners, as there was a 
particular surge in both Japan’s and Lancashire’s exports of finer coloured cotton piece-good 
exports to India.35 In December 1929, in response to the deteriorating economic situation, 
the Bombay and Ahmedabad Millowners’ Associations united to present a joint demand 
before the Indian government for an increase of the cotton piece-good tariff.36 The Indian 
business community, after a series of disputes with the Indian government,37 also abandoned 
their moderation on the nationalist cause and joined in support of the Gandhian Civil 
Disobedience movement.38 Thus in early 1930, the Indian government confronted a united 
textile industry, militant nationalism, and its own revenue crises.39 In order to defend 
Britain's wider economic and strategic interests in India, the Indian government abandoned 
Lancashire’s vested interest in the maintenance of a ’open' Indian market and in March 1930, 
it increased the tariff on cotton piece-good imports.
Although the Indian government endorsed tariff protection it also forced through the 
Indian Legislative Assembly the first preferential tariff for Lancashire’s cotton piece-good
34. See table 3.4.
35. See table 3.4 and 3.5.
36. The Bombay Millowners' Association to the Indian Tariff Board, 20 April 1932, in Indian Tariff Board. 
Cotton Textile Enquiry: Volume I (1934), p. 20.
37. Tomlinson B. R., The Political Economy o f the Raj, 1914-1947. The Economics o f  Decolonization in 
India (Methuen, London; 1979), pp. 73-76; Markovits C., p. 68; Chatterji B., pp. 320, 323.
38. Markovits C., pp. 70-71.
39. Nishikawa H., pp. 315-316; Chatterji B., pp. 333-338.
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imports. The introduction of the preferential cotton tariff - given the Indian cotton 
manufacturers hostility to preferential tariffs - appeared to be a major concession to the 
Lancashire cotton industry. However, despite the tariff preference for Lancashire the 
preferential tariff system fulfilled the Indian need for tariff protection against both 
Lancashire’s and Japan’s cotton piece-good imports, since the March 1930 tariff increased 
both the British preferential and non-British preferential cotton duty.40 The differential but 
protective tariff system was maintained by the Indian government as the most effective 
means of protecting the Indian cotton textile industry from both Lancashire’s and Japanese 
competition, and yet appeasing Lancashire opinion by maintaining tariff preference. 
Despite nationalist posturing Indian industrialists appreciated that given residual British 
influence on Indian commercial policy, particularly when Indian products were 
complementary to British imports, effective tariff protection could be achieved through a 
differential but protective tariff system. Since the mid-1920s the Bombay millowners’ 
championing of tariff discrimination against Japanese imports amounted to a de facto 
acceptance of imperial preference as the most effective means of curbing Japanese imports 
and gaining British agreement for the proposed tariff increases.41 Furthermore, Indian tariff 
preference in favour of Lancashire was far less thorough than is usually portrayed.42 The 
Indian nationalists passed an amendment through the Indian Legislative Assembly which 
subjected all grey piece-good imports - as late as 1931 grey piece-goods remained 
Lancashire’s single largest piece-good export by category to India43 - to a 3.5 annas per pound 
minimum specific duty,44 and it was not until 1932 that Lancashire obtained a preferential
40. See table 3.6.
41. In a similar fashion the Bombay millowners championed the Ottawa Conference and Lancashire-Bombay 
cooperation as the best means to gain tariff protection against Japanese competition, Markovits O , pp. 
88-89; Chatterji B., p. 19. Such appreciation of Anglo-Indian cooperation over tariff questions was not 
confined to the Bombay cotton industry. Tata, the Indian steel producer, appreciated that cooperation 
with British steel producers over the introduction o f a preferential iron and steel tariff was the best 
means o f obtaining effective tariff protection against cheap Belgian steel imports, Wagle D. M.,
Imperial Preference and the Indian Steel Industry, 1924-29', Economic History Review (1981), pp. 125-
131. Finally, Indian manufacturers opposition to imperial preference could not be absolute, since they 
too were dependent upon the British Raj for the maintenance o f the existing social order. Indian 
manufacturers quickly realised that if the nationalist card was pressed too strongly the resulting increase 
in economic dislocation and social tensions could affect their business organisations as much as British 
competitors. Consequently, the Indian business community were firm supporters o f the conclusion of 
the Ghandi-Irwin Pact to end Civil Disobedience, and the quick return to constitutional methods to 
advance the Indian nationalist cause, Markovits C., pp. 76-77, 79-80, 82-84; Chatterji B., pp. 18, 319- 
322, 323-325.
42. Nishikawa H., p. 320.
43. See tables 3.6 and 3.7.
44. For a specific duty the effective ad valorem tariff rate increases as the price falls, thus the effective rate
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minimum specific duty on grey piece-goods. The effectiveness of the differential tariff 
system can be gauged by the fact that both the Japanese and Lancashire cotton industries 
objected to the Indian tariff increases. The Japanese complained of tariff discrimination,45 
while Lancashire complained of a preferential tariff that involved higher duties for 
Lancashire goods and the non-preferential specific duty on grey piece-goods.46 Thus, 
contrary to appearances, the introduction oflndian tariff protection, through the preferential 
tariff system, marked a new phase in the decline of Lancashire’s influence upon Indian tariff 
policy.
The decline of Lancashire’s influence upon Indian tariff policy in the 1930s stemmed 
from the policy of the British government that in certain circumstances wider British 
economic interests in India were best served by appeasing specific Indian nationalist 
demands through the sacrifice of sectional British interests. Thus in 1928 as a means of 
rallying Indian moderates to the Raj, Irwin, the Viceroy, declared that Dominion status was 
Britain’s political goal for India.47 Furthermore, despite the size of the Lancashire lobby in 
Parliament48 Lancashire no longer had the economic status or political leverage to dictate 
and tailor Indian tariff policy to the needs of the Lancashire cotton industry.49 Unfortunately 
for the Lancashire cotton industry, as already indicated by the events of 1921, the British 
government consistently placed Indian fiscal and monetary stability before any sectional
o f protection increases as the price of the good fells. In the case o f Lancashire’s grey piece-goods, the 
effective ad valorem rate o f the specific duty was always higher than the actual British preferential ad 
valorem tariff rate, and throughout 1931 always higher that the actual non-British ad valorem tariff rate, 
thus cancelling out any tariff preference for Lancashire's grey piece-goods, see tables 3.8, and 3.9; 
Hubbard G. E., p. 270.
45. Dai Nippon Boseki Rengdkai Geppo, February 1930, Indo Yunyu Menpu Kanzei Zoritsu Teian ni Saishi
Mengyo Sandantai no Seimeisho' [A public statement by three cotton manufacturing groups on the 
proposal to increase the Indian rate of duty on cotton piece-good imports]; Nishikawa H., pp. 316-317.
46. The Indian trade section of the Manchester Chamber of Commerce complained that the loss of the bulk 
of the grey piece-good trade with Indian was because of the specific duty that precluded preferential 
treatment on Lancashire’s grey piece goods, they complained that, "for this we have to thank not 
competition alone, but the specially severe tariff treatment which these goods have been receiving for 
the past twenty-two months", The Manchester Chamber o f Commerce, Monthly Record: Annual 
Report o f the Board o f Directors and Trade Sections, 1932, pp. xiii-xiv; Dai Nippon Boseki Rengdkai 
Geppo, July 1931, Eikoku Boseki Rengokaicho Efu Miruzushi no Iken’ [The opinion o f the English 
Spinners Chairman Mr. F. Mills].
47. Chatteiji B., pp. 318, 333-338.
48. There were nearly 60 Conservative MPs from both Lancashire and Cheshire in the National 
Government, Markovits C., p. 50; see chapter 1.
49. Of course this does not mean to say that the Lancashire cotton industry had absolutely no influence on 
Indian tariff policy.
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British commercial interest: thus the British government ignored Lancashire’s commercial 
interest in Indian tariff policy in order to defend Britain’s overall control of the Indian 
economy.50 For the British and Indian governments the maintenance of the rupee-pound 
exchange rate - at 1 shilling 6 pence to the rupee - and the balancing of the Indian budget 
through increased tariff income,51 was far more important than Lancashire's access to the 
Indian market/2 Moreover, like the British government, sections of the Lancashire cotton 
industry also appreciated that in the face of Indian nationalist opposition, Britain could no 
longer dictate Indian tariff policy. Lancashire realised that the Indian nationalist reaction to 
British opposition to Indian constitutional reform - as evidenced by the March 1930 - March 
1931 Indian boycott of imported cotton piece-goods - would nullify the effects of any 
improvement in their tariff position that resulted form such pressure.53 In a similar fashion, 
although the Lancashire cotton industry was unimpressed with the level of tariff preference 
granted by the Indian government,54 they were sanguine enough to realise that pressure to 
increase the level of tariff preference could result in Indian pressure to totally abolish British 
tariff preference on cotton piece-goods.55 Thus both the British government and to a certain 
extent the Lancashire cotton industry accepted that in the face of Indian nationalism Britain 
could no longer dictate all aspects of Indian economic policy to the advantage of all Britain’s 
commercial interests.
Any lingering hopes of the Lancashire cotton industry to exert leverage on the British
50. Tomlinson B. R., pp. 83ff; Rooth T., British Protectionism and the International Economy: Overseas 
Commercial Policy in the 1930s (Cambridge University Press, London; 1993), p. 183; Rothermund D., 
pp. 100-103; Chatterji B., pp. 17-18, 20-21.
51. Chatterji B., pp. 333-347.
52. Indeed by 1933 some members of the British and Indian government already foresaw the long-run 
decline o f Lancashire’s exports to India, and thus the role of the British and Indian government was not 
to defend Lancashire’s access to the Indian market but to avoid further political complication by 
ensuring that Lancashire's withdrawal from the Indian market was, "as gradual a process as possible", 
Ainscough to Edgcumbe (Board of Trade), 27 October 1933, FO371/17164,F7065/1203/23; Wurm C., 
p. 236.
53. Feamley A. C., pp. 201-203, 205-207; Redford A., p. 283, footnote 3.
54. The Manchester Chamber o f Commerce, Monthly Record, March 1930, p. 83.
55. The Manchester Chamber o f Commerce, Monthly Record, March 1930, pp. 83-84; Feamley A. C., p. 
201; Redford A , p. 282. Lancashire's explicit need to mollify Indian nationalist opinion was again 
underlined during the Lancashire-India trade talks in October 1933, when the Lancashire delegation in 
India telegraphed the Manchester Chamber of Commerce to insist that Lancashire's evidence before the 
India Select Committee should be significantly toned down, otherwise their would be no prospect of 
gaining improved access to the Indian market through a Lancashire-India agreement, Ghosch S. C., 
'Pressure and Privilege: The Manchester Chamber of Commerce and the Indian problem, 1930-1934.', 
Parliamentary Affairs (1964-65), pp. 201-205.
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government, by threatening to combine with the anti-India reform MPs and sabotage the 
Indian reform process, proved illusory. Once the Conservative Party committed themselves 
to Indian constitutional reform, the National Government could discount any large scale 
Conservative rebellion over Indian constitutional reform. Given the size of the National 
Government's majority36 - and the support of the Labour Party for Indian constitutional 
reform - so long as the Lancashire lobby was managed with consideration the British 
government could safely ignore the potential threat of Lancashire MPs combining with the 
Conservative anti-India reform MPs to disrupt the progress of Indian constitutional reform.37 
Moreover, the Lancashire demand for better access to the Indian market and the anti-Indian 
reform campaign were not unified. The protective nature of the new Indian differential tariff 
structure was largely established between 1930 and 1932. In contrast the Indian reform 
process only came before Parliament after the structure of the Indian cotton tariff and the 
Indo-Japanese trade dispute had been settled: the White Paper on Indian Constitutional 
Reform did not appear until March 1933, and the Government of India Bill was not voted on 
until 1934.5* Thus the potential for cooperation between the Lancashire and anti-India 
reform MPs was somewhat reduced since the climax of both campaigns occurred at slightly 
different points. Consequently, freed from the threat of a rebellion on Indian constitutional 
reform, the National Government could now appease Indian nationalist opinion through the 
sacrifice of Lancashire’s economic interests in India. Therefore it consistently refused to 
support - or more usually allow the Indian government to reject - Lancashire's demands for 
either a reduction of the British preferential cotton piece-good tariff or the curbing of Indian 
Fiscal Autonomy.59
56. PughM., The Making o f Modem British Politics, 1867-1939 (Basil Blackwell, Oxford; 1987), p. 274;
Stannage C. T., The General Election o f 1935’, (Unpublished thesis, Cambridge; 1973), pp. 30-31.
57. Gilbert M., Prophet o f  Truth: Winston S. Churchill, 1922-1939 (Minerva, London; 1990), pp. 377, 382, 
389-405; Addison P., Churchill on the Home Front, 1900-1955 (Jonathon Cape, London; 1992), pp. 
299-300.
58. Ghosch S. C., 'Decision-making and Power in the British Conservative Party: A case study of the Indian 
problem 1930-1934', Political Studies (1965), pp. 205-212.
59. At the end of 1931 the Indian Viceroy defended Indian Fiscal Autonomy from the threats of the 
Lancashire cotton industry, Markovits C., p. 50, footnotes 52 and 53; Feamley A. C., pp. 209-212. In a 
similar fashion the question of access to the Indian cotton market was, at the request of the Indian 
government, taken off the Ottawa agenda because they had just appointed a Tariff Board to look into 
the question of Indian cotton duties, Chatterji B., p. 374.
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The background to the Indian denunciation of the Indo-Japanese T rade Treaty.
Despite the increased tariff protection Indian cotton manufacturers remained alarmed at the 
post-1931 revival of cotton piece-good imports. In 1932-33 Indian imports of cotton piece- 
goods surged to 1,193.4 million yards, a dramatic 58.6% increase on the previous year, and a 
figure that approached pre-Depression levels of imports.60 Indian cotton manufacturers 
were perturbed by the resilience of cotton piece-good imports to tariff increases and 
apparent inability of recent tariff increases to curtail import volumes.61 The fear of renewed 
import competition spurred the Indian cotton manufacturers into again demanding further 
tariff protection; and under pressure from the cotton manufacturers lobby the Indian 
government, in March and October 1931, again increased the import duty on cotton piece- 
goods. These tariff rises increased proportionately the rate of duty on both the British and 
non-British tariff. Thus the most favoured nation clause of the 1904 Indo-Japanese Trade 
Convention was not further violated.62 However, the 1931 tariff increases still failed to curb 
cotton piece-goods imports, and much to the horror of the Indian cotton manufacturers, 
cotton piece-good imports increased throughout 1932 after the imposition of the October 
1931 tariff increase. Of particular concern to the Indian cotton manufacturers was the 
resilience of Japanese cotton piece-good imports to the recent tariff increase; between 
October 1931 and March 1932 imports of Japanese cotton piece-good imports increased by 
15.9% over the same 1930 - 1931 period. In contrast, the rise in the duty on British exports 
had the desired effect as imports of Lancashire cotton piece-goods fell by 22.8% over the 
same period.63
Unlike the Lancashire cotton industry in the early 1930s, the efficient Japanese 
cotton industry responded masterfully to successive Indian tariff increases: it successively 
reduced export prices and thus maintained the price competitiveness of Japanese goods in 
the Indian cotton piece-good market. Not even the combination of tariff increases and the 
devaluation of the pound and rupee in relation to the yen in September 1931 halted the rise in 
Japanese exports. Towards the end of 1931, under the impact of the devalued rupee and 
Indian tariff rises, the price of Japanese grey piece-good exports had been slowly rising.
60. See table 3.1.
61. Nishikawa H., p. 328.
62. See table 3.6.
63. See tables 3.10 and 3.11.
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However, Japanese cotton manufacturers quickly responded to the change in economic 
circumstances and took full advantage of the devaluation of the yen in December 1932 to cut 
export prices - even afterthe September 1932 tariff increase - to India by some 9.7% between 
January-March 1932 and October-December 1932.64 Consequently, by mid-1932 the 
Japanese cotton manufacturers, aided by the yen depreciation, had overcome the effects of 
the preferential Indian tariff system and again re-established a significant price differential 
over competing Lancashire grey piece-goods.65 The effective price cutting of Japanese 
cotton piece-goods not only maintained demand for Japanese products in the Indian market, 
it prevented Lancashire from benefiting from the increased levels of Indian tariff preference 
for Lancashire cotton piece-goods. Further, it was apparent that as Lancashire's cotton 
piece-good exports were squeezed out of the Indian market by the successive increases of the 
British preferential tariff, Japanese goods competed more directly with Indian 
manufactures.66
The success of Japanese imports in 1932 convinced the Indian cotton manufacturers 
that the preferential tariff system must be changed or replaced. In their opinion, the 1931 
tariff rises failed to cut Japanese cotton piece-good imports because the tariff increases had 
to uphold the preferential tariff system. Thus tariff increases on non-British cotton textiles 
had to be moderated by the need to maintain a proportional increase with the British 
preferential tariff. However, the continued exceptional price-elasticity of Japanese cotton 
piece-good imports resulted in the Indian cotton manufacturers' demand for a rate of tariff 
protection on Japanese cotton piece-goods that would either dramatically increase the 
preferential duty on imports from Britain or result in a break in the system of proportional 
duties on British and non-British imports. This placed the Indian and British governments in 
a dilemma. They realised that any further increase in the British preferential tariff would 
provoke an outcry in Lancashire and seriously jeopardise attempts at consensual 
constitutional reform in India. Although the Lancashire lobby had proved ineffective in 
reducing the level of Indian duties, it still carried sufficient political weight to thwart any 
dramatic increase in the preferential British duty.
64. See table 3.12; Nishikawa H., p. 332.
65. See table 3.12.
66. Mehta F. A., Price-competition between India, Japan and the UK in the Indian cotton textile market 
during the Nineteen-thirties', The Review o f Economics and Statistics (1957), pp. 76-77.
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Nevertheless, the surge of Japanese cotton-piece good imports into India in 1932 
united the Bombay and Ahmedabad millowners in demanding further tariff protection 
against Japanese competition. Once again the Bombay millowners led demands for 
increased protection against Japanese cotton piece-good imports. In particular they 
complained that the earlier tariff increases had now been undermined by the December 1931 
devaluation of the yen.67 However, in contrast to the Bombay millowners the Ahmedabad 
millowners were unwilling to see increased protection against Japanese imports result in 
continued tariff preference for Lancashire, and they demanded an end to any form of tariff 
preference. In their submission to the Indian Tariff Board the Ahmedabad Millowners’ 
Association complained that there was considerable competition between Indian and 
Lancashire cotton piece-goods, and that the Indian government should resist British pressure 
to grant increased preferential access, since it was "incumbent on the Government of India... 
to adopt the same scale of duties on British goods as on non-British manufacture and to help 
the free and natural growth of the textile industry in India by giving adequate protection’’.68 
Thus even the immediate fears of Japanese competition did not blind the Ahmedabad 
millowners to the nationalist desire to end Lancashire’s preferential access to the Indian 
market. However, such was the threat of Japanese competition that the Ahmedabad 
millowners soon abandoned their opposition to imperial preference and again joined with 
Bombay in demanding a supplementary tariff solely on Japanese imports.69 This was a 
welcome change for the Indian government, which was still wary of offending the 
Lancashire cotton industry by increasing the British preferential tariff70 In September 1932
67. Letter from the Bombay Millowners1 Association to the Indian Tariff Board, 31 May 1933, in Indian
Tariff Board. Cotton Textile Industry: Volume 1 The Representations submitted to the Indian Tariff 
Board by the applicants fo r protection (Manager of Publications, Delhi; 1934), pp. 23-24; Dai Nippon 
Bdseki Rengdkai Geppo, June 1932, Bonbei Bdseki Rengdkai no Taikanzei Sutetomento' [Bombay 
Spinners' Association anti-tariff investigation committee's statement], and July 1932, 'Amedabaddo 
Bdseki Rengdkai Chinjutsusho' [Declaration of the Ahmedabad Spinners' Association],
68. Letter for the Ahmedabad Millowners' Association to the Indian Tariff Board, 5 June 1932, in Indian
Tariff Board. Cotton Textile Industry: Volume I (1934), p. 113.
69. Dai Nippon Bdseki Rengdkai Geppo, July 1932, Bonbei Bdseki Rengdkai Kinkyu Taisaku Seigan’
[Bombay Spinners' Association's Emergency Countermeasure Petition]; Nishikawa, p. 131. On a 
somewhat paradoxical note, by the summer of 1932, the Bombay Millowners' Association - which had 
been consistently less hostile to imperial preference - was so alarmed by Japanese competition that they 
were prepared to risk political friction with Lancashire in order to gain an immediate tariff increase on 
all cotton piece-good imports. It worried that the maintenance of imperial preference prevented a tariff 
increase on Japanese imports, and urged the Indian government that "if the government, due to the 
Indo-Japanese Trade Treaty, or other measures, cannot implement administrative measures [i.e. increase 
the non-British tariff], then we request that tariffs be increased against all foreign goods", Dai Nippon 
Bdseki Rengdkai Geppo, August 1932, Bonbei Bdseki Rengdkai Chinjutsusho no Yoshi’ [Summary o f  
the Bombay Spinners' Association's Declaration]; Chatterji B., p. 378.
70. The Manchester Chamber of Commerce complained loudly that the Indian cotton textile industry already
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it responded to the parallel pressures of the Indian and Lancashire cotton industries by 
increasing duties only on non-British cotton piece goods.71
Despite the September 1932 tariff increase the Indian cotton manufacturers 
continued to demand further protection from Japanese competition. Furthermore, these 
insistent demands were increasingly difficult to contain within the existing preferential tariff 
system. The Indian government recognised that it would have to offend either Lancashire or 
Japan: either Lancashire's preferential tariff would again have to be increased or the most 
favoured nation clause of the 1904 Indo-Japanese Trade Convention would again have to be 
violated by some form of tariff discrimination aimed primarily at Japanese cotton 
manufactures. In regard to tariff discrimination against Japan, Sir Samuel Hoare, the 
Secretary of State for India, recognised that further measures would be difficult to 
accommodate within the existing commercial treaty structure. Even before the 
discriminatory September 1932 tariff increase he had already warned of the dangers of tariff 
discrimination against Japan. In July 1932, he told the Indian government that the 
introduction of'dumping duties' on Japanese goods could only be done at the risk of bringing 
the Indian government "into direct conflict with article one [the most favoured nation 
clause] of the Indo-Japanese convention",72 However, while the Indian government toyed 
with the idea of further discrimination against Japan the Indian Tariff Board recommended 
exactly the opposite solution to the problem of Japanese competition: the preferential 
specific duty on all grey piece-good imports should be abolished, and from the March 1933 
budget a flat rate duty of 5 annas per pound should be levied on all grey piece-good imports.73 
Once again Lancashire grey piece-goods would be subject to the same specific duty as 
similar Japanese goods, as had been the case at the time of the first preferential Indian cotton 
tariff in April 1930, and had only been favoured by the September 1932 tariff increases. 
Thus by the beginning of 1933 Indian demands for further tariff protection from Japanese 
competition confronted the British and Indian governments with the need either to raise 
tariffs against both Lancashire and Japan or dramatically increase the rate of tariff
received adequate protection, and that a prosperous Indian cotton textile industry and a Lancashire 
export trade could exist side by side, Presidential address ofR. Bond, The Manchester Chamber o f  
Commerce, Monthly Record, July 1932, pp. 208-209; The Manchester Chamber o f Commerce,
Monthly Record: Annual Reports o f the Board o f Directors and Trade Sections, 1932, p. ix.
71. See table 3.5; Chatterji B., p. 378.
72. Hoare to the Indian government, 20 July 1932, FO371/17160,F1493/1203/23.
73. Memorandum of the President of the Board of Trade, 'The Indian Tariff Board's Report on Cotton
Goods', 18 January 1933, CAB CP. 5(33); Chatterji B., p. 376.
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discrimination against Japanese goods. Both courses of action ran risks, but it was the fear of 
Lancashire’s interference in Indian constitutional reform that spurred the Indian government 
to increase the rate oftariff discrimination against Japanese imports.
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The denunciation of the 1904 Indo-Japanese Trade Treaty.
The British government recognised the political embarrassment that the end of the specific 
preferential duty on Lancashire’s grey piece-good exports to India would cause. A horrified 
Board ofTrade reported that the 5 annas per pound specific duty would be the equivalent to a 
33 1/3% ad valorem tariff on Lancashire’s medium count grey piece good exports to India/4 
which would mean that not only would Lancashire’s cotton piece-goods pay the same the 
specific duty as Japanese goods, but also that the specific duty on Lancashire's grey piece- 
goods would be higher than the current preferential ad valorem rate of duty on British cotton 
piece-goods.75 The Manchester Chamber of Commerce immediately voiced their hostility to 
the Indian Tariff Board’s proposal, and warned the British government of the dire political 
consequences of the implementation of the measure. They complained to the British 
government that the Indian Tariff Board report was against the spirit of the Ottawa 
Conference and imperial cooperation, and they petitioned the British government to 
pressure the Indian government for an "easier treatment of Lancashire’s exports in the Indian 
market”. Finally, they warned that a protectionist Indian budget that was unfavourable to 
Lancashire would result in the Chamber abandoning its policy of political restraint on such 
questions as Indian constitutional reform.76
The British government was deeply alarmed at the potential economic impact of the 
specific duty on the struggling Lancashire cotton industry and the threat of the Lancashire 
lobby to hinder the Indian constitutional reform process. However, despite the government's 
sympathy towards Lancashire's case, the Lancashire lobby on Indian tariff policy was once 
again exposed. Although the British government was horrified at the consequences of an 
increase in Lancashire’s preferential duty, at no time did it consider pressing the Indian 
government for an ’easing of treatment’ of Lancashire’s exports by reducing the tariff on 
Lancashire’s cotton piece goods. Within the cabinet Sir Walter Runciman, the President of 
the Board ofTrade, led the defence of Lancashire’s interests in the Indian market. On 
political and economic grounds he objected to the provisions of the Indian Tariff Board's 
report, and commented that it was "difficult to conceive of proposals, which if they became
74. Memorandum of the President of the Board ofTrade, The Indian Tariff Board's Report on Cotton 
Goods', 18 January 1933, CAB 24 CP. 5(33).
75. See table 3.5.
76. Memorandum of the Manchester Chamber of Commerce to the President of the Board ofTrade, in CAB 
24 CP. 5(33).
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widely known, would arouse greater and more justifiable hostility in Lancashire". He 
disliked the withdrawal of Lancashire’s preferential tariff through the proposed single 
specific duty on grey piece-good imports, especially "at a time when there are some signs of 
recovery from the deepest trough of the depression". Finally, he restated the need for 
preferential tariffs and complained that the Indian businessmen had gone against a secret 
undertaking at the Ottawa Conference, not to end the preferential tariff on British goods.77 
Although the 1932 Lancashire-India pact had not been binding, its abrogation so soon after 
the Ottawa Conference smacked of Indian imperial betrayal of Lancashire. Thus his prime 
concern was the political appeasement of Lancashire through the continued preferential 
access of Lancashire's cotton piece-goods to the Indian market.
Runciman's fears over the effect of the new specific duty on Lancashire's grey piece- 
goods was equally shared by Sir Samuel Hoare and the India Office. Hoare recognised that 
the continued preferential access of Lancashire’s grey piece-goods to the Indian market was a 
price well worth paying for Lancashire’s political restraint over Indian political reform. He 
reported to the cabinet that the proposed flat rate specific duty on grey piece-goods would 
not be introduced and that some other means of protection for Indian cotton manufacturers 
from Japanese competition would have to be found. Hoare and the Indian government 
agreed that even though the contents of the T ariff Board report were now known in India, the 
Indian government would not submit the Tariff Board report to the Indian Legislative 
Assembly, and that the existing cotton duties would remain fixed for the next six months.78 
This met Lancashire's objection but it failed to meet Indian demands. To meet Indian 
demands for increased protection against Japanese competition Hoare accepted that a new 
scheme for protection would have to be placed before the Indian Legislative Assembly. 
However, with cabinet agreement he promised that any new scheme would be based upon 
the continuation of tariff preference, in keeping with pledges made by the Indian delegation 
at the Ottawa Conference.79
77. Memorandum of the President of the Board ofTrade, 'The Indian Tariff Board's Report on Cotton 
Goods', 18 January 1933, CAB 24 CP. 5(33). The Manchester Chamber of Commerce was preparing 
evidence to challenge the Indian Fiscal Autonomy Convention in the Select Committee on Indian 
Constitutional Reform, Redford A., p. 286; Rooth T., pp. 183-184; ChatteijiB., p. 376.
78. Memorandum of the Secretary of State for India, The Indian Tariff Board's Report on Cotton Goods', 
20 January 1933, CAB 24 CP. 8(33); Cabinet Conclusions, 1 February 1933, CAB 23 6(33)3; Chatterji
B., p. 377.
79. Cabinet Conclusions, 1 February 1933, CAB 23 6(33)3.
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This placed the Indian government in a very awkward predicament. In March 1933, 
in order to satisfy the divergent demands of the Lancashire and Indian cotton industries, it 
decided to introduce discriminatory tariffs on Japanese goods and risk political and 
commercial friction with Japan. The Indian government accepted that following the 
abandonment of the Indian Tariff Board report the demands of the Indian cotton 
manufacturers could only be met by some form of trade discrimination against Japanese 
cotton textile imports.80 Faced by overwhelming Indian pressure for discrimination against 
Japanese goods, on 29 March 1933, and with the minimum of debate, the British cabinet 
approved the Indian denunciation of the 1904 Indo-Japanese Trade Convention,81 thus 
giving the Indian government the freedom to introduce trade discrimination solely against 
Japanese goods. However, the cabinet attempted to lessen the blow upon Japan, and insisted 
that the announcement of the denunciation of the Trade Convention should be accompanied 
by an invitation to Japan to begin trade negotiations with the Indian government.82 Despite 
the seriousness of the Indian denunciation of the 1904 Indo-Japanese Trade Convention, the 
Foreign Office had less influence on the Indian govemmenf s actions than over the British 
withdrawal ofthe West African colonies from the 1911 Anglo-Japanese Trade Convention.83 
For the British government the satisfying of domestic nationalist pressures on the Indian 
government took precedence over potential effects on Anglo-Japanese relations, which was 
a marked contrast to the cabinet’s outright rejection of the denunciation of the Anglo- 
Japanese Trade Treaty as a means of securing trade protection for Lancashire in the British 
colonies.
In Japan business groups reacted angrily to the announcement by the Indian 
government of the denunciation of the 1904 Trade Convention. Thomas Snow, the British 
Commercial Attach^ in Tokyo, reported that the reactions of the cotton industry and the 
Japanese press gravely concerned the Japanese authorities. The Japanese were angered at 
the threatened loss of the Indian market, and they believed the Lancashire cotton industry 
had instigated the Indian denunciation of the Trade Convention. Further, the Japanese
80. The Indian government to the Secretary o f State for India, 27 February 1933, and the India Office to the 
Foreign Office, 3 March 1933, FO371/17160,F1493/l203/23.
81. Cabinet Conclusions, 29 March 1933, CAB 23 22(33)4; Chatterji B., p. 379.
82. Cabinet Conclusions, 29 March 1933, CAB 23 22(33)4.
83. Orde minuted that the, "Denunciation o f this treaty would hit Japan far more than [the] denunciation of 
our own commercial treaty, in respect of the West African Colonies", minute by Orde, 8 March 1933, 
F0371/17160, FI 493/1203/23.
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considered the Indian action as part of some international plot against Japan, seeing it either 
as part of the British 'Ottawa strategy’ to exclude Japanese products from the British Empire, 
or as the start o f a League of Nations inspired economic boycott of Japan. Talks with the 
leaders of the Japanese cotton industry confirmed to Snow how seriously the Japanese 
regarded the Indian denunciation of the Trade Convention. Abe Fusajiro, Chairman of the 
Cotton Spinners’ Association* stated that the Indian denunciation would affect both political 
and trade relations, while Tsuda Shingo, the Chairman of Kanegafuchi Spinning Company, 
blamed the inefficient Lancashire cotton industry for the Indian denunciation. Snow 
reported that there was even talk of a retaliatory Japanese boycott against Indian raw cotton, 
British spinning machinery and Australian raw wool.84
However, as with the announcement of the withdrawal of the British West Africa 
colonies from the 1911 Anglo-Japanese Trade Treaty, the indignation of the Japanese 
business community was moderated by the desire of the Japanese government to contain 
Indo-Japanese trade friction. In particular the major concern of the Japanese government 
was to avoid a situation whereby Indo-Japanese trade was carried out outside any treaty 
framework.85 It was so alarmed by this prospect it was prepared for the continuation of the 
current Trade Convention until a new trade convention was negotiated.86 Accordingly the 
Japanese Foreign Ministry welcomed the offer of the Indian government for trade 
negotiations. The invitation was particularly welcomed because it appeared to remove 
doubts that the British government was trying to isolate Japan.87 Consequently, the Japanese 
government agreed to enter into trade negotiations with the Indian government.88 There was 
some indication that the Japanese appreciated how their export success had prompted the 
Indian denunciation of the Trade Convention. Snow reported that the Japanese might 
control their manufacturers’ export drive.89 However, the appreciation of Japan’s recent
84. Snow to the Foreign Office, 20 April 1933, F0371/17160,F2600/1203/23.
85. In early October 1933 during the Indo-Japanese trade negotiations, Sawada, an official from the 
Japanese Foreign Ministry, wrote to Hirota in some alarm over the awkwardness o f the Japanese 
business delegates during the trade negotiations. Sawada complained that these activities could lead to 
the break up of the trade negotiations and thereby destroy the very foundation upon which Japan's trade 
with India had been built in the past, Ishii O., footnote 52, p. 122.
86. Matsudairato Simon, 19 April 1933, F0371/17160,F2580/1203/23.
87. Snow to the Foreign Office, 20 April 1933, F0371/17160,F2600/1203/23.
88. Interview between Runciman and Matsudaira, and interview between Simon and Matsudaira, Cabinet 
Conclusions, 26 April 1933, CAB 23 31(33)2.
89. Snow to the Foreign Office, 20 April 1933, F0371/17160,F2600/1203/23.
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export success did not blind the Japanese Foreign Ministry to the ’injustice’ of Indian 
denunciation of the Trade Convention. Matsudaira Tsuneo, the Japanese Ambassador, told 
Simon, the Foreign Secretary, that given the Indian trade surplus with Japan the Indian action 
was less understandable.90
Once both the British, Indian and Japanese governments accepted that a new Indo- 
Japanese trade convention would be negotiated, both the Foreign Office and the Japanese 
Foreign Ministry began preparations for the trade negotiations. However, while both the 
Foreign Office and Japanese Foreign Ministry desired to reduce potential obstacles to the 
conclusion of a new treaty there were distinct differences between their respective 
approaches to this question. The Foreign Office was particularly concerned that since India 
was not a sovereign state and remained dependent upon Britain, appropriate diplomatic 
formalities had to be observed in the Indo-Japanese negotiations. However, the Foreign 
Office was also aware that the fulfilment of these diplomatic formalities should not be seen 
to give Britain t^great an influence on the outcome of the Indo-Japanese negotiation. Simon 
had been at great pains to tell Matsudaira that because of India’s fiscal autonomy Britain had 
no control over India’s tariff policy and commercial negotiations.91 Therefore the 
independence of India in commercial matters would be far more easily emphasised to the 
Japanese if the Indo-Japanese trade negotiations took place in India. The Foreign Office’s 
view of Japanese reactions to the location of the negotiations was confirmed when Snow 
reported that both the negotiations and signature of a new agreement should take place in 
India, otherwise Japanese opinion would be convinced that Britain was behind the trade 
negotiations.92 This view was shared by Viscount Ishii, a leading Japanese delegate to the 
World Economic Conference in London.93 However, the India Office took a different view. 
It stated that since Britain was responsible for India’s external affairs, the signature of a new 
Indo-Japanese Trade Convention had to take place in London. To avoid Japanese suspicions 
that the trade convention initialled in India might be altered in London, the Foreign Office 
agreed to Japanese demands that any agreement initialled in India could not be altered in
90. Matsudaira to Simon, 24 April 1933, FO371/17160,F269l/1203/23; Cabinet Conclusions, 26 April
1933, CAB 23 31(33)2.
91. Matsudaira to Simon, 24 April 1933, FO371/17160,F2691/1203/23; Cabinet Conclusions, 26 April
1933, CAB 23 31(33)2.
92. Snow to the Foreign Office, 25 June 1933, F0371/17160,F4205/1203/23.
93. Interview between Viscount Ishii and Simon, 27 June 1933, F0371/17160,F4415/1203/23.
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London.*4 In contrast the Japanese Foreign Ministry was more anxious that the Indo- 
Japanese trade negotiations should not be undermined by any anti-Japanese tariff rises in 
Britain, the British Empire, and India. Matsudaira requested that both before and during the 
Indo-Japanese trade negotiations there should be no increase in British, British Dominion, 
and Indian tariffs. Further, he made plain that any increase in the Indian tariff would be seen 
by the Japanese as an act of bad faith. However, although the British government suspended 
the proposed increase in their silk and artificial silk duties, it protested to the Japanese that it 
had no influence upon either Dominion or Indian tariff policy.95
94. India Office to the Foreign Office, FO371/17161,F4804/1203/23.
95. See chapter 2.
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The Indo-Japanese trade war.
Despite the denunciation of the 1904 Indo-Japanese Trade Convention and the Japanese 
government's agreement to negotiate a new trade convention, the Indian cotton 
manufacturers maintained their demands for increased protection from Japanese 
competition. Their main complaint remained that the December 1931 devaluation of the 
yen had undermined the Indian government's attempts to give tariff protection to the Indian 
cotton textile industry.96 Under intense pressure the Indian government in May 1933 moved 
to increase the non-British tariff on cotton piece-goods from a 50% ad valorem rate to a 75% 
ad valorem rate.97 In May 1933 Hoare reported the complaints of the Indian cotton 
manufacturers to the British government, and stated that the September 1932 tariff increase 
on non-British goods had little effect in restraining Japanese exports to India. He stated that 
in 1932 Japanese exports of cotton piece-goods to India totalled some 550 million square 
yards, and that most of these imports had arrived after the September 1932 tariff increase.98 
Further, on 24 May 1933, when the Indian proposal for the non-British cotton textile tariff 
increase was presented to the British cabinet for approval, Hoare underlined the importance 
of its immediate implementation. In stark terms he told his colleagues that irreparable 
damage would be caused to Anglo-Indian relations by a their refusal to allow the Indian 
government to proceed with the measure.” Again, as in the case of the Indian denunciation 
of the 1904 Indo-Japanese Trade Convention, the British government placed Indian 
commercial interests before possible effects on Anglo-Japanese relations and approved the 
Indian government’s request.100 Moreover, the Foreign Office raised no objection on foreign 
policy grounds to further Indian tariff discrimination against Japan. Simon and the Foreign 
Office had already acquiesced in the action of the Indian government as a defensive action to 
offset the effect of the yen devaluation.101 Once again the Foreign Office agreed that the
96. Memorandum o f the Secretary o f State for India, Proposal of the Government o f  India to Increase the 
Duty of Cotton Piece Goods o f non-British origin to 75% ad valorem under Power Conferred by 
Section 3(5) of the Indian Tariff Act', 24 May 1933, CAB 24 CP. 137(33).
97. Memorandum of the Secretary of State for India, Proposal of the Government of India to Increase the 
Duty of Cotton Piece Goods o f non-British origin to 75% ad valorem under Power Conferred by 
Section 3(5) o f the Indian Tariff Act’, 24 May 1933, CAB 24 CP. 137(33); Chatterji B., p. 379.
98. Memorandum of the Secretary o f State for India, Proposal of the Government o f India to Increase the 
Duty of Cotton Piece goods o f non-British origin to 75% ad valorem under Power Conferred by 
Section 3(5) of the Indian Tariff Act1, 24 May 1933, CAB 24 CP. 137(33).
99. Cabinet Conclusions, 24 May 1933, CAB 23 36(33)11.
100. Cabinet Conclusions, 24 May 1933, CAB 23 36(33)11; Chatterji B., pp. 370-380.
101. Memorandum of the Secretary of State for India, Proposal of the Government of India to Increase the
162
Lancashire and the Indo-Japanese trade negotiations, 1933-1937
situation in India was more important than possible effects on Anglo-Japanese relations, 
though it feared that the Indian government’s action would not be without consequences for 
Anglo-Japanese relations. In regard to Hoare’s paper, Alec Randall, the First Secretary in the 
Far Eastern Department, conceded that, ’The case presented on behalf of the Govt, of India is 
impressive, but it is to be feared that the Japanese reaction will be most unfavourable".102 
However, even the Foreign Office was not prepared for the dramatic reaction of the Japan 
cotton manufacturers to the Indian government's announcement, on 6 June 1933, of the 
increase of the non-British cotton-piece good tariff.103 Shortly after the announcement, 
Randall merely commented that although the Japanese were indignant at the tariff increase, 
the threat of a Japanese boycott of Indian raw cotton should not be taken seriously.104 Such 
comments indicate that the Foreign Office had been somewhat complacent in assessing the 
Japanese commercial reaction to the Indian government’s tariff increase.
The Japanese had been considering a boycott of Indian raw cotton since the Indian
denunciation of the 1904 Indo-Japanese Trade Convention. However, it was the Indian
government’s increase in the non-British cotton piece-good tariff that was the spur to action.
The Japanese feared that this tariff increase to their most important export market would
wreak havoc in the Japanese cotton industry.105 The Dai Nippon Bdseki Rengdkai Geppo
estimated that some 20% of the Japanese cotton manufacturing establishment would be
forced into idleness as a result of the Indian government’s action.106 Further, the Japanese
were indignant at the discriminatory treatment of their exports to India, and British attacks
upon Japanese commercial practices. Both the Jiji and thsAsahi Shinbun bitterly castigated
a House of Commons debate which suggested that Japan had manipulated her exchange rate
to improve her export performance.107 The Osaka Mainichi reported the comments of Sir 
*
Lullubhai Shalmftdas, an Indian businessman on a visit to Japan, who stated that he saw no
Duty o f Cotton Piece Goods o f non-British origin to 75% ad valorem under Power Conferred by 
Section 3(5) o f the Indian Tariff Act’, 24 May 1933, CAB 24 CP. 137(33); Minute by Orde, 22 May 
1933, F0371/17160,F3387/1203/23.
102. Minute by Randall, 23 May 1933, F0371/17160,F3540/1203/23.
103. Drummond I. M., British Economic policy and the Empire, 1919-1939 (George Allen & Unwin, 
London; 1972), pp. 133-134.
104. Minute by Randall, 9 June 1933, F0371/17160,F3855/1203/23.
105. In 1932 over 25% of Japanese cotton piece-good exports went to India, see table 3.2.
106. Cited in Ishii O., p. 108.
107. The Jiji, 6 June 1933; The Asa hi Shinbun, 7 June 1933.
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reason why poor Indians should have to pay for expensive Manchester goods, and the 
denunciation of the Trade convention was the work ofLancashire.108 Further, anger in Japan 
over their treatment by the Indian government went beyond questions of economic interest, 
and aroused Japanese suspicions that it was another example of international prejudice 
against Japan. Oswald White, the British Commercial Counsellor in Osaka, compared 
Japanese reactions to Indian tariff discrimination with Japanese reactions to the 'anti- 
Japanese’ American Immigration Act of 1924.109 "This present situation is the American 
exclusion of Japanese immigration over again in a different form".”0 On 14 June 1933, 
without the support of the Japanese government, the Japan Cotton Spinners' Association 
adopted a resolution calling for the boycott of Indian raw cotton.111 The Japanese reasoned 
that the raw cotton boycott would create economic chaos in India,112 and force the Indian 
government to revoke or moderate the non-British cotton piece-good tariff increase.
The treatment of Japanese cotton piece-good imports by the Indian government not 
only provoked the raw cotton boycott, but also threatened the participation of the Japanese 
cotton manufacturers in the Indo-Japanese trade negotiations. The latter were sceptical of 
the value of negotiations with India. On 12 July 1933,Tsuda told the Kobe YushinNippofhai 
the Japanese Cotton Spinners' Association refused to appoint delegates to the trade 
negotiations, because they doubted an agreement would be reached, and believed that 
'England' was rendering full assistance to India.113 The Japanese Foreign Ministry worried 
that the Japan Cotton Spinners' Association's refusal to appoint delegates might jeopardise 
the Indo-Japanese trade negotiations, and in order to ensure their participation in the 
negotiations, Japanese Foreign Ministry officials suggested some conciliatory gesture from 
the Indian government: such as a promised reduction of the non-British cotton piece-good ad 
valorem tariff by 25% if the yen appreciated in value.114 The Foreign Office passed on this
108. Snow to the Foreign Office, 21 June 1933, FO371/17161,F4856/1203/23.
109. Wray H., 'Japanese-American Relations and Perceptions, 1900-1940', in Conroy H. and Wray H. (eds.), 
Pearl Harbor Reexamined: Prologue to the Pacific War (University o f Hawaii Press, Honolulu; 1990), 
p. 7.
110. White (Osaka) to Tokyo, 26 June 1933, FO371/17161,F4744/1203/23.
111. Snow to the Foreign Office, 14 June 1933, FO371/17160,F3955/1203/23.
112. Shimoda M., Inmen Fubai to Osaka [The boycott of Indian cotton and Osaka] (Osaka Toshi, Osaka; 
1933), pp. 10-13; Ishii O., pp. 112-113; In 1932 the Japanese consumed 24% of the total India raw 
cotton production, see table 3.3.
113. Phipps (Osaka) to Snow (Tokyo), 12 July 1933, FO371/17161,F5412/1203/23.
114. Snow to the Foreign Office, 15 June 1933, FO371/17160,F3998/1203/23.
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request, but the Indian government refused to consider such an action.115 Despite concerns 
over the participation of the Japanese cotton manufacturers, the Japanese government 
remained committed to the successful conclusion of a new trade convention and took steps 
to placate Japanese opinion over the role of Britain in the recent Indian tariff increase. Not 
only had the Japanese government pointedly refused to endorse the raw cotton boycott,116 the 
Japanese Minister in Ottawa, on leave in Japan, was dispatched to give lectures to select 
Japanese industrialists on the true nature of British imperial relationships, and the real 
meaning ofthe Ottawa Conference.117
Doubts in Japanese business circles over the utility of the India-Japan-Lancashire 
trade talks were equally shared by the Lancashire cotton industry. A public exchange of 
letters between the Japan Economic Federation, and the British Chambers of Commerce, the 
Federation of British Industries and the Manchester Chamber of Commerce, revealed the 
divergent Japanese and British outlook over the India trade question. On the one hand the 
Japanese complained ofthe injustice of Indian tariff discrimination, while on the other hand 
the British spoke of the need to defend their commercial interests from unfair trade 
competition. "* Like the Japanese the Lancashire cotton industry proved unwilling to appoint 
delegates to the India-Japan-Lancashire cotton trade talks, and it required Lord Derby, a 
prominent link between the British government and the Lancashire cotton industry and 
variously described as the TCing of Lancashire’, to persuade a sceptical Lancashire cotton 
industry to appoint delegates for the forthcoming cotton trade talks in India."9 Indeed the 
main concern ofthe Lancashire cotton industry was the Lancashire-India cotton talks and not 
the Lancashire-Japan cotton talks in India, as the Lancashire cotton industry sought 
improved access to the Indian market via a reciprocal trade agreement with the Indian cotton 
industrialists and Indian government.120 However, Lancashire’s apprehension over their role 
as an adjunct to the Indo-Japanese trade negotiations was shared by the Foreign Office. The 
Foreign Office was keenly aware of the limits of Indian benevolence to Lancashire, and
115. The Foreign Office to the India Office, FO371/17160,F4213/1203/23.
116. Statement by Hirota, 11 January 1934, F0371/18166,F731/24/23.
117. Snow to the Foreign Office, 16 July 1933, FO371/17161,F4737/1203/23.
118. The Manchester Chamber o f  Commerce, Monthly Record, June 1933, p. 170; Fletcher W. M., p. 82.
119. See chapter 2; Memorandum ofthe Manchester Chamber of Commerce to the Board ofTrade, 11 July 
1933, F0371/17155,F5306/583/23; Wurm C., p. 238.
120. Chatterji B., pp. 381-386.
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Lancashire’s lack of influence on the Indian government.’21 On 21 June, Randall minuted 
that the situation regarding the India-Japan and the Lancashire-Japan cotton trade talks was 
complex, but it was clear that Lancashire would have little influence on the Indo-Japanese 
trade negotiations, since "in negotiations with Japan the Indian Govt, will [be] endeavouring 
primarily to protect their own industries’’.122 Randall clearly recognised that it was no 
concern of the Indian government to induce the Japanese - via an easier treatment of 
Japanese goods in the Indian market - to adopt global trade restraint vis a vis Lancashire, and 
that it was equally unlikely that the Indian government would grant Lancashire trade 
concessions in their own market at the expense of Japanese imports.
121. In India there were some optimistic voices about the possibility o f Indo-Lancashire cooperation against 
Japanese competition. Bentall, a leading figure o f the British business community in India and active in 
the new constitutional arrangements for India, thought that an arrangement was possible between 
Lancashire and India. He believed that Lancashire could obtain a reduction of the ad valorem tariff on 
British goods to 15% through an Indo-Lancashire agreement, since the "time is ripe because there is at 
the present moment a bond of unity between the two in their joint opposition to Japan", Chatterji B., 
'Lancashire Cotton Trade and British Policy in India, 1919-1939', (unpublished thesis, University of 
Cambridge; 1978), p. 373.
122. Minute by Randall, 21 June 1933, FO371/17154,F4096/583/23.
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Lancashire and the Indo-Japanese trade negotiations, 1933-1934.
Despite Lancashire's reservations over the utility ofthe Indo-Japanese trade negotiations, its 
prospect of benefiting from the forthcoming negotiations improved as sections ofthe native 
Indian cotton industry, in order to forestall Lancashire’s opposition to Indian constitutional 
reform, sought to further Lancashire-Indian cooperation. In the summer of 1933, Hormasji 
Mody, a leading figure in the Bombay cotton manufacturing industry, arrived in Britain with 
the explicit intention of achieving an understanding in regard to Japanese competition 
between the Bombay and Lancashire cotton industries. The Bombay millowners were 
particularly concerned over the need to buy off possible Lancashire cooperation with the 
anti-Indian constitutional reformers through the offer of improved access of Lancashire's 
cotton textil^to the Indian market.123 On a visit to Manchester in August 1933, Mody offered 
the possibility of Lancashire-Bombay cooperation. He stated that both Lancashire and 
Bombay faced Japanese competition, and that the Indian government could act in such a way 
to favour both groups. However, he emphasised that such Indian cooperation was dependent 
on Lancashire’s favourable attitude, ’’towards the legitimate demands of politically minded 
India”.124 Further, as noted before the Bombay cotton industry was mainly in competition 
with the Japanese cotton industry, and thus increased protection against Japanese products 
and decreased protection against Lancashire’s products suited Bombay's needs.
In contrast with the possibilities of Bombay-Lancashire cooperation, there appeared 
little prospect of similar Lancashire-Japan cooperation. Furthermore, while in public 
Lancashire spoke of the need for Japan to adopt trade restraint or face Lancashire's 
retaliation, in private they admitted to having few levers over the Japanese cotton industry. 
Still in public the Lancashire cotton industry took a firm line on the need of the Japanese to 
meet Lancashire’s demand for Japanese export restraint to India. Richard Bond, the 
President of the Manchester Chamber of Commerce, threatened that unless the Japanese 
offered some form of trade restraint Lancashire would be justified in seeking government 
sponsored trade discrimination against Japan. "If the Japanese make no proposals of a kind 
which meet our case, then we should have an added justification for calling upon the 
Government to take steps, either by tariffs or quotas or otherwise to preserve our trade”.525
123. Chatterji B., Trade, Tariffs, and Empire, pp. 384-386.
124. The Economist, 5 August 1933, p. 276; The Manchester Chamber o f Commerce, Monthly Record, 
August 1933, pp. 241-242.
125. The Economist, 5 August 1933, p. 276.
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However, in private talks with the government the Lancashire delegates took a far less 
strident attitude to the strength of Lancashire’s negotiation position in the forthcoming trade 
talks. Sir William Clare-Lees, the head of the delegation, admitted to Sir Edward Crowe, the 
head of the Department of Overseas Trade, that in fact the Lancashire delegation had no 
collective policy. Further, in regard to Lancashire’s negotiating position with the Japanese, 
he could only state his ’personal position’, which was that British foreign policy concessions 
should be offered in return for Japanese trade concessions. He believed that Lancashire 
could gain much by giving Japanese cotton textiles a free hand in China, as it would reduce 
Japanese competition in other overseas markets. Moreover, he believed that British 
recognition ofManchukuo would prove helpful in the forthcoming talks with the Japanese. 
This attitude greatly alarmed the Foreign Office, for they feared that a combination of no 
definite proposals together with a general desire to improve Lancashire's position through 
indiscriminate British ’concessions’ in China to Japan, could make the Lancashire delegation 
difficult to handle in India.126
However, in a further government pep talk to the Lancashire delegation, Sir Horace 
Wilson, chief industrial advisor to the British cabinet, pointedly told the Lancashire 
delegates the limitations of their role in both the Indo-Japanese trade talks and Anglo- 
Japanese relations. On the one hand Wilson conceded that the British government wanted to 
improve relations with Japan, and that a breakdown in the cotton talks might have serious 
consequences, "over a field considerably wider than that covered by their discussions”.127 
However, despite his urging that it was better for the Lancashire-Japan cotton talks to end on 
a friendly basis, he still accepted that not only was the British government prepared for the 
failure of the trade talks, it even accepted that they probably would fail.128 Thus despite 
Wilson’s concern over the effect of a breakdown of the talks on Anglo-Japanese relations, he
126. Memorandum of interview between Sir W. Clare-Lees and Sir E. Crowe, 16 August 1933,
F0371/17162,F5514/1203/23.
127. Meeting of the Manchester Chamber of Commerce's cotton textile delegation to India and Sir H. 
Wilson, 24 August 1933, FO371/17162,F5839/1203/23; Wurm quotes the same passage of Wilson's 
statement to the Manchester Chamber of Commerce cotton delegates to indicate the important foreign 
policy implications the British government attached to the Lancashire-Japan cotton trade talks. 
However, he fails to mention the Board o f Trade's acceptance that the cotton talks would fail, and thus 
avoids the paradoxical question that if an amicable settlement of the Lancashire-Japan cotton talks were 
so important to British foreign policy why was the British government prepared to see them fail, Wurm
C., p. 241.
128. Meeting of the Lancashire Textile Delegation to India at the Board ofTrade, 24 August 1933, 
F0371/17162,F5839/1203/23.
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still accepted that Lancashire’s interpretation of their commercial interests remained 
paramount. Consequently, he emphasised that Lancashire should not seek a commercial 
understanding with Japan at any price, and that the breakdown of the cotton talks was far 
more preferable to the British government than a botched Lancashire-Japan cotton trade 
agreement.
Although concerned about the prospects of a Lancashire-Japan cotton trade 
agreement, the Lancashire cotton industry realised that with respect to future opportunities 
in the India market these talks were secondary to the Lancashire-India trade talks. The 
weakness in Lancashire's position - as noted by the Foreign Office - was the fact that in the 
forthcoming trade talks the India government would be defending Indian industrial interests. 
Furthermore, the Lancashire-Bombay agreement now appeared less assured in the face of an 
Indian cotton manufacturing industry that had little sympathy with Lancashire’s plight. A 
request from the Lancashire cotton industry for a conference with all their Indian 
counterparts had already received a less than enthusiastic response.129 The Lancashire 
delegates were acutely aware of this point and pressed the British government over the 
possible support of the Indian government for the Lancashire cotton industry. Clare-Lees 
spoke ofthe need for a stiff Anglo-Indian front against Japan, while Samuel Hammersley, 
the Conservative MP for Stockport, and Raymond Streat, both part of the Lancashire 
delegation, questioned Crowe on the nature of Indian obligations relating from the Ottawa 
Conference.130 However, despite the importance of the Indian market to Lancashire, the 
Board of T rade was unforthcoming about the possibilities ofLancashire-Indian cooperation.
In contrast to Mody's offer of Lancashire-Bombay cooperation, the Lancashire-India 
cotton talks revealed how peripheral Lancashire was to the calculations of the majority of 
the Indian cotton interests. At the first meeting between the Lancashire and Indian cotton 
industrialists which took place on 18 September 1933, the Indians were clearly not 
impressed with Lancashire's proposals. Lancashire claimed that the Japanese wanted to 
stabilise their cotton piece-good exports to India at 615 million square yards per annum - a 
figure which was 6% higher than Japan’s cotton piece-good exports to India in 1932 - while 
the Manchester delegates wanted to fix Japanese exports to India at 315 million square yards
129. Minute by Allen, 15 August 1933, FO371/17161,F5463/1203/23; Chatterji B., Trade, Tariffs, and 
Empire, p. 386.
130. Meeting of the Lancashire Textile Delegation to India at the Board ofTrade, 24 August 1933,
F0371 /17162,F5839/1203/23.
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per annum. Further, not only did the Lancashire delegates want India to restrict Japanese 
access to the Indian market, they also wanted all the displaced Japanese export volume to be 
transferred to Lancashire via a 5% reduction on the British preferential tariff. Finally, the 
Lancashire delegates requested increased preferential duties on British cotton yams, rayon 
piece-goods, and rayon yam. In return for the desired tariff concessions Lancashire 
proposed to assist Indian goods in British colonial markets, increase purchases of Indian raw 
cotton, and - without authorisation or approval - promised British government support of 
Indian raw cotton cultivation.131
The Indian cotton manufacturers had little interest in Lancashire’s proposals, and 
regarded Lancashire's reciprocal concessions for better access to the Indian market as 
worthless. Lancashire's offer to assist Indian textiles in the British colonial market was 
rejected by the Indians since it would simply displace competition between Lancashire’s and 
India’s products from the Indian market to the British colonial market. Further, Lancashire’s 
offer to purchase more Indian raw cotton was rejected by the Indians. Although interested by 
the proposal, the Indians refused to see this offer as a valuable concession from Lancashire, 
since Lancashire bought little Indian raw cotton and - given the Lancashire cotton industry’s 
orientation towards the finer American and Egyptian raw cotton - it was difficult to see how 
this small quantity could be increased. Moreover, Lancashire’s low utilisation of Indian raw 
cotton also undermined Lancashire's 'promise' of British government support for Indian raw 
cotton cultivation. The Indian cotton interests reasoned that given Lancashire's low 
utilisation rate it was unlikely that British government support would be forthcoming, since 
any benefit derived from such assistance to India raw cotton output would go to the Japanese 
cotton industry and not to Lancashire.132 The Lancashire-India trade talks broke-up with no 
agreement, and without the Indian cotton manufacturers accepting Lancashire’s prime 
demand that restrictions on Japanese cotton textile exports to India should fall to Lancashire 
through a reduction in Britain’s preferential cotton tariff. Randall concluded with some
131. If the Indians refused to reduce the preferential British ad valorem tariff, Lancashire requested either 
the abolition of the preferential British specific duty on grey piece goods or its reduction from 4.375 
annas per pound to 2 annas per pound, Board ofTrade to the Foreign Office, 19 October 1933, 
FO371/17163,F6697/1203/23. Even the reduction o f the preferential British specific duty on grey 
piece-goods to 2 annas per pound would give Lancashire a substantial advantage over Japanese 
competition in the Indian market, since it would be the equivalent of a 15% ad valorem duty, and thus 
mean that Lancashire’s grey piece-goods would receive the full British preferential ad valorem tariff see 
table 3.9. However, any reduction ofthe tariff on British grey piece-goods would yet again result in 
increased British competition against Indian grey piece-goods; Chatterji B., Trade, Tariffs, and Empire, 
pp. 386-387.
132. Board of Trade to the Foreign Office, 19 October 1933, FO371/17163,F6697/1203/23.
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bitterness that the hopes of the Lancashire cotton industry had been thwarted by the Indian 
cotton manufacturers, and that now "In general it seems that the anticipation regarding 
Lancashire's share of the textile trade to be taken from Japan will be falsified: the Indian 
manufacturers will do their best to get it all".133 However, this statement merely proved the 
veracity of Randall's previous conviction that the Indian government would do little for the 
Lancashire cotton industry, and that in reality Lancashire had only a limited amount of 
influence on the Indian government. The course of the Lancashire-India cotton talks again 
revealed the limits of Lancashire's threat to disrupt Indian constitutional reform as a 
bargaining counter. Indeed Lancashire's attempt to curry Indian favour through displays of 
moderation on the constitutional reform question totally backfired. During the Lancashire- 
India cotton talks - at the insistence of Clare-Lees, and prompting of Lord Derby and Hoare - 
the Manchester Chamber of Commerce delayed and then drastically watered down their 
'anti-Indian' oral evidence before the Joint Select Committee on Indian Reform,154 and yet 
still failed to gain any acceptance for commercial concessions from the whole of the Indian 
cotton industry.
Despite the failure of the Lancashire-India trade talks the Lancashire cotton industry 
still hoped to circumvent the opposition of the Indian cotton industry to a reduction of the 
preferential British cotton tariff through a separate Lancashire-Bombay agreement. On 28 
October 1933 Clare-Lees and Mody reached a separate Lancashire-Bombay agreement, 
known as the Lees-Mody Pact, over Lancashire's preferential access to the Indian market and 
Lancashire's attitude to Indian political reform. In return for Lancashire's cooperation on 
questions of Indian constitutional reform, the Bombay millowners agreed to support 
Lancashire's demand for a reduction of the British preferential tariff on cotton and artificial 
silk piece-goods. However, in the Lees-Mody Pact, the Bombay millowners only undertook 
not to raise any obstacle if the Indian government was financially in a position to withdraw 
the October 1931 5% ad valorem surcharge upon Lancashire's cotton piece-goods.133 Thus 
even this support for Lancashire from one section of the Indian cotton industry promised no 
definite improvement of Lancashire’s access to the Indian market. The Board ofTrade's only 
hope that the Lees-Mody Pact might benefit the Lancashire cotton industry was a totally
133. Minute by Randall, 26 September 1933, FO371/17163,F6774/1203/23.
134. Redford A., pp. 286-287; Chatterji B., pp. 387-388.
135. The Manchester Chamber o f Commerce, Monthly Record, November 1933, pp. 327-329; Redford A., 
p. 288; Chatterji B., Trade, Tariffs, and Empire, p. 389.
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unsupported contention that the Indian government might ignore domestic opposition and 
implement the terms of the Pact.136
Lancashire’s commercial and political weaknesses, which undermined their 
attempts to negotiate improved access to the Indian market, also contributed to Lancashire's 
failure to reach a 'market sharing' agreement with the Japanese cotton delegation. The 
Lancashire-Japan cotton talks started after the failed Lancashire-India cotton talks, and 
immediately devolved into a hostile encounter of economic self-justification between the 
Lancashire and Japanese delegates. Streat found the Lancashire-Japan cotton talks "very 
abstract, and a good fifty miles from reality".137 Clare-Lees told the Japanese that whilst 5-6 
years ago Lancashire could regard the progress of the Japanese cotton industry with 
equanimity, the textile industry was now faced with a choice: either both countries could 
reach an orderly solution or they would have to look after themselves. In this vein he warned 
the Japanese that:
Japan's competitive attack was proceeding at a pace which could only be regarded as 
abnormal ... we cannot be reproached for proposing to cope with it by measures 
which must necessarily be equally unprecedented.138
The Japanese counter to Clare-Lees was equally forthright. The leader of the Japanese 
delegation stated that the efficiency of their industry was due neither to a, "deliberate 
national policy nor to concerted action on the part of industrialists ...[but was due to ] ... 
patriotic efforts to stimulate production and self preservation”. To this statement Clare-Lees 
made an aggressive final sally,
If [a nation's] policy imperils the well being of the people of other nations, it is natural 
that they should act vigorously in their own defence ... in a world consuming less, 
Japan was producing more; this had to stop.139
However, such a threat evoked no Japanese reply. If a Lancashire-Japan world marketing 
agreement was to be achieved, it would have to wait until the Anglo-Japanese cotton trade 
talks in London, after the conclusion of the Indo-Japanese trade negotiations. However,
136. Minute by Allen, 26 October 1933, F0371/17164,F6795/1203/23.
137. Dupree M. (ed.), entry dated 11 October 1933, p. 256.
138. Clare-Lees statement to the Japanese delegation, 4 October 1933, FO371/17163,F6697/1203/23.
139. Clare-Lees statement to the Japanese delegation, 4 October 1933, FO371/17163,F6697/1203/23.
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during the period of the various India based cotton talks the Japanese did make one offer of a 
possible solution to Anglo-Japanese trade problems through a political arrangement. 
Kando, a Japanese Foreign Ministry official, bypassed both the Lancashire and Japanese 
cotton delegations and indicated to George Sansom, the British commercial counsellor in 
Tokyo who had been appointed as a special advisor to the Indian government for the Indo- 
Japan trade negotiations, that in return for some British gesture over China or Manchuria, the 
Japanese would be more willing to cooperate over the cotton trade talks.140 Frank Ashton- 
Gwatkin, the economic advisor in the Foreign Office, responded favourably to the report of 
this offer, but stated that such a proposal would have to be considered within the constraints 
imposed on British foreign policy by League ofNations' commitments against Japan, and the 
state of Anglo-American relations. Further, given the breakdown of the Lancashire-Japan 
cotton talks and the imminent approach of the Indo-Japanese trade negotiations any serious 
discussions based upon this offer would again have to wait until the Lancashire-Japan cotton 
talks in London.
140. Kando to Sansom, 11 October 1933, FO371/17163,F6787/1203/23.
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The Indo-Japanese trade negotiations, 1933-1934.
Both the Lancashire-India and Lancashire-Japan cotton talks had underlined the impotence 
of the Lancashire cotton interests in ensuring their access to the Indian market. This lack of 
influence upon Indian tariff policy was again reflected in the Indo-Japanese trade 
negotiations where the interests of the Lancashire cotton industry were marginal to the India- 
Japan deliberations. Any benefit Lancashire derived from the Indo-Japanese trade 
negotiations was merely a by-product of the Indian government's desire to protect the Indian 
cotton industry from Japanese competition.
Negotiations between the Indian and Japanese officials began on 23 September 
1933, and the Indian negotiators put forward their first proposal on 17 October 1933. The 
main thrust of the Indian proposals was to link restrictions on Japanese cotton piece good 
exports to India - by both volume and category - to the Japanese purchase of Indian raw 
cotton. The initial proposal of the Indians was to restrict total Japanese cotton piece good 
imports to a basic quota of 300 million yards per annum and a maximum quota of 350 
million yards per annum. The various piece-good categories would be allocated specified 
proportions - grey piece-goods 45%, bordered grey piece-goods 13%, bleached or white 
piece-goods 8%, and coloured and dyed piece-goods 34% - within the total import quota and 
with no rectification of excess and surplus between the four categories through a transfer 
system. In return for the basic quota the Japanese were required to take a minimum of 1.25 
million bales of Indian raw cotton per annum. Further, for every additional 10,000 bales of 
raw cotton the Japanese purchased over the 1.25 million yard minimum they would be 
allowed to export an additional 2 million yards of cotton piece-goods per annum, up to the 
350 millionyards maximum quota. Thus if the Japanese were to export the maximum of 350 
million yards of cotton piece-goods to India they would have to purchase 1.5 million bales of 
Indian raw cotton. Finally, if  the Japanese agreed both to the quota and sliding-scale system 
the Indians would agree to reduce the non-British cotton piece-good duty to its pre-July rate 
of a standard 50% ad valorem duty and a 5.25 annas per pound minimum specific duty on 
grey piece-goods. However, the Indians also requested an additional agreement that gave 
the Indian government the right to imposed additional duties on Japanese cotton piece-goods 
in the event of a depreciation of the yen in relation to the rupee.141
141. Indian official proposal to the Japanese, 17 October 1933, FO371/17163,F6697/1203/23.
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In contrast to the Indian proposal, which would dramatically reduce Japanese cotton 
piece-good exports to India, the Japanese initial proposal sought to limit Japanese exports to 
their 1932 level. The Japanese government agreed to limit cotton piece-good exports to 
India to 578.5 million yards - the 1932-33 figure of Japanese cotton piece-good exports to 
India - in return for which duties on Japanese cotton piece-good imports would again be 
reduced to their pre-July 1933 level. However, both the Indians and Japanese objected to 
each other’s proposals. The Indians dismissed as abnormally high the 1932-33 level of 
Japanese cotton piece-good exports to India, while the Japanese objected to the linkage of 
piece-good exports to India to the purchase of Indian raw cotton.142 Following the initial 
exchange of proposals a huge gap existed between the Indians and Japanese over the 
acceptable volume of Japanese cotton piece-good exports to India. Sansom considered that 
the Japanese delegates had been much stiffer in these early stages of negotiations than had 
been anticipated.143
Despite the initial standoff between the Indians and Japanese some progress 
eventually occurred in the negotiations. The Japanese conceded the Indian demand for a 
linkage between cotton piece-good exports and raw cotton purchases.144 Then on 25 October 
1933 the Indians privately communicated to Sawada, the chief Japanese Foreign Ministry 
negotiator, a revised offer which Sansom regarded as perfectly reasonable: of a minimum 
cotton piece-good import quota of 325 million yards and a maximum cotton piece-good 
import quota o f375 million yards and with no alteration to the raw cotton off-take.145 On 30 
October the Indians again revised the Japanese cotton piece-good import quota upwards, to a 
minimum quota of 350 million yards and a maximum quota of 400 million yards.146 
However, the Indian cotton manufacturers made it clear that they would object to any further 
concessions to the Japanese.147 These concessions by the Indians encouraged the Foreign 
Office to hope that an early settlement to the Indo-Japanese trade negotiations was now 
possible. Randall minuted, "This is encouraging, though I can hardly believe the Japanese
142. Snow to the Foreign Office, 20 November 1933, FO371/17165,F7993/1203/23.
143. Sansom to Crowe, 22 October 1933, FO371/17164,F6882/1203/23.
144. Snow to the Foreign Office, 20 November 1933, FO371/17165,F7993/1203/23.
145. Sansom to the Foreign Office, 25 October 1933, FO371/17163,F6781/1203/23.
146. Sansom (Simla) to the Foreign Office, 20 November 1933, FO371/17165,F7993/1203/23, Minute by 
Allen, 1 November 1933, FO371/17164,F6904/1203/23.
147. The Manchester Guardian, 4 November 1933.
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will agree at once”.148 However, in Japan the cotton manufacturers proved unwilling to 
accept the Indian government’s terms.149 Yet pressure from the Japanese government 
resulted in the cotton industrialists’ agreement to the 400 million yards maximum import 
quota in return for the purchase of 1.5 million bales of Indian raw cotton.150 Thus by early 
November 1933 the substantive issue between the Indian and Japanese - the size of the 
Japanese cotton piece-good quota and the Japanese raw cotton purchases - had been settled.
However, in spite of the improved Indian offer on the minimum and maximum 
import quota for Japanese cotton piece-goods, Japanese cotton manufacturers still rejected 
the division of the total cotton piece-good import quota into rigid categories. In particular 
they regarded as totally inadequate the Indian government's allocation of a fixed 8% 
bleached piece-good category of the total import quota. The Japanese complained that with 
the retention of the high specific duty of 5.25 annas per pound on grey piece-goods it would 
be difficult for them to achieve their full quota allocation of grey piece-goods.151 As a result 
they wanted to sell more bleached piece-goods to India. In early November in an attempt to 
increase their allocation of bleached piece-goods the Japanese proposed only three 
categories for the total cotton piece-good import quota: grey piece-goods 45%, bleached 
piece-goods 20%, and coloured and dyed piece-goods 35%. Further, they demanded that a 
10% transfer of the total cotton piece-good import quota should be allowed between the 
three categories.152 In Osaka Japanese cotton manufacturers were demanding an 18% 
bleached category and were suggesting the recall of the Japanese cotton industry delegates 
unless this was achieved.153 In public, after being severely savaged by the cotton 
manufacturers for agreeing to the ’8%’ bleached piece-good share,154 the Japanese Foreign 
Ministry reversed its position and sided with the demands of the Japanese cotton 
manufacturers for an increased bleached category. Hirota Koki, the Japanese Foreign 
Minister, implied that the only reason the Indian government did not grant the Japanese a 
larger bleached category was due to opposition from the Lancashire cotton industry.155
148. Minute by Randall, 27 October 1933, FO371/17163,F6781/1203/23.
149. Snow to the Foreign Office, 4 November 1933, FO371/17164,F6995/1203/23.
150. The Manchester Guardian, 4, 6, and 7 November 1933; Ishii O., pp. 125-126.
151. Snow to the Foreign Office, 4 and 8 November 1933, FO371/17164,F6955,F7018/1203/23.
152. Snow to the Foreign Office, 8 November 1933, F0371/17164,F7018/1203/23.
153. Snow to the Foreign Office, 20 November 1933, FO371/17164,F7364/1203/23.
154. Snow to the Foreign Office, 24 November 1933, FO371/17164,F7364/1203/23.
155. Snow to Kurusu, 22 November 1933, FO371/17164,F7336/1203/23.
176
Lancashire and the Indo-Japanese trade negotiations, 1933-1937
The Japanese demand for an increased allocation of bleached piece-goods brought 
the Indo-Japanese trade negotiations into direct conflict with Lancashire's remaining 
economic interest in the Indian market. For the Lancashire cotton industry exports of 
bleached piece-goods to India retained both an economic and psychological importance. In 
1930 Japan’s exports of grey piece-goods to India had exceeded Lancashire's exports, and 
again in 1932 Japan’s exports of coloured piece-goods to India had exceeded Lancashire's 
exports.156 In contrast to the end of Lancashire’s dominance in the grey and coloured piece- 
good markets, Lancashire still exported more bleached piece-goods to India than Japan. In 
1932 Lancashire exported some 280 million linear yards of bleached piece-goods to India, 
which made bleached piece-goods Lancashire's largest category of piece-good exports to 
India.157 Further, these exports amounted to over 2.3 times Japan's exports of bleached piece- 
goods to India,158 and thus gave the Lancashire cotton industry some confidence that they 
could still compete with Japanese products in specialised markets. Therefore Japanese 
attempts to increase their share of piece-goods exports to India posed a direct threat to 
Lancashire's most substantial economic interest in the Indian market.
Initially the Indian government proved unwilling to sacrifice Lancashire’s 
commercial interest and accept Japanese demands for a larger bleached category. By the end 
of November 1933 the trade negotiations had reached a deadlock over the Indian 
government's insistence on an '8.8%' bleached category and Japanese demands of an '18%' 
bleached category.159 However, much to the alarm of the British government the Indian 
government’s resistance to Japanese demands slowly eroded.160 The Indian government was
156. See table 3.7.
157. See table 3.7.
158. See table 3.7.
159. The Japanese had dropped their demand for the total cotton piece-good quota to be divided into three 
categories but were still insisting upon a 10% transfer of the total quota between individual categories. 
Thus if the Japanese used the foil transfer for the bleached piece-good category it would increase its 
share o f the total cotton piece-good quota from 8% to 18%. Under pressure from the Japanese to allow 
for the transfer o f cotton piece-goods between the categories the Indian government had conceded this 
point and offered a maximum 10% transfer of the total o f each category between the four categories 
which allowed the Japanese a maximum of a '8.8%' bleached piece-good category of the total cotton 
piece-good import quota, Memorandum of the Secretary o f State for India, Negotiations between India 
and Japan in regard to the Cotton Trade', 23 November 1933, CAB 24 CP. 282(33).
160. On 21 November 1933 the Indian government told the British government that they were prepared to 
offer the Japanese a 5% transfer of the total cotton piece-good import quota. Thus giving the Japanese
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concerned over the effect of the Japanese boycott of Indian raw cotton on the Indian cotton 
growers, and feared the reaction of the Indian cotton growers if the boycott was not ended 
quickly through the conclusion of an Indo-Japanese trade agreement. The Indian 
government worried that conditions in the world cotton market had worsened for Indian 
cotton producers - the relative fall in the dollar meant that American raw cotton would be far 
more competitive on the world market against Indian raw cotton - and so it would be difficult 
for the Indian cotton growers to sell the produce that the Japanese were boycotting. In these 
circumstances the Indian government considered it was unwise to allow the boycott to 
continue over a desire to keep the Japanese bleached category as low as possible in deference 
to Lancashire. Moreover, it reasoned that if this became widely known in India the political 
consequences would be incalculable.161 Thus in order to end the Japanese boycott of Indian 
raw cotton it told the British government that it was prepared to meet the Japanese demand 
for an ’18%’ bleached piece-good category, by changing the 10% transfer by category to a 
10% transfer to the total cotton piece-good quota. The Viceroy accepted that the increase of 
the Japanese bleached piece-good category was regrettable, but it was preferable to a break 
in negotiations with Japan.162
However, while the Indian government was more concerned over the political 
consequences of the failure of the Indo-Japanese trade negotiations on Indian interest 
groups, both the India Office and the Board of T rade worried over the effect of the increased 
Japanese bleached piece-goods quota on Lancashire. Since Lancashire had only so recently 
gained nothing for presenting its modified evidence before the Select Committee on Indian 
Reform, any further erosion of Lancashire's interests in the Indian market could renew its 
hostility to Indian reform. In response to the Indian government's equivocation over the 
bleached piece-good categoiy, the India Office urged the Indian government to stand firm 
and not to grant any concession to the Japanese in the bleached piece-good category.163 
Hoare told the British cabinet that his main concern was the effect the concession would 
have on Lancashire. He recognised the emotional importance of the Indian bleached piece- 
good market to Lancashire, and that an increase in Japan's bleached piece-good category 
would be a significant blow for Lancashire’s pride. Moreover, he feared that an Indo-
a '13%' bleached piece-good category, Viceroy to Hoare, 23 November 1933, CAB 24 CP. 282(33).
161. The Indian government to Hoare, 24 November 1933, CAB 24 CP. 282(33).
162. The Indian government to Hoare, 23 November 1933, CAB 24 CP. 282(33).
163. Hoare to the Indian government, 24 November 1933, CAB 24 CP. 282(33).
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Japanese trade agreement under the proposed Indian terms would revive the hostility of the 
Manchester Chamber of Commerce to the Indian Fiscal Autonomy Convention of 1919. 
Further, in the face of such agitation the formal signature of an India-Japan Trade 
Convention in London might prove awkward.564
Runciman proved even more hostile than the India Office to concessions to Japan at 
Lancashire’s expense, and was committed to preventing any increase in Japan’s bleached 
piece-good category. Overt concessions to the Japanese would lead to renewed Lancashire 
attacks upon both the Indian and British governments for failing to defend Lancashire's 
interests. Runciman warned the cabinet that an increase in Japan's bleached piece-goods 
quota would result in Lancashire’s complaint that its interests in bleached goods was being 
sacrificed for a more favourable treatment of Indian interests in grey piece-goods. He 
produced figures to show that an increase of the Japanese bleached piece-good category 
from ’8.8%’ to ’18%’ would increase Japanese bleached piece-good exports by some 49 
million yards on their 1928-1931 average. In contrast the corresponding decline in Japanese 
grey piece-good exports from a ’44.2%’ to a ’35%’ share of the total cotton piece-good import 
quota would result in a 70 million yard decrease in Japanese grey piece-good imports over 
the same period.565 Runciman stated that such an obvious maltreatment of Lancashire's 
interests by the Indian government would lead to renewed Lancashire hostility to Indian 
Fiscal Autonomy, and the process of Indian constitutional reform. Further, he claimed that 
imperial economic ties would be strained, especially following British concessions to Indian 
jute manufactures in the British market, while Lancashire’s consumption of Indian raw 
cotton would be discouraged. Finally, he warned the British cabinet that the dispute over 
bleached piece-goods would spill over into the British political arena, and that the British 
government would face severe criticism from Lancashire that the government had known of 
Lancashire’s interests but had failed to protect them. Runciman told the cabinet that he 
wanted the Indian government to refuse the Japanese demands. However, he did accept that 
if the Japanese fears over their inability to fill grey piece-good category were well founded, 
he would accept a reconsideration of the Indian duties on non-British cotton textiles.166 Thus 
both the India Office and the Board of Trade strongly opposed the increase of the bleached
164. Memorandum of the Secretary of State for India, ’Negotiations between India and Japan in regard to 
the Cotton Trade1, 27 November 1933, CAB 24 CP. 282(33).
165. See table 3.13.
166. Memorandum by the President of the Board of Trade, Indo-Japanese Trade Negotiations', 27 
November 1933, CAB CP. 283(33).
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piece-good category because of worries over Lancashire’s reaction, and its future attitude to 
Anglo-Indian relations.
Faced by the demands of Hoare and Runciman for the need to defend Lancashire’s 
interest, the British cabinet agreed to Hoare's solution to the current impasse over the 
bleached piece-good category. The cabinet was alarmed that the Indian government had 
already made too many concessions at Lancashire’s expense in the current Indo-Japanese 
trade negotiations,167 and that if the Lancashire cotton interests could combine with other 
British industries - linseed, jute, and pig-iron who, as a result of Ottawa, faced duty free 
competition from Indian products - they would undermine Ottawa, imperial preferential 
trade, and Anglo-Indian relations.168 The President of the Board of Trade, and the Colonial 
Secretary took a particularly hard line over Indian trade concessions to the Japanese, and 
were adamant that even against the judgement of the Indian government British trade 
interests in India must be defended.169 In contrast Simon and Hoare insisted that Britain 
should not interfere in the Indo-Japanese trade negotiations, since it would strain both 
Anglo-Japanese and Anglo-Indian relations. Simon stated that since the British government 
had clearly told the Japanese that they had no role in Indian commercial affairs such 
interference would lead to Japanese charges of bad faith,170 while the Indian government 
complained to Hoare that British interference risked the Indo-Japanese trade negotiations 
and the continued raw cotton boycott all for a mere 25 million yards of Lancashire's export 
trade.171 As a means out of the impasse Hoare proposed that if the British government agreed 
financially to tide-over the Indian cotton growers until February 1934 - when the current 
Japanese stocks of Indian raw cotton would be exhausted - then the Indian government could 
reject the Japanese demands. The cabinet accepted this proposal and formed a Cabinet 
Committee to study the issue. Hoare agreed to persuade the Viceroy to delay the 
announcement of the 10% transfer by total cotton piece-good import quota, while the British 
government debated ways oftiding-overthe Indian cotton growers for the next 2-3 months.172
167. Simon to Snow, 28 November 1933, F0371/17164,F7336/1203/23.
168. Hoare to the Indian government, 28 November 1933, 'Cabinet Committee on Indian Cotton', CAB 
27/556; Cabinet Conclusions, 28 November 1933, CAB 23 65(33)1.
169. Cabinet Conclusions, 28 November 1933, CAB 23 65(33)1.
170. Cabinet Conclusions, 28 November 1933, CAB 23 65(33)1, see interview between Simon and 
Matsudaira, 26 April 1933, Cabinet Conclusions, CAB 23 31(33)2.
171. The Indian government to Hoare, 30 November 1933, 'Cabinet Committee on Indian Cotton', CAB 
27/556.
172. Cabinet Conclusions, 28 November 1933, CAB 23 65(33)1.
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Thus the cabinet reverted to their initial disposition for a direct intervention in Indian 
commercial affairs and agreed to Hoare’s suggestion to consider more subtle ways of 
influencingthe Indo-Japanese trade negotiations.
However, despite the threat of a breakdown in the Indo-Japanese trade negotiations 
over the bleached piece-good category, the Foreign Office did not view such an event - in 
contrast to Anglo-Indian relations - as a serious blow to Anglo-Japanese relations, and 
offered no foreign policy reasons for accepting Japanese demands for an increased bleached 
piece-good category. Indeed Sansom, usually unwilling to press the Japanese on economic 
grounds, told the British government that "the Government of India should be urged to stand 
firm", since the Indian government's last offer could not be revised to accommodate such a 
minor detail.173 The Foreign Office fears of March 1933 that economic discrimination 
against Japan - over the British West African colonies - would inflame Japanese opinion had 
now subsided. The Foreign Office considered that the successful conclusion of the Japanese 
campaigns in Manchuria had rendered Japanese opinion less quarrelsome over foreign trade 
discrimination. On the cabinet debate over the bleached piece-goods category question 
Charles Orde, the head of the Far Eastern Department, minuted that the consequences of a 
breakdown in negotiations were not as serious as they would have been a few months 
previously, "for the atmosphere generally is much less affected by the excitement 
engendered by the Manchurian affair".’74 Thus the Foreign Office had no objection to the 
Indian government's breaking off negotiations with the Japanese.175 However, privately the 
Foreign Office found the deadlock over the defence of Lancashire’s interests to be somewhat 
cosmetic, and viewed the impasse over the bleached piece-goods category to be 
disproportionate to the possible risk of an Indian tariff war with Japan.176
On 1 December 1933 the Cabinet Committee on Indian Cotton met to look at 
methods of aiding the Indian raw cotton growers, but was disappointed at the high cost of 
such potential support. The committee estimated that the cost for the next 2-3 months of
173. Sansom to Crowe, 23 November 1933, F0371/17164,F7336/1203/23.
174. Minute by Orde, 27 November 1933, FO371/17165,F7450/1203/23.
175. Hoare to the Indian government, 24 November 1933, CAB 24 CP. 282(33).
176. Minute by Allen, 30 November 1933, FO371/17165,F7455/1203/23.
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supporting the Indian government could be as highj£9 million.177 Further, there was little 
possibility of recouping these losses from re-sales of the Indian raw cotton crop, especially in 
view of the huge 1933 American crop and the depreciation of the dollar. Thus the cost of 
backing the Indian raw cotton growers looked prohibitive to the committee, especially in 
view of Hoare’s estimate that the potential loss to Lancashire as a result of an '18%' Japanese 
bleached piece-good category was only some £200,000-300,000. However, both Runciman 
and Hoare refused to back down on the need to maintain a hard line on concessions to the 
Japanese at Lancashire's expense. In particular Hoare emphasised the fact that the guarantee 
alone of the raw cotton crop by the British government to the Indian government would 
suffice, since the Indian government could then stand firm and bluff the Japanese into 
backing down. Further, he reasoned that if the measure worked then with regard to Ottawa 
Britain could expect a more liberal treatment from the Indian government. With the 
committee undecided, critical support for Runciman and Hoare came from Neville 
Chamberlain, the Chancellor of the Exchequer, who shared Hoare's desire to call the 
Japanese bluff, and approved British financial backing of the Indian cotton growers.178 Thus 
with the consent of the Chancellor both the Cabinet Committee and the full Cabinet agreed 
to support the Indian cotton growers.
The backing of the British government proved critical in the Indian government’s 
rejection of Japanese demands, as the Indian government abandoned their decision to accept 
the Japanese request for an' 18%' bleached piece-good category. After being privately told of 
the British government’s support for the Indian cotton growers, on 4 December 1933 the 
Indian delegates rejected the Japanese demands for the increased bleached piece good 
category and the removal of the yen depreciation clause.179 Further, the Indian negotiators 
told their Japanese counterparts that if the boycott continued the Indian government would 
support the Indian cotton growers. No reference was made to the role of the British 
government in case it led to political complications.180 Thus the firmness of the Indian 
government is directly attributable to the British decision to safeguard the Indian cotton 
growers if the negotiations continued to stall and the raw cotton boycott continued.
177. 'Cabinet Committee on Indian Cotton1, 1 December 1933, CAB 27/556.
178. 'Cabinet Committee on Indian Cotton', 1 December 1933, CAB 27/556.
179. Indian government to the Foreign Office, 5 December 1933, FO371/17165,F7627/1203/23.
180. Cabinet Conclusions, 6 December 1933, CAB 23 68(33)12.
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While the Indian government insisted on an ’8.8%’ bleached piece-good category,181 
the Japanese cotton manufacturers rejected this proposal, and again on 6 December 1933 
threatened to withdraw their delegates from the Indo-Japanese trade negotiations. However, 
the Japanese Foreign Ministry conceded that the Indian government would not make any 
more substantial concessions to Japan, accepted the Indian proposals as the basis for the new 
Indo-Japanese Trade convention, and began to pressure the Japanese cotton manufacturers 
into agreeing to the Indian proposals. From 7 December 1933 the Japanese authorities 
attempted to suppress the raw cotton boycott.182 Between 7 and 9 December 1933 in a series 
of meetings in Tokyo the Japanese government pressed the cotton manufacturers into 
accepting the Indian terms,183 while on 9 December 1933NakajimaKumakichi,the Japanese 
Minister for Commerce and Industry, visited Osaka in order to browbeat the cotton 
manufacturers into submission. In public Nakajima told the Japanese cotton manufacturers 
that the new Indo-Japanese trade convention was necessary, since Japan needed to control 
her own exports, otherwise she would face increased international resentment and far 
greater trade restrictions. However, British officials had little doubt that in a further private 
meeting Nakajima issued something little short of an ultimatum to the Japanese cotton 
manufacturers: either accept the Indian terms or face a withdrawal of government support.184 
The Japanese cotton manufacturers, already divided over the continuation of the raw cotton 
boycott,185 buckled under the governmental pressure and reluctantly accepted the Indian 
terms, and by 22 December 1933 90% of the raw cotton boycott had unofficially been 
terminated.186 With some confidence Japanese officials informed their British counterparts 
that the Japanese cotton manufacturers would accept the Indian proposals.187 Finally, on 6 
January 1934 the Japan Cotton Spinner’s Association formally called off the raw cotton 
boycott and accepted the terms agreed between the Indian and Japanese governments as the
181. Foreign Office to Snow, 5 December 1933, F0371/17165,F7532/1203/23.
182. Snow to the Foreign Office, 7 December 1933, F 0371/17165,F7637,F7645/1203/23.
183. The Manchester Guardian, 7 and 11 December 1933.
184. Snow to the Foreign Office, 12 December 1933, FO371/17165,F7690/1203/23.
185. The small millowners had originally been unwilling participants in the raw cotton boycott, and by 
December 1933 were suffering from the non-importation of Indian raw cotton. Further, it was reported 
that Indian raw cotton importers in Tokyo had already started to sell considerable quantities o f raw 
cotton to the small millowners, Hasegawa S., ’Nichi-In Kaisho no Gaiko Senryaku', [The Diplomatic 
Strategy of the Indo-Japanese Conference], Gaiko Jiho (1934), pp. 137-138; The Manchester 
Guardian, 11 December 1933; Ishii O., p. 137.
186. Snow to the Foreign Office, 22 December 1933, F0371/18166,F667/24/23.
187. Snow to the Foreign Office, 18 and 20 December 1933, FO371/17165,F7808,F7855/1203/23.
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basis ofthe new Indo-Japanese Trade Convention.188
In order to make the provisional Indo-Japanese trade agreement more amenable to 
the Japanese cotton manufacturers, the Japanese Foreign Ministry pressed for minor 
improvements in the Indian proposals. Kurusu Saburo, an official in the Japanese Ministry 
of Foreign Affairs, explained that these final pieces of skirmishing stemmed from the 
Japanese government's wish not to lose 'face' before their own commercial circles.189 Faced 
by the claims of the Japanese government to save its face, the Board of Trade agreed to allow 
the Japanese bleached piece-good quota rise to '9.6%'.190 In keeping with the Board of Trade 
guidelines, in mid- December the Indian government offered a 20% transfer within the 
bleached and bordered grey piece-good categories - the equivalent of a '9.6%' bleached 
piece-good category - to the Japanese. However, for this '9.6%' bleached piece-good 
category the Indian government demanded the inclusion of the yen depreciation clause, and 
an undertaking from the Japanese that the raw cotton boycott would be called off within ten 
days of 23 December 1933.191
Like the Japanese cotton manufacturers, Lancashire reacted unfavourably to the new 
Indo-Japanese Trade Convention. The establishment of a small Japanese bleached piece- 
good category was no substitute for the larger than anticipated Japanese cotton piece-good 
import quota and the non-reduction of the British preferential tariff. Further, the Lees-Mody 
Pact's promise to reduce Britain's preferential tariff proved to have no immediate chance of 
introduction, since it was dependent upon Indian fiscal conditions. Already the Indian 
government's increase of the tariff on artificial silk piece-goods, from 35% to 50% in January 
1934, ignored one promise of the Lees-Mody Pact for the introduction of a preferential tariff 
on British artificial silk goods.192 Furthermore, although the quota on Japanese piece-goods 
meant that in theory Lancashire would benefit as much as Indian cotton manufacturers, the 
non reduction of the preferential British cotton piece-good import tariff meant that in 
practice Lancashire would derive little benefit from the Indian impositionof import restraint 
upon Japanese piece-goods. In Lancashire the combination of the non-reduction of the
188. The Manchester Guardian, 6 January 1934.
189. Kurusu to Snow, 2 December 1933, FO371/17165,F7532/1203/23.
190. Minute by Randall, 6 December 1933, FO371/17165,F7687/1203/23.
191. India and Japan trade negotiations, 23 December 1933, FO371/17165,F7961/1203/23.
192. The Manchester Chamber o f Commerce, Monthly Record, 31 January 1934, p. 5.
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British preferential tariff and the size of the Japanese cotton piece-good quota was 
recognised as a defeat for Lancashire’s chances of recovering their lost’ Indian trade. Thus in 
a somewhat restrained commentary on the Indo-Japanese Trade Convention the Manchester 
Chamber of Commerce’s Special Committee on Japanese Competitioncomplained that,
The Indian millowners and the Lancashire cotton industry may feel that the 
Government of India has been rather more generous than the circumstances really 
warranted in the terms granted in the India market to Japan. Bearing in mind the 
depreciation of the yen, and the other factors contributing to Japanese prices, the 
reduction of the duty to 50 per cent, was hardly warranted, whilst the maximum 
quantities allowed for imports of cotton goods appear to have been too much 
influenced by the abnormal conditions of the last year or two, instead of by the more 
normal position of earlier years.193
Outside the confines of the Manchester Chamber of Commerce spokesmen for the 
Lancashire cotton industry were less restrained in their criticism of the failure of the 
Lancashire-India cotton talks and the Indo-Japanese Trade Convention.194 In Parliament 
Alan Chorlton, the firebrand Conservative MP of the Cotton Trade League, complained that 
in the Indian market, because of a combination of the value of the yen and the non reduction 
of the British preferential tariff, in regard to Japanese competition Lancashire’s cotton piece- 
goods remained at a 15-17% disadvantage,195 while Streat recorded that when the ’Ginger 
Group’ of six MPs met in the Manchester Free Trade Hall to condemn government inactivity 
vis a vis the Lancashire cotton industry, ’’there was a tremendous clamour about the 
unsatisfactory nature of the Indo-Japanese Agreement and the new Indian Tariff Bill’’.196 
However, there was little in the short-run that these radicals could do to reverse the recent 
tariff decisions of the Indian government. Indeed the volume of protest could be considered 
inversely proportionate to the amount of influence Lancashire now had over Indian tariff 
decisions.
193. The Manchester Chamber o f  Commerce, Monthly Record, 31 January 1934, p. 6.
194. Wurm C., p. 244.
195. Parliamentary Question, Chorlton, 23 April 1934, F0371/18167,F2331/24/23.
196. Dupree M. (ed.), entry 27 February 1934, p. 297.
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The stabilisation of Indo-Japanese trade relations, and the marginalisation of 
Lancashire.
In contrast with the dramatic changes of the early 1930s in the economic position and 
political influence of the Indian, Lancashire and Japanese cotton industries in the Indian 
cotton piece good market, the latter part of the decade witnessed the stabilisation of these 
positions. The Indian cotton industry maintained its dominance of the Indian cotton piece- 
goods market, while both the Lancashire and Japanese cotton industries tacitly accepted 
their positions of subsidiary suppliers to the Indian market. Following the signature of the 
Indo-Japanese Trade Convention in 1934 the Indian cotton industry continued to expand: 
between 1934 and 1938 Indian output of mill produced cotton piece-goods increased by 
22.7%.197 In contrast in the second half of the decade Indian imports of cotton piece-goods 
from both Lancashire and Japan never approached their respective 1932 import records for 
the decade. Lancashire’s exports of cotton piece-goods to India declined in successive years 
from 552.1 million yards in 1934 to a mere 205.3 million yards in 1938.198 In contrast 
Japanese exports of cotton piece-goods to India did slightly better: between 1934 and 1938 
Japanese exports ranged between 300 and 474 million yards.199 However, while the 
Lancashire and Japanese cotton industries still fought for their right of access to the Indian 
market, the foreign policy friction that had characterised battles over the Indian market were 
largely absent during the second half of the decade. Indo-Japanese trade relations became 
even more divorced from foreign policy issues as the Japanese and Indian cotton industries 
accepted a managed Indo-Japan cotton trade. Furthermore, the continued relative decline of 
Lancashire's cotton piece-good exports to India removed another cause of Japanese 
resentment, since continued tariff preference for Lancashire did not result in the resurgence 
of Lancashire’s exports to India.
In spite of the failure of the Lancashire-India cotton trade talks and the imperfect 
Lees-Mody Pact of 1933, the Lancashire cotton industry still pestered the British and Indian 
governments for a reduction in the preferential British tariff. In the latter half of the decade 
the Lancashire lobby was eventually rewarded with a reduction in the preferential British 
tariff on cotton piece-goods. Faced by the prospect of the Lancashire cotton industry
197. See table 3.4.
198. See table 3.1.
199. See table 3.1.
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cooperating with the anti-Indian reformers - over the 1935 White Paper on Indian 
constitutional reform - the British and Indian governments agreed that it was crucial for the 
Indian government to buy off Lancashire's opposition with a reduction of the preferential 
tariff.200 Still progress remained slow, while the Indian government formalised its 
commitment to a 5% cut in Britain's preferential tariff through the 9 January 1935 
Supplementary Agreement,201 it remained reluctant to implement the measure. Outside of 
Bombay Indian industrialists were hostile to the grant of a tariff concession to Lancashire 
without any reciprocal grant in the British market to Indian commercial interests.202 
However, the main hindrance to the implementation of the tariff cut remained the Indian 
government’s reluctance to jeopardise the budget through a cut in tariff income on British 
cotton piece-good imports.203
Nevertheless, the continued decline of Lancashire’s cotton piece-good exports to 
India sustained Lancashire’s demands for a reduction in the preferential tariff on British 
cotton piece-goods. The Manchester Chamber of Commerce declared that it was Indian 
protectionism and not Japanese competition that was the main cause for the continued 
decline of Lancashire’s exports of cotton piece-goods to India.204 Worried by calls in 
Lancashire for the withdrawal of India’s Ottawa preferences in the British market, the India 
Office pressed the Indian Tariff Board to look on the Chamber’s submission for a reduction 
in their preferential tariff in a favourable light.205 In response to this pressure in June 1936 the 
Indian Tariff Board recommended a 5% reduction in the ad valorem tariff on Britain's 
preferential tariff on cotton piece-goods.206 However, although the recommendation of the 
Indian Tariff Board was incorporated immediately into the Indian budget there was little 
evidence that the 5% cut in the British preferential tariff was sufficient to improve 
Lancashire’s trade with India. The Chamber complained that the, ’’tariff reductions
200. ChatterjiB., Trade, Tariffs, and Empire, pp. 396-398.
201. The Manchester Chamber o f  Commerce, Monthly Record, January 1935, pp. 5-8; ChatteijiB., Trade, 
Tariffs, and Empire, pp. 398-399.
202. ChatterjiB., Trade, Tariffs, and Empire, pp. 395-397.
203. Chatterji B., Trade, Tariffs, and Empire, pp. 395, 399-400.
204. Feamley A  C., p. 217.
205. Chatterji B., Trade, Tariffs, and Empire, pp. 401-402.
206. The Manchester Chamber o f  Commerce, Monthly Record, July 1936, pp. 285-289; The Manchester 
Chamber o f Commerce: Annual Report o f  the Board o f Directors and Trade Sections, 1936, pp. xvi- 
xvii.
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themselves are disappointing and not as substantial as Lancashire interests hoped to achieve 
or as they think their case merited”.207 The Chamber’s fears over the inadequacies of the tariff 
cut proved correct as Lancashire’s cotton piece-good exports to India continued to decline: 
between 1935 and 1937 these exports fell by 39.3% in volume.208 Despite the continued fall 
of Lancashire’s cotton piece-good exports to India in 1937 the Indian government rejected 
another request by the Chamber for a reduction of the preferential tariff on British cotton 
piece-goods.209 Thus the period following the conclusion of the Indo-Japanese Trade 
Convention proved of little direct benefit to the Lancashire cotton industry. Lancashire's 
cotton piece-good exports to India did not recover as a result of Indian trade restrictions on 
Japanese imports, and the Indians showed no desire to grant trade preferences to Lancashire 
that would increase Lancashire’s cotton piece-good exports to India. Indeed it appeared that 
the Indian government only granted tariff concessions to Lancashire in 1936 once it was 
apparent that this measure would have only a limited impact on Lancashire’s exports to India. 
Furthermore, the failure ofLancashire to increase cotton piece-good exports to India through 
increased tariff preference, removed Japanese fears that this measure would be detrimental 
to Japanese exports to India. For example in February 1936 the Japanese Charge d’ Affai^in 
London requested that if the Indian government reduced the preferential tariff of 
Lancashire’s cotton piece-goods there should be a similar proportional decrease of the Indian 
tariff on Japanese cotton piece-goods.210 However, Japanese concerns over the reduction of 
the British preferential tariff on cotton piece-goods were not great, since following the above 
approach and the implementation of the tariff cut in July 1936 there is no evidence of any 
other Japanese demands for a proportionate cut in the Japanese tariff.
In 1936 with the Indo-Japanese Trade Convention due to expire in March 1937, the 
Japanese and Indian governments began preparations for the negotiation of a new trade 
agreement. In contrast to the post-1934 Lancashire-India discussions on Lancashire’s access 
to the Indian market and the 1933-34 Indo-Japanese trade negotiations, the 1936-37 Indo- 
Japanese trade negotiations were a low key affair. Unlike the 1933-34 negotiations the 
renegotiation of the Trade Convention was left entirely in Japanese Foreign Ministry
207. The Manchester Chamber o f Commerce, Monthly Record, July 1936, p. 288.
208. See table 3.1.
209. The Manchester Chamber o f Commerce, Monthly Record, January 1936, pp. 17-18, February 1936, 
pp. 59-60, 71, 85-86, and November 1937, pp. 505-506.
210. Fuji to the Foreign Office, 4 February 1936, FO371/20287,F669/669/23.
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officials' hands, as no Japanese industrial delegation was sent to India. Further, there was 
little comment in Japan on the course of the trade negotiations.211 In a similar fashion the 
later negotiations of 1936-37 provoked little interest in Britain. As with the Japanese cotton 
industry no Lancashire delegation was sent to India to exploit Indian fears of Japanese 
competition for Lancashire’s benefit.212 This relative indifference to the outcome of the Indo- 
Japanese trade negotiations was shared by the British government. Again in contrast to the 
1933-34 negotiations no Cabinet level discussions took place over fears of the impact of the 
trade negotiations on either Anglo-Japanese relations, or the possible reaction of the 
Lancashire cotton industry to an unfavourable agreement. Such was the course of the 
negotiations that the Foreign Office had no cause to interfere in order to defend any British 
foreign policy interest. The only concern of the Foreign Office was that the India Office and 
the Board of Trade communicated on the course of the trade negotiations without reference 
to the Foreign Office. At the end of the Indo-Japanese trade negotiations Orde complained 
that,
We ought to tell the 1.0. that it is important that we should be consulted before U.K. 
views about measures affecting Japanese trade are expressed to India. There may be 
serious political considerations involved, and B.ofT. views are not necessarily those 
ofH.M.G.2'3
However, this bureaucratic pique at being excluded from the negotiations merely reflected 
the lack of British foreign policy interest in Indo-Japanese trade relations. The Foreign 
Office had been regularly informed about the progress of the negotiations and had found no 
reason to intervene over the conduct of the Indian government.
Indeed the only conspicuous display of concern within the British government prior 
to the start of the Indo-Japanese trade negotiations was in the India Office. These concerns 
bore no relation to economic issues but to worries that the Japanese were trying to use the 
forthcoming trade negotiations as a means of increasing their diplomatic status in India. The 
India Office worried that the Japanese request to use the Japanese Consul-General in 
Calcutta, Yonezawa, as the Japanese negotiator for the trade negotiations would be
211. Cunningham's Official Diary of the Indo-Japanese trade negotiations, 10 September 1936,
F0371/20287.F5687/669/23; Cunningham to the Foreign Office, 31 October 1936,
F0371 /20288,F7174/669/23.
212. Cunningham to the Foreign Office, 31 October 1936, F0371/20288,F7174/669/23.
213. Minute by Orde, 30 March 1937, F0371/21031,FI 632/52/23.
189
Lancashire and the Indo-Japanese trade negotiations, 1933-1937
interpreted as an unwelcome enhancement of Japanese diplomatic status in India. Sir 
Findlater Stewart of the India Office wrote to the Foreign Office that, ”it is desirable to 
prevent foreign consular officers in India, and in particular the Japanese consular officers, 
assuming diplomatic functions”.214 However, in reply the Foreign Office told the India 
Office that there were no grounds for preventing a Consul-General from leading any trade 
negotiations. To reduce the India Office’s fears, the Foreign Office suggested that the Indian 
government should insist that prior to the trade negotiation the Consul-General should 
receive some special credentials or empowerment from the Japanese government.215
However, this did not mean that the British government was totally unmoved by the 
fate of Lancashire’s commercial interests vis a vis the Indo-Japanese trade negotiations. The 
British government understood that with regard to Japanese competition in the Indian 
market the last remaining safeguard for Lancashire’s exports was the continued division by 
piece-good category of the Japanese cotton piece-good import quota.216 Fortunately for 
Britain this concern dovetailed with the Indian government’s own desire to protect the Indian 
cotton manufacturing industry by retaining a strict division by category of the Japanese 
cotton piece good import quota.217 Thus this shared concern with the Indian government for 
the retention of the piece-good categories removed much of the pressure from the British 
government for a special pleading of the case of the Lancashire cotton industry.
Negotiations between the Indian and Japanese representatives started in July 1936, 
and the Indian officials put forward new proposals to modify the existing Trade Convention. 
The aim of the Indian government was to protect the recent increase of Indian production of 
cotton piece-goods by reducing the Japanese cotton piece-good quota, to retain the cotton 
import piece-good categories as quantitative safeguards for specific sections of the Indian 
cotton industry, and to secure the continued Japanese purchase of Indian raw cotton.21* Thus
214. Sir S. F. Stewart (India Office) to Vansittart, 20 April 1936, FO371/20287,F2203/669/23.
215. Orde to Sir S. F. Stewart (India Office), 6 May 1936, FO371/20287,F2203/669/23.
216. Sir S. F. Stewart (India Office) to Vansittart, 20 April 1936, F0371/20287,F2230/669/23.
217. Cunningham's Official Diary of the Indo-Japanese trade negotiations, 6 August 1936,
F0371/20287,F4936/669/23.
218. Report o f the Bombay Chamber o f Commerce, 1936, pp. 91-99; The Indian Merchants' Chamber to the 
Government o f Bombay, 22 April 1936, in Annual Report o f the Indian Merchants’ Chamber, 1936, 
pp. 268-271; Indian Chamber of Commerce, Calcutta, to the Government of Bengal, 27 March 1936, in 
Indian Chamber o f  Commerce, Calcutta: Annual Report o f the Committee, 1936, pp. 143-144, and pp. 
14-15.
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the Indian negotiators proposed a reduction of the existing Japanese cotton piece-good quota 
by 100 million yards - to 225 million yards -, and a subdivision of the 34% coloured and dyed 
piece-good category into two new categories of a 20% printed piece-goods and a 14% dyed 
and coloured piece-goods. The Indians claimed that reduction of the Japanese cotton piece- 
good quota was based upon: the need for a 42 million yard reduction to take into account the 
secession of Burma from the Indian Raj on 1 April 1937; the fact that in the 1934 Trade 
Convention Japanese re-exports to India had been seriously underestimated; and to account 
for the increased Indian cotton piece-good production since 1934. The division of the 
coloured and dyed piece-good category reflected the Indian concern that since 1934 
Japanese firms, much to the disadvantage of the Indian printing industry, had concentrated 
on exports of printed cotton piece-goods within this category. The creation of a separate 
printed piece-good import category was specifically intended to defend the Indian cotton 
printing industry from Japanese competition.219
In direct contrast to the aims of the Indian government the intention of the Japanese 
government for the renegotiation ofthe Trade Convention was to defend the status quo of the 
cotton piece-good import quota; liberalise the subdivision of the quota; reduce the tariff on 
Japanese cotton piece-good imports; and retain the most favoured nation clause of the Trade 
Convention. Thus the Japanese rejected the Indian proposals and insisted that: even for the 
secession of Burma there should be no reduction in the basic cotton piece-good import 
quota; the maximum cotton piece-good quota should be increased from 400 million to 475 
million yards; the specific duty of 5.25 annas per pound on Japanese grey piece-goods 
should be abolished and the ad valorem rate of duty on all Japanese piece-good imports 
should be reduced to 40%; and that there should be three subdivisions - plain greys and 
bordered greys 40%, bleached 20%, and coloured and dyed 40% - of the cotton piece-good 
import quota.220
To overcome the Japanese intransigence the Indian government prepared both 
concessions and threats for the Japanese in order to obtain a quick renegotiation of the Indo- 
Japanese Trade Convention. Towards the end of August 1936 the Indians revised their
219. Cunningham’s Official Diary of the Indo-Japanese trade negotiations, 16, 23 July, and 6 August 1936, 
F0371/20287,F4500,F4617,F4936/669/23.
220. Cunningham's Official diary ofthe Indo-Japanese trade negotiations, 6 August 1936, 
FO371/F20287/F669/4936/23; Report o f the Committee o f  the Bengal Chamber o f  Commerce, 1937, 
Vol. H , p. 412.
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downward reduction of the Japanese cotton piece-good import quota to only 50 million 
yards, i.e. a basic 275 million and a maximum 325 million yards quota .221 This was now 
based upon a 42 million yard reduction for the secession ofBurma and a mere 8 million yard 
reduction for the 600 million yard increase in Indian cotton piece-good production since 
1934.222 However, although the Japanese agreed to accept the existing tariffs and only 
suggested that the Indian government should redivide the cotton piece-good import 
categories, they still refused to accept any reduction in their existing cotton piece-good 
quota.223 Consequently, Indian frustrations at the continued stalemate in the trade 
negotiations resulted in the announcement on 27 October 1936 of their intention to 
denounce the existing Indo-Japanese Trade Convention - which included the most favoured 
nation clause - as an attempt to pressure the Japanese into acceptance of their proposals.224
The Indian notification to denounce the 1934 Indo-Japanese Trade Convention, 
unlike the 1933 Indian denunciation of the Indo-Japanese Trade Treaty, had virtually no 
short term impact on Anglo-Japanese relations. Thus there was no debate in the British 
Cabinet over the Indian action. In the Foreign Office only Sansom expressed concern over 
the potential impact on Anglo-Japanese relations. Sansom feared that Japanese public 
opinion would see a denunciation of the T rade Convention as a threat to Japan.225 However, 
this proved to be incorrect, as Yonezawa told Wilfred Cunningham, the Foreign Office 
advisor to the Indian government for the Indo-Japanese trade negotiations, an Indian 
denunciation ofthe 1934 Trade Convention would arouse little interest in Japan.226 On the 
other hand the Indian notification of the denunciation of the Trade Convention did not lead 
to the Japanese acceptance of the Indian proposals. Prior to the Indian denunciation 
Cunningham had already stated that the Japanese would not be intimidated by an Indian
221. Sir S. F. Stewart (India Office) to Orde, 20 August 1936, FO371/20287,F5236/669/23; Report o f the 
Committee o f the Bengal Chamber o f Commerce, 1937, VoL II., pp. 412-413.
222. Cunningham's Official Diary of the Indo-Japanese trade negotiations, 3 September 1936,
F0371/20287,F5542/669/23.
223. Cunningham's Official Diary of the Indo-Japanese trade negotiations, 21 September 1936,
F0371/20287,F5916/669/23.
224. Cunningham's Official Diary of the Indo-Japanese trade negotiations, 3 September and 5 October 1936, 
F0371/20287,F5542,F6216/669/23; Cunningham to the Foreign Office, 31 October 1936, 
FO371/20288,F7174/669/23.
225. Cunningham's Official Diary ofthe Indo-Japanese trade negotiations, 10 September 1936,
F0371/20287,F5687/669/23.
226. Cunningham's Official Diary of the Indo-Japanese trade negotiations, 30 October 1936,
F0371/20287,F6763/669/23.
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denunciation of the Trade Convention,227 This was confirmed when Yonezawa told 
Cunningham that the Japanese Foreign Ministry had expected an Indian denunciation of the 
Trade Convention.228 The Japanese government had already discounted that possibility and 
Japanese public opinion had little interest in the issue. Furthermore, the Indian government’s 
notification to denounce the Trade Convention enhanced the confidence of Yonezawa, for 
even following the Indian notification Yonezawa told Cunningham with some pleasure that 
he wanted to continue the negotiations, but now on Japanese terms.229
However, while the Indo-Japanese trade negotiations remained deadlocked230 the 
separate Burma-Japan trade negotiations began in December 1936 for the first Burma-Japan 
trade treaty. The details of these negotiations were concluded by the end of December 1936 
and they had an important bearing on the Indo-Japanese trade negotiations. Not only did 
they clear the ground for the conclusion of the new Indo-Japanese Trade Convention it also 
underlined the relative lack of influence of Lancashire on the trade policy of this fledgling 
state. The main point to note was that as expected the Burmese government agreed to a 
Japanese cotton piece-good quota of 42 million yards per annum ,231 The clarification of this 
point reduced previous Japanese objection to any reduction of India’s import quota on 
Japanese cotton piece-goods, based on the secession of the Burmese market from India, 
while the size of the Burmese import quota on Japanese cotton piece-goods remained 
undecided. However, the Burma-Japan trade negotiations again revealed the limits of 
British influence on the course of imperial commercial relations. During the trade 
negotiations the Japanese proposed the division of the cotton piece-good import quota into 
only three categories, 10% grey piece-goods, 10% bleached piece-goods, and 80% coloured 
piece-goods.232 The British government told the Burmese government that a large coloured
227. Cunningham’s Official Diary o f the Indo-Japanese trade negotiations, 5 October 1936,
F0371/20287,F6219/669/23.
228. Cunningham's Official Diary of the Indo-Japanese trade negotiation, 30 October 1936, 
FO371/20287,F6763/669/23.
229. Cunningham's Official Diary of the Indo-Japanese trade negotiations, 30 October 1936,
F0371 /20287,F6763/669/23.
230. Cunningham's Official Diary of the Indo-Japanese trade negotiations, 12 November 1936, 
FO371/20288,F7141/669/23.
231. Cunningham's Official Diary o f the Indo-Japanese trade negotiations, 8 December 1936, 
FO37l/20288,F7763/669/23; Cunningham to the Foreign Office, 3 March 1937,
FO371/21031,Fl740/52/23.
232. Cunningham's Official Diary of the Indo-Japanese trade negotiations, 8 and 11 December 1936,
F0371 /20288,F7801 ,F7802/669/23.
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piece-good category would adversely effect Lancashire - since it was Lancashire's only 
profitable trade with Burma - and could result in pressure for a revision of British tariffs from 
which Burmese exports benefited, i.e. the duty free entry ofBritish Empire rice.233 However, 
it was the more forceful pressure of the Indian government that led Burma to reject Japanese 
demands for a large coloured piece-good category. The Indian government stated that if the 
Burmese did not insist on a subdivision of the Japanese coloured piece-good category it 
would become all the more difficult for the Indian government to insist on a similar 
subdivision of the coloured piece-good category in the Indo-Japanese Trade Convention.234 
Stiffened by the Indian government the Burmese stood their ground, and on 3 February 1937 
the Japanese acceded to the subdivision ofthe coloured piece-good category.235 In Burma it 
was presumed that the Japanese had agreed to the subdivision of the coloured piece-good 
category in order to resume the Indo-Japanese trade negotiations.236
With the conclusion of the Burma-Japan trade negotiations the Indo-Japanese trade 
negotiations resumed on 19 February 1937,237 and gradual progress was made towards the 
conclusion of a new Indo-Japanese Trade Convention. Both the Indians and Japanese made 
concessions in order to obtain a settlement. The Indian government conceded that the 
Japanese cotton piece-good quota should only be reduced in line with the secession of 
Burma, while the Japanese abandoned their objections to the subdivision of the coloured 
piece-good quota.238 The new Indo-Japanese Trade convention was initialled on 12 April 
1937 and provided for a basic cotton piece-good quota of 283 million yards for a 1 million 
bale raw cotton off-take, and a maximum 358 million yard cotton piece-good quota for a 1.5 
million bale raw cotton off-take: the quota was divided by piece-good category into 40% 
greys, 13% bordered greys, 10% bleached, 20% printed, and 17% dyed, with the provision
233. Secretary o f State for India to the Chief Secretary o f the Burmese government, 27 December 1936, 
FO371/F20288/F669/8089/23; Cunningham to the Foreign Office, 3 March 1937, 
FO371/21031,F1632/52/23.
234. The Indian government to the Secretary of State for India, 29 December 1936,
F0371/20288,F8089/669/23; Cunningham to the Foreign Office, 3 March 1937,
FO371/21031 ,F1740/52/23.
235. The Manchester Chamber o f Commerce, Monthly Record, 30 April 1937, p. 180; Report o f the 
Committee o f the Bengal Chamber o f Commerce, 1937, VoL II.,. pp. 413-414.
236. Cunningham to the Foreign Office, 3 March 1937, FO371/21031,F1740/52/23.
237. Cunningham to the Foreign Office, 18 March 1937, FO371/21031,F1970/52/23.
238. Cunningham to the Foreign Office, 9 March 1937, FO371/21031,F1632/52/23; Indian government to 
the India Office, 22 March 1937, FO371/21031,F1871/52/23; Report o f the Committee o f the Bengal 
Chamber o f Commerce, 1937, Vol. II., pp. 414-415.
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for a 10% transfer by categoiy for greys and a 5% transfer by category for the remaining 
piece-good categories.239 Indeed such was the haste of the Indian and Japanese governments 
to conclude the Trade Convention that both the Japanese and Indian cotton manufacturers 
claimed too much had been conceded to the other side during the course of the trade 
negotiations.240 However, what was more noticeable was the total lack of public comment by 
the Manchester Chamber of Commerce. Unlike their criticism of the 1934 Indo-Japanese 
Trade Convention, the Manchester Chamber of Commerce’s Monthly Record carried no 
commentary, and merely confined itself to publishing the factual details of the Trade 
Convention.241 Thus by 1937 the triangular trade relationship over the Indian cotton piece- 
good market between India, Japan and Lancashire effectively disappeared from the forefront 
of Anglo-Japanese relations. The success of Indian protectionism against both Lancashire 
and Japan ensured that neither could complain that, because of the continued large scale of 
exports of the other cotton industry to the Indian market, their exclusion from the Indian 
market was unjustified.
239. The Manchester Chamber o f Commerce, Monthly Record, 30 April 1937, p. 181; Report o f  the 
Committee o f the Bengal Chamber o f Commerce, 1937, Vol. II., pp. 52-54.
240. Cunningham to Orde, 9 and 18 March 1937, FO371/21031,F1632,F1859/52/23; Report ofthe 
Committee o f the Bengal Chamber o f Commerce, 1937, V ol H , pp. 409-411; Annual Report o f  the 
Indian Merchant’s Chamber, 1937, pp. 305-308; Journal o f the Indian Merchants' Chamber, (May 
1937), pp. 147-149.
241. The Manchester Chamber o f  Commerce, Monthly Record, 30 April 1937, p. 181.
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Conclusion.
Despite the intensity ofthe Indo-Japanese trade friction between 1933 and 1934, by 1937 
Indo-Japanese trade relations did not have a substantial impact upon Anglo-Japanese 
foreign relations. The contrast between the publicly contentious 1933-34 negotiations of the 
first Indo-Japanese Trade Convention and the relatively subdued renegotiations of 1936-37 
underlined the limited long-run impact of the Indo-Japanese cotton dispute upon Anglo- 
Japanese foreign relations. The heightened atmosphere of the 1933-34 negotiations 
reflected a series of contemporary fears that proved illusory to the course of long-run 
political and economic relations. Once the Indian cotton industrialists had established the 
paramountcy of their case for protectionism the retreat of Lancashire's and Japan's exports 
coincided with the waning in importance of the Indian cotton piece-good market in Anglo- 
Indian and Anglo-Japanese relations. Thus Indian tariff protection did not continue as a 
fundamental issue in Anglo-Japanese relations and represented little more than another 
source of short-term political difficulties between Britain and Japan.
For the British government the continued economic decline of Lancashire was 
fundamental in shaping the British government's response to Lancashire's attempt to profit 
from the Indo-Japanese trade dispute. Lancashire’s economic decline translated into a loss 
of influence upon the British and Indian governments, at a time when the rise of a nationalist 
Indian economic lobby ensured that its views on Indian commercial policy could no longer 
be ignored. Neither government sought to defend Lancashire economic interests in India, 
but merely to ensure, through commercial 'gestures’ such as the defence of Lancashire's 
bleached cotton piece-goods in November-December 1933, that resentment in Lancashire 
did not hinder Indian constitutional reform. Tariff preference in favour of Lancashire 
proved a hollow victory because the Indian government ensured that the rate of tariff 
preference was never sufficient to allow Lancashire to regain its former export volume of 
cotton piece-goods to the Indian market. Indeed it was only when Lancashire's imports were 
so marginalised that, in June 1936, the Indian government consented to the 5% ad valorem 
reduction of the British imperial tariff on cotton piece-goods, a measure which the 
Lancashire cotton industry had demanded before the 1934 Indo-Japanese Trade Convention. 
The main concern of the British and Indian governments was scarcely to protect Lancashire's 
trade in India at all, but to minimise the political friction in Britain of Lancashire's retreat 
from the Indian market, which naturally entailed the protection of some of Lancashire's
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remaining commercial interests in India. However, the decision of the British and Indian 
governments to abandon Lancashire also had important implications for Anglo-Japanese 
relations. Japanese resentment over Indian tariff discrimination was substantially reduced 
once it was realised that tariff preference was not saving Lancashire's export trade with India. 
Consequently, Japanese industrialists could not accuse the British government of 
manipulating Indian tariff policy to defend Lancashire and exclude Japan from the Indian 
market.
Finally, the Indo-Japanese trade dispute had only limited foreign policy 
implications, since the prime concern of both the British and Japanese governments was to 
minimise the effect of the cotton dispute on Anglo-Japanese relations. Moreover, neither 
government sought to exploit the situation and use the Indo-Japanese cotton dispute as a 
means of improving Anglo-Japanese relations. The British government's main policy aim of 
managing Lancashire’s economic retreat from India, resulted in its refusal, as in the case of 
the Lancashire-Japan cartel negotiations in London, to include foreign policy goals in 
Lancashire’s talks with the Japanese cotton manufacturers. The British government 
remained cautious over the possibilities for the Lancashire-Japan cotton talks on Anglo- 
Japanese relations. Certainly it did not want the cotton talks to exacerbate Anglo-Japanese 
friction, but neither was it prepared to force an unwilling Lancashire into a settlement with 
its Japanese counterparts, merely for the vague possibility of improving Anglo-Japanese 
relations. Furthermore, these calculations by the British government were not undermined 
by the Japanese government, which also sought to minimise the domestic impact ofthe Indo- 
Japanese cotton dispute, and to avoid any foreign policy entanglements that could result 
from a politically inspired Lancashire-Japan cotton settlement.
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Table 3.1: Indian imports of Lancashire and Japan's cotton piece-goods, by volume and 
value, 1916-1938.
Year Total Indian imports of 
cotton piece-goods
Imports from Lancashire Imports from Japan
Volume Value (mil­ Volume Value (mil­ Volume Value (mil­
(millions of lions or ru­ (millions of lions of ru­ (millions of lions o f ru­
linear
yards)
pees) linear
yards)
pees) linear
yards)
pees)
1916 1,891.6 447.3 1,747.9 423.8 100.0 24.2
1917 1,532.2 487.7 1,403.9 440.8 94.4 32.5
1918 1,097.3 485.3 851.3 372.7 238.0 106.3
1919 1,063.5 512.2 962.5 457.5 75.8 36.8
1920 1,491.1 829.0 1,277.2 701.2 170.2 83.6
1921 1,080.1 429.0 947.2 371.2 90.1 36.5
1922 1,577.1 580.5 1,440.6 518.6 107.6 42.2
1923 1,466.6 561.8 1,306.1 488.7 122.6 46.1
1924 1,801.2 687.2 1,589.7 597.4 155.1 57.3
1925 1,539.9 537.9 1,274.9 440.6 216.7 68.7
1926 1,766.7 543.5 1,457.2 443.8 243.4 65.5
1927 1,936.7 541.7 1,530.0 423.2 322.8 82.3
1928 1,899.5 528.6 1,442.5 400.0 356.8 88.7
1929 1,882.4 493.3 1,235.0 332.7 561.6 126.8
1930 882.3 198.7 520.7 125.0 320.7 59.1
1931 752.2 142.9 376 99.0 339.6 54.4
1932 1,193.4 207.3 586.3 118.8 578.4 78.2
1933 760.5 130.1 414.4 85.4 340.5 42.9
1934 943.5 168.9 552.1 120.1 373.6 51.3
1935 960.4 157.4 439.0 89.7 474.7 63.1
1936 763.9 133.6 333.8 72.7 416.7 57.8
1937 590.4 116.9 266.3 63.9 305.7 46.1
1938 647.2 102.7 205.3 46.0 424.4 51.1
[Sources: Accounts relating to the Sea-Borne Trade and Navigation o f  British India (De­
partment of Commercial Intelligence and Statistics, Calcutta; various years); Statistical 
Abstract o f  United Kingdom (HMSO, London; various years).]
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Table 3.2 : Lancashire and Japan's percentage share of India's cotton piece-good import 
volume; and Lancashire and Japan's cotton piece-good exports to India as a percentage of 
their respective total cotton piece-good export volume* 1916-1936.
Year Percentage share o f India's total 
volume of cotton piece-good im­
ports
Percentage share o f exports o f 
cotton piece-goods to India of 
total cotton piece-good exports
Lancashire Japan Lancashire Japan
1916 94.2 5.3 33.3 18.7
1917 92.2 6.2 28.2 11.9
1918 77.6 21.7 23.0 23.6
1919 90.5 7.1 27.3 8.6
1920 85.6 11.4 28.8 20.6
1921 88.1 8.4 31.2 13.1
1922 91.3 6.8 33.4 13.8
1923 89.1 8.4 30.2 13.9
1924 88.7 6.8 34.7 15.4
1925 82.2 8.4 27.5 16.7
1926 82.5 8.6 37.1 17.1
1927 79.0 16.7 36.5 21.8
1928 75.9 18.8 36.3 25.1
1929 65.6 29.8 32.8 31.4
1930 59.0 26.3 20.9 20.4
1931 50.1 45.1 21.0 24.0
1932 49.1 48.5 25.5 28.5
1933 54.5 44.8 14.6 16.3
1934 58.5 39.6 26.8 14.5
1935 46.4 50.2 21.8 17.4
1936 43.7 54.5 19.7 15.3
[Sources: Accounts relating to the Sea-Borne Trade and Navigation o f  British 
India-, Abstract o f  UK Statistics (Department of Commercial Intelligence and Sta­
tistics, Calcutta; various years); Statistical Abstract o f the United Kingdom 
(HMSO, London; various years); Seki K., The Cotton Industry o f  Japan (Japan 
Society for the Promotion of Science, Tokyo; 1956), pp. 306-307.]
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Table 3.3 : Indian raw cotton production and raw cotton exports to Lancashire and Japan, 
1924-1937 (millions of bales).
Year Indian 
pro­
duc­
tion of 
raw 
cotton
Indian 
ex­
ports 
of raw 
cotton
Indian exports 
of raw cotton 
to:
Indian exports 
of raw cotton 
as a percentage 
of total Indian 
raw cotton pro­
duction to:
Indian exports 
of raw cotton 
as a percentage 
of total Indian 
raw cotton ex­
ports to:
Lanca­
shire
Japan Lanca­
shire
Japan Lanca­
shire
Japan
1924 5.38 3.33 0.16 1.67 2.3 31.0 4.8 50.1
1925 6.18 4.17 0.22 2.08 3.6 33.6 3.6 49.9
1926 5.35 3.19 0.09 1.84 1.7 34.4 2.8 57.7
1927 4.67 2.69 0.16 1.23 3.4 26.3 5.9 45.7
1928 5.47 3.71 0.24 1.61 4.4 29.4 6.5 43.4
1929 6.32 4.07 0.27 1.64 4.3 25.9 6.6 40.3
1930 6.19 3.93 0.28 1.78 4.5 28.7 7.1 45.3
1931 4.17 2.37 0.17 1.08 3.6 22.9 7.1 45.6
1932 4.35 2.06 0.17 1.08 3.9 24.8 8.2 52.4
1933 5.10 2.82 0.34 1.10 6.7 21.6 12.0 39.0
1934 6.04 3.49 0.35 2.05 5.8 33.9 10.0 58.7
1935 6.00 3.39 0.46 1.76 7.7 29.3 13.6 51.9
1936 6.88 4.27 0.62 2.43 9.0 35.3 14.5 56.9
1937 5.76 2.73 0.39 1.36 6.8 23.6 14.3 49.8
[Source: Review o f  the Trade o f  India: Annual Statement o f  the Sea-Borne Trade 
o f British India with the British Empire and Foreign Countries (Department of 
Commercial Intelligence and Statistics, Delhi; various years).]
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Table 3.4: Percentage share of Indian milled cotton piece good consumption of Indian 
mill produced cotton piece-goods, and Indian imports of Lancashire and Japan's cotton 
piece-goods, 1916-1938.
Year Indian 
consump­
tion (i)
Indian mill 
production 
(minus In­
dian ex­
ports)
India mill 
production 
as a per­
centage of  
Indian 
consumpi- 
ton
Imports 
from Lan­
cashire as 
a percent­
age of In­
dian
consump­
tion
Imports 
from Japan 
as a per­
centage of 
Indian 
consump­
tion
1916 3,223.4 1,331.8 41.3 54.2 3.1
1917 2,947.8 1,424.6 48.3 47.6 3.2
1918 2,398.9 1,301.6 54.2 35.5 9.9
1919 2,506.7 1,443.2 57.6 38.4 3.0
1920 2,925.5 1,434.4 49.0 43.6 5.8
1921 2,645.5 1,570.6 59.4 35.8 3.4
1922 3,145.3 1,568.2 49.8 45.8 3.4
1923 3,001.6 1,535.0 51.1 43.5 4.1
1924 3,590.1 1,788.9 49.8 44.5 4.1
1925 3.329.6 1,789.7 53.7 38.3 6.5
1926 3,828.0 2,061.3 53.8 38.1 6.3
1927 4,124.7 2,188.0 53.0 37.1 7.8
1928 3,643.6 1,744.1 47.9 39.6 9.8
1929 4,168.0 2,285.6 54.8 29.6 13.5
1930 3,345.7 2,463.4 73.6 15.6 9.6
1931 3,637.5 2,885.3 79.3 10.3 9.3
1932 4,296.9 3,103.5 72.2 13.6 13.4
1933 3,649.0 2,888.6 79.2 11.3 9.3
1934 4,283.3 3,334.8 77.9 12.9 8.7
1935 4,445.7 3,499.7 78.7 9.4 10.7
1936 4,145.0 3,381.1 81.6 8.0 10.0
1937 4,433.8 3,843.1 86.7 6.0 6.9
1938 4,739.5 4,092.3 86.3 4.3 8.9
[Sources: Nishikawa H., Nippon Teikoku Shugi to Mengyd [Japanese imperialism 
and the cotton industry] (Minerva Shobo, Kyoto; 1987), tables V-2, V-4, and V- 
9, pp. 278, 283, 302-303; Review of the Trade o f India: Annual Statement o f the 
Sea-Borne Trade o f British India with the British Empire and Foreign Countries 
(Department of Commercial Intelligence as Statistics, Delhi; various years).]
Note: (i) Indian consumption of cotton piece-goods is derived from, Indian mill produc­
tion minus Indian exports plus total foreign imports (re-exports have not been deducted 
from this figure since 1 have no precise figure available, however, re-export volumes 
were small and would not substantially alter the values).
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Table 3.5: Indian imports by volume and value of coloured, printed and dyed piece- 
goods, from Lancashire and Japan per quarter, 1927/28-1933/34.
Quarter Volume of imports (millions of linear 
yards)
Value of imports (millions of rupees)
Total Lancashire Japan Total Lancashire Japan
1927-28 4th 131.22 102.23 17.33 48.70 38.29 4.52
1928-29 1st 129.10 96.35 22.53 45.72 34.94 5.76
2nd 140.53 92.36 25.55 48.19 33.08 6.12
3rd 117.85 69.64 30.72 39.53 25.14 7.30
4th 119.43 77.26 30.90 40.00 26.74 7.94
1929-30 1st 126.29 74.89 41.74 40.90 26.37 10.10
2nd 123.51 73.10 36.54 39.63 25.24 8.25
3rd 102.66 59.74 28.65 31.88 19.77 6.23
4th 131.00 70.89 47.32 39.04 23.65 9.89
1930-31 1st 99.57 64.49 26.22 29.20 20.40 5.19
2nd 66.79 46.40 13.19 18.74 13.36 2.48
3rd 31.55 14.86 12.58 8.51 4.60 2.45
4th 47.83 22.00 22.18 11.86 6.41 4.20
1931-32 1st 47.65 24.50 19.60 11.41 6.52 3.44
2nd 60.92 29.01 24.84 13.63 7.33 4.20
3rd 51.11 22.81 24.03 11.64 5.78 4.55
4th 57.02 29.76 24.33 13.16 8.14 4.03
1932-33 1st 99.09 49.79 45.57 12.04 12.72 6.75
2nd 145.36 61.70 77.76 14.44 15.50 10.56
3rd 91.63 38.45 49.72 11.98 9.44 6.12
4th 88.70 44.36 41.15 18.12 11.37 5.62
1933-34 1st 70.44 36.49 32.40 13.98 9.53 4.28
2nd 48.61 38.02 10.21 9.22 7.84 1.28
3rd 49.85 31.54 17.93 10.14 7.59 2.41
4th 82.89 46.48 34.89 16.46 11.66 7.63
[Sources: Review o f  the Trade o f  India: Annual Statement o f  the Sea-Borne Trade o f  British India 
with the British Empire and Foreign Countries (Department of Commercial Intelligence and Statis­
tics* Delhi; various years).]
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Table 3.6 : Abstract of the Indian tariff schedule for cotton piece-goods, 1894-1937.
Year British Tariff Non-British Tariff Excise duty on Indian 
mill produced cotton 
piece-goods
1894 5% 5% None
1885 3.5% 3.5% 3.5%
1917 7.5% 7.5% 3.5%
March 1921 11% 11% 3.5%
December 1925 11% 11% Suspended
March 1926 11% 11% Abolished
April 1930 Plain Greys: the highest tariff be­
tween a 15% ad valorem duty and a 
3.5 annas per lb. specific duty. 
Others : a 15% ad valorem duty
Plain Greys: the highest tariff be­
tween a 20% ad valorem duty and a 
3.5 annas per lb. specific duty. 
Others : a 20% ad valorem duty
March 1931 Plain Greys: the highest tariff be­
tween a 20% ad valorem duty and a 
3.5 annas per lb. specific duty. 
Others : a 20% ad valorem duty
Plain Greys: the highest tariff be­
tween a 25% ad valorem duty and a 
3.5 annas per lb. specific duty. 
Others : a 25% ad valorem duty
October 1931 Plain Greys: the highest tariff be­
tween a 25% ad valorem duty and a 
4.375 annas per lb. specific duty. 
Others : a 25% ad valorem duty
Plain Greys: the highest tariff be­
tween a 31.25% ad valorem duty 
and a 4.375 annas per lb. specific 
duty.
Others : a 31.25% ad valorem duty
September
1932
Plain Greys: fee highest tariff be­
tween a 50% ad valorem duty and a 
5.25 annas per lb. specific duty. 
Others : a 50% ad valorem duty
July 1933 Plain Greys: fee highest tariff be­
tween a 75% ad valorem duty and a 
6.75 armas per lb. specific duty. 
Others : a 75% ad valorem duty
January 1934 
(Indo-Japanese 
Trade Convention)
Plain Greys: the highest tariff be­
tween a 50% ad valorem duty and a 
5.25 armas per lb. specific duty. 
Others : a 50% ad valorem duty
June 1936 Plain Greys: the highest tariff be­
tween a 20% ad valorem duty and a 
3.5 annas per lb. specific duty. 
Others : a 20% ad valorem duty
April 1937 Indo-Japanese Trade Convention
[Sources: Review o f  the Trade o f  India: Annual Statement o f  the Sea-Borne Trade o f  British India with the 
British Empire and Foreign Countries (Department of Commercial Intelligence and Statistics, Delhi; various 
years); The Board o f Trade Journal, Nishikawa H., Nippon Teikoku Shugi to Mengyd [Japanese imperialism 
ant the cotton industry] (Minerva Shobo, Kyoto; 1987), table V-5, p. 29; Feamley A. C., The Manchester 
Chamber o f Commerce Lancashire Textiles and British Imperial Trade, 1919-1939’ (Unpublished M.Litt., 
Oxford University; 1986), p. 185.]
203
Lancashire and the Indo-Japanese trade negotiations, 1933-1937
Table 3.7 : Lancashire and Japan's exports of cotton piece-goods to India by category, 
1916-1938 (millions of linear yards).
Year Grey piece-goods Bleached piece-goods Coloured, printed, and 
dyed piece-goods
Total Lanca­
shire
Japan Total Lanca­
shire
Japan Total Lanca­
shire
Japan
1916 846.9 762.0 75.6 589.8 582.2 2.6 454.9 403.7 21.9
1917 625.5 544.9 73.3 502.3 496.2 2.6 395.6 362.9 18.7
1918 583.4 375.4 206.8 286.6 274.9 10.5 227.3 201.3 20.8
1919 533.3 464.6 62.7 322.0 311.0 2.7 208.3 187.0 10.4
1920 580.2 420.3 150.4 421.8 408.6 3.8 489.2 448.6 16.1
1921 635.6 526.5 83.5 306.2 299.3 1.9 138.3 121.6 4.9
1922 931.0 833.3 90.0 402.5 395.4 2.4 243.8 211.9 15.4
1923 703.9 599.8 96.9 415.3 402.9 2.3 347.5 303.7 23.4
1924 845.5 727.4 109.8 548.9 532.9 4.5 406.9 338.4 40.9
1925 709.1 561.4 142.6 465.1 446.3 4.7 365.8 267.4 69.5
1926 748.4 588.8 154.9 570.9 550.3 2.9 447.4 318.3 85.8
1927 875.5 651.2 214.8 556.5 526.7 5.6 504.8 352.2 102.7
1928 838.6 581.6 241.8 554.1 525.4 5.5 506.9 335.6 109.8
1929 925.6 520.5 393.7 473.6 435.9 13.9 483.5 278.6 154.3
1930 365.0 143.3 218.3 271.6 229.9 28.1 245.8 147.6 74.3
1931 249.4 59.7 185.2 279.7 207.0 59.8 223.2 110.3 94.7
1932 365.0 111.1 243.9 412.7 281.0 120.3 424.9 194.3 214.2
1933 230.2 88.2 141.6 261.6 184.1 75.2 268.7 142.4 124.0
1934 297.4 102.7 193.7 285.2 236.6 40.3 361.1 213.1 139.8
1935 331.9 85.4 246.1 263.3 198.9 58.2 351.2 154.9 191.4
1936 261.8 53.5 208.2 219.6 163.9 48.1 282.6 116.7 160.6
1937 133.1 23.9 108.9 202.2 128.7 64.9 255.5 113.9 132.2
1938 257.6 30.2 227.2 179.1 102.3 69.9 210.5 72.9 127.7
[Source: Accounts relating to the Sea-Borne Trade and Navigation o f  British India (Depart­
ment of Commercial Intelligence and Statistics, Calcutta; various years).]
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Table 3.8 : Estimate of the ad valorem tariff rate of the application of the 3.5 annas per 
pound specific duty on Lancashire's grey piece-good exports to India, 1929/30-1931/32.
Quarter Volume 
(millions of 
linera 
yards)
Volume 
(millions of 
lbs.)
Earnings 
(millions of 
rupees)
Rupees per 
lb.
Annas per 
lb. (i)
Equivalent 
ad valor­
em rate of 
specific 
duty (ii)
1929-30 4th 158.36 28.90 33.80 1.169 18.70 18.27%
1930-31 1st 85.86 15.67 17.11 1.091 17.46 20.04%
2nd 37.09 7.14 7.14 1.055 16.88 20.73%
3rd 9.64 1.87 1.87 1.062 16.99 20.60%
4th 10.89 1.97 1.97 0.989 15.82 22.12%
1931-32 1st 19.69 3.59 3.29 0.916 14.67 23.86%
2nd 12.95 2.36 2.14 0.907 14.51 24.12%
[Source: Review o f  the Trade o f  India: Annual Statement o f the Sea-Borne Trade o f  British India 
with the British Empire and Foreign Countries (Department of Commercial Intelligence and Statis­
tics, Delhi; various years).]
Notes :(i) This is based on dividing the export value by volume (converted in lbs.), to ob­
tain an average import price of Lancashire's grey piece-goods.
(ii) This is the equivalent ad valorem rate of a 3.5 annas per lb. specific duty.
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Table 3.9 : Estimate of the ad valorem tariff rate of the application of the 4.375 annas 
per pound specific duty on Lancashire's grey piece-good exports to India, 1931/32- 
1932/33.
Quarter Volume 
(millions of 
linear 
yards)
Volume 
(millions of 
lbs.)
Earnings 
(millions of 
rupees)
Rupees per 
lb.
Annas per 
lb. (i)
Equivalent 
ad valor­
em rate of 
spedific 
duty (ii)
1931-32 3rd 11.21 2.07 1.71 0.826 13.22 33.09%
4th 15.82 2.93 2.40 0.819 13.10 33.39%
1932-33 1st 20.43 3.78 3.20 0.846 13.54 32.31%
[Source: Review o f the Trade o f  India: Annual Statement o f the Sea-Borne Trade o f British India 
with the British Empire and Foreign Countries (Department of Commercial Intelligence and Statis­
tics, Delhi; various years).]
Notes : (i) This is based on dividing the export value by volume (converted into lbs.), to 
obtain an average import price of Lancashire's grey piece-goods.
(ii) This is the equivalent ad valorem rate of a 4.375 annas per lb. specific duty.
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Table 3.10 : Indian imports of cotton piece-goods per quarter, by volume and value, 
1927/28-1933/34.
Quarter Volume of imports (millions of linear 
yards)
Value of imports (millions of rupees)
Total Lancashire Japan Total Lancashire Japan
1927-28 4th 446.82 379.33 64.97 135.79 108.92 19.40
1928-29 1st 452.68 377.45 56.57 127.27 104.68 14.28
2nd 468.17 368.91 88.22 135.87 102.79 21.75
3rd 438.23 361.91 96.61 121.69 88.41 23.74
4th 552.54 379.42 115.47 143.84 102.15 25.90
1929-30 1st 467.65 325.30 125.53 127.76 90.03 30.10
2nd 471.23 307.12 140.52 126.27 84.78 32.39
3rd 412.57 250.80 140.13 107.24 67.55 31.29
4th 531.11 351.83 156.62 132.12 89.69 33.08
1930-31 1st 388.73 253.49 119.19 92.50 62.75 23.60
2nd 194.44 134.31 50.05 45.05 32.03 9.22
3rd 124.36 53.31 64.51 26.24 12.47 11.45
4th 174.89 80.08 86.85 35.22 17.89 14.88
1931-32 1st 193.97 102.80 83.07 37.14 21.12 13.81
2nd 195.00 106.30 78.73 36.77 21.35 12.48
3rd 156.12 61.57 87.19 29.42 12.98 14.28
4th 200.66 102.10 88.31 38.71 22.01 13.85
1932-33 1st 282.04 146.36 128.38 52.62 30.96 19.09
2nd 369.48 174.53 185.97 64.31 35.60 25.59
3rd 267.90 114.60 147.32 43.17 22.59 18.41
4th 274.12 150.80 116.79 47.24 29.81 15.17
1933-34 1st 240.37 127.13 110.32 39.41 25.32 13.55
2nd 161.91 87.05 74.02 26.04 17.20 8.60
3rd 133.82 90.73 42.31 24.23 18.65 5.32
4th 207.77 120.26 85.55 37.92 25.81 11.69
[Source: Review o f  the Trade o f India: Annual Statement o f the Sea-Borne Trade o f  British India 
with the British Empire and Foreign Countries (Department of Commercial Intelligence and Statis­
tics, Delhi; various years).]
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Table 3.11: Half-yearly changes of Lancashire and Japan’s exports of cotton piece-goods 
to India, 1931-1933 (millions of linear yards).
Half-Year Grey Bleached Coloured Total
Lanca­
shire
Japan Lan-
cashie
Japan Lanca­
shire
Japan Lanc-
shire
Japan
1931 1st half 30.6 107.0 105.8 21.1 46.5 41.8 128.8 169.9
1931 2nd half 24.2 84.4 91.9 32.3 51.8 48.9 167.9 165.9
Percentage
change
-20.9 -21.1 -13.1 +54.3 +11.4 +16.9 -8.2 -2.4
1932 1st half 36.2 107.3 132.7 39.5 79.5 69.9 248.4 216.7
Percentage
change
+50.0 +27.7 +44.4 +21.0 -53.4 +43.0 +48.8 +30.6
1932 2nd half 52.9 135.5 136.0 70.3 100.1 127.5 289.1 333.4
Percentage
change
+46.1 +26.3 +2.5 +77.4 +25.9 +82.5 +16.4 +53.8
1933 1st half 66.3 102.8 130.8 50.7 80.8 73.5 277.9 227.1
Percentage
change
+25.1 -24.1 -3.8 -27.8 -19.3 -43.3 -3.9 -31.9
1933 2nd half 28.2 59.9 70.0 28.3 69.6 28.1 177.8 116.3
Percentage
change
-42.4 -41.7 -46.5 -44.3 -13.9 -61.7 -36.0 -48.8
[Source: Review o f the Trade o f India: Annual Statement o f the Sea-Borne Trade o f Brit­
ish India with the British Empire and Foreign Countries (Department of Commercial Intel­
ligence and Statistics, Delhi; various years).]
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Table 3.12 : Changes in the import price of Lancashire’s and Japan’s grey piece-good ex­
ports to India, before and after the inclusion of the minimum specific duty, 1930/31- 
1933/34 (rupees per lb*).
Quarter Tariff levy Index (1930-31 4th quarter = 
100)
Lancashire Japan Lancashire Japan
before after before after before after before after
1930-3 1 4th 15.82 19.32 14.18 17.68 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
1931-32 1st 14.67 18.17 13.95 17.45 92.7 94.0 98.4 98.7
2nd 14.51 18.01 13.27 16.77 91.7 93.2 93.6 94.8
3rd 13.22 17.59 13.36 17.73 83.6 91.0 94.2 100.3
4th 13.10 17.47 13.39 17.77 82.2 90.4 94.4 100.5
1932-33 1st 13.54 17.91 12.93 17.30 85.6 92.7 91.2 97.8
2nd 14.05 18.42 12.04 17.29 88.8 95.3 84.9 97.8
3rd 13.36 17.73 10.79 16.04 84.4 91.8 76.1 90.7
4th 13.61 17.99 10.87 16.12 86.0 93.1 76.6 90.7
1933-34 1st 12.98 17.36 10.16 15.41 82.0 98.8 71.6 87.2
[Source: Review o f the Trade o f India: Annual Statement o f the Sea-Borne Trade o f Brit­
ish India with the British Empire and Foreign Countries (Department of Commercial In­
telligence and Statistics, Delhi; various years).]
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Table 3.13 : Comparison by the Board of Trade of the effect of a 10% transfer by cagte- 
gory and a 10% transfer by the total cotton piece-good import quota, on the four catego­
ries of the Japanese cotton piece-good import quota (millions of yards)*
Category Average Indian 
imports o f Jap­
anese cotton 
piece-goods,
1928-1931
Effect o f Japanese cotton piece- 
good import quota o f400 million 
yards
Effect o f the 
10% transfer 
by the total 
cotton piece- 
good import 
quota on In­
dia's 1928- 
1931 average 
imports o f Jap­
anese cotton 
piece-goods
The actual In­
dian imports of 
Japanese cot­
ton piece- 
goods, 1932-33With a 10% 
transfer by cat­
egory
With a 10% 
transfer by total 
cotton piece- 
good import 
quota
Volume Percent Volume Percent
Plain greys 210 176.8 44.2 140.0 35.0 -70
243.95
Bordered greys 49 52.0 13.0 52.0 13.0 +3
Bleached 23 35.2 8.8 72.0 18.0 +49 120.35
Coloured 106 136.0 34.0 136.0 34.0 +30 214.22
Total 388 400.0 400.0 578.52
[Source: Memorandum of the President o f the Board of Trade, Indo-Japanese Trade Negotiations', 27 No­
vember 1933, CAB 24 CP. 283(33).]
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Introduction.
Before the First World War the Angio-Dutch concern Royal Dutch Shell established itself, 
through its subsidiaries Rising Sun Petroleum in Japan and Asiatic Petroleum in Manchuria, 
as one of the most important oil companies in East Asia. However, Japan's adoption of a 
more 'nationalistic' petroleum policy in 1934 brought Royal Dutch Shell into the forefront of 
Anglo-Japanese economic rivalry. State regulation threatened to undermine, if not 
annihilate, Royal Dutch Shell's established - but economically vulnerable - commercial 
operations and future growth in the two eastern markets. Royal Dutch Shell's opposition to 
Japanese and Manchukuoan interference in the oil industry was limited not merely to the 
defence of its commercial operations in these markets. As a multinational oil company it 
could not comfortably coexist with state interference in any market without the risk of 
copycat action in markets outside Japan and Manchukuo. Thus it had little choice but to 
defend its Japanese and Manchurian commercial operations from state regulation or 
interference. Naturally, it turned to the British government in its fight against the Japanese 
and Manchukuoan petroleum policies.
Given the importance of Royal Dutch Shell, the Foreign Office took serious notice of 
its complaint. The Foreign Office shared the company’s fear that interference in the oil 
industry would set an example for other governments to copy. Indeed, the Foreign Office 
was particularly nervous of the implications of the decision of Manchukuo to introduce an 
oil monopoly. Not only did this legislation threaten the establishment of monopolies on 
other goods in Manchukuo: it seemed obvious that Japan’s breach of the Open Door could 
easily be used by the Chinese government to establish similar monopolies against Britain's 
far more extensive commercial interests in China. Thus the Foreign Office gave its full 
support to Royal Dutch Shell’s opposition to the Japanese and Manchukuoan petroleum 
policies. However, the Foreign Office made clear that it viewed the issue solely as a 
commercial dispute between the company and the Japanese and Manchukuoan 
governments. Consequently, while friction over the oil question might affect Anglo- 
Japanese friendship, it would not be allowed to impinge upon British foreign policy towards 
Japan.
Britain's response to Royal Dutch Shell's difficulties in Japan and Manchukuo was in 
fact conditioned crucially by both Anglo-Japanese and Anglo-American relations. Britain's
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opposition to the Japanese and Manchukuoan petroleum policies was dependent upon 
assessments of Japan’s response to any defence of Royal Dutch Shell’s interests, and its 
capacity to absorb any Japanese political and or economic retaliation. But it was obvious 
from the start that effective British opposition to the Japanese and Manchukuoan petroleum 
policies was dependent upon Anglo-American cooperation. The other major foreign oil 
company affected by the Japanese and Manchukuoan legislation, Stanvac, was American, 
and American oil supplies were the critical element, if the threat of an oil embargo was to be 
used to put economic pressurej[the Japanese and Manchukuoan governments. The 
relationship with Stanvac and the American government was thus critical in the defence of 
Royal Dutch Shell’s oil interests. From the British viewpoint the management of Anglo- 
American relations proved as important as the management of Anglo-Japanese relations.
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Japan’s oil policy.
The dominant position of foreign oil companies in the Japanese oil market during the 
interwar period stemmed from their early involvement in the exploitation of the Japanese oil 
market. In 1892-93 Standard Oil of New York was the first foreign oil company to establish 
a sales base in Japan.1 It was renamed Stanvac in September 1933 after a series of corporate 
dissolutions and mergers when Socony-Vacuum and Standard Oil Company of New Jersey 
each contributed on^ialf of the capital to reconstituting Standard Oil's Japanese operations.2 
In 1893 Standard Oil was followed into Japan as an oil retailer by the British owned Samuel 
Samuel Trading Company - later to be called the Rising Sun Petroleum Corporation - which 
was absorbed in 1903 by Asiatic Petroleum, a subsidiary of the Anglo-Dutch Royal Dutch 
Shell group.3 Japanese oil companies soon emerged to compete with both Rising Sun 
Petroleum and Stanvac in the Japanese market.4 Nevertheless, aside from tariff policy,5 
before the 1930s the Japanese government was reluctant to intervene in the oil industry 
either for the benefit of domestic oil companies or for national policy reasons. The only 
direct state involvement in the oil industry was the establishment of the Tokuyama fuel 
depot and refinery in 1921 for the production of fuel oil solely for the Imperial Japanese 
Navy.6 Thus prior to the Depression there is no evidence of any discrimination against 
foreign oil companies operating in Japan or the wilful bending of administrative measures to 
influence the domestic petroleum industry in the interest of national policy objectives.
During the mid-to late-1920s, as the importance of oil became increasingly apparent, 
the Japanese government began to take a greater interest in the development of a national oil
1. Samuels R. J., The Business o f the Japanese State: Energy Markets in Comparative and Historical
Perspective (Cornell University Press, London; 1987), p. 169; Kikkawa T., 'Business Activities of the 
Standard-Vacuum Oil Co. in Japan Prior to World War IT, Japanese Yearbook on Business History 
(1990), p. 32.
2. Oil and Petroleum Yearbook, 1937,; Anderson I. H., The Standard Vacuum Company and United States
East Asian Policy, 1931-1941 (Princeton University Press, Princeton; 1975), p. 36; Kikkawa T., pp. 33,
39.
3. Samuels R. J., p. 169; Kikkawa T., pp. 36, 40.
4. Samuels R. J., p. 169.
5. In the 1890s the Japanese government increased tariffs on imported oil in an attempt to favour Japanese
produced crude oil - where all the domestic oil fields were owned by Japanese concerns - over imported 
crude oil, Samuels R. J., pp. 169-170.
6. The Tokuyama fuel refinery was strictly limited to the production of fuel oil for the Imperial Japanese
Navy, and all commercial by-products were distributed to selected private companies for resale,
Samuels R. J., pp. 170-171.
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policy. Its two most pressing concerns were the role of oil as a strategic resource and the fate 
of domestic oil companies and oil refining capacity in the face of foreign competition. 
Although it was only after World War Two that oil emerged as an important industrial 
resource, already during the interwar period it had emerged as a vital military resource. In 
1919 the Imperial Japanese Navy installed its first liquid fuel boiler. Subsequently all 
Japanese warships were oil fired,7 and in recognition of the future importance of oil in July 
1925 the Imperial Japanese Navy established the Sekiyu Chosakai (Oil Investigation 
Bureau).8 Furthermore, the Japanese oil industry also demanded a more active 
governmental role in oil policy, and in response to pressure from Japanese oilmen and Diet 
members in July 1926 the Ministry of Commerce and Industry established the Nenryo Chosa 
Iinkai (Fuel Investigation Committee).9 The main aim of these bodies was to reduce Japan's 
strategic dependence upon imported oil through the discovery and development of new oil 
fields within the Japanese archipelago.10 However, Japan proved to be oil-barren and thus 
nothing could be done to overcome Japanese dependence upon overseas oil supplies. In 
1924 imported crude oil surpassed domestic production,11 and the situation worsened as 
Japanese oil production failed to keep pace with increased domestic demand. In©*e«sed 
domesticfincreased Japan’s dependence upon overseas supplies.12
In contrast to the inability of the Japanese government to end its strategic 
dependence on oil imports, the promotion of import substitution offered the possibility of 
strengthening the Japanese oil companies and oil refining capacity. This became more 
urgent when the growth of oil imports and the continued success of foreign oil companies in 
the Japanese market threatened to undermine the Japanese oil companies, Japanese oil 
production and Japanese oil refining. From the mid-1920s Rising Sim Oil and Standard Oil, 
the two dominant foreign oil companies in Japan, fought a series of price wars,13 based on
7. Samuels R  J., p. 170.
8. Samuels R  J., p. 173.
9. Samuels R, J., p. 173; Inokuchi T. (or Iguchi T.), Gendai Nippon Sangyd hattatsu-shi II, Sekiyu [History
of the development of modem Japanese industries n , Petroleum Industry] (Gendai Nippon Sangyd
Hattatsushi Kenkyukai, Tokyo; 1963), p. 55.
10. Samuels R  J., p. 173.
11. Samuels R  J., pp. 173-174.
12. Indeed as oil consumption in Japan increased so Japanese dependence upon imported oil increased, See 
tables 4.1, 4.2, and 4.3 for the percentages of Japanese oil imports in the 1930s.
13. See table 4.4.
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cheap imported oil, which threatened to eliminate the Japanese oil production industry.14 In 
response, some Japanese firms such as Mitsubishi Shoji in 1924 established long-term 
supply contracts with overseas crude oil producers,15 while other Japanese firms dependent 
upon high cost domestic supplies, faced an uncertain future. Nippon Sekiyu, the leading 
Japanese oil company, which was heavily dependent upon domestic oil production, reduced 
its dividend payments from over 10% in 1925 to 5% in 1930, and under 1% in 193 L16 
Furthermore, although Japanese production of refined oil products increased fourfold 
between 1924 and 1934, during the same period, and despite unfavourable tariffs, imports of 
refined petroleum products by Rising Sun Oil and Standard Oil increased fivefold.17 
Japanese observers viewed this as detrimental to the development of Japanese oil refining 
capacity.
Towards the end of the 1920s increased market instability contributed to calls from 
both inside and outside the Japanese oil industry for government regulation. The increased 
market instability of the late 1920s and early 1930s was portrayed as the result of the 
dumping policies by Rising Sun Petroleum and Standard Oil, which was presented as a 
justification for state regulation of the domestic oil market and oil industry.18 The main 
reason for the collapse of oil prices was in fact the discovery of new oil fields which led to a 
glut of oil on the world market.19 Indeed, the major oil companies sought to protect their 
investments through market sharing agreements and not price wars.20 Nevertheless, the 
inability of the oil companies to regulate a series of short-lived Japanese cartel agreements 
increased calls from within the domestic industry for government regulation of the oil
14. Inokuchi T., pp. 245-246; Samuels R  J., p. 174.
15. Samuels R  J., p. 174.
16. Inokuchi T., p. 245; Samuels R  X, p. 174. In contrast in 1931 Royal Dutch Shell still paid out a 6% 
dividend, Oil and Petroleum Yearbook, 1937.
17. Mitsubishi Economic Research Bureau, Japanese Trade and Industry: Present and Future, (Macmillan, 
London; 1936), pp. 211, 214; Samuels R  J., p. 174.
18. Udagawa M., 'Business Management and Foreign Affiliated Companies in Japan Before World War IT,
in Udagawa M. and Yuzawa T. (eds.), Foreign Business in Japan Before World War II (University of 
Tokyo Press, Tokyo; 1990), p. 23.
19. Williamson H. F., Andreno R  L., Daum A. R , and Klose G. C., The American Petroleum Industry: The 
Age o f Energy, 1899-1959 (Northwestern University Press, Evanston; 1963), Vol., II., pp. 524-525; 
Gibb G. S., and Knowhon E. H., History o f Standard Oil Company (New Jersey), Vol., II., The 
Resurgent Years, 1911-1927 (Harper & Brothers, New York; 1956), pp. 304-305; Larson H.,
Knowlton E. H., and Popple C. S., History o f Standard Oil Company (New Jersey), Vol. III., New 
Horizons, 1927-1950 (Harper & Row, New York; 1971), pp. 305-306; Anderson I. H., p. 32.
20. Anderson I. H., pp. 32-35.
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industry. In August 1928 the naigai (joint foreign and domestic) cartel of the six foreign and 
Japanese oil firms collapsed after only a month. A similar arrangement in 1929, designed to 
give a 55.5% market share to Rising Sun Oil and Standard Oil, and a 44.5% market share to 
the four Japanese oil companies, also proved ineffective.21 One of the main reasons for the 
failure of the successive naigai cartels was the policy of the Japanese owned Ogura Oil 
Company to increase its market share through a ruthless price cutting policy.22 The oil 
companies eventually turned to the Japanese government to regulate their cartel 
arrangements, and in August 1932 a new naigai supervised by the Ministry of Commerce 
and Industry under the Juyo Sangyd Toseihd (Important Industries Control Law), was 
established which quickly increased petrol prices by some 30%.23 Nevertheless, this 
government endorsed price/volume cartel soon collapsed. On 25 September 1932 some 800 
vehicles had surrounded the Ministry of Commerce and Industry and complained of the rise 
in the gasoline price. Protests continued into November, until the Ministry of Commerce 
and Industry intervened and ’secured’ a reduction in the gasoline price.24 The cartel faced an 
even more serious challenge when in August 1932 Matsukata Kojiro, son o f  the genro (elder 
statesman) Matsukata Masayoshi, negotiated a deal in Moscow to import into Japan 35,000 
tons per year of Soviet gasoline, which amounted to nearly 10% of Japanese petroleum 
imports and almost 6% of Japanese petroleum sales.25 On his return to Japan Matsukata 
purchased the necessary transport and storage facilities, began shipments to Japan in 1933, 
and undercut the naigai oil cartel prices by some 40%.26 Oil prices in Japan fell further as the 
naigai oil cartel slashed prices to meet this new source of competition. Attempts to restore
21. Samuels R. J., p. 174.
22. Between 1927 and 1932 Ogura increased its annual sales of gasoline from 13,200 tons to 81,000 tons, 
Department of Overseas Trade, Economic Conditions in Japan, 1932 (HMSO, London; 1933), p. 66.
23. Nakamura T., and Miyazaki I., Nippon no Energi Mondai' [Japan's Energy Problems], in Arisawa H.
(ed.), Gendai Nippon Sangyd Koza [Studies on Modern Japanese Industry], VoL III., (Iwanami Shoten, 
Tokyo; 1961), p. 21; Inokuchi T., p. 246; Allen G. C., 'Japanese Industry: Its organisation and 
Development to 1937', in Schumpeter E. B. (ed.), The Industrialization o f Japan and Manchukuo, 
1930-1940: Population, Raw Materials and Industry (Macmillan, New York; 1940), pp. 774-775;
Allen G. C., Japanese Industry: Its Recent Development and Present Condition (Institute of Pacific 
Relations, New York; 1940), p. 17; Samuels R. J., p. 174; See tables, 4.4, and 4.5.
24. Inokuchi T., p. 247; Samuels R. J., p. 174. At the same time the Taxi Drivers Guild of Tokyo instituted 
a boycott of Rising Sun Petroleum’s products, since it was perceived as the instigator of the recent price 
increase, Department of Overseas Trade, Economic Conditions in Japan, 1932, p. 66. However, the 
action of the Taxi Drivers Guild in insisting Rising Sun Petroleum was responsible for the recent price 
rise contradicts the view that it was the foreign oil companies who because of aggressive price cutting 
had destabilised the Japanese oil market.
25. Inokuchi T., p. 247.
26. Nakamura T. and Miyazaki I., p. 21; Inokuchi T., p. 247.
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price stability again failed, as Matsukata ignored the cartel’s peace plan.27 Thus it was world 
oversupply together with the policies of the Ogura Oil company and Matsukata’s ’red oil’, not 
the actions of the foreign oil companies, that were responsible for the destabilisation of the 
Japanese oil market in the early 1930s. Moreover, it was the Japanese oil refiners that 
suffered most from the price war with Matsukata.28
Faced by the increased instability of the oil market and difficulties of the Japanese oil 
refiners, in 1933 the government began seriously to consider regulation of the oil industry in 
Japan. Political motives as well as economic motives prompted its involvement. The 
introduction of state regulation presented an opportunity to promote the interests of 
domestic oil refiners over those of the foreign importers of refined petroleum products.29 In 
1933 the Imperial Japanese Navy established the inter-ministerial Sekiyu Kokusaku 
Shingikai (National Oil Policy Council) with the express aims of examining the disorder in 
the oil market, rising demand, and foreign domination of petroleum resources.30 This 
council, affiliated to the Imperial Japanese Navy influenced Mining Bureau of the Ministry 
of Commerce and Industry, developed two alternative programmes, announced in May 
1933, for the Japanese oil industry.31 The first proposal the Sekiyu Kokka Kanri An 
(Nationalisation of the Petroleum Industry Plan) called for the nationalisation of the 
Japanese oil industry. A state monopoly of crude oil production, oil refining, trade, sales and 
other commercial activities would be delegated to a half-public half-private oil corporation, 
in which all profits after the payment of dividends and operating costs were paid into the 
state treasury for the development of domestic resources and synthetic fuels. Further, all 
foreign oil holdings in Japan would be appropriated as part of the state’s capital contribution 
to the new oil corporation.32 The second proposal was the Kyokashugi Tosei An (Licensing 
Control Plan), which eschewed nationalisation and had more limited aims. It was modelled 
on the 1928 French Petroleum Industry Law which required a legal oil stockpile and gave
27. The main proponents of the peace plan were the four Japanese oil companies. Rising Sun Petroleum and
Stanvac remained opposed to including Matsukata in the naigai cartel arrangements, and it was not 
until July 1934 that the price war was ended when Matsukata joined a new naigai cartel, Inokuchi, pp. 
247-248; Samuels R. J., p. 175.
28. Inokuchi T., p. 248.
29. Inokuchi T., p. 250.
30. Samuels R. J., p. 176; Anderson I. H., p. 75.
31. Inokuchi T., p. 251; Samuels R. J., p. 177.
32. Inokuchi, p. 251; Samuels R. J., p. 177.
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priority to domestic refiners over importers of refined petroleum products.33 Thus the 
Licensing Control Plan would give the Ministry of Commerce and Industry the right to 
licence and fix levels of crude oil imports, refining capacity, oil stockpiles and other 
commercial activities. In addition, funds would be given to the Ministry of Commerce and 
Industry for the development of overseas oilfields outside of Anglo-American zones of 
influence.34 Throughout the summer of 1933 the two plans were debated by the Japanese 
government and the oil industry and strong opposition to the nationalisation of the oil 
industry rapidly emerged. The Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs opposed nationalisation 
because it feared that the appropriation of the foreign oil companies assets would lead to 
reprisals. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs was supported by elements within the Ministry of 
Commerce and Industry and the army who feared that, since Japan was unprepared for war, 
it could not face such retaliation if it took the form of an oil embargo.35 The Japanese oil 
industry also put up strong opposition to the nationalisation of the oil industry.36 Given this 
widespread hostility, the Japanese government rejected nationalisation, and on 27 March 
193437 it introduced a new Petroleum Law largely based on the Licensing Control Plan.
The 1934 Petroleum Law introduced extensive state control of the oil industry in 
Japan and was immediately recognised as a serious threat to Rising Sun Oil’s operations in 
Japan. The Law demanded that oil refiners and importers must obtain Japanese government 
sanction prior to changing any operation, and keep an oil stock determined by the Japanese 
government. Oil companies could not refuse requests to sell oil to the Japanese government. 
The Japanese government reserved the right in the public interest to change the oil 
companies' selling price. The Law also contained the provision that failure to comply with 
the legislation would result in the revocation of the relevant oil company's trading license.38
33. Grayson L. E., National Oil Companies (John Wiley and Sons, Chichester; 1981), p. 24; Samuels R  J., 
chapter 2, and p. 177.
34. Samuels R  J., p. 177.
35. Inokuchi T., p. 252.
36. Samuels R  J., p. 177.
37. Kikkawa T., ’1934nen no Sekiyu Gyoho to Gaikokusekiyukaisha to no Kosho* [The diplomacy of the
1934 Petroleum Industry Law and the Foreign Oil Companies], in Oyuka I. (ed.), Senkanki Nippon no 
Taigai Keizai Kankei [Japan's Foreign Economic Relations in the Interwar Period] (Nippon Keizai 
Hyoronsha, 1990), p. 174; Mitsubishi Economic Research Bureau, p. 216; Allen G. C., 'Japanese 
Industry: Its organisation and Development to 1937*, pp. 774-775; Allen G. C., Japanese Industry: Its 
Recent Development and Present Condition, pp. 16-23; Anderson I. H., pp. 75-76; Clive (Tokyo) to 
the Foreign Office, 25 April 1934, F0371/18189,F3153/1659/23.
38. Udagawa M., p. 23; Kikkawa T., T934nen no Sekiyu Gyoho to Gaikokusekiyukaisha to no Kosho', p.
174; Clive (Tokyo) to the Foreign Office, 25 April 1934, F0371/18189,F3152/1659/23.
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Sir Robert Clive, the British Ambassador in Tokyo, reported that although the provisions of 
the Petroleum Law were not discriminatory its publication had caused Rising Sun Oil and 
Stanvac great anxiety.19 The prospects for Royal Dutch Shell's operations in East Asia 
worsened when the Manchukuo government decided to nationalise its domestic oil industry 
through an Oil Monopoly Law that bore a striking resemblance to the Nationalisation of the 
Petroleum Industry Plan proposal of the National Oil Policy Council. The Manchukuo 
government, dominated by Japanese military idealists, perceived state planned and operated 
industrial developments as the cornerstone of Manchukuo’s economic development.40 Thus 
a nationalised oil industry complemented the government's plans for the development of the 
whole economy. In a series of promulgations in 1934 the Oil Monopoly Law called for the 
establishment of a nationalised oil industry. A government controlled Manchukuo 
Petroleum Company would control all oil production, refining and distribution in 
Manchukuo. Aside from the threat to British commercial interests the Oil Monopoly Law 
was also a direct breach of the established ’Open Door’ policy, and other international treaties 
that prohibited the establishment of monopolies in China.41 Thus the establishment of the oil 
monopoly in Manchukuo constituted a massive challenge to western interests in East Asia.
39. Clive (Tokyo) to the Foreign Office, 25 April 1934, F0371/18189,F3152/1659/23; Anderson I. H., p.
76.
40. Nakagame K., Manchukuo and Economic Development', in Duus P., Myers R. H., and Peattie M. R. 
(eds.), The Japanese Informal Empire in China, 1895-1937 (Princeton University Press, New Jersey; 
1989), pp. 133-143.
41. The 'Open Door' policy for China was first proposed in 1899 by John Hay, the American Secretary of 
State, and was formally recognised by all the major powers, including Japan, in the Nine Power Treaty 
in 1922. The aim of the 'Open Door* was to ensure equality of commercial opportunity throughout 
China for all business interests, and thus reduce the economic basis for military and political competition 
amongst the major powers in China, and so facilitate the economic development of China. Moreover, 
although the Japanese had established Manchukuo in March 1932 as an independent state, the Japanese 
and Manchukuo authorities agreed to abide by the Open Door principle, which had formally applied to 
Manchukuo - then Manchuria - when it was still part of China. The British complained that the 
establishment of a monopoly in Manchuria violated Article V of the 1842 Sino-British Treaty, Article 
XV of the 1844 Sino-American Treaty, Article XIV of the 1858 Sino-French Treaty, and Article III of 
the 1922 Nine Power Treaty, Foreign Office memorandum, The Japanese Petroleum Law and the 
Threatened Oil Monopoly in Manchuria', 30 October 1934, F0371/18190,F6426/1659/23. For British 
complaints that the oil monopoly breached Japanese and Manchukuoan pledges to uphold the Open 
Door in Manchukuo, see interview between Clive and Hirota, the Japanese Minister of Foreign Affairs, 
in Clive (Tokyo) to the Foreign Office, 24 November 1934, F0371/18191,F6971/1659/23.
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The challenge to Royal Dutch Shell and Stanvac operations in Japan and Manchuria.
State intervention in the Japanese and Manchukuoan oil markets posed a severe threat to the 
operations of both Royal Dutch Shell and Stanvac throughout East Asia. Until 1933, the 
growing Japanese petroleum market had been dominated by Rising Sun Petroleum and 
Stanvac: in 1933 the two companies supplied over 50% of the huge gasoline market, and 
accounted for 56.4% of all refined petroleum product sales by volume in Japan.42 The 
Japanese and Manchukuoan oil markets represented a huge proportion ofRoyal Dutch Shell 
and Stanvac's East Asian investment and distribution operations. Even in 1937, after 3 years 
of state regulation, Stanvac's sales in Japan, Formosa, Korea, and Manchukuo, still 
represented 43.4% of Stanvac's total sales in East and Southeast Asia43 To support their 
large scale distribution networks the two companies had invested heavily in Japan. In 1941 
Stanvac’s direct investment in Japan and Korea was estimated at $7,748,000, which 
represented its second largest direct investment - outside of oil production - in East Asia.44 
From a commercial standpoint Japan’s Petroleum Law presented a far more serious threat to 
both companies' oil operations than the nationalisation of the Manchukuoan oil industry. 
Royal Dutch Shell sold over 23 times as much gasoline in Japan as in Manchuria, while 
Stanvac sold 15 times as much.45 Moreover, since Royal Dutch Shell supplied more oil and 
petroleum products to the Japanese and Manchukuoan markets than Stanvac,46 state 
regulation posed the greater threat to the Anglo-Dutch oil concern. Precisely because both 
Royal Dutch Shell and Stanvac operations were so heavily committed in these eastern 
markets, it meant that neither company could easily contemplate 'discriminatory' Japanese
42. Royal Dutch Shell (London) to Rising Sun Petroleum (Yokohama), 29 January 1937,
F0371/21032,F710/66/23; Udagawa M., p. 23; Samuels R. J., p. 174; See table 4.2.
43. For the other markets the figures were China 22.6%, the Philippines 14.4%, Malaya 8.2%, the Dutch 
East Indies 7.7%, Indo-China 2.3%, Thailand 0.9%, and Burma 0.5%, Anderson I. H., p. 3, and table 
B-3, p. 220.
44. Stanvac's investment of $8,943,000 in China and Manchuria was larger than its investment in Japan and 
Korea. Furthermore, Stanvac's direct investment of $256,950,000 in the Dutch East Indies was 
considerably larger than its investments in either China and Manchuria or Japan and Korea. However, 
this total included major investments in oil drilling etc., and some $150,850,000 worth of oil reserves, 
Anderson I. H., p. 202; Kikkawa T, 'Business Activities of the Standard-Vacuum Oil C. in Japan Prior 
to World War IT, table 3, p. 51. See also Kikkawa T., Business Activities of the Standard-Vacuum Oil 
Co. in Japan Prior to World War II’, table 1, pp. 44-45 for figures for 1929.
45. See table 4.6.
46. See table 4.6; Rising Sun Petroleum emerged as the most important foreign company in the Japanese 
market after 1910 because of its lead in the sale of gasoline in the booming Japanese market, Kikkawa 
T., Business Activities of the Standard-Vacuum Oil Co. in Japan Prior to World War II', pp. 42-47; 
Anderson I. H., p. 4.
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and Manchukuoan regulation of the industry.
As it happened, the commercial style of both Royal Dutch Shell and Stanvac's 
operations in Japan and Manchuria made them vulnerable to government sponsored import 
substitution. This vulnerability derived from their similar historical development in Japan 
and Manchuria, which favoured the importation of refined oil products rather than the 
development of on-site refining capacity in either market. After a brief foray into producing 
oil in Japan by Standard Oil,47 both Rising Sun Petroleum and Standard Oil had since the 
beginning of the century dominated the Japanese market by retailing imported oil and 
refined products. Even after the emergence of Japanese rivals, Nippon Sekiyu and Hoden 
Sekiyu, the two western firms still controlled some 65% of the Japanese oil market.4* Their 
domination was due to a combination of factors: the superiority of their refining plant 
outside Japan which enabled them to deliver competitive and superior refined products in 
the Japanese market over their Japanese competitors;49 and an extensive distribution 
network which had been established in Japan prior to the First World War.50 Thus in one 
critical respect in the interwar period western firms differed from their Japanese 
competitors: neither company operated any refining capacity in Japan,51 whereas in contrast 
by 1932 Nippon Sekiyu operated in Japan six oil refineries, with an approximate refining 
capacity of 53,200 tons per month.52 Consequently, both western firms were vulnerable to 
government promoted import substitution of refined petroleum products.
The weakness of Royal Dutch Shell and Stanvac's operations in Japan and 
Manchukuo to import substitution was compounded by the fact that during the interwar 
period, despite the global growth of oil consumption, the discovery of new oil fields had 
resulted in a global oversupply.53 Thus the two western firms could not dictate oil policy to
47. Samuels R. J., pp. 169-170; Kikkawa T., Business Activities of the Standard-Vacuum Oil Co. in Japan 
Prior to World War IT, pp. 33, 36-39.
48. Udagawa M., p. 5.
49. Kikkawa T., Business Activities of the Standard-Vacuum Oil Co. in Japan Prior to World War IT, p. 36.
50. Kikkawa T., Business Activities of the Standard-Vacuum Oil Co. in Japan Prior to World War IT, pp.
37-38, 40.
51. Between 1909 and 1915 Rising Sun Petroleum had operated a refining plant at Satozaki in Fukuoka 
Prefecture, Kikkawa T., Business Activities of the Standard-Vacuum Oil Co. in Japan Prior to World 
War IT, pp. 40-41; Inokuchi T., pp. 137, 141.
52. Report by Sansom, The Oil Industry in Japan’, 8 March 1933, F0371/17167,F2313/2313/23.
53. It was this same oil glut that had led to petroleum’s price collapse in the late 1920s.
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the Japanese and Manchukuoan authorities, since alternative sources of supply were readily 
available. International cartel arrangements between oil producers were equally limited. 
The major oil companies responded to the world glut by instigating a series of marketing 
arrangements and dividing up the newly discovered Middle Eastern oil fields.54 However, 
this international oil production cartel did not include the major independent American oil 
companies - Tide Water Associated Oil, Standard Oil of California, Union Oil, The Texas 
Company, Richfield, and General Petroleum - who had the capacity to supply Japan and 
Manchukuo with crude oil, and yet had no vulnerable distribution networks in either 
Japanese or Manchukuoan markets.55 In 1929 Tide Water Associated entered into a contract 
with Mitsubishi to establish a jointly funded joint subsidiary in Japan, to import and refine in 
Japan crude oil supplied by the American firm. The details of the joint venture were 
concluded in 1931; the two parties agreed to establish the Mitsubishi Oil Company and open 
a new oil refinery at Ogimachi in Kawasaki Prefecture, with a capacity of refining 5,000 
barrels of imported crude oil per day.56 Lacking either a monopoly in oil supply to Japan and 
Manchukuo, or a watertight international oil cartel, Royal Dutch Shell and Stanvac could 
rely neither upon their own nor the international cartel’s control of Japan’s oil supplies to 
pressure the Japanese government into adopting more acceptable oil policies. This meant 
that their operations in Japan and Manchukuo were vulnerable to state intervention and 
import substitution of refined petroleum products.
The failure of the two oil companies to build oil refineries in Japan, which would 
have made them less vulnerable to government sponsored import substitution, resulted 
mainly from their poor understanding of the trends in Japanese oil policy, according to one 
contemporary Japanese authority.57 Since the mid-1920s it was a clear aim of the Japanese
54. Gibb G. S., and Knowlton E. H., pp. 306-308; Anderson I. H,, pp. 32-35.
55. For example in 1939 these 6 oil companies supplied 73.9% of Japan's imports of crude oil, and yet only 
23.9% of Japan's imports of gasoline, Anderson I. H., p. 82, and table B-6, pp. 226-227.
56. Kikkawa T., 'Business Activities of the Standard Vacuum Oil Co. in Japan Prior to World War II', p. 52; 
Oil and Petroleum Yearbook, 1937, Department o f Overseas Trade, Economic Conditions in Japan, 
1932, pp. 65-66.
57. In a similar fashion the oil companies had received reports in the summer of 1933 that under pressure 
from the Japanese army the Manchukuo government intended to establish a monopoly over the 
production, refining and distribution of petroleum. In the case of American oil interests both Stanvac 
and the State Department concluded that, until the monopoly was established, any action on Stanvac’s 
behalf would be premature, Anderson I. H., p. 50. Furthermore, given the relatively short space of time 
between the circulation of the rumours and the promulgation of the Oil Monopoly Law it is difficult to 
see what the oil companies could have achieved by way of defensive measures or compromise to 
circumvent some of the effects of the Oil Monopoly Law.
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oil tariff to favour imported crude over imported refined petroleum products, a clear 
indication of the Japanese government's desire to increase domestic refining capacity.58 
Rising Sun Petroleum and Stanvac failed to respond to this explicit trend of the Japanese oil 
tariff policy prior to the introduction of the Petroleum Law. This was the source of their 
difficulties according to Kurusu Saburo, the Chief of the Commercial Affairs Bureau of the 
Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs, in 1935, who was then in the process of negotiating the 
implementation of the Petroleum Law with Rising Sun Petroleum and Stanvac, and who 
criticised both oil companies for being poorly informed about the Japanese oil market.59 
Indeed Kikkawa Takeo argues that both Rising Sun Petroleum's and Stanvac's desire to 
refine oil outside Japan, and lack of knowledge of Japanese tariffs, predisposed both 
companies not to establish refining capacity in Japan.60 The Japanese government did not 
discriminate against the Japan based refiningoperations of the US-Japan owned Mitsubishi 
Oil Company but did discriminate against the Japanese owned Matsukata oil company.61 On 
the face of it, therefore, the problems of Rising Sun Petroleum and Stanvac in the Japanese 
market stemmed from their own refusal to establish refining plants in Japan.62 However, this 
argument ignores the fact that before the announcement of the Petroleum Law, and even 
before the establishment of the National Oil Policy Council, both Rising Sun Petroleum and 
Stanvac considered establishing refining plants in Japan* This had occurred after the 
devaluation of the yen in December 1931 and the revision of the oil tariff in 1932, both of 
which favoured the import of crude oil, and gave oil refined in Japan a decisive price 
advantage over imported refined petroleum products.63 Moreover, it is difficult to believe 
that they did not share the conclusion drawn by the Department of Overseas Trade’s 
Economic Conditions in Japan, 1932, written by George Sansom, the British Commercial
58. Kikkawa T., ’Business Activities of the Standard-Vacuum Oil Co. in Japan Prior to World War II’, p. 52. 
Prior to the Second World War it was a common Japanese practice to use tariff policy and 
administrative measures to favour the development of domestic industries, and besides Royal Dutch 
Shell other British industries had suffered from this policy. For example the Japanese government 
introduced subsides to domestic soda ash producers to enable them to compete with British imports, 
Nicholas S., British Business Interests in Japan Before 1941: Origins, Evolution, and Operations’, in 
Yuzawa T, and Udagawa M. (eds.), Foreign Business in Japan Before World War II (University of 
Tokyo Press, Tokyo; 1990), pp. 72-74.
59. Kikkawa T., Business Activities of the Standard-Vacuum Oil Co. in Japan Prior to World War II', p. 39.
60. Kikkawa T., Business Activities of the Standard-Vacuum Oil Co. in Japan Prior to World War 11', pp.
52-53.
61. See table 4.7
62. Kikkawa T., Business Activities of the Standard-Vacuum Oil Co. in Japan Prior to World War II’, p. 53.
63. Kikkawa T., Business Activities of the Standard-Vacuum Oil Co. in Japan Prior to World War II’, p. 53.
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Counsellor in Tokyo and prepared with the assistance of Rising Sun Petroleum,64 that the 
1932 petroleum tariff adjustment was part of a Japanese government plan to favour
domestic refiners over importers of refined pm /fartg^il iiui Tjpsmacg^r     ^ nii|
As the report stated, it "provides a clear illustration of the national policy of encouraging 
domestic industries and diminishing the dependence of Japan upon imported products other 
than indispensable raw materials”*65 Thus in November 1932, both oil companies wrote to 
Nakajima Kumakichi, the Minister of Commerce and Industry, to state their willingness to 
build oil refineries in Japan.66 Nothing came of this proposal prior to what the companies 
regarded as the to the 'destabilisation' of oil policy through the publication of the National Oil 
Policy Council recommendations in May 1933, and the subsequent announcements in 1934 
of the Petroleum and Oil Monopoly Laws. Consequently, the failure of the two western 
companies to establish oil refining capacity in Japan was not the result of ignorance of 
Japanese oil policy, but stemmed from a recognition that increased state intervention would 
make such investment disproportionate to the risks involved.
64. Report by Sansom, 'The Oil Industry in Japan', 8 March 1933, F0371/17167,F2313/2313/23.
65. Department of Overseas Trade, Economic Conditions in Japan, 1932, p. 65.
66. Kikkawa T., 'Business Activities of the Standard-Vacuum Oil Co. in Japan Prior to World War II', 
footnote 56, p. 53.
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The British response to the 1934 Petroleum Law and Oil Monopoly Law.
While the Japanese Petroleum Law ofMarch 1934 introduced an element of uncertainty into 
Royal Dutch Shell's operations in East Asia, it was not until the publication of the 27 June 
Ordinance of the Ministry of Commerce and Industry that the full severity of the Law 
became apparent.67 Aside from questions of principle, the requirements of the 27 June 
ordinance threw into question the commercial viability ofRising Sun Petroleum’s operations 
in the Japanese petroleum market. The Anglo-Dutch subsidiary's particular objection was to 
the six month stock holding requirement of the 27 June ordinance, a clear attempt by the 
Japanese government to reduce its short-term strategic dependence on oil imports by forcing 
the oil companies to hold a six month oil reserve. Previously the company had maintained 
only two months of stocks in Japan.68 It estimated that it would need an additional 8 million 
yen (£480,000)69 of tankerage to fulfil the measure, of which 4.5 million yen (£270,000) of 
tankerage would have to be installed by March 1935 to meet the three month interim 
stockholding requirement. However, this was not the end of the cost of the six month 
stockholding requirement, since the company estimated that it would require a massive 20 
million yen (£1,200,000) increase of oil stocks, from the current 9 million yen level, to fulfil 
the six month stockholding.70 Thus to continue its operations in Japan it appeared in July 
1934 that Royal Dutch Shell would have to invest at least 28 million yen (£1,680,000) - and 
in the long-run would have to invest some £2,500,000 in oil refining equipment in Japan71 - in 
a Japanese market that might well be subject to even stricter government control in the 
future.72 Therefore even if the company did establish a six month stockholding capacity in 
Japan, the viability of such an investment remained uncertain since quota and price controls
67. An Imperial Ordinance on 26 June authorised the Ministry of Commerce and Industry to execute the 
Petroleum Law, Clive (Tokyo) to the Foreign Office, 22 September 1934,
F0371 /18189,F6362/1659/23; Anderson I. H., pp. 76-77.
68. Clive (Tokyo) to the Foreign Office, 26 September 1934, F0371/18189,F5793/1659/23; Anderson I. H., 
p. 95.
69. Converted in 1934 rates, ¥1 to Is. 2 7/16J., Japan Financial and Economic Annual.
70. Starling (Petroleum Department) to the Foreign Office, 20 July 1934, F0371/18189,F4477/1659/23.
71. Starling (Petroleum Department) to the Foreign Office, 20 July 1934, F0371/18189,F4477/1659/23. In 
June 1933 Asiatic Petroleum was capitalised at £19 million, while in 1937 Rising Sun Petroleum was 
only capitalised at 20 million yen, Oil and Petroleum Yearbook, 1937; Department of Overseas Trade, 
Economic Conditions in Japan, 1933-1934 (HMSO, London; 1935), p. 82.
72. Starling (Petroleum Department) to the Foreign Office, 20 July 1934, F0371/18189,F4477/1659/23 An 
intervention by Clive secured for the oil companies greater time to submit their operational plans, Clive 
(Tokyo) to the Foreign Office, 26 July 1934, F 071/18189,F4575/1659/23; Foreign Office 
Memorandum, 8 August 1934, F0371/18189,F4994/1659/23; Anderson I. H., p. 79.
226
Royal Dutch Shell and the Petroleum and Oil Monopoly Laws
authorised by the Petroleum Law might wipe out the necessary rate of return on the 
investment. There appeared little prospect of Japanese opposition to the Petroleum Law. 
The Minister of Commerce and Industry, Nakajima Kumakichi, had told the Diet in March 
1934 that the desire to increase oil storage should not be atthe expense ofthe oil companies.73 
However, by the time the Far Eastern Department of the Foreign Office heard of this 
statement in September 1934, so little had been achieved by domestic opposition to the 
Petroleum Law, that the Foreign Office quickly discounted the potential of this opposition.74
Faced with the prospect of state regulation of the Japanese oil market, the parent 
company, Royal Dutch Shell immediately turned to the British government for support, and 
in both Tokyo and London company officials found a sympathetic response from officials at 
the Foreign Office, Department of Overseas Trade, and Petroleum Department. However, 
although the company officials wanted general diplomatic backing they did not as yet seek 
specific support from the British government to confront the Japanese government or 
coordinate policy with the American government. At this stage their aim was to seek the 
modification and/or amelioration of the Petroleum Law through cooperation and 
compromise with the Japanese government. Sir Andrew Agnew, a Director of Asiatic 
Petroleum - Rising Sun Petroleum’s parent company - told F. C. Starling, the Director of the 
Petroleum Department, of the limited aims of Rising Sun Petroleum, which would ensure 
their continued operation in the Japanese market even if the Petroleum Law was either fully 
or only partially fulfilled. Thus Rising Sun Petroleum sought Foreign Office support for its 
request from the Japanese government for guarantees that any investment undertaken by the 
firm would not be jeopardised by any future actions of the Japanese government, and that the 
firm would receive no less favourable treatment than any of the Japanese oil companies.75 
However, Agnew was certain that the Petroleum Law would not be revoked and that the 
long-term intention of the Japanese government was to bend Rising Sun Petroleum and 
Stanvac to the needs of their petroleum policy.76
Officials at both the Petroleum Department and the Foreign Office sympathised with 
the plight of Rising Sun Petroleum. Indeed, they showed a more immediate alarm than the
73. Captain King (Admiralty) to the Foreign Office, 19 September 1934, F0371/18189,F5690/1659/23.
74. Minute by Randall, 22 September 1934, FO371/18189,F5690/1659/23.
75. Starling (Petroleum Department) to the Foreign Office, 20 July 1934, F0371/18189,F4477/1659/23.
76. Starling (Petroleum Department) to the Foreign Office, 20 July 1934, F0371/18189,F4477/1659/23.
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company officials that the long-term effect of the Japanese petroleum policy could be a 
disaster for the company. After his talk with Agnew, Starling warned the Foreign Office that 
the effect of the Petroleum Law could be to force the company's complete withdrawal from 
the Japanese petroleum products market. The Petroleum Law raised serious grounds for 
concern, and although not discriminatory by nature the powers were so wide ranging that it 
was impossible to say that discrimination against Rising Sun Petroleum might not occur in 
the future. Starling concluded that Min substance, if not in name, it almost amounts to the 
setting up by the Japanese Government of a Government monopoly in petroleum”.77 The 
Foreign Office agreed with Starling's appraisal of the petroleum situation in Japan, and not 
only accepted the need for British diplomatic support of Rising Sun Petroleum, but 
expressed concern lest the company's representative in Yokohama was too quick to 
compromise with the Japanese government's demands.78 Thus Royal Dutch Shell, the 
Petroleum Department of the Board of Trade, and the Foreign Office all agreed on the 
iniquity of the Petroleum Law and the need for British diplomatic support for Rising Sun 
Petroleum. However, since the Japanese government had neither undertaken any 
discriminatory action against Rising Sun Petroleum nor broken any international treaty, 
there appeared no case for aggressive British diplomatic representations. Thus the initial 
Foreign Office protests to the Japanese Ministry ofForeign Affairs amounted to requests that 
the Japanese government meet with Rising Sun Petroleum to discuss the situation arising out 
of the Petroleum Law.79
The need for greater British diplomatic support on behalf of British oil interests 
became clearer over the summer of 1934. The Japanese refusal to compromise with Rising 
Sun Petroleum and the growing body of evidence that the Manchukuo government would 
institute an oil monopoly, convinced Royal Dutch Shell and the Foreign Office of the need 
for a more forceful defence of British oil interests from Japanese and Manchukuoan 
encroachments. In August 1934 Japan published the first gasoline sales quotas for the 
second half of 1934 as authorised by the Petroleum Law, which cast considerable doubt on 
the long-term future of Rising Sun Petroleum and Stanvac in the Japanese oil market. This
77. Starling (Petroleum Department) to the Foreign Office, 20 July 1934, F0371/18189,F4477/1659/23.
78. Clive (Tokyo) to the Foreign Office, 26 July 1934, F0371/18189,F4575/1659/23; Minute by Orde, 10 
August 1934, F0371/18189,F4994/1659/23.
79. Starling (Petroleum Department) to the Foreign Office, 20 July 1934, F0371/18189,F4477/1659/23; 
Foreign Office to Clive (Tokyo), 23 July 1934, F0371/18189,F4477/1659/23; Clive (Tokyo) to the 
Foreign Office, 26 July 1934, F0371/18189,F4575/1659/23.
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belated publication of the first gasoline sales quota disclosed that the two foreign oil 
companies, while retaining their volume of gasoline sales, faced a considerable reduction in 
their established market share. In contrast, all the Japanese oil companies - save Matsukata - 
received an increase in their current market shares. The Japanese government allocated 
Rising Sun Petroleum a 27.65% and Stanvac a 17.81% share of the gasoline market. For 
Rising Sun Petroleum this represented a 6.17% and for Stanvac a 7.14% cut of their 
respective market share of the Japanese gasoline market over the preceding three months.80 
However, the Japanese government rejected British and American protests that the gasoline 
sales quota discriminated against Rising Sun Petroleum and Stanvac, and claimed that it in 
fact represented a legitimate and nondiscriminatory aspect of industrial policy. The 
Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs’ reply to Clive's 31 July protest over the gasoline sales 
quota stated that,
it is Japan’s desire in general to refine imported raw material rather than to import the 
manufactured article, and accordingly, in view of the fact that there are idle refining 
plants, it is intended in the first place to allot to them such proportion of increased 
demand as is appropriate.81
Indeed it is clear, as the Japanese government claimed, that the allocation of gasoline sales 
quotas discriminated solely against importers of refined petroleum products, and not on the 
basis of national ownership of the respective oil companies.82 Matsukata, the Japanese- 
owned importer of Soviet refined petroleum products, received a reduced gasoline sales 
quota, while Mitsubishi Oil, the joint US-Japanese owned oil concern which operated an oil 
refinery in Japan, like all other oil refiners in Japan, received an increased gasoline sales 
quota.83 Tide Water Associated Oil, the American partner in Mitsubishi Oil, whose 
operations benefited from the enforcement of the Petroleum Law, did not complain to the 
State Department over the Petroleum Law, and in fact advanced its half share - just over 
$200,000 - for the capital necessary for Mitsubishi Oil to fulfil the six month stockholding 
requirement.84 However, since Royal Dutch Shell was primarily concerned with its future
80. Starling (Petroleum Department) to the Foreign Office, 8 September 1934,
F0371/18189,F5436/1659/23; See table 4.7.
81. Clive (Tokyo) to the Foreign Office, 7 November 1934, F0371/18190,F6670/1659/23; Anderson I. H., 
p. 78.
82. Clive (Tokyo) to the Foreign Office, 21 November 1934, FO371/18190,F6923/1659/23.
83. See table 4.7.
84. Anderson I. H., footnote 16, pp. 78-79. Sansom argued that since the proportion of excess refining 
capacity in Japan was lower than the proportion of excess refining capacity in North America and
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prospects in the Japanese oil market, the legitimacy of Japan's import substitution policy was 
an irrelevance. Furthermore, the gasoline quota was not the only indication Rising Sun 
Petroleum received that the Japanese government would be uncompromising over the 
provisions of the Petroleum Law. Talks between the oil companies and the Japanese 
government proved fruitless. An attempt by Rising Sun Petroleum and Stanvac to secure a 
guarantee of their future status within the Japanese oil market was rebuffed when the 
Japanese government insisted that both oil companies re-submit their operational plans for 
the second half of 1934 by 31 August 1934, with the provision for a reduced percentage of 
the gasoline market.85 Consequently, the first gasoline sales quota and failure of the summer 
oil talks weakened Royal Dutch Shell's faith in the Japanese government and hardened its 
desire not to compromise with the Petroleum Law. Royal Dutch Shell's head office in 
London told Rising Sun Petroleum, "Obviously if our trade is to be progressively curtailed in 
this way it would be foolish for us to increase our capital expenditure in Japan". In view of 
the gasoline quota even a small increase of tankerage in Japan was a risk.86
The deterioration of Rising Sun Petroleum’s position under the Petroleum Law was 
parallelled by the development of Asiatic Petroleum's position under the Manchukuo Oil 
Monopoly Law. However, the first promulgation of the Oil Monopoly Law gave no 
indications that there would be any discrimination against the operations of the principal 
western oil companies in Manchuria, Asiatic Petroleum, Stanvac, and Texas Oil. On 21 
February 1934 the Manchukuo government announced the formation of the Manchukuo 
Petroleum Company, with a 5 million yuan capitalisation - 20% from the Manchukuo 
government, 40% from the South Manchuria Railway, and 10% each from Mitsui, 
Mitsubishi, Ogura Oil, and Nippon Sekiyu - for the production, refining, and distribution of 
petroleum products throughout Manchukuo, but with no monopoly provisions.87 
Nevertheless, there soon emerged worrying rumours that the Manchukuo Petroleum 
Company would be given monopoly privileges. Neville Butler, the British Consul General
Europe, the attempt by the Japanese government to increase its oil refining capacity, at the expense of 
Rising Sun Petroleum and Stanvac's refined petroleum products, was unjustified. However, his 
argument ignores the claim that the Petroleum Law was 'discriminatory’, Department of Overseas 
Trade, Economic Conditions in Japan, 1933-1934, pp. 80-83.
85. Rising Sun Petroleum (Yokohama) to Royal Dutch Shell (London), 17 August 1934, 
FO371/18189,F5104/1659/23; Anderson I. R , pp. 79-80.
86. Royal Dutch Shell (London) to Rising Sun Petroleum (Yokohama), 27 August 1934,
F0371/18189,F5436/1659/23.
87. Butler (Mukden) to Cadogan (Peking), 18 April 1934, FO371/18108,F2689/142/10; Anderson I. H., pp.
53-54.
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in Mukden, was told by an official in the Manchukuo Department of Industry that "some 
form of monopoly” would "eventually” be adopted for petroleum products.88 In response, 
Clive, and Joseph Grew, the American Ambassador in Tokyo, presented separate but almost 
identical notes of protests to the Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Both notes 
complained that an oil monopoly in Manchukuo would breach the Open Door principle, and 
directly violated several international treaties which prohibited the formation of monopolies 
in China that excluded foreign interests.89 Thus although the commercial interests involved 
in Manchukuo were less significant than those involved in Japan, because of the breach of 
the Open Door and violation of international treaties, the response of the Foreign Office and 
State Department was more immediate and much stronger. However, there was little to 
suggest that international protest could prevent the establishment of an oil monopoly in 
Manchukuo. As with the Petroleum Law, there was no evidence that domestic Japanese 
pressure would challenge the formation of an oil monopoly in Manchukuo. Indeed the 
Japanese oil companies appeared to be willing participants in the formation of the 
Manchukuo Petroleum Company and enactment of the Oil Monopoly Law. Butler reported 
that Hashimoto Keizaburo, the President of both Nippon Sekiyu and the Manchukuo 
Petroleum Company - and the brother-in-law of General Hishikari, the Commander of the 
Kwantung Army, Governor of the Kwantung Leased Territory, and Japanese Ambassador to 
Manchukuo - was the driving force behind the Manchukuo Petroleum Company.90
The lack of progress of the talks with the Japanese government together with 
developments in Manchukuo persuaded officials of Royal Dutch-Shell that only the threat to 
restrict Japan’s oil supplies would force the Japanese government to compromise. This led 
Rising Sun Petroleum to seek an Anglo-American front against Japan. Stanvac, the other 
major company affected by the Japanese actions was American. If Royal Dutch Shell and 
Stanvac were to threaten to embargo Japan’s oil supplies, American government support 
would be critical in allowing a restriction of supply policy to be effective. The case for the oil 
embargo threat, in reaction to the threatened Manchukuo oil monopoly, was first outlined in 
early August 1934 in a joint meeting between H. W. Malcolm, Rising Sun Petroleum’s 
manager in Japan, J. C. Goold, Stanvac’s manager in Japan, Clive, and Grew. They believed
88. Butler (Mukden) to Cadogan (Peking), 28 April 1934, F037l/18108,F2820/142/10; Anderson I. H., p.
55.
89. Clive (Tokyo) to the Foreign Office, 2 and 9 July 1934, FO371/18109,F3991,F4735/142/10; Anderson I.
H„ pp. 55-56.
90. Butler (Mukden) to the Foreign Office, 18 July 1934, F0371/18109,F4812/142/10.
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that the only way to stop the Japanese from implementing the oil monopoly was through a 
threat by the oil companies to restrict their oil supplies to Japan. They were categorical that 
American government support was a prerequisite for the success of the policy.91 This 
approach was quickly followed up in London by Agnew who, without even outlining the 
justification of the oil embargo threat, made a clear cut case to the Petroleum Department for 
the need of American support of any restriction policy. Agnew stated that in the face of a 
restriction of Anglo-American controlled oil supplies to Japan, non-Anglo-American 
controlled substitute oil supplies were available to the Japanese. However, he doubted that 
either of the two major non-Anglo-American oil suppliers, the Soviet Union and the Dutch 
East Indies, could be immediately and effectively used by the Japanese to replace withheld 
oil supplies. He considered that Soviet oil production and consumption was not elastic 
enough to meet any large short term demand from Japan, while Royal Dutch Shell and 
Stanvac were in the happy position of controlling the Dutch East Indies oil fields.92 The only 
source of uncertainty was the independent American oil companies - especially in California 
- who clearly had the ability to meet Japanese demand. In Agnew's opinion these oil 
companies were extremely unlikely to support any measure to prevent excessive supplies 
from reaching Japan which did not have the strong backing of the US government.93
The Foreign Office, already disturbed by the implications of the Manchukuo oil
91. Clive (Tokyo) to the Foreign Office, 8 August 1934, FO371/18109,F5299/142/10; Clive (Tokyo) to the 
Foreign Office, 17 August 1934, F0371/18189,F5068/1659/23; Rising Sun Petroleum (Yokohama) to 
Royal Dutch Shell, 17 August 1934, FO371/18189,F50l4/1659/23. Anderson makes the extraneous 
point that this proposal was specifically designed to deal with the Manchukuo oil monopoly, and was 
later converted by the Foreign Office into a policy of dealing with both the Oil Monopoly Law and 
Petroleum Law. However, it appears that the Manchukuo oil monopoly was only directly referred to 
since neither the gasoline sales quota had been published nor had the oil companies yet concluded that 
their talks with the Japanese government were futile, Anderson I. H., pp. 58-59.
92. See table 4.9.
93. Meeting between Coleman (Petroleum Department) and Agnew, 20 August 1934,
F0371/18189,F5104/1659/23; Memorandum by Orde, 20 August 1934, FO371/18189,F5104/1659/23. 
Royal Dutch Shell's concern that without American government backing an oil embargo threat with 
Stanvac could be easily breached by an independent American oil company, received ample 
confirmation in September 1934. A report reached Royal Dutch Shell's headquarters in London, that a 
representative of Ladgerwood, a Los Angeles based oil company, had approached the Texas Railroad 
Commission for permission to ship 30 million barrels of crude oil to Japan. The Royal Dutch Shell 
representative in New York believed that the Japanese government was behind this enquiry, Royal 
Dutch Shell (New York) to Royal Dutch Shell (London), 17 September 1934,
F 0317/18189,F5661/1659/23. Clive was worried by rumours that there were plans to ship 100,000 
tons of Iraqi crude oil to Japan, Clive (Tokyo) to the Foreign Office, 17 October 1934, 
F0371/18189,F6128/1659/23. However, the Petroleum Department discounted this possibility since 
the only Iraqi oil fields capable of supplying this amount of crude oil were controlled by major British oil 
interests, minute by Harcourt-Smith, 17 October 1934, F0371/18189,F6128/1659/23.
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monopoly on British interests in China, welcomed the strategy of Royal Dutch Shell and 
Stanvac to threaten an oil embargo. The Foreign Office regarded the threat as the only 
relatively risk-free means of defending British oil and commercial interests in East Asia. Sir 
John Pratt, head of the China Section, minuted his approval of the oil companies proposal, 
"the risks involved... are not so great or so certain as to cause us to reject a proposal which 
seems to provide us with our only weapon for defending our interests in a vast and rapidly 
expanding market".94 The Foreign Office immediately sounded out the view of the 
American government.95 The State Department promptly replied, without giving specific 
details, that it was willing to cooperate with the British government.96 The Foreign Office 
approach was matched by a direct approach to the State Department by Royal Dutch Shell 
and Stanvac. On 22 August 1934, Sir Henry Deterding, the Chairman of Royal Dutch Shell, 
and Walter Teagle, the President of Standard Oil, joined forces to enlist American support 
for sterner measures against Japan. However, the State Department, though sympathetic to 
the plight of the oil companies, proved unwillingto endorse a firm policy line towards Japan. 
In discussions with William Phillips, the Under Secretary of State, Dr. Stanley Hombeck, the 
Far Eastern Affairs Division Chief, and Harold Ickes, the Secretary of the Interior, made the 
point that ultimately America would be responsible for any oil embargo against Japan, and 
gave no indication of any willingness to initiate such a measure.97 In London Embassy 
officials further outlined the limits of American support for the oil companies. They 
informed their Foreign Office counterparts that they regarded the oil issue as a purely 
commercial question; the size of the American interest involved did not merit the use of 
force - not requested by the British - and if the companies suspended supplies to Japan, it was 
purely a commercial decision.98 The suggestion by American officials that the issue did not 
merit the use of force suggests that they misunderstood the Foreign Office and oil companies' 
request or that they looked at the worst case scenario resulting from the oil embargo threat - a 
Japanese military response - and decided that the oil embargo threat was too great a risk. 
Further indication that the American government would not endorse the oil embargo was 
provided when E. H. Millard, the Second Secretary of the American Embassy in London,
94. Minute by Pratt, 19 August 1934, FO37l/18109,F5068/l 42/10; Anderson I. H., pp. 59-60.
95. Minute by Orde, 21 August 1934, FO371/18189,F5104/1659/23.
96. Minute by Orde, 1 September 1934, F0371/18189,FS335/1659/23.
97. Starling (Petroleum Department) to the Foreign Office, 8 September 1934,
F0371/18189,F5436/1659/23; Anderson I. H., pp. 81-83.
98. Starling (Petroleum Department) to Orde, 14 September 1934, F0371/18189,F5436/1659/23; Minute by 
Pratt on conversation with Dooman, 25 October 1934, F0371/18190,F6312/1659/23.
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told Alec Randall, the First Secretary of the Far Eastern Department, that the American 
government could not be expected to restrict the supply of oil to Japan from the independent 
oil companies." This final point meant that even if the American government was prepared 
to risk the oil embargo threat against Japan, the policy would fail because it was unwilling to 
force the independent oil companies into supporting the embargo. Thus in mid-October 
1934 there appeared little prospect of a combined Anglo-American front against Japan in 
support of their respective oil companies, as Randall stated, "It has been decided that any 
measure to debar crude-oil supplies to Japan shall not, at present at least, be instigated or 
taken by the Governments concerned".100
99. Minute by Randall, 18 September 1934, F0371/18189,F5536/1659/23.
100. Minute by Randall, 17 October 1934, F0371/18189,F6128/1659/23.
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The limits of Anglo-American cooperation.
In spite of the Anglo-American decision in October 1934 not to authorise the oil embargo 
threat, the continued thrust of Japanese and Manchukuoanoil policy sustained support in the 
oil companies and Foreign Office for a forceful response in defence of British oil interests 
and the Open Door. In Japan both the Embassy and Rising Sun Petroleum, supported by the 
American Embassy and Stanvac, demanded a much firmer line, in response to both the 
demands for the fulfilment of the Petroleum Law, and the nationalisation of the 
Manchukuoan oil industry. The Foreign Office shared these alarms, encouraged the oil 
companies to resist the Japanese and sought to establish the diplomatic groundwork for the 
oil embargo threat.
The main pressure for a tougher approach to Japan came from representatives of the 
two oil companies in Japan. As they pointed out in mid-October, after another round of 
fruitless talks with Japanese officials, there was an urgent need for a stronger line since both 
firms faced imminent demands for compliance with the Petroleum and the much anticipated 
promulgation of the Manchukuo Oil Monopoly Law.101 On 19 October 1934 Asiatic 
Petroleum, Stanvac, and Texas Oil were told by the Manchukuoan authorities that a 
Monopoly Law would be promulgated on 15 November 1934, and its provisions would 
include the abolition of all petroleum sales organisations in Manchukuo, the compulsory 
purchase of all oil equipment, and a kerosene sales quota. Butler warned that following this 
announcement the Manchukuo authorities would undertake, "the progressive extinction of 
the foreign companies’ trade in refined petroleum products in this country”.102 Alarmed by 
these developments Asiatic Petroleum in Shanghai warned Royal Dutch Shell that only an 
immediate protest could have some effect in halting the progress of the oil monopoly, since 
the ’’Monopoly Law not yet promulgated our opinion is that this is last effort to bluff and if no 
opposition received by 15th November will proceed on these lines therefore we consider
101, Rising Sun Petroleum (Yokohama) to Royal Dutch Shell (London), 18 and 24 October 1934, 
FO371/18190,F6353/l659/23; Clive (Tokyo) to the Foreign Office, 24 October 1934, 
FO371/18190,F6312/l 659/23. Anderson makes the point that there was a divergence between Royal 
Dutch Shell and the Foreign Office over the use of the oil embargo threat. Royal Dutch Shell saw it 
primarily as intended to defend its interests in Japan, while the Foreign Office saw it as intended to 
defend the principle of the Open Door from the Manchukuo oil monopoly. However, while Anderson is 
correct to point out this difference of emphasis, it was not true that Royal Dutch Shell had no interest in 
protecting its Manchukuoan operations through the oil embargo threat, Anderson I. H., pp. 78-79.
102. Butler (Mukden) to the Foreign Office, 23 October 1934, FO371/18190,F6664/1659/23.
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strong protest at the earliest possible date".103
Developments in Manchukuo paralleled developments in Japan, as Rising Sun 
Petroleum and Stanvac came under strong pressure from the Japanese authorities to submit 
future operational plans that conformed with the provisions of the Petroleum Law.104 The 
firms stalled and British diplomats feared that this noncooperation would be used at the 
forthcoming meeting of the Petroleum Law’s Petroleum Committee to justify an 
unfavourable report on Rising Sun Petroleum and a further reduction of its sales quota.105 
The oil companies became so concerned by their inability to reach a compromise agreement 
with the Japanese government that they started to consider withdrawal from the Japanese 
market as their only viable option.106 Rising Sun Petroleum's representatives in Japan urged 
head office in London to obtain the necessary cooperation of the British, American, and 
Dutch governments, to back suitable defensive measures by both oil companies.107 The case 
for American government support was all the more urgent as the refusal of Asiatic 
Petroleum, Stanvac, and Texas Oil, to supply crude oil to the Manchukuo Petroleum 
Company had been immediately nullified by the decision of Standard Oil of California and 
Union Oil to tender for the same supply contract.108
The oil companies’ demand that only a strong line against the Japanese would force a 
compromise was endorsed by Clive and Grew, who urged their respective foreign ministries 
immediately to adopt a tougher stance against Japan. In response to a cautious Foreign 
Office telegram, reflecting the initial failure of Anglo-American cooperation and Admiralty
103. Asiatic Petroleum (Shanghai) to Royal Dutch Shell (London), 22 October 1934, 
FO371/18190,F6354/1659/23; Starling (Petroleum Department) to Randall, 26 October 1934,
F0371/18190,F6354/1659/23.
104. The plans had to be submitted by 30 September 1934, and following Rising Sun Petroleum and 
Stanvac's non compliance the Japanese Ministry o f Commerce and Industry three times demanded that 
the oil companies submit their future operational plans, Clive (Tokyo) to the Foreign Office, 10 
October, 2 and 7 November 1934, FO371/18190,F6552,F6543,F6661/1659/23; Anderson I. H., p. 84.
105. Clive (Tokyo) to the Foreign Office, 24 October 1934, FO371/18190,F6312/1659/23; Foreign Office 
Memorandum, 30 October 1934, FO371/18190,F6426/1659/23.
106. However, Angew stated that such considerations were premature at this stage, Starling (Petroleum 
Department) to Randall, 30 October 1934, F0371/18190,F6439/1659/23.
107. Rising Sun Petroleum (Yokohama) to Royal Dutch Shell (London), 9 November 1934, 
FO371/18190T6691/1659/23.
108. Butler (Mukden) to Cadogan (Peking), 6 October 1934, F0371/18110,F6270/142/10; Starling 
(Petroleum Department) to Randall, 3 December 1934, FO371/18191,F7207/1659/23; Anderson I. H.,
p. 60.
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fears that the oil embargo threat would destabilise Anglo-Japanese relations, Clive firmly 
responded that the time had arrived for stiffer measures. ’’Both United States Embassy and 
ourselves appreciate objections mentioned in your telegram but we feel that, for fear of 
embittering relations [with Japan], to abstain from using in moderation our advantages is to 
make an unprofitable sacrifice in the cause of friendship”. However, there were clear limits 
to what Clive considered a suitable response. He was explicit that there should be no oil 
embargo against Japan, for fear of Japanese reactions. But he considered it perfectly 
justifiable to impose Anglo-American conditions of petroleum sale upon Japan in support of 
the oil companies.109 Thus both the British and American diplomats as well as 
representatives of the western oil interests in Japan agreed that in order to defend the oil 
companies from state regulation in Japan and nationalisation in Manchukuo the time was 
ripe for a stiffer line against Japan.
The concern expressed locally over the plight of British oil interests in Japan and 
Manchukuo found a sympathetic audience in London. The Foreign Office was particularly 
angered by the formal introduction of the oil monopoly in Manchukuo on account of its 
violation of the Open Door.110 The Japanese denied responsibility for the actions of the 
Manchukuo government: the Manchukuo Petroleum Company had no monopolistic 
privileges that violated the ’Open Door’ principle, and stated that future protests should be 
directed to the Manchukuoan government.111 This brought an angry response from the 
Foreign Office. Charles Orde, the head of the Far Eastern Department, minuted that, "This is 
a gross evasion, and I submit that a pretty sharp rejoinder is necessary. 12 The Foreign Office 
was particularly angered by the ’evasive’ replies of the Japanese government for authority 
over Manchukuo, since the British non-recognition of Manchukuo severely curtailed British 
efforts to exert formal diplomatic pressure on Manchukuo and make diplomatic
109. Clive (Tokyo) to the Foreign Office, 20 October and 9 November 1934,
F0371/18190,F6312,F7160/1659/23; Anderson I. H., pp. 87-88.
110. Clive (Tokyo) to the Foreign Office, 8 August 1934, FO371/18109,F5299/142/10; Starling (Petroleum 
Department) to Randall, 26 October 1934, FO371/18190/F6354/1659/23; The British Consul in 
Shanghai to the Foreign Office, 22 October 1934, FO371/18190,F6354/l659/23; Anderson I. H., p. 58.
111. Clive (Tokyo) to the Foreign Office, translation of the Japanese government's 5 November Aide 
Memoire, F0371/18190,F6643/1659/23; Butler (Mukden) to the Foreign Office, 22 and 24 October 
1934, F0371/18190,F6664,F6665/1659/23.
112. Minute by Orde, 9 November 1934, FO371/18190,F6643/l659/23; Butler (Mukden) to the Foreign 
Office, 2 November 1934, FO371/18190,F6894/l659/23. American officials were also incensed by 
Japanese denials of responsibility for the actions of the Manchukuoan government, Anderson I. H., pp. 
63-64.
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representations on behalf of Asiatic Petroleum.
Following the demands for firmness from the oil companies as well as Clive and 
Grew,553 and despite the previous failure to elicit firm commitments from the State 
Department, the Foreign Office in late October 1934 prepared the ground work for a strong 
line against Japan. The Foreign Office argued that a combination of commercial and 
national interest made it essential for Britain to respond to Japanese actions: Britain could 
not neglect the political and commercial importance of the British oil companies in Japan 
and Manchukuo; while the enforcement of the Manchukuo Oil Monopoly Law would be a 
considerable blow to British prestige in China.154 Pratt was particularly emphatic of the dire 
consequences for British interests in China, if Britain refused to make a stand on the 
Monopoly Law. "In both Japanese and Chinese eyes I fear that we shall be exposed as 
helpless by our lack of resolution. ”555 As the Foreign Office appreciated, enforcement of the 
Manchukuoan oil monopoly would set an example for other countries to imitate.116
However, while the Foreign Office developed plans for the oil embargo threat it 
appreciated that in order to minimise Japanese reactions it could only be employed within 
strictly defined boundaries.557 The oil companies would take the lead in organising 
resistance to Japan, and if satisfied with theprganisation of the oil embargo, it would be their 
choice to call the Japanese bluffby the usejthe oil embargo threat, and if necessary initiate an 
oil embargo.5 58 Thus the aim of the Foreign Office policy was merely to give the oil 
companies the option of threatening or using an oil embargo against Japan; even if the oil 
embargo threat proved a practicable policy there was no guarantee that the oil companies 
would utilise this measure. On 4 December 1934 Rising Sun Petroleum warned head office
113. Minute by Harcourt-Smith, 26 October 1934, F0371/18190,F6312/1659/23.
114. Minute by Randall, 26 October 1934, F0371/18190,F6312/1659/23.
115. Foreign Office Memorandum, The Japanese Petroleum Law and the threatened oil Monopoly in 
Manchuria, 30 October 1934, FO371/18190,F6426/1659/23; Minute by Pratt, 30 October 1934, 
FO371/18190,F6426/1659/23; Minute by Harcourt-Smith, 26 October 1934, 
FO371/18190,F6312/1659/23; Anderson I. H„ p. 88.
116. Minute by Randall, 26 October 1934, F0371/18190,F6312/1659/23.
117. Anderson states that the Foreign Office turned the oil embargo threat into a demand for a full oil 
embargo against Japan. However it is clear that while the Foreign Office was more strident in their 
demands for firmer action against Japan and was prepared to see the oil companies employ the oil 
embargo against Japan, they never demanded an immediate oil embargo against Japan, Anderson 1. H. 
chapter 3, especially, pp. 80, 83, 86.
118. Minute by Randall, 26 October 1934, FO371/18190,F6312/1659/23.
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that the oil embargo threat should not be used immediately, since it would give the Japanese 
government an excuse to enforce even more unfavourable gasoline sales quotas against 
Rising Sun Petroleum and Stanvac.119 Consequently, within this strategy the British 
government would play no part in the organising, initiation, and use of the oil embargo threat 
against Japan,120 and "The action of His Majesty’s Government would be limited to informing 
the British oil companies concerned and the United States Governments that they approved 
the policy."121 Nevertheless, the Foreign Office was convinced that the oil embargo threat 
was the only practical policy to force the Japanese and Manchukuoan authorities to back 
down. Indeed the Foreign Office knew that this strategy had already proven successful in a 
similar situation in Germany. Orde noted,
The oil companies have recently used the threat of restricting supplies to Germany of 
their own accord and with the assent of His Majesty's Government to refrain from the 
very thing that is being attempted by the Japanese viz. the creation of large stores at 
the companies’ expense.122
Finally, the Foreign Office concluded that action against Japan must be linked to action in 
Manchukuo, since supply restrictions placed solely upon Manchukuo could easily be 
circumvented by oil supplies from Japan. Thus a settlement of the Petroleum Law could not 
be used as a means of avoiding a settlement of the Oil Monopoly Law.523 Indeed, Orde feared 
that a timely concession by the Japanese over the Petroleum Law would remove the 
justification for threatening an oil embargo against Japan, which would break the link 
between the Japanese and Manchukuoan oil embargoes, and thus undermine the oil 
companies' leverage on the Manchukuoan authorities.124 This final slant from Orde 
demonstrated that the Foreign Office was less concerned over the relative scale of 
commercial stake in Japan and Manchukuo, and more intent on using the oil companies' 
threat of oil sanctions as the means of opposing the Oil Monopoly Law’s breach of the Open 
Door. However, although the Foreign Office endorsed the need for a firm line against Japan, 
the policy of the oil companies’ threat to withhold oil supplies remained of limited
119. Clive (Tokyo) to the Foreign Office, 4 December 1934, FO371/18191,F7208/1659/23.
120. Minute by Randall, 26 October 1934, F0371/18190,F6312/1659/23.
121. Foreign Office Memorandum, 30 October 1934, F0371/18190,F6426/1659/23.
122. Memorandum by Orde, 9 November 1934, F0371/18190,F6727/1659/23.
123. Memorandum by Orde, Oil in Japan and Manchuria’, 9 November 1934, FO371/18190,F6727/1659/23.
124. Minute by Orde, 15 November 1934, F0371/18190,F6771/1659/23.
239
Royal Dutch Shell and the Petroleum and Oil Monopoly Laws
effectiveness.
While the Foreign Office was convinced ofthe need for an immediate and strong line 
against Japan there was strong opposition in the British government to the use of the oil 
embargo threat against Japan. It was clear that an oil embargo would be viewed as a serious 
matter in Japan* In July 1934, amid rumours of a possible oil embargo by Rising Sun 
Petroleum and Stanvac, Kurusu Saburo warned Erie Dickover, the First Secretary of the 
American Embassy in Japan, that "the question of an embargo ... was more serious than 
appeared at first glance, because it focused upon the question of national defence".125 In 
particular the Admiralty had serious reservations over an oil embargo against Japan, and 
feared that it could lead to Japanese seizure of the Dutch East Indies oil fields.126 The Foreign 
Office recognised that strong objections from the Admiralty could be a fundamental barrier 
to the adoption of the oil embargo threat.127 The fears of the Admiralty were compounded by 
concern in the Board of Trade that an oil embargo could lead to some form of Japanese 
economic retaliation.128 Nevertheless, Orde was convinced that with American and Dutch 
government backing the Admiralty’s objections could be overcome, especially since Clive 
had stated that he believed the Japanese would not undertake any military action in response 
to a threatened embargo.129 Thus in order to overcome internal opposition the Foreign Office 
sought a cabinet endorsement of its policy of allowing the oil companies to use the oil 
embargo threat against Japan.130 On 21 November 1934 Sir John Simon, the Foreign 
Secretary, gained partial assent from the cabinet for the Foreign Office's policy. However, 
cabinet approval was limited to an examination of the feasibility of the embargo threat; 
permission for the immediate use of the threat was withheld. Furthermore, the cabinet made 
the explicit point that the embargo threat was to be a purely commercial venture, and there 
could be no government financial compensation for Royal Dutch Shell for any losses
125. Anderson I. H., p. 57.
126. Foreign Office Memorandum, 26 October 1934, FO371/18190,F6312/1659/23, Foreign Office 
Memorandum, 'The Japanese Petroleum Law and the Threatened oil Monopoly in Manchuria', 30 
October 1934, FO371/18190,F6426/1659/23; Anderson I. H., pp. 88-89. Craigie, who was the head of 
the American Department and Foreign Office negotiator at the London Naval Conference, also 
commented that it would be a mistake to contemplate an oil embargo against Japan during the 
Conference, Minute by Craigie, 20 November 1934, F0371/18191,F7024/1659/23.
127. Minute by Randall, 26 October 1934, FO371/18190,F6312/l 659/23.
128. Foreign Office Memorandum, The Japanese Petroleum Law and the Threatened Oil Monopoly in 
Manchuria', 30 October 1934, FO371/18190,F6426/1659/23.
129. Memorandum by Orde, ’Oil in Japan and Manchuria', 9 November 1934, F0371/18190,F6727/1659/23.
130. Minute by Orde, 'Oil in Japan and Manchuria', 9 November 1934’, FO371/18190,F6727/1659/23.
240
Royal Dutch Shell and the Petroleum and Oil Monopoly Laws
sustained as a result of withholding supplies to Japan and Manchukuo.131
With cabinet approval the Foreign Office determined upon an immediate approach 
to the American government, to see if it would support the oil embargo threat against Japan. 
Sir Victor Wellesley, the Under Secretary to the Foreign Office, Pratt and Orde, concluded 
that with American approval the oil embargo threat would be ready for immediate 
implementation,
It is suggested therefore that our proper course at the present juncture is to [approach] 
the Americans and put [the] above considerations before them. The key to the 
position lies with them. If they are satisfied that it is possible to control the export of 
crude oil from the United States then let the British American and Dutch oil interests 
immediately concert measures for refusing to supply crude oil to Japan and 
Manchukuo.132
Although the minute suggested that the oil companies should initiate an immediate embargo 
it actually meant that the oil companies would initially simply threaten the Japanese with an 
oil embargo. The phrase ’immediately concert measures for refusing to supply crude oil' 
referred to the need for the oil companies to start preparations for an oil embargo to provide 
the necessary back up for a convincing oil embargo threat against Japan. At an 
interdepartmental meeting Foreign Office officials were explicit that the approach to the 
American government was only to determine if the oil embargo threat was a practicable 
policy.133
Despite the similarity of British and American attitudes to the oil issue, contacts with 
the State Department in September and October of 1934 had revealed the ambiguity of 
official American opinion.134 While initial objections from the State Department in 
September and October 1934 appeared to preclude the oil embargo during this same period 
there had been some indications that the American government did not totally reject firm 
action against Japan. State Department and Embassy staff in London showed a clear
131. Cabinet Conclusions, 21 November 1934, CAB 23 41(34)4.
132. Joint minute by Wellesley, Pratt, and Orde, 23 November 1934, F0371/18191,F7024/1659/23.
133. Minute of interdepartmental meeting between Starling (Petroleum Department), Vernon (Colonial 
Office), Lee (Board of Trade), Pratt, Orde, Randall, and Allen. 23 November 1934,
F0371/18191.F7044/1659/23.
134. Anderson is wrong to suggest that the Foreign Office underestimated American ambivalence to the use 
of the oil embargo threat against Japan, Anderson I. H., p. 89.
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concern over the plight of Stanvac, they also indicated that the American government could 
order the independent oil companies to participate in any scheme to restrict oil supplies to 
Japan. In one particularly boastful statement on 25 October 1934, Eugene Dooman, the 
number two in the State Department’s Far Eastern Division who was in London for the 
London Naval talks, told Pratt that the prestige of the American government was so high with 
the oil industry that it only had to ’give the word’, and the independent oil companies would 
toe the line. However, Dooman also insisted that the American government would 
undertake no action until it was certain of the British and Dutch governments' commitment 
to the oil embargo threat.135 Thus prior to the November decision to press ahead with the oil 
embargo threat Foreign Office officials had received encouragement that the American 
government could enforce an oil embargo against Japan.
The first meeting between the Foreign Office and State Department officials 
indicated that, as the Foreign Office hoped, the American government could control the 
independent oil companies and would endorse the oil embargo threat. On 27 November 
1934 Orde and Randall presented the Foreign Office proposal to Millard and Dooman, who 
passed on the request to the State Department. Orde made clear to the Americans that the oil 
embargo threat would be used as a last resort by the oil companies. Moreover, it would be 
subject to American government approval, and an American guarantee that they could 
control oil supplies to Japan. However, in talk with the two American officials Orde and 
Randall received encouragement that the American government would support the oil 
embargo threat. Dooman welcomed this approach. He stated that no legislation was 
required to control oil exports from America, and that any internal opposition to such control 
could be overcome.136 These official pronouncements were soon buttressed by a remark 
from Dooman to Pratt at a luncheon party of the Astors. According to Pratt, Dooman had 
boasted that oil could be easily withheld from Japan without legislation, since the Petroleum 
Control Board could make arrangements to control the supply of American crude oil.137 Thus 
with such encouragement from American officials in London, the Foreign Office believed
135. Minute by Pratt, on conversation with Dooman, 25 October 1934, FO371/18190,F6312/1659/23. 
Hombeck had also told Godber, a director of Asiatic Petroleum, that the American government would 
only undertake any action when they were sure that the British government would undertake such 
action, Starling (Petroleum Department) to Orde, 11 and 14 September 1934, 
F0371/18189,F5468,F5536/1659/23.
136. Minute of meeting between Millard, Dooman, Orde, and Randall, 27 November 1934,
F0371/18191,F7079/1659/23; Anderson I. H., pp. 89-90.
137. Pratt to Orde, 5 December 1934, FO371/18191,F7079/1659/23.
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that there was every chance the American government would agree to the control of oil 
exports to Japan. Randall was particularly impressed by Dooman’s remark to Pratt, and 
minuted that "This should make it easier for the State Dept, to come to a decision in favour of 
restriction".138
After the favourable soundings of American officials in London the response of the 
State Department that it would not endorse the restriction of oil exports to Japan came as a 
deep disappointment to the Foreign Office. On 7 December 1934 Millard and Dooman 
returned to the Foreign Office with this bad news from the State Department. On the critical 
question of the control of oil supplies, the two officials euphemistically reported the inability 
of the American government to effect a sufficiently uniform action of controlling the 
American oil companies. In plainer words the American government could not control oil 
supplies form America to Japan, in lieu of those withheld by Royal Dutch Shell, Stanvac, and 
Texas Oil. Therefore the American government would not participate in the oil embargo 
threat against Japan. In a further justification the Americans quoted the British axiom’, 
better to take no action than an ineffective action. As a final point they held out the prospect 
of reconsidering the situation if the British government pressed on ahead with the oil 
embargo.139 However, in view of the American inability to control oil supplies to Japan, both 
the Foreign Office and State Department officials recognised, at the same meeting, the 
futility of pursuing the oil embargo threat, and concluded that the limited control of oil 
supplies by Royal Dutch Shell and Stanvac precluded the threat of withholding supplies 
from Japan. All participants at the meeting agreed that British and American government 
support of the oil companies would be limited to diplomatic support of the oil companies in 
their talks with the Japanese government.140 However, it is noticeable that the State 
Department refused to endorse the oil embargo threat, not because it viewed the risks of the 
policy as too great, but because the American government believed it could not force the 
independent oil companies to participate in an oil embargo against Japan.
Thus the rejection of the oil embargo by the American government removed from 
Royal Dutch Shell and Stanvac the option of using the one lever they had over the Japanese
138. Minute by Randall, 5 December 1934, FO371/18191,F7079/1659/23.
139. Record of meeting between Millard, Dooman, Orde, and Randall, 7 December 1934, 
FO371/18191,F7300/l659/23; Anderson I. H., p. 90.
140. Record of meeting between Millard, Dooman, Orde, and Randall, 7 December 1934,
F0371/18191 ,F7300/1659/23.
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government that was external to the oil companies. This was all the more critical with the 
approach of a new round of talks between the oil companies and the Japanese government. 
However, when these talks did begin on 9 January 1935, neither Royal Dutch Shell nor 
Stanvac had the luxury of confronting Japanese 'intransigence' with the threat of an oil 
embargo. The rejection of the oil embargo threat by the State Department caused great 
bitterness in the Foreign Office. On 11 December Orde wrote a spiteful minute castigating 
the behaviour of the Americans, in which Dooman was singled out for particular criticism. 
Orde considered that "The manoeuvres of the United States Government in this business 
make a rather unpleasant impression".141 Nevertheless, the failed attempt to orchestrate the 
oil embargo threat did not place any strain upon Anglo-American diplomatic relations, nor 
did it mark the end of Anglo-American diplomatic cooperation in support of the oil 
companies. With the directors of Royal Dutch Shell and Stanvac already in Shanghai ready 
to proceed to Tokyo for talks with the Japanese government,142 both the British and American 
governments again resumed diplomatic protests in support of the oil companies.143 Finally, it 
is worth restating that although the oil embargo threat was not approved by the American and 
British governments, this was not because either government feared the effect of the above 
policy upon Japan's foreign policy. Both governments viewed the oil embargo threat as a 
legitimate part of their respective oil companies’ defence of their interests from Japanese and 
Manchukuoan encroachment. Thus the oil embargo threat was abandoned not out of fear of 
the Japanese response to this measure, but because the American government was unable to 
ensure the participation of the independent oil companies. Consequently, without the latter's 
participation both the American and British governments realised that the oil embargo threat 
would be worthless.
141. Minute by Orde, 11 December 1934, F0371/18191,F7518/1659/23.
142. Godber of Royal Dutch Shell, Walden, Chairman of the Board of Stanvac, and Parker, President of 
Stanvac, were waiting in Shanghai, ready to travel to Tokyo for talks with the Japanese government, 
Starling (Petroleum Department) to Randall, 3 December 1934, FO371/18191,F7270/l659/23; 
Anderson I. H., p. 85.
143. Clive (Tokyo) to the Foreign Office, 14 December 1934, FO371/18191,F7400/1659/23; Rising Sun 
Petroleum (Yokohama) to Royal Dutch Shell (London), 14 December 1934,
F0371/18191JF7400/1659/23.
244
Royal Dutch Shell and the Petroleum and Oil Monopoly Laws
Withdrawal from Manchukuo and survival in Japan.
In spite of the failure of the Foreign Office to orchestrate for a potential oil embargo against 
Japan, the question of Royal Dutch Shell and Stanvac's participation in the Japanese and 
Manchukuoan oil markets remained unresolved. Both companies continued negotiations 
with the Japanese and Manchukuoan authorities in an attempt to obtain some safeguards for 
their future operations. Although the oil companies knew they could not threaten the 
Japanese and Manchukuoan authorities with an embargo, they still had some leverage over 
the respective governments. Neither the Japanese nor Manchukuoan authorities could 
easily contemplate the disruption caused to short run oil supplies after a withdrawal by Royal 
Dutch Shell and Stanvac from either oil market. However, if the Japanese and 
Manchukuoan authorities pressed ahead with their respective petroleum policies, Royal 
Dutch Shell and Stanvac’s obstructiveness would diminish proportionally as both countries 
located alternative sources of supply. In practice this meant that as domestic refining 
capacity increased in Japan and Manchukuo, Royal Dutch Shell and Stanvac could expect 
their share of the refined petroleum products market to shrink as this new capacity came on 
stream.
In the case of the Manchukuo oil monopoly, following the failure to sanction the oil 
embargo threat, even the short run position of the three foreign oil companies in the 
Manchukuoan oil market appeared poor. The Manchukuoan authorities were ideologically 
committed to establishing the oil monopoly144 - promulgated on 14 November 1934145 - while 
the expected extension of the Manchukuo Petroleum Company's oil refinery at Dairen 
presaged the demise of foreign sales of refined petroleum products.146 Furthermore, the oil 
companies now had only a limited interest in defending their position in the smaller 
Manchukuoan market. Agnew told the British government that the oil companies would, 
"not sacrifice the Japanese market merely for the sake of pressure on Manchukuo”.147 Thus
144. Garstin (Harbin) to the Foreign Office, 9 November 1934, FO371/18190,F6957/1659/23. The 
Manchukuoan government was also colluding with Japanese oil companies through the misuse of tariff 
administration to squeeze non-Japanese oil companies out of the Manchukuoan kerosene market, Clive 
(Tokyo) to the Foreign Office, 21 November 1934, FO371/18190,F6921/l659/23; Butler (Mukden) to 
the Foreign Office, 10 and 17 November 1934, F0371/FI 8191/F6997,F7147/1659/23.
145. Butler (Mukden) to the Foreign Office, 14 November 1934, F0371/18191,F7171/1659/23.
146. Butler (Mukden) to the Foreign Office, 10 November 1934, F0371/18191,F6997/1659/23.
147. Minute by Orde of meeting between, Agnew, Darch, Starling (Petroleum Department) and Orde, 4 
April 1935, F0371/F19351/F94/2227/23; Anderson I. H„ p. 64.
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the oil companies were prepared to abandon the Manchukuoan market and the defence of the 
Open Door if they could reach a suitable compromise over the Petroleum Law. However, 
talks in February 1935 revealed there was a possibility of Asiatic Petroleum, Stanvac, and 
Texas Oil continuing to distribute their own and the Manchukuo Petroleum Company's 
products.148 Current capacity of refining plant in Manchukuo equalled only 50% of 
consumption, which together with operational problems at the Dairen refinery,149 suggested 
leeway for the continued sale of the three foreign oil companies' products.150 Indeed the 
Foreign Office was sufficiently impressed with the February 1935 proposal that they were 
prepared to ignore their previous objection to the Oil Monopoly Law’s violation of the Open 
Door. Orde minuted, "If things work out on these lines we can be reasonably satisfied. We 
shall probably have to condone the name of monopoly in Manchuria but that will be a minor 
evil".151
Once the Manchukuoan authorities started to tighten the terms for the foreign oil 
companies' operations, optimism for a commercial compromise soon evaporated. Towards 
the end of February 1935 the Manchukuo authorities guaranteed only 14% of 1934 gasoline 
consumption to the three foreign oil companies, while contracts with the Manchukuo 
Petroleum Company still remained uncertain152 Unable to secure a firm guarantee of their 
continued operation within Manchukuo, both Asiatic Petroleum and Stanvac abandoned any 
desire tacitly to work with the Manchukuo oil monopoly. They reaffirmed the principle of 
not supplying oil monopolies, and resumed their outright opposition to the oil monopoly.153 
Talks between the foreign oil companies and the Manchukuo authorities were now 
suspended, never to be resumed, as both sides realised that no compromise could be 
achieved.154 The Manchukuo authorities recognised this final refusal and told the foreign oil 
companies that from 1 April 1935 it would seek alternative sources of petroleum supplies.155
148. Agnew (London) to Godber (Tokyo), 12 February 1935, FO371/19350,F964/94/23.
149. Butler (Mukden) to the Foreign Office, 2 and 7 February 1935, FO371/19350,F1230,F1231/94/23.
150. Godber (Tokyo) to Agnew (London), 9 February 1935, FO371/19350,F902/94/23.
151. Minute by Orde, 12 February 1935, FO371/19350,F902/94/23.
152. Godber (Japan) to Agnew (London), 21 February 1935, F0371/19350,F1241/94/23; Clive (Tokyo) to 
the Foreign Office, 4 March 1935, FO371/19350,F2125/94/23.
153. Meeting between Kurusu and Sansom, 1 March 1935, FO371/19350,F2125/94/23; Clive (Tokyo) to 
the Foreign Office, 2 March 1935, FO371/19350J1441/94/23.
154. Agnew (London) to Godber (Japan), 27 February 1935, F0371/19350,F1459/94/23; Godber (Japan) to 
Agnew (London), 1 March 1935, F0371/19350,F1504/94/23.
155. Clive (Tokyo) to the Foreign Office, 2 March 1935, FO371/19350,F1441/94/23.
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On 10 April 1935 the Manchukuo authorities began the enforcement of the oil monopoly, 
and in response the three foreign oil companies ceased all operations in Manchukuo.156 Thus 
the oil companies failed to prevent the inauguration of the Oil Monopoly Law and its 
violation of the Open Door. However, as Orde noted, there was little anyone could do to 
prevent the Manchukuo authorities from the pursuit of the oil monopoly.157 Indeed even the 
Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs proved unable to halt the development of the 
Manchukuo oil monopoly. Disturbed by the violation of the Open Door, breach of 
international treaties, and the strain it placed upon Japanese relations with Britain and 
America the Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs tried unsuccessfully to modify the Oil 
Monopoly Law.158 The Foreign Office did not doubt that the Japanese Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs was sincere in its efforts but recognised that it was "powerless",159 in the face of the 
Kwantung army’s insistence on the Manchukuo oil monopoly.160 Nevertheless, the failure to 
reach a compromise did not end the friction between the oil companies and the 
Manchukuoan authorities, as all the foreign oil companies now sought compensation from 
the Manchukuoan authorities for being forced out ofManchukuo, not a particularly easy task 
since the British government did not recognise Manchukuo.161 The oil companies shared 
these misgivings and realised that it would be difficult to extract an appropriate amount of 
compensation from either the Manchukuoan or Japanese authorities. However, Asiatic 
Petroleum, Stanvac, and Texas Oil agreed to present similar claims to the Manchukuoan 
authorities for the sale of their fixed assets and the loss of future earnings,162 and on 10 May 
1935 the three foreign oil companies submitted their respective claims to the Manchukuoan 
government.163
156. Butler (Mukden) to the Foreign Office, 9 and 30 April 1935, FO371/19350,F2711.F2790/94/23; 
Cadogan (Peking) to the Foreign Office, 3 May 1935, F0371/19352,F2893/94/23.
157. Minute by Orde, 4 April 1935, F0371/19351,F2297/94/23.
158. Clive (Tokyo) to the Foreign Office, 15 March and 12 April 1935, F0371/19351,F2323,F2434/94/23.
159. Minute by Allen, 10 April 1935, F0371/19351,F2323/94/23.
160. Butler (Mukden) to the Foreign Office, 2 March 1935, F0371/19351,F2323/94/23.
161. Minute by Orde on meeting between, Agnew, Darch, Starling (Petroleum Department), and Orde, 4 
April 1935, F0371/19351,F2227/94/23.
162. See table 4.8; Butler (Mukden) to the Foreign Office, 24 April and 11 May 1935, 
F037l/19352,F2978,F4336/94/23; Starling (Petroleum Department) to Orde, 25 April 1935, 
F0371/19351,F2732/94/23; Clive (Tokyo) to the Foreign Office, 26 April 1935,
F0371/19351 ,F2722/94/23; Anderson I. H., p. 65.
163. Butler (Mukden) to the Foreign Office, lOMay 1935, FO371/19352,F3004/94/23; Seetable4.8.
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The response of the Manchukuoan authorities to the foreign oil companies’ claims 
for compensation was slow and disappointing. In June 1934 Asiatic Petroleum and Stanvac 
re-submitted their compensation claims but received no immediate response.164 The 
Manchukuo authorities eventually replied in September 1935, stating that while they were 
prepared to discuss the sale of the oil companies’ fixed assets, they were not prepared to meet 
any compensation claims for loss of future earnings.165 Subsequently, the Manchukuo 
authorities hindered the oil companies' attempts to dispose of their remaining oil stocks to 
anyone other than the Manchukuo Petroleum Company.166 Frustrated in their compensation 
claims with the Japanese and Manchukuo authorities, the companies made a desperate 
attempt to liquidate their operations in Manchukuo in November 1935 by offering 
everything to the Manchukuo government for a fixed lump sum. However, as expected, the 
Manchukuo government refused this offer while they were prepared to pay for the fixed 
assets, they would not meet the oil companies claims for compensation.167 Furthermore, the 
Manchukuo authorities told Butler they were in no position to make large payments to the 
oil companies.168 Thus by the end of 1935 the foreign oil companies had been forced out of 
Manchukuo by the Oil Monopoly Law, and the whole problem of compensation for the oil 
companies remained unresolved.169
In contrast to the poor position of the foreign oil companies in Manchukuo, with 
regard to the Petroleum Law they still appeared to some leverage over the Japanese
164. Butler (Mukden) to the Foreign Office, 24 June 1935, F0371/19352,F4522/94/23.
165. Butler (Mukden) to the Foreign Office, 18 September 1935, F0371/19353,F6558/94/23.
166. Butler (Mukden) to the Foreign Office, 2, 7, 23 and 30 May, 1 June, 17 July, and 1 August 1935, 
F0371/19352„19153,F2894,F3398,F3563,F3745,F4340,F5404,F5919/94/23. These oil stocks had not 
been included as part of the foreign oil companies compensation claims, Butler (Mukden), 21 and 28 
March 1935, F0371/19351,F2282,F2481/94/23; Jamieson (Harbin), 12 April 1935, 
F0371/19351,F2824/94/23. See table 4.10 for the volume of remaining petroleum stocks in 
Manchukuo.
167. Butler (Mukden) to the Foreign Office, 5 December 1935, F0371/19353,F7958/94/23; Anderson I. H., 
pp. 67-68.
168. Butler (Mukden) to the Foreign Office, 5 December 1935, F0371/19353,F7958/94/23.
169. It appears that prior to the outbreak of the Pacific War the foreign oil companies received no 
compensation from the Manchukuoan or Japanese authorities. In May 1940 the Foreign Office 
recorded that Asiatic Petroleum’s claim for compensation from the Manchukuoan government was still 
outstanding, Starling (Petroleum Department) to the Foreign Office, 22 May 1940, 
F0371/24698,F3303/1073/10; Anderson L H., footnote 56, pp. 68-69. Anderson notes that in 1941 in 
an attempt to lift the American oil embargo against Japan the Japanese government offered Stanvac 
$1,500,000 to compensate them for the Manchukuo oil monopoly, Anderson I. H., p. 187.
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government. Although the Japanese government was committed to the substitution of 
imported refined petroleum products and increased stockholding liability, the time lag 
before the completion of either policy prevented the Japanese government from forcing the 
oil companies fully to comply with either policy.170 Even while the two oil companies were 
pursjing the oil embargo threat, they were aware that the Japanese government was prepared 
to meet some of their demands in order to prevent their withdrawal from the Japanese 
market.171 In November 1934 Yoshino, the Chief of the Commerce Bureau of the Japanese 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and Kurusu, suggested that since the cost of the six month 
stockholding could force Rising Sun Petroleum and Stanvac to withdraw from Japan, the 
more intransigent faction might be persuaded to accept a less rigid stockholding 
requirement, "conditional upon the foreign oil companies’ decision as to whether or not it 
would be economically feasible for them to continue in business in Japan".172 In December 
1934 the Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs stated that it would welcome the views of the 
foreign and Japanese oil companies on the modification of the Petroleum Law.173
The spirit of cooperation continued into the more formal talks of 1935 between 
Frederick Godber, a Director of Royal Dutch Shell, George Walden, the Chairman of the 
Board of Stanvac, and Philo Parker, a veteran of twenty years of the China market with 
Socony and Stanvac’s expert on Asian psychology, and Japanese officials from the 
Commerce Bureau of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.174 Even prior to the talks Rising Sun 
Petroleum and Stanvac received favourable sales quotas for the first half of 1935, which 
indicated the willingness of the Japanese government to accommodate the two foreign oil 
companies.175 In February 1935 Godber reported that the Japanese officials were prepared to
170. Memorandum of interview between Dickover (US Embassy) and Kurusu, 18 October 1934,
F0371/18191,F7160/1659/23.
171. Clive (Tokyo) to the Foreign Office, 21 November 1934, Rising Sun Petroleum (Yokohama) to Royal 
Dutch Shell (London), 23 November 1934, and minute by Orde, 23 November 1934, 
F0371/18191,F6932/1659/23.
172. Clive (Tokyo) to the Foreign Office, 23 November 1934, F0371/18191.F6958/1659/23; Anderson I.
H„ p. 85.
173. Rising Sim Petroleum (Yokohama) to Royal Dutch Shell (London), 14 December 1934,
F0371/18191 ,F7400/1659/23.
174. These talks were carried out on a purely commercial basis and there was no involvement o f either the 
British or American Embassy staff, Memorandum by Sansom, 16 April 1935,
F0371/19352^3345/94/23.
175. Starling (Petroleum Department) to Randall, 1 January 1935, F0371/19350,F95/94/23; Department of 
Overseas Trade to the Foreign Office, 31 January 1935, FO371/19350,F690/94/23; Anderson I. H., p.
92.
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give some significant guarantees for Rising Sun Petroleum and Stanvac’s operations in 
Japan. Godber believed that this climb down was due to the realisation that Japan could not 
quickly supplement any lost capacity that would result from Rising Sun Petroleum and 
Stanvac's refusing to cooperate with the Japanese authorities. "In general they now realise 
that [the] law failed to take into account relatively important facts which may make its 
smooth operation difficult".176 The foreign oil companies also received indirect support 
from the Japanese oil companies who likewise sought a reduction in the stockholding 
provision and greater freedom for price setting.177 Finally, on 13 April 1935, after a break in 
the negotiations,178 officials in the Commerce Bureau guaranteed that the Petroleum Law 
would be modified to meet the criticisms of the foreign oil companies, and ensure their 
future operations in the Japanese market. In a written memorandum, known as the Five 
Points Agreement’, the Japanese officials agreed that the foreign oil companies: would only 
be required to hold three months of stocks, which included current working stocks; would 
have a one third share of increased Japanese consumption of refined petroleum products, 
with an oral guarantee of a 50% share. The Japanese government agreed not to fix oil prices 
below the oil companies’ cost price.179 The Five Point Agreement’ was a virtual capitulation 
to the oil companies’ demands and was warmly received by oil company and embassy 
officials in Japan.180 Clive viewed the abandonment of the six month stockholding provision 
as a substantial defeat for the Japanese militarists.181
However, the Five Points Agreement’ did not mark the end of Rising Sun Petroleum’s 
fight to remain in Japan and still evade the original provisions of the Petroleum Law. British
176. Godber (Tokyo) to Agnew (London), 9 February 1935, F0371/19350,F902/94/23; Memorandum by 
Sansom, 4 March 1935, F0371/19351 ,F2124/94/23.
177. Godber (Tokyo) to Agnew (London), 6 April 1935, F0371/19351,F2294/94/23; Darch (Royal Dutch 
Shell) to Coleman (Petroleum Department), 15 May 1935, F0371/19352,F3222/94/23.
178. The British and American oil representatives, and Embassy staff noted a marked reluctance by the 
Japanese officials to put any agreement in writing. This they believed stemmed from the fear of the 
Japanese officials of public criticism, particularly when the Diet was in session. Thus it was agreed to 
adjourn negotiations until the end of the current Diet session, Godber (Tokyo) to Agnew (London), 9 
February 1935, FO371/19350JF902/94/23; Clive (Tokyo) to the Foreign Office, 7 February 1935, 
FO371/19350,F851/94/23; Memorandum by Sansom, 20 February 1935, F0371/19351,F2124/94/23; 
Anderson L H., pp. 92-93.
179. Godber (Tokyo) to Agnew (London), 6 April 1935, F0371/1935l,F2449/94/23; Clive (Tokyo) to the 
Foreign Office, 15 April 1935, F0371/19351,F2458/94/23; Memorandum by Sansom, 15 April 1935, 
F0371/19352,F3345/94/23.
180. Clive (Tokyo) to the Foreign Office, 15 April 1935, F0371/19351,F2458/94/23.
181. Clive (Tokyo) to the Foreign Office, 20 September 1935, FO371/19353,F6061/94/23.
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opinion remained sanguine about the long term intentions of the Japanese, as the hard liners 
in the Japanese government sought to reverse the Tive Point Agreement* with the foreign oil 
companies and insist on a stricter interpretation of the Petroleum Law.182 In August 1935 
Commander Enomoto, of the Imperial Japanese Navy, told T. G. Ely, the manager of Rising 
Sun Petroleum’s operations in Japan, that it was the long term intention of the Japanese to 
increase the foreign oil companies’ stockholding requirement.183 Evidence of the tougher 
Japanese stance towards the foreign oil companies soon emerged. In September 1935 the 
Japanese government rejected a request by the foreign and Japanese oil companies for an 
increase in the price of benzine.184 Soon afterwards Commerce Bureau officials told the 
foreign oil companies that the Tive Point Agreement’ was to be abandoned. Rising Sun 
Petroleum was told that it would have to: meet the six month stockholding obligation,185 or 
declare its intention to do so - though there was the possibility of some compensation for 
capital costs; that it would be allocated under 1/3 of any increase in gasoline sales; and that 
the Japanese government reserved the right to fix petroleum prices without reference to the 
oil companies’ costs.186 The foreign oil companies faith in the Japanese sank even lower 
when the Japanese government proposed higher duties on refined petroleum imports, and 
Rising Sun Petroleum and Stanvac calculated that the increased revenue was designed to 
meet the expense of the capital compensationplan.187 The foreign oil companies’ opposition 
to the six month stockholding was weakened when it became clear that the Japanese oil
182. Memorandum by Macarae (Tokyo), 3 May 1935, F037l/l9352,F3541/94/23.
183. Clive (Tokyo) to the Foreign Office, 3 August 1935, F037l/19353,F5485/94/23; Coleman (Petroleum 
Department) to Randall, 31 August 1935, F0371/19353,F5681/94/23.
184. Rising Sun Petroleum (Yokohama) to Royal Dutch Shell (London), 18 and 26 September 1935, and 
Royal Dutch Shell (London) to Rising Sun Petroleum (London), 20 and 30 September 1935,
F0371/19353,F6321 ,F6937/94/23.
185. Although in September 1935 the Japanese government announced that, after permission from the 
Ministry of Commerce and Industry and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the six month stockholding 
provision would be suspended until 30 June 1935, the foreign oil companies quickly realised that this 
was only an interim reprieve from the Japanese pursuit of the six month stockholding provision, Darch 
(Royal Dutch Shell) to Coleman (Petroleum Department), 30 August 1935, and Coleman (Petroleum 
Department) to Randall, 31 August 1935, F0371/19353,F5681/94/23; Clive (Tokyo) to the Foreign 
Office, 20 September 1935, FO371/19353,F6061/94/23; Darch (Royal Dutch Shell) to Starling 
(Petroleum Department), 18 September 1935, and Rising Sun Petroleum (Yokohama) to Royal Dutch 
Shell (London), 25 September 1935, F0371/19353,F6321/94/23; Anderson I. H., pp. 96-67.
186. Rising Sim Petroleum (Yokohama) to Royal Dutch Shell (London), 30 September 1935, 
F0371/19353,F6321/94/23; Clive (Tokyo) to the Foreign Office, 9 October 1935, 
F0371/19353.F6391/94/23; Anderson I. H„ p. 97.
187. Rising Sun Petroleum (Yokohama) to Royal Dutch Shell (London), 25 November 1935,
F0371/19353,F7647/94/23.
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companies intended to comply with the six month stockholding requirement.188 
Nevertheless, despite fears over the reliability of Stanvac,189 and another rebuff from the 
State Department to Royal Dutch Shell and Stanvac over control of the independent 
American oil companies oil exports to Japan,190 Rising Sun Petroleum believed that it was 
still in a strong position, since the Japanese government still could not afford the disruption 
caused by a withdrawal of the foreign oil companies.191 This view was shared by the British 
and American Embassies in Japan.192 However, negotiations with the Japanese proved 
unsuccessful. The Commerce Bureau officials rejected Rising Sun Petroleum and Stanvac’s 
demand for a return to the Tive Points Agreement', and insisted that unless the foreign oil 
companies met the six month stockholding requirement they would face further 
discrimination in their gasoline sales quota.193 The Japanese officials even rejected Rising 
Sun Petroleum and Stanvac's offer - in an attempt to induce the Japanese to modify their hard 
line stance194 - of the joint patent to their hydrogenation process, on the grounds that it was of 
little interest to them.195
188. Royal Dutch Shell (London) to Rising Sun Petroleum (Yokohama), 20 September 1935, 
F0371/19353,F6321/94/23; Clive (Tokyo) to the Foreign Office, 9 October 1935, 
F0371/19353,F6391/94/23; Starling (Petroleum Department) to Randall, 12 November 1935,
F0371/19353,F7135/94/23.
189. Minute by Randall, 10 October 1935, F0371/19353,F6391/94/23; Meeting between Agnew, Godber, 
Darch (all Royal Dutch Shell), Starling (Petroleum Department), and Gasgoine (Foreign Office), 14 
November 1935, F0371/19353,F7183/94/23; Minute by Gasgoine, 19 November 1935,
F0371/19353,F7267/94/23; Anderson I. H., p. 99.
190. Lindsay (Washington) to the Foreign Office, 22 November 1935, F0371/19353,F7376/94/23. 
Furthermore, British Embassy staff in Washington also told Agnew that any similar approach to 
themselves would be rejected, meeting between Agnew (Royal Dutch Shell), Chalkey, and Broadwood 
(both British officials in Washington), 29 October 1935, FO371/19353.F7028/94/23.
191. Agnew (London) to Royal Dutch Shell (New York), 14 November 1935, F0371/19353,F7267/94/23.
192. Wiggin (Tokyo) to the Foreign Office, 2 December 1935, F0371/19353,F7557/94/23.
193. Rising Sun Petroleum (Yokohama) to Royal Dutch Shell (London), 3, 9, 24 and 27 December 1935, 
and Royal Dutch Shell (London) to Rising Sun Petroleum (Yokohama), 30 December 1935,
F0371/19353,F7557,F7787,F8137/94/23.
194. Although the Admiralty was concerned over the possible transfer of hydrogenation technology to Japan 
- hydrogenation was the process of transforming coal into oil which if economically viable would have 
reduced the Japanese military dependence upon oil imports - the Foreign Office decided that the plight 
of the oil companies in Japan was so serious that the oil companies should go ahead with the offer, 
meeting between Agnew, Godber, Darch (all Royal Dutch Shell), Starling (Petroleum Department), and
& U S 4 December 1935, F0371/19353,F7651/94/23; Royal Dutch Shell (New York) to Royal 
— - ^ D u t c h  Shell (London), 6 December 1935, FO371/19353,F7780/94/23; Royal Dutch Shell (London) to 
Rising Sun Petroleum (Yokohama), 9 December 1935, F0371/19353,F7787/94/23; Minute by Orde, 12 
December 1935, F0371/19353,F7787/94/23.
195. Rising Sun Petroleum (Yokohama) to Royal Dutch Shell (London), 24 and 27 December 1935, and 
Royal Dutch Shell (London) to Rising Sun Petroleum (Yokohama), 30 December 1935,
F0371/19353,F8137/94/23; Anderson I. H., pp. 97-99. Mira Wilkins is wrong to suggest that in
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When talks between the foreign oil companies and Japanese officials resumed in 
1936, the familiar pattern of Japanese pressure on the oil companies to comply with the 
Petroleum Law and fear of their withdrawal, pushed both sides towards an unstable modus 
vivendi. Despite the lack of progress, talks with Yoshino and Kurusu convinced Rising Sun 
Petroleum and Stanvac representatives in Japan that neither official wanted to force the two 
foreign oil companies to withdraw from Japan.196 However, Kurusu warned the companies’ 
representatives that, in anticipation of the failure of the talks between the foreign oil 
companies and the Japanese government, Nippon Sekiyu and Mitsubishi Oil had applied for 
increased gasoline sales quotas, which would naturally be taken from the British and 
American oil companies’ quotas.197 Progress towards a modus vivendi remained slow198 until 
the British Embassy officials revived an earlier Japanese199 suggestion that the two western 
companies could fulfil the stockholding requirement, either through establishing their own 
storage companies in Japan or through an arrangement with a Japanese company.200 Royal 
Dutch Shell and Stanvac immediately recognised this suggestion as a solution to their 
problems of the Petroleum Law201 - since it enabled them to meet the stockholding 
requirement of the Petroleum Law, and yet avoid excessive expenditure on their own part -
December 1935 Stanvac and Royal Dutch provided the Japanese with the research results of Stanvac’s 
hydrogenation process. Consequently, her statement that this was a major concession to the Japanese is 
equally untrue, Wilkins M., 'The Role of U.S. Business', in Borg D„ and Okamoto S. (eds.), Pearl 
Harbor as History: Japanese-American Relations, 1931-1941 (Columbia University Press, New York; 
1973), p. 365; Wilkins M., The Contributions of Foreign Enterprises to Japanese Economic 
Development*, in Yuzawa T. and Udagawa M. (eds.), Foreign Business in Japan Before World WarII 
(University of Tokyo Press, Tokyo; 1990), p. 41.
196. Rising Sun Petroleum (Yokohama) to Royal Dutch Shell (London), 27 November 1935, 
F0371/19353,F8137/94/23, 6 January 1936, 16 January 1936, 21 January 1936, and 10 February 1936, 
FO371/20280,F142,F296,F458,Fl 086/105/23; Starling (Petroleum Department) to the Foreign Office, 
24 February 1936, F0371/20280,FI 086/105/23.
197. Rising Sun Petroleum (Yokohama) to Royal Dutch Shell (London), 24 February 1936, 
F0371/20280,F1124/105/23.
198. Royal Dutch Shell (London) to Rising Sun Petroleum (Yokohama), 24 February 1936, and 7 March 
1936, F0371/20280/F1086,F1399/105/23; Rising Sun Petroleum (Yokohama) to Royal Dutch Shell 
(London), 27 February 1937, 6 March 1936, and 11 March 1936,
F0371/20280,F1137,FI 399,FI 581/105/23.
199. The first suggestion was made in late December 1935, Rising Sim Petroleum (Yokohama) to Royal 
Dutch Shell (London), 27 December 1935, F037l/19353,F8137/94/23; AndersonL H., p. 99.
200. Rising Sun Petroleum (Yokohama) to Royal Dutch Shell (London), 13 March 1936,
F0371 /20280,F1581 /105/23.
201. Royal Dutch Shell (London) to Rising Sun Petroleum (Yokohama), 19 March 1936,
F0371/20280,FI 597/105/23.
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and, despite objections from Rising Sun Petroleum’s representatives in Japan202 pressed 
ahead to establish a stockholding arrangement with Mitsui.203 By October 1936 Rising Sun 
Petroleum, Stanvac and Mitsui were ready to sign an agreement in which Mitsui would pay 
for the new storage capacity and new oil stocks while Rising Sun Petroleum and Stanvac 
would lease and then purchase - as their commercial operations in Japan expanded - these oil 
stocks in order to ’fulfil’ the six month stockholding requirement, and yet still not maintain 
more than three months of their own oil stocks in Japan.204 The auspices for the arrangement 
with Mitsui appeared good, as it had the full backing of the Japanese government.205 Not 
only had the Japanese government agreed to compensate Mitsui for its capital outlay, Rising 
Sun Petroleum believed that the Japanese Ministry of Commerce and Industry had actually 
pushed Mitsui into the arrangement with Rising Sun Petroleum and Stanvac.206 Thus the 
arrangement with Mitsui appeared to presage a period of stability for the two companies in 
Japan.
However, once again another change of direction in the enforcement of the 
Petroleum Law by the Japanese government threatened the foreign oil companies’ position 
in Japan and jeopardised the stockholding arrangement with Mitsui. In late October 1936 
the Ministry of Commerce and Industry’s refusal to confirm in writing that the arrangement 
with Mitsui was acceptable to the Japanese government207 prevented Rising Sun Petroleum
202. Rising Sun Petroleum (Yokohama) to Royal Dutch Shell (London), 20 March 1936,
F0371 /20280,F1597/105/23.
203. Mitsui was chosen because they already distributed approximately half of Stanvac’s product throughout 
Japan, Royal Dutch Shell (London) to Rising Sun Petroleum (Yokohama), 19 March 1936, 
F0371/20280,F1597/105/23; Anderson I. H., p. 99.
204. Rising Sun Petroleum (Yokohama) to Royal Dutch Shell (London), 27 March 1936, and 16 April 1936, 
F0371/20280,F1774,F2255/105/23; Royal Dutch Shell (London) to Rising Sun Petroleum 
(Yokohama), 17 April 1936, FO371/20820,F2255/l05/23; Royal Dutch Shell (New York) to Royal 
Dutch Shell (London), 22 April 1936, and Royal Dutch Shell (London) to Royal Dutch Shell (New 
York), 24 April 1936, F0371/20280,F2403/105/23; Starling (Petroleum Department) to Orde, 2 
October 1936, and memorandum by Agnew (Royal Dutch Shell), 29 October 1936, 
F0371/20820,F6040/105/23; Anderson I. H., pp. 99-100.
205. Yoshino and Kurusu had only one mild criticism of the arrangement with Mitsui, that since the large 
zaibatsu like Mitsui were out of political favour in Japan it might be better if Rising Sun Petroleum and 
Stanvac established their stockholding arrangement with one or two of the smaller zaibatsu, like 
Sumitomo and/or Ogura, Rising Sun Petroleum (Yokohama) to Royal Dutch Shell (London), 24 March 
1936, F0371/20280,F1674/105/23.
206. Memorandum by Agnew (Royal Dutch Shell), 29 October 1936, F0371/20280,F6040/105/23.
207. Rising Sun Petroleum (Yokohama) to Royal Dutch Shell (London), 2 November 1936, 
F0371/20280,F6764/105/23; Starling (Petroleum Department) to Orde, 19 December 1936, 
FO371/20280,F7853/l 05/23; Minute by Warner, 4 December 1936, F0371/20280,F7483/105/23; 
Anderson I. H., pp. 100-101.
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and Stanvac from formalising the stockholding arrangement with Mitsui.208 In December 
1936 the revised kerosene sales quotas for the first half of 1937 reduced both Rising Sun 
Petroleum and Stanvac's sales quotas while increasing quotas for the Japanese oil
r 209compames. Next, the Japanese government again increased the import duty on refined 
petroleum products.210 Then on 21 November 1936, Haruhiko Ogai, the Director of the 
Mining Bureau of the Ministry of Commerce and Industry, reprimanded the two western 
companies for their non-fulfilment of the six month stockholding requirement.211 In 
response to these developments Rising Sun Petroleum warned head office that, "we feel... 
that henceforth we may be faced with more ruthless nationalistic policy".212 In response to 
this change of direction from the Japanese authorities both the British and American 
Embassies protested at the 'discriminatory' kerosene quota, revision of the petroleum tariff, 
and failure to sanction the Mitsui arrangement.213 Both the Foreign Office and Rising Sun 
Petroleum's representative in Japan were unconvinced by the Japanese response to the 
British and American diplomatic protests,214 and the latter recommended that the recent 
Japanese actions should be met with restrictions on oil supplies to Japan.215 However, this 
suggestion was immediately rebuffed by Royal Dutch Shell in London, who viewed the 
recent action of the Japanese government as mild when compared with previous 
'discrimination' against themselves. Royal Dutch Shell concluded that so long as a stable 
working relationship with the Japanese authorities could be maintained, especially via the 
Mitsui arrangement, then 'discrimination' in the less important kerosene market could be 
tolerated.216
208. Memorandum by Agnew (Royal Dutch Shell), 15 December 1936, FO371/20280,F7853/l 05/23.
209. Rising Sun Petroleum (Yokohama) to Royal Dutch Shell (London), 4 December 1936, 
FO371/20280,F7853/l 05/23; Starling (Petroleum Department) to the Foreign Office, 12 January 1937, 
F0371/21032,F246/66/23.
210. Rising Sun Petroleum (Yokohama) to Royal Dutch Shell (London), 4 December 1936, 
F0371/20280,F7853/105/23; Starling (Petroleum Department) to the Foreign Office, 12 January 1937, 
F0371/21032,F240/66/23.
211. Clive (Tokyo) to the Foreign Office, 6 and 27 January 1937, FO371/21032,Fl 19,F1250/66/23.
212. Rising Sun Petroleum (Yokohama) to Royal Dutch Shell (London), 4 December 1936,
F0371/20280,F7483/105/23.
213. Clive (Tokyo) to the Foreign Office, 17, 19, 24, and 29 December 1936,
F0371/20820,21032/7769,F7827,F7962,F513/105,66/23; Anderson I. H„ p. 101.
214. Clive (Tokyo) to the Foreign Office, 16 January 1937, FO371/21032,F322,F333/66/23; Rising Sun 
Petroleum (Yokohama) to Royal Dutch Shell (London), 20 January 1937, FO371/21032,F445/66/23.
215. Royal Dutch Shell (London) to Rising Sun Petroleum (Yokohama), 29 January 1937,
F0371/21032.F710/66/23.
216. Royal Dutch Shell (London) to Rising Sun Petroleum (Yokohama), 29 January 1937, and Starling
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In order to maintain a stable working arrangement with the Japanese authorities 
Royal Dutch Shell and Stanvac were prepared to go much further than ignoring the 
'discriminatory' kerosene quota. After three years of fruitless negotiations with the Japanese 
authorities both foreign oil companies were prepared to ’sacrifice’ their earlier demands for a 
proportionate share of the growth in the Japanese petroleum market. In response to the 
recent change in Japanese petroleum policy, the two firms told their representatives in Japan 
that they should now request sales quotas commensurate with their capital investments in 
Japan.217 Consequently, since neither Rising Sun Petroleum nor Stanvac had invested 
heavily in Japan after the promulgation of the Petroleum Law - in contrast to the Japanese oil 
companies who had invested capital in both the six month stockholding facilities and oil 
refining capacity - this meant that both companies were prepared to forego previous 
demands of a proportionate share in the growth of the Japanese oil market. In return for this 
conceding the right of the Japanese authorities to determine oil quotas in favour of domestic 
oil refiners, both oil companies merely requested guarantees that their operations in Japan 
should be reasonably remunerative, they should have equality in matters of taxation, and 
recognition from the Japanese authorities of their arrangement with Mitsui.218 Thus, prior to 
the Sino-Japanese War, while Rising Sun Petroleum and Stanvac were able to retain a 
substantial share of the Japanese refined petroleum products market and avoid many of the 
requirements of the Petroleum Law, they were forced to accept that the Japanese 
government’s determination to pursue an import substitution policy and increased 
stockholding requirement meant a significant reduction of their share of the Japanese 
petroleum market and continued uncertainty over their prospects in the Japanese market.219 
However, it is noticeable that even after the British and American governments had 
abandoned the oil embargo threat policy, Rising Sun Petroleum and Stanvac’s own 
opposition prevented the Japanese government from forcing them into a strict compliance 
with the Petroleum Law.
(Petroleum Department) to the Foreign Office, 2 February 1937, FO371/21032,F710/66/23.
217. Royal Dutch Shell (London) to Rising Sun Petroleum (Yokohama), 29 January 1937,
F0371/21032,F710/66/23.
218. Royal Dutch Shell (London) to Rising Sun Petroleum (Yokohama), 29 January 1937, and Starling 
(Petroleum Department) to the Foreign Office, 2 February 1937, F0371/21032,F710/66/23.
219. This uncertainty was again emphasised on the eve of the Sino-Japanese War when it was reported that 
Mitsui intended to pull out of the as yet unsigned arrangement with Rising Sun Petroleum and Stanvac, 
the Admiralty to the Foreign Office, 28 June 1937, F0371/21032,F3718/66/23.
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Conclusion.
The promulgation of the Japanese Petroleum Law and the Manchukuo Oil Monopoly Law in 
1934 affected both Royal Dutch Shell's oil interests and Anglo-Japanese relations. 
However, the most noticeable impact was upon Royal Dutch Shell’s trade in Japan and 
Manchukuo. In Manchukuo the effect of the Oil Monopoly Law on Royal Dutch Shell’s 
commercial operations was clear cut. In 1935, as a result of the Oil Monopoly Law, its 
subsidiary Asiatic Petroleum was forced to withdraw in protest, and without compensation, 
from Manchukuo. In Japan the commercial effect of the Petroleum Law on Royal Dutch 
Shell’s subsidiary Rising Sun Petroleum was more complex. Both Rising Sun Petroleum and 
Stanvac were able to avoid the capital investment required for the six month stockholding 
requirement. Yet at the same time they suffered a marked decline of their share of the 
Japanese refined petroleum products market. In particular the implementation and 
operation of the Petroleum Law resulted in a substantial fall of their combined market share 
of the Japanese gasoline market: in 1933 prior to the implementation of the Japan Petroleum 
Law they held 52.9% of the Japanese gasoline market, by 1937 their combined share of the 
gasoline market had fallen to 38.2%.220 Thus although Rising Sun Petroleum survived in 
Japan without increasing their stock holding commitment, this represented only a partial 
victory. The price was Rising Sun Petroleum's non-participation in the growth of the 
Japanese oil market, and its continued operations in Japan were always subject to a high 
degree of political pressure and uncertainty.221 Furthermore, it was clear that Rising Sun 
Petroleum and Stanvac's survival in Japan was due less to the resistance of both oil 
companies than the limits of Japan’s import substitution policy. So long as Japan did not 
have the domestic capacity to meet demand for refined petroleum products the need for
220. Royal Dutch Shell (London) to Rising Sun Oil (Yokohama), 29 January 1937, 
FO371/21032,F710/66/23; Udagawa M., p. 23. Furthermore, in Korea Royal Dutch Shell and 
Stanvac's operations suffered a similar decline, as a result of Japanese administrative 'discrimination' 
after the formation o f the government controlled Ch6sen Sekiyu Kaisha (Korea Petroleum Company) in 
June 1935, Kermode (British Consul in Seoul) to the Department o f Overseas Trade, 12 June 1935, 
F0371/19352,F3765/94/23; Rising Sun Petroleum (Yokohama) to Royal Dutch Shell (London), 18 
September 1935, F0371/19353,F6321/94/23. Between 1933 and 1937 Royal Dutch Shell and 
Stanvac's share o f the Korean gasoline market fell from 63.63% to only 25.61%, Royal Dutch Shell 
(London) to Rising Sun Petroleum (Yokohama), 29 January 1937, FO371/21032,F710/66/23.
221. This is in contrast to several authors who suggest that the Petroleum Law was ineffective because 
Rising Sun Petroleum and Stanvac were able to evade the six month stockholding and continue 
operations in Japan, Anderson I. H., p. 105; Davenport-Hines R. T. P., and Jones G., British Business 
in Japan since 1868', in Davenport-Hines R  T. P., and Jones G. (eds.), British Business in Asia since 
I860 (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge; 1989), p. 232; Wilkins M .,' The Contribution of 
Foreign Enterprises to Japanese Economic Development', pp. 41-42; Wilkins M., 'The Role of U.S. 
Business', pp. 362-365.
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imports of refined petroleum products continued.
In contrast to the dramatic impact of the Petroleum and Oil Monopoly Laws upon 
Royal Dutch Shell’s operations, the repercussions upon Anglo-Japanese relations were 
minimal. This is the more surprising given Foreign Office alarm that promulgation of the 
Manchukuo oil monopoly posed a serious threat to British commercial operations in China. 
Although concerned at Japan andManchukuo’s breach of the Open Door, the Foreign Office 
had no desire to escalate Royal Dutch Shell's difficulties beyond that of a commercial 
dispute between the oil company and the Japanese and Manchukuoan authorities. Within
the context of a commercial dispute Royal Dutch Shell, Stanvac, and the Foreign Office 
sought to maximise both oil companies’ chances of forcing the Japanese and Manchukuoan 
authorities into a compromise. However, the plan to bolster the oil companies' resistance 
through a commercially organised oil embargo against Japan and Manchukuo collapsed in 
December 1934 when the American government realised it could not enforce the 
participation of the independent American oil companies. The commercial embargo thus 
collapsed not out of fear of Japanese retaliation but because of the limited authority of the 
American government over its oil producers. After this failure to orchestrate a commercial 
oil embargo against Japan* Royal Dutch Shell and Stanvac’s resistance to the Petroleum and 
Oil Monopoly Laws was treated as a purely commercial dispute which had no direct impact 
upon Anglo-Japanese relations.
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Table 4 .1 : Japan’s annual production, import, and total supply of crude oil, 1930/31- 
1939/40 (kilolitres).
Production Imports Total Supply
1930-31 316,560 570,120 886,680
1931-32 305,760 616,020 921,792
1932-33 235,500 852,516 1,106,016
1933-34 225,564 1,018,356 1,234,920
1934-35 283,860 1,200,324 1,484,184
1935-36 350,952 1,332,048 1,683,012
1936-36 390,696 1,678,320 2,066,796
1937-38 392,640 2,326,320 2,718,972
1938-39 391,880 1,975,896 2,367,756
1939-40 370,752 1,745,664 2,116,416
[Source: GHQ SCAP., Japanese Economic Statistics (GHQ SCAP Eco­
nomic and Scientific Section Programs and Statistics Division, Bulletin 
No. 60, Section 1 - Industrial Production; August 1951), pp. 19-20.]
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Table 4.2 : Sales of petroleum products by volume in Japan, 1930-1938 (kilolitres).
Year Gasoline Kerosene Light fuel oil Crude oil Lubricating
oil
Total
1930 555,060 144,726 227,997 1,091,908 206,111 2,225,802
1931 615,692 121,599 191,731 1,265,100 178,583 2,372,705
1932 692,470 140,442 223,784 1,418,246 171,954 2,646,290
1933 711,027 132,386 200,352 1,530,810 215,810 2,790,385
1934 870,831 174,994 201,090 1,792,793 286,610 3,308,323
1935 1,025,097 136,653 133,889 2,381,091 277,350 3,954,080
1936 1,035,694 134,306 107,392 2,164,594 320,070 3,762,056
1937 1,301,293 179,727 143,336 3,046,139 351,000 5,063,435
1938 1,006,507 148,684 207,280 2,578,838 446,000 4,292,309
[Source: Inokuchi T., Gendai Nippon Sangyd Hattatsu-shi, Vol. II., Sekiyu [History of the development of 
modern Japanese industries n , Petroleum industry} (Gendai Nippon Sangyd Hattatsu-Shi Kenkyu-Kai, 
Tokyo; 1963), table 35, p. 245 ]
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Table 4.3 : Imported crude oil as a percentage of Japan’s total consumption, and the per­
centage of petroelum products derived from imported crude oil, 1930/31-1938/39.
Year Crude oil Gasoline Kerosene Gas oil Diesel oil Lubricating
oil
1930-31 64.30 70.06 58.75 51.12 54.60 66.47
1931-32 66.83 72.75 65.81 53.74 25.70 68.08
1932-33 77.08 83.16 70.29 66.91 71.20 68.87
1933-34 81.87 89.95 73.86 71.36 83.21 77.35
1934-35 80.87 92.70 77.45 66.76 83.27 74.82
1935-36 79.15 92.44 73.65 66.04 73.42 68.70
1936-37 81.20 90.74 71.81 63.53 70.97 74.11
1937-38 85.56 92.90 69.72 65.84 78.54 78.58
1938-39 83.45 92.57 67.07 68.03 78.26 79.97
[Source: GHQ SCAP., Japanese Economic Statistics (GHQ SCAP Economic and Scientific Section Pro­
grams and Statistics Division, Bulletin No. 60, Section - 1 Industrial Production; August 1951), pp. 19-20.]
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Table 4.4 : Petroleum products market price, 1926-1937 (yen per kilolitre).
Year Gasoline Kerosene Light fuel oil Machine oil
1926 202.78 152.78 114.45 128.89
1927 187.67 143.97 85.89 136.33
1928 168.53 133.81 74.08 118.53
1929 137.03 129.39 78.70 103.25
1930 127.31 118.53 70.61 90.50
1931 124.17 110.83 60.00 79.72
1932 119.45 116.67 75.00 94.45
1933 130.56 138.89 86.11 116.67
1934 117.36 121.75 79.17 95.61
1935 139.95 116.67 84.72 111.11
1936 154.17 116.89 85.89 111.81
1937 185.00 162.78 133.89 163.33
[Source: Inokuchi T., Gendai Nippon Sangyd Hattatsu-shi, Vol. II., Sekiyu [History o f the 
development o f modem Japanese industries n , Petroleum industry] (Gendai Nippon 
Sangyd Hattatsu-Shi Kenkyu-Kai, Tokyo; 1963), table 36, p. 245.]
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Table 4.5 : Price of petroleum products (yen per box).
Gasoline Kerosene Light fuel oil Machine oil Crude oil
1929 December 5.60 5.30 3.40 4.30 1.70
1930 December 4.90 4.80 2.60 3.60 1.70
1931 March 4.80 4.60 2.50 3.40 1.40
June 4.80 4.70 2.70 3.60 1.20
September 4.90 4.70 2.70 3.60 1.10
December 5.00 4.80 2.80 3.70 1.20
1932 March 4.40 4.80 2.70 3.50 1.25
June 4.00 4.00 2.60 3.30 1.30
September 4.70 4.40 3.10 3.70 1.45
December 5.60 5.40 3.50 4.50 1.60
1933 March 5.40 5.50 3.60 4.50 1.60
June 5.10 5.20 3.50 4.50 1.60
September 4.20 4.50 2.80 3.60 1.45
December 4.00 4.40 2.90 3.60 1.45
[Source: Inokuchi T., Gendai Nippon Sangyd Hattatsu-shi, Vol. II., Sekiyu [History of the development 
of modern Japanese industries II, Petroleum industry] (Gendai Nippon Sangyd Hattatsu-Shi Kenkyu- 
Kai, Tokyo; 1963), table 37, p. 250 ]
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Table 4.6 : Comparative sale of petroleum by British and American oil companies in 
Manchuria and Japan in 1933 (thousands of 42-gallon barrels).
Manchuria Japan
Shell (Anglo-Dutch) 253 5,960
Stanvac (USA) 197 3,128(a)
Texas (USA) 82 53
Total 532 9,087
[Source: Butler (Mukden) to the British Legation in Peking, 14 June 1934, 
F0371/18109,F5158/142/10. ]
Note : (a) Of this total approximately half was sold to customers through Mitsui and the 
remainder through Stanvac's own distributions network.
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Table 4.7 : Effect of the August 1934 gasoline quota on the Japanese and western oil 
companies' market share.
Company Nationality of Owner­
ship
Market share 
based on actual 
sales, June-Au­
gust 1934
Authorised 
sales quota, Ju- 
ly-December 
1934
Percentage 
change of mar­
ket shared be­
tween actual 
sales and au- 
thoriesed quota
Rising Sun Petroleum Anglo-Dutch 29.47 27.65 -6.7
Stanvac American 19.18 17.87 -7.14
Nippon Sekiyu Japanese 21.87 23.93 +9.60
Ogura Japanese 12.74 13.36 +4.87
Mitsubishi American-Japanese 8.36 8.90 +6.46
Matsukata Japanese 4.94 4.64 -6.07
Others All Japanese 3.44 3.94 +14.53
[Sources: Starling (Petroleum Department) to the Foreign Office, 8 September 1934, 
F0371/18189.F5436/1659/23; Anderson I. H., The Standard Vacuum Company and United States East 
Asian Policy, 1931-1941 (Princeton University Press, Princeton; 1975), footnote 14, p. 77.]
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Table 4.8 : Claims by the foreign oil companies for compensation from the Manchukuo 
government.
Company Compensation claim
Asiatic Petroleum £418,000
Stanvac $1,781,880
Texas Oil $456,737
[Sources: Butler (Mukden) to the Foreign Office* 10 May 1935, 
FO371/19352,F3004/94/23; Anderson I. H., The Standard Vacuum 
Company and United States East Asian Policy, 1931-1941 (Princeton 
University Press, Princeton; 1975), p. 67.]
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Table 4.9 : Source of supply of imported petroleum into Japan in 1933 (tons).
Type of Pe­
troleum
Controlled by British 
interests
Controlled by Amer­
ican interests
Controlled by the 
Soviet Union
Total
Volume Percent­
age o f 
total im­
ports
Volume Percent­
age o f 
total im­
ports
Volume Percent­
age o f 
total im­
ports
Crude Oil 104,000 10.52 884,000 89.47 988,000
Fuel Oil 483,000 33.99 662,000 46.59 276,000 19.42 1,421,000
Kerosene 33,000 54.09 28,000 45.90 61,000
Benzine 233,000 57.81 180,000 44.66 403,000
Total 843,000 29.34 1,754,000 61.05 276,000 9.60 2,873,000
[Source: Agnew (Royal-Dutch Shell) to Starling (Petroleum Department), 28 November 1934, 
F0371/18191,F7207/1659/23.]
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Table 4.10 : Petroleum stocks possessed by the three foreign oil companies in Manchuria 
(excluding the Kwantung Leased Territories) on the eve of the implementation of the Oil 
Monpoly Law (tons).
Company Kerosene Gasoline
Asiatic Petroleum 1,279,190 287,440
Stanvac 1,915,910 369,600
Texas Oil 577,155 106,840
[Source: Butler (Mukden) to the Foreign Office, 28 March 1935, F0371/19351,F2481/94/23.]
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Introduction.
When Japanese competition emerged in the mid to late- 1930s as the greatest threat to British 
shipping interests in the Pacific-East Asia region, it entered an arena that had already seen 
considerable British debate on the requirements for British shipping to meet foreign 
competition. For the world shipping industry the interwar years were a time of 
unprecedented economic severity; from the end of the postwar boom in 1920 to shortly 
before the Second World War, there was little relief from the twin problems of low trade 
volumes and gross overcapacity. Naturally, this dismal situation was accentuated by the 
impact of the Depression as the world shipping industry adjusted slowly to the sudden 
downturn in world trade. However, for the British shipping industry the problem of 
overcapacity and low freight rates was further compounded by the common interwar policy 
resorted to by most of the important maritime countries of extending state aid to their own 
merchant marines. The experience of the First World War justified the need to maintain an 
effective merchant marine as an insurance for future national emergencies; state financial 
aid was therefore readily used to support various mercantile establishments. Thus for the 
relatively unsubsidised British shipping industry state aid to foreign competitors added to 
the commercial difficulties of the poor economic environment. Consequently, during the 
1930s, and prior to the emergence of Japanese competition, the previously free trade British 
shipping industry turned to the government for support to enable it to compete on a level 
footing with its subsidised competitors.
However, while the British shipping industry looked to the British, Dominion, and 
Colonial strength as the means of improving its commercial position, calls for the protection 
of imperial trade and countervailing shipping subsidies had to be balanced against the wider 
needs of the shipping industry and Britain’s trade policy. Subsidies and trade protection 
challenged Britain’s perceived need of limited government spending, and its long-term 
requirement of a freer world economy. Both the British government and large sections of the 
shipping industry remained reluctant to endorse widespread government intervention. 
Furthermore, intervention in support of the shipping industry could not be divorced from 
Britain’s foreign and trade policy requirements, and intra-imperial relations. Any form of 
British sponsored restrictions on foreign shipping access to its vast imperial shipping routes 
would hardly be welcomed by Britain's trading partners: consequently such a policy ran the 
risk of enormous political and economic retaliation. However, even if the British
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government endorsed imperial shipping reservation a final consideration for British policy 
makers was the impact of this policy upon intra-imperial relations. An effective imperial 
policy for British shipping would be dependent upon the support of the Dominion and Indian 
governments. However, this support was conditional upon the extent to which Britain’s 
imperial shipping policy advanced Dominion and Indian commercial interests.
Therefore the British clash with Japan was part of the general demands of British 
shipping interests for some government protection against subsidised shipping competition, 
yet unlike the cotton dispute, this British campaign was not specific to Japan. The British 
saw foreign shipping subsidies as an international problem of which Japan was only one of 
many contributors. Thus even though Japan was regarded as an unstable power, any 
domestic or international constraints upon Britain's response to other subsidising countries 
were equally applicable to Japan. Furthermore, Anglo-Japanese shipping rivalry in the 
1930s was part of a long history of intense Anglo-Japanese commercial friction over the 
regulation of respective shipping interests in various shipping conferences.1 Before World 
War One it was only through some aggressive commercial diplomacy that the Nippon Yusen 
Kaisha (NYK), in the face of strong British competition, had been able to maintain its 
position in the Far Eastern Shipping Conference.2 Such commercial disputes continued 
throughout the 1920s and 1930s.3 Thus while Anglo-Japanese shipping rivalries intensified 
in the mid to late-1930s it represented a continuation of an established pattern of commercial 
friction between Britain and Japan, and between Britain and other competitors.
1. The shipping industry was organised into two distinct categories: liners which engaged in scheduled
sailings and conference trade, and tramps that plied an independent carrying trade. Shipping 
conferences consisted of bodies of independent shipping lines on specific routes that agreed for a fixed 
period to set minimum freight quotes and regulate the apportionment of traffic. However, such 
conferences were subject to renegotiation and competition from outside lines, Sturmey S. G., British 
Shipping and World Competition (Athlone Press, University of London; 1962), chapter XH[; Imperial 
Shipping Committee, British Shipping in the Orient (HMSO, London; 1939), pp. 77-78.
2. Chida T., and Davies P. N., The Japanese Shipping and Shipbuilding industries: A history o f modem
growth (The Athlone Press, London; 1990), pp. 20-1; Imperial Shipping Committee, pp. 79-80; Wray 
W. D Mitsubishi and the N. Y.K., 1870-1914 (Harvard University Press, Cambridge Massachusetts; 
1984), pp. 293-302.
3. Imperial Shipping Committee, pp. 80-81, 84, 86; Wray W. D., TSTVK and the Commercial Diplomacy of
the Far Eastern Freight Conference, 1896-1956', in Yui T., and Nakagawa K. (eds.), Business History 
of Shipping: Strategy and Structure (University of Tokyo, Tokyo; 1985), pp. 284-298.
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The British and world shipping industries in the interwar period.
The underlying problem for the world shipping industry in the interwar period was the 
overcapacity of shipping tonnage in relation to the stagnant levels of world trade.4 The 
carrying of transnational seaborne trade was crucial to the shipping industry and obviously it 
could not isolate itself from the fluctuations of world trade. Following the postwar slump 
there was a dramatic decline in world trade from which there was only a limited recovery. In 
1921 world seaborne trade was nearly 20% below its 1913 level, and while there was arise in 
world trade until 1929, the onset of the Depression again saw volumes of world trade ^  fall 
to 1913 levels by 1932. Only in 1937 with the arrival of the prewar boom did world seaborne 
trade exceed its previous interwar peak.5 However, during the interwar period shipping 
capacity did not respond elastically to the falls in seaborne trade, and in relation to 1913 
levels, there was virtually a continual excess of shipping tonnage in relation to volumes of 
trade.6 Naturally, the Depression exacerbated this problem, so that in 1932 despite the fall in 
world trade volumes world shippingcapacity still remained some 50% above its 1913 level.7 
Thus for the shipping industry the excess of shipping capacity and the stagnation of world 
trade acted as a continual drag upon the industry.
Although problems in the world shipping industry were universal, for British 
shipowners, the owners of the largest merchant shipping fleet in the world, their sole concern 
was the relative position of the British shipping industry. Measured in terms of gross 
tonnage figures for the interwar period revealed an alarming decline in the relative position 
of the British shipping industry, and confirmed "the gloomy view taken in the shipping 
journals of the position of our shipping industry".8 Throughout the interwar period British 
tonnage stagnated at around 20 million tons, little above its 1914 level, while total world 
tonnage continued to expand. The result was a decline in the share of British registered 
tonnage as a percentage of world tonnage from 39.3% in 1914, to 30.1% by 1930, a trend
4. Board of Trade memorandum, ’Ships and Shipping Policy', 31 May 1933, FO371/17328,W9109/5461/50.
5. Sturmey S. G., p. 65; Hope R,,AN ew History o f British Shipping (John Murray, London; 1990), p. 358;
See table 5.1.
6. See table 5.1.
7. Hope R., p. 358.
8. Board of Trade memorandum, 'Ships and Shipping Policy1, 31 May 1933, FO371/17328,W9109/5461/50;
Sturmey S. G., p. 85.
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which continued until 1939.9 Industry leaders complained loudly that it was British tonnage 
that bore the brunt of the adjustment in the imbalance between world demand and supply. 
This complaint seemed not unjustified when during the Depression only the British 
merchant marine showed any significant shrinkage in response to global shipping 
overcapacity.10 By the late-1930s the continual contraction of British shipping tonnage 
appeared so great that British opinion feared that in time of war vital British and imperial sea 
communications would be endangered by an insufficient merchant marine."
However, from a commercial standpoint idle capacity was of secondary importance 
when compared with the main problem of low freight rates and low earnings. Stagnant 
world trade and shipping overcapacity severely eroded the earning capacity of British 
shipping, at a time of increased operating and shipbuilding costs.12 After the end of the 
postwar boom, the fall of freight rates in the 1920s was dramatic; for example, the rate for 
shipment of a ton of coal from the Tyne to Port Said fell from £10 during World War One to 
only 1 ls/3d by 1923.13 Earnings, especially in tramp shipping, were again further eroded 
during the Depression.14 For example, among Britishshipping interests which owned some 6 
million tons of liner capacity, dividend payments fell from 6.23% in 1929 to 1.56% in 1933,13 
while in 1935 profits in the British shipping industry in relation to capitalisation were only 
one-seventh those of the motor industry, and the lowest ratio for any British industry.16 
Furthermore, while the war years and the postwar boom had left many companies with 
substantial capital assets, in the 1920s these reserves were rapidly exhausted in sustaining 
uneconomic shipping operations, and as a result of the dramatic depreciation of these 
inflated capital values during the 1920s.17 This left many British shipping companies in a 
critical position by the early 1930s as their capital reserves, already squandered in the 1920s, 
left little available to sustain operations in a prolonged economic downturn against
9. Sturmey S. G., p. 61; Hope R , p. 359; See table 5.2, and 5.3.
10. See table 5.4.
11. Annual Report: Chamber o f Shipping o f  the United Kingdom, 1936-1937, pp. 57-60.
12. Sturmey S. G., p. 65.
13. H opeR, p. 357; See table 5.1.
14. Sturmey S. G., p. 85; See tables 5.1, and 5.5.
15. Hope R , p. 358; Sturmey S. G., p. 86.
16. Hope R , ’Profits in British industry, 1924-1935' (Unpublished thesis, Oxford University; 1984), cited in 
HopeR, p. 358.
17. Sturmey S. G., pp. 85-86; HopeR, pp. 363-365.
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subsidised competitors.
In the interwar period the imbalance between shipping capacity and seaborne trade 
was intensified by the widespread adoption of state subsidies for both shipping operations 
and ship building. For non-subsidised British operators,18 shipping subsidies not only 
exacerbated the crisis in the shipping industry, they were its primary cause.19 However, since 
all the principal maritime nations saw a large merchant marine as a vital arm of their national 
interest they refused to accept significant reductions in their flag tonnage. Therefore when 
market forces threatened a significant reduction of tonnage, they accepted subsidies as a 
legitimate means to preserve vital levels of national tonnage, and were extremely reluctant 
to reduce them.20 In the 1920s several important maritime nations, Germany, Italy and 
Japan, and from the start of the Depression France, either adopted or continued to offer 
subsidies to their respective merchant fleets.21 However, in the 1920s the most important 
country to adopt a subsidy policy was the United States. In a complete reversal of its prewar 
attitude, on the grounds of World War One experience, the post-Wilson administrations 
proved determined, for the purpose of national defence, to maintain a substantial merchant 
fleet in defiance of economic conditions.22 In 1920 the American government passed the 
United States Merchant Marine Act to promote and maintain the American merchant fleet.23 
Following this legislation the United States Shipping Board was authorised to spend $25 
million in five years to build new vessels for operations on routes that were deemed essential 
to American interests, and which no private concern would undertake.24 The activities of the
18. In common with many other countries British shipping companies received certain state support in the
form of postal subventions: in 1938, for example, the annual postal subvention was a £295,000 fixed 
grant to the Peninsular & Oriental Steam Navigation Company (P&O), Imperial Shipping Committee, 
pp. 52-53; Sturmey S. G., p. 106.
19. However, in contrast to the British shipping industry, due to the rapid adoption of technical advances 
and utilisation o f innovative management techniques, the unsubsidised Scandinavian shipping fleets 
increased from 3.6 million ton in 1919 to 7.6 million tons by 1939, Sturmey S. G., pp. 91, 94; Mance 
O., International Sea Transport (London; 1945), p. 81.
20. Board of Trade memorandum, ’Ships and Shipping Policy’, 31 May 1933,
FO371/17328,W9109/5461/50.
21. Board of Trade memorandum, 'Ships and Shipping Policy', 31 May 1933,
F0371/17328, W9190/5461/50; Carter (Board of Trade) to the Foreign Office, 25 September 1934, 
FO37I/I846,W8586/291/50; Imperial Shipping Committee, pp. 53-56, 59-63; Sturmey S. G., pp. 113- 
122; Hope R., pp. 361-362.
22. T. W. O' Connor, Chairman of the United States Shipping Board, and Senator Copeland of New York,
in Lindsay (Washington) to Simon, 6 January 1933, FO371/16601,A556/29/45; Hope R., p. 360.
23. Sturmey S. G., pp. 122-123.
24. Sturmey S. G., pp. 38-39; Hope R., p. 360. Ironically, given later British condemnation of subsidies, in
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Shipping Board continued into the 1930s so that by 1937 they had spent some $900 million 
in support of American shipping.25 The Americans deemed that these subsidies were 
necessary to compensate for the higher operating costs of American vessels.26 Thus state 
subsidies to shipping had a considerable impact upon the shipping industry in the interwar 
period.27
Like many other maritime powers the Japanese government also provided state 
financial assistance to its merchant marine. Indeed in contrast to the cotton industry - where 
the British falsely alleged that the industry received state subsidies28 - it was not in dispute 
that Japan subsidised its shipping industry. From the Meiji era onwards various Japanese 
shipping interests, particularly liner operations, had received state aid and this policy 
continued during the interwar period.29 Subsidies were increased in 1929 with the onset of 
the Depression and while Japanese shipping operators coped with the appreciation of the yen 
as Japan returned to its prewar gold parity.30 The new level of state support remained intact 
throughout the 1930s even after the dramatic devaluation of the yen in December 1931. 
Then in 1932, again like many other countries, government support was extended when the 
Japanese introduced a state supported ’scrap and build’ scheme.31 Furthermore, although 
British shipping interests complained about the use of administrative discrimination against 
foreign shipping operations in the Japanese Empire, British officials regularly found such
the 1920s there was little criticism of these subsidies. British shipping interests accepted that subsidies 
were the concern of individual countries, and acted as a stimulant to the shipping industry since they 
increased global capacity and therefore increased competition, Annual Report o f the Liverpool Steam 
Ship Owners' Association, 1922, pp. 7-9.
25. Board of Trade memorandum, 'Ships and Shipping Policy1, 31 May 1933,
F0371/17328,W9109/5461/50; Imperial Shipping Committee, pp. 57-59; Thornton R. H., British 
Shipping (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge; 1959), chapter VI; Sturmey S. G., pp. 123-124; 
Stafford J. J., The United States Merchant Marine in Foreign Trade, 1800-1939', in Yui T., and 
Nakagawa K. (eds.), Business History o f Shipping: Strategy and Structure (University of Tokyo,
Tokyo; 1985), pp. 102-114; Hope R., pp. 359-360.
26. T. V O' Connor, Chairman of the United States Shipping Board, and Senator Copeland of New York, in 
Lindsay (Washington) to Simon, 6 January 1933, FO371/16601,A556/29/45; Sturmey S. G., p. 72.
27. Sturmey S. G., chapters IV, and V; Hope R., p. 360.
28. See chapter 1.
29. Mance O., p. 80; Sturmey S. G., pp. 120-121; Imperial Shipping Committee, p. 59; Chida T., and Davies 
P. N., pp. 5-10, 16-19,37.
30. Imperial Shipping Committee, p. 59.
31. Chida T., and Davies P. N., pp. 44, 47-50; Sturmey S. G., p. 121; Imperial Shipping Committee, pp. 60- 
62; Miwa R-, 'Maritime Policy in Japan: 1868-1936', in Yui T., and Nakagawa K., (eds.), Business 
History o f Shipping: Strategy and Structure (University of Tokyo, Tokyo; 1985), pp. 123-146.
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claims to be unjustified,32 and that the Japanese government did not discriminate against 
foreign shipping as a means of promoting its own shipping industry.33 Thus in regard to the 
question of Japanese shipping subsidies and shipping practice Japan adhered to 
contemporary norms. Consequently, it would be difficult to single out Japan for pursuing 
unorthodox shipping policies in the interwar period, as a means of justifying discrimination 
solely against Japanese shipping.
32. When the Foreign Office investigated claims of Japanese shipping malpractice they usually found little 
evidence to support these assertions, for example, the British consuls in Kobe, Nagasaki, and 
Yokohama found no evidence to support the allegation, made in 1934, that while in Japanese ports, 
unlike their British rivals, Japanese vessels were not charged tonnage dues, see 
FO371/18193,F4886/2609/23. In a similar fashion, again in 1934, the Foreign Office rejected British 
shipping operators claims that the Japanese manipulated its foreign exchange control law to the 
disadvantage o f the British, FO371/18193,F3250/3250/23.
33. The Imperial Shipping Committee report o f 1938, British Shipping in the Orient levelled no charge o f  
unfair government discrimination against foreign shipping. However, the British did raise more 
commercially motivated complaints of'sharp practice' by individual Japanese concerns and rate cutting, 
Mance O., p. 93; Hope R., p. 360.
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British shipping interests and British shipping policy.
Faced by both the domestic and international economic crisis o f the Depression34 British 
shipping interests and their supporters furiously turned upon subsidised foreign competition 
as the prime cause of the current economic difficulties.33 The British argued that not only did 
subsidies discriminate against non-subsidised competitors, they also retarded the recovery 
of the world ^  shipping industry since they allowed subsidised shipowners to sustain 
operations at uneconomic freight rates.36 However, while the British could easily identify 
the source of its economic difficulties they remained uncertain in how to deal with this 
problem. Even though the British government had adopted domestic protection and 
imperial preference between 1931 and 1932, the shipping industry, like the British 
government, remained reluctant to harness government sponsored protection of its carrying 
trade and state subsidies as a means of alleviating its current difficulties. The shipping 
industry shared the Board of Trade’s firm belief that the recovery of the British shipping 
industry was dependent upon a recovery of world trade through the reduction of trade 
barriers and not by extending protection to the British shipping industry.37 The industry had a 
long tradition of support for free trade, as outlined in the 1849 Navigation Laws, and in 
general it was loathe to abandon this stance.3* However, its current reluctance to abandon 
free trade rested upon more practical economic considerations. Given the global scale of 
British shipping operations, shipowners realised that any form of imperial protection or 
counter subsidy policy would not only risk more extensive foreign retaliation it would have 
only a limited impact in halting the immediate decline of their industry. The only hope for
34. By July 1932 some 3.56 million tons of British merchant shipping - 17% of the total fleet - was laid up,
Sturmey S. G., p. 66.
35. Annual Report: Chamber o f Shipping o f the United Kingdom, 1929-1930, pp. 58-59, and 1932-1933,
pp. 8-9, 183-184, 196-200, Annual Report o f the Liverpool Steam Shipowners’Association, 1932, pp. 
11-12, and 1933, pp. 14-15; Peninsular and Oriental Steam Navigation Company: Report o f the 
Proceedings a t the Ninety-Second General Meeting o f the Proprietors, 1932, pp. 31-33; Memoranda of 
the Liverpool Steam Ship Owners’ Association, and the Chamber o f Shipping o f the United Kingdom, in 
Board o f Trade Memorandum, ’Ships and Shipping Policy', 31 May 1933,
FO371/17328,W9190/5461/50; Parliamentary question by Colonel Ropner, the Conservative MP for 
Barkston Ash who was also a member of the Chamber of Shipping, to the President of the Board of 
Trade, 11 May 1933, FO371/17328,W5461/5461/50.
36. Annual Report o f  the Liverpool Steam Ship Owners’ Association, 1932, pp. 11-12, and 1933, pp. 14-15;
Sturmey S. G., p. 67.
37. Board o f Trade memorandum, 'Ships and Shipping Policy*, 31 May 1933,
F0371/17328.W9109/5461/50.
38. Although the Chamber of Shipping of the United Kingdom was increasingly reluctant to give 
unconditional support to an anti-British subsidy and pro-free trade policy, see below.
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the British shipping industry remained the reduction of protectionist measures and the 
resumption of growth in world trade. Thus the two main representative bodies of the British 
shipping industry, the Liverpool Steam Ship Owners’ Association and the Chamber of 
Shipping of the United Kingdom, in preparation for the June 1933 World Economic 
Conference's planned check of the spread of protectionism and return to more free trade 
policies - which included discussions on the way to reduce subsidies and restrictive practices 
in the shipping industry39 - rejected subsidies and the protection of imperial carrying trade. 
Both bodies feared the consequences of: foreign retaliation to British carrying trade 
protection; the estimated £21 million per annum cost of meeting all foreign subsidised 
competition; the further risk of a grotesque subsidy race with foreign competitors; the 
inefficiency subsidies would promote; and unfairness of subsidised British vessels 
competing against unsubsidised British vessels.40 Consequently, prior to the Conference the 
shipowners remained committed to the principles of free trade and non-subsidised 
operations.
However, the failure of the World Economic Conference to either remove trade 
barriers or deal with the specific problems of the world shipping industry undermined the 
previous unified commitment of the British shipping industry to free trade. The shipping 
industry split on sectional lines over the advocacy of subsidies for British shipping 
operations and the need to reserve Britain’s carrying trade for non-subsidised - i.e. British - 
vessels. While the Liverpool Steam Ship Owners' Association, representative of liner 
interests,41 remained hostile to the protection of British carrying trade and silent on the 
subsidy question,42 the larger Chamber of Shipping of the United Kingdom, representative of 
both the tramp and liner interests,43 advocated the immediate introduction of subsidies and
39. Annual Report o f the Liverpool Steam Ship Owners* Association, 1933, pp. 10-12, 15-16; Parliamentary
reply of the President of the Board of Trade, 11 May 1933, FO371/17328/W5461/5461/50.
40. Annual Report: Chamber o f Shipping o f the United Kingdom, 1932-1933, pp. 15, 157,181, 187-197; 
Annual Report o f  the Liverpool Steam Ship Owners'Association, 1933, pp. 12-14, 16-23; Memoranda 
o f the Liverpool Steam Ship Owners’ Association, and of the Chamber o f Shipping of the United 
Kingdom, in the Board of Trade memorandum, 'Ships and Shipping Policy', 31 May 1933,
F0371/17328, W9190/5461/50.
41. The Liverpool Steam Ship Owners Association represented some 4.75 million gross tons, some 25% of 
total British shipping, of mainly passenger and cargo liners, Memorandum of the President of the Board 
o f Trade, 11 December 1933, CAB 24 CP. 298(33).
42. Memorandum of the Liverpool Steam Ship Owners' Association, 22 September 1933, 
F0371/17328,W10903/5461/50;^4nwwa/ Report o f the Liverpool Steam Ship Owners' Association,
1934, pp. 11-12.
43. The Chamber of Shipping of the United Kingdom represented some 13 million gross tons, nearly 70% of
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the reservation of Britain’s carrying trade. In particular the Chamber of Shipping was 
concerned that British tramp shipping faced an immediate crisis which demanded urgent 
government support.44 Even before the start of the Conference the Chamber of Shipping’s 
waning commitment to free trade was evidenced by their demand that in the event of failure 
Britain should adopt retaliatory subsidies and seek to reserve Britain's carrying trade for 
British vessels.45 This was confirmed in July 1933, prior to the formal conclusion of the 
Conference, when the Chamber of Shipping adopted a resolution that, in the event of its 
failure, called for: the immediate introduction of British subsidies; the threat of the 
withdrawal of Britain's most favoured nation clause from countries that would not 
participate in a low tariff non-subsidy trade group; and the exclusion from Britain's intra- 
imperial trade of third parties who refused to extend similar concessions to British vessels in 
their intra-imperial and coasting trades.46 In December 1933 the Chamber of Shipping again 
complained of the crisis in the tramp shipping section and repeated earlier demands for 
government support.47 Finally, in March 1934 the annual conference of the Chamber of 
Shipping adopted the resolutions that: pending a revival of world trade any foreign subsidy 
must be met by an equivalent British subsidy; the need for a formation of a low tariff group; 
and the use of the threatened reservation of Britain's intra-imperial trade.48
In recognition of the intense pressure it was under from the Chamber of Shipping of
Britain's shipping capacity, of both tramp and liners, Memorandum of the President o f the Board of 
Trade, 11 December 1933, CAB 24 CP. 298(33).
44. Report of the Chamber of Shipping of the United Kingdom, 'British tramp Shipping before the war and 
in 1933', July 1933, FO371/17328,W9491/5461/50; Annual Report: Chamber o f Shipping o f the United 
Kingdom, 1933-1934, pp. 38-39. The fell o f the freight index for tramp ships had been fer greater than 
the fell of the index for liners, Board of Trade memorandum, 'Ships and Shipping Policy', 31 May 1933, 
FO371/17328,W9109/5461/50; See table 5.1. However, it was recognised that the faU in trade volumes 
meant that liners frequently sailed without a full cargo and thus the index for liners underestimated the 
fen in earning capacity o f liners, Board o f Trade memorandum, 'Ships and Shipping Policy’, 31 May 
1933, FO371/17328,W9109/5461/50; Sturmey S. G., pp. 66-67.
45. Annual Report: Chamber o f Shipping o f the United Kingdom, 1932-1933, pp. 15-16; Memorandum of
the Chamber of Shipping of the United Kingdom, in Board of Trade memorandum, 'Ships and Shipping 
Policy', 31 May 1933, FO371/17328,W9109/5461/50.
46. Recommendations o f the Shipping Policy Committee of the Chamber of Shipping of the United 
Kingdom, 28 July 1933, F0371/17328,W9491/5461/50.
47. Report of the Chamber o f Shipping Special Committee on Tramp Shipping, 11 December 1933, CAB 24 
CP. 298(33); see table 5.5.
48. Annual Report: Chamber o f Shipping o f the United Kingdom, 1933-1934, pp. 42-44, 103-107; Annual
Meeting of the Chamber of Shipping of the United Kingdom, 1 March 1934, in 
F0371/18485, W2430/291 /50.
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the United Kingdom for a domestic solution to the current shipping crisis,49 the British 
government gave only halfhearted support50 to the non-subsidising Dutch and Scandinavian 
countries' request for further international discussions on the shipping subsidy question.51 
Following the collapse of the World Economic Conference the government was increasingly 
sympathetic to the demands of the shipping industry for some form of government 
intervention. Even Sir Walter Runciman, the President of the Board of Trade who came 
from an orthodox free trade background in the shipping industry52 and was a reluctant 
protectionist and advocate of state involvement in industry,53 was alarmed at the plight of 
British tramp shipping. In response to the demands of the Chamber of Shipping, Runciman, 
together with Neville Chamberlain, the Chancellor of the Exchequer, publicly declared that 
they would not allow the collapse of the British shipping industry.54 Consequently, on 13 
December 1933 a cabinet committee was established to examine the demands of the 
Chamber of Shipping.55 However, while the committee recognised the need to offer some 
form of state aid to the shipping industry it refused to endorse the Chamber of Shipping’s 
demand for extensive subsidies to the whole shipping industry, and proposed only a limited 
subsidy to the tramp section together with a state funded ’scrap and build’ scheme.56 One of 
the main reasons for rejecting subsidies for the entire British merchant fleet was because the 
shipping industry itself was deeply divided over the need for extensive state subsidies.57 In 
recognition of the crisis in the shipping industry the cabinet accepted the committee’s 
recommendation and agreed a British counter-subsidy to the tramp section together with a 
'scrap and build’ scheme as the only way to counter shipping industry demands for support in
49. Minute by Clarke, 17 August 1933, FO371/17328,W9491/5461/50.
50. Foley (Board o f Trade) to the Foreign Office, 13 April 1934, and 25 May 1934, 
F0371/18486,W3557,W5115/291/50.
51. Danish Minister (London) to the Foreign Office, 22 March 1934, FO371/18486,W2863/291/50.
52. Runciman was the President of the Chamber of Shipping of the United Kingdom in 1926.
53. Speech of Sir W. Runciman at the annual banquet of the Chamber of Shipping o f the United Kingdom,
10 February 1933, Annual Report: Chamber o f Shipping o f the United Kingdom, 1932-1933, pp. 227- 
228.
54. Cabinet Conclusions, 13 December 1933, CAB 23 69(33)5.
55. Memorandum of the President of the Board of Trade, 'The Position of British Mercantile Marine', 25 
June 1934, CAB 24 CP. 161(34).
56. Memorandum o f the President o f the Board o f Trade, The Position o f British Mercantile Marine’, 25 
June 1934, CAB 24 CP. 161(34).
57. Memorandum of the President o f the Board o f Trade, The Position o f British Mercantile Marine', 25 
June 1934, CAB 24 CP. 161(34); Annual Report o f  the Liverpool Steam Ship Owners' Association,
1934, pp. 38-40; Annual Report: Chamber o f Shipping o f the United Kingdom, 1934-1935, pp. 50-53.
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its fight against subsided competition.58 No strong objections were raised to the tramp 
subsidy or the ’scrap and build’ scheme; the Foreign Office accepted that in a protectionist 
age these measures had few international ramifications.59 Both the ’scrap and build’ scheme 
and a £2 million annual subsidy to tramp shipping were introduced in 1935.60 However, 
while the Board of Trade accepted limited operating subsidies for the tramp section, it 
remained unwilling to endorse any measure of shipping restriction. The Board argued that 
the Chamber of Shipping’s concept of a low tariff non-subsidy group would prove 
ineffective; the threat of reserving intra-imperial trade risked substantial economic 
retaliation and dangerous economic estrangement from the United States; while the Board 
doubted if Britain's existing commercial treaties would allow for the reservation of intra- 
imperial trade.61 Finally, in rejecting the various proposals to enhance Britain’s carrying 
trade the Board pointed out that divisions within the shipping industry underlined the 
dangers of these measures.62
While the introduction of the tramp subsidy met the demand of the tramp section for 
government support, it did nothing for other sectors of the British shipping industry. 
Although the British shipping industry had been unwilling to endorse extensive shipping 
subsidies, this did not mean that liner operators had abandoned their opposition to subsidised 
foreign competition and the need for some form of government support.63 In both the North 
Atlantic and Pacific routes the British shipping industry complained of the dire effect of such 
subsidised competition. British shipowners were particularly concerned over the effects of 
American competition upon established British services. The British argued that because of 
the S3 billion subsidy paid to the American merchant marine since 1920, British ships were 
unable to compete against subsidised American vessels.64 Further, Alexander Shaw, the
58. Cabinet Conclusions, 27 June 1934, CAB 23 26(34)9, and 5 December 1934, CAB 23 45(34)12.
59. Minute by Shuckburg, 26 June 1934, FO371/18486,W6248/291/50; Memorandum by Ashton-Gwatkin, 
27 November 1934, FO371/18487,W10494/291/50.
60. Sturmey S G., pp. 108-110; Hope R., pp. 366-367.
61. Board of Trade memorandum, 16 September 1933, F0371/17328,W10596/5461/50; Low (Board of 
Trade) to Malkin (Foreign Office), 9 January 1934, F0371/18485, W291/291/50; Board of Trade to the 
Foreign Office, 5 February 1934, FO371/18485,W1338/291/50; Foley (Board of Trade) to the Foreign 
Office, 25 May 1934, F0371/18486,W5115/291/50.
62. Memorandum o f the President o f the Board o f Trade, The Position of British Mercantile Marine’, 25 
June 1934, CAB 24 CP. 161(34).
63. Annual Report: Chamber o f Shipping o f the United Kingdom, 1935-1936, p. 60.
64. Statement by Sir Alan Anderson, Chairman of the Orient Line, 28 December 1932, in 
F0371/16601 ,A2723/29/45.
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forceful Chairman of the Peninsular and Oriental Steam Navigation Company (P&O), 
added his considerable weight to these complaints. Shaw emphasised the disadvantages 
British shipowners faced. Not only did American ships receive^ considerable subsidies, 
these vessels remained free to participate in the British coasting trade while unsubsidised 
British vessels were excluded from the extensive American coasting trade.63 However, in 
response to this British attack, leading Americans, including T. V. O’ Connor, the Chairman 
of the United States Shipping Board, strongly defended their position: the British 
exaggerated the extent of the subsidy to American vessels, since they had included the 
inflated price of American wartime construction which had been sold cheaply after the war 
to American owners but which had been built in response to appeals from America’s wartime 
allies; American vessels competed at a fair freight rate, since subsidies were only intended to 
equalize competition; the British subsidised their merchant fleet; and finally, the merchant 
marine of America was a great national asset that should not be dissipated.66 Thus the 
Depression witnessed considerable public friction between leaders of the British shipping 
industry and their American counterparts.
In contrast to British shipping interests, who were outspoken in their criticism of 
American shipping policy, the British government remained reluctant to be drawn into this 
dispute in support of their shipping industry. Officials realised that if the subsidy issue was 
to be addressed, Britain would have to apportion blame and thus risk inflaming American 
opinion. For the British government the importance of maintaining American goodwill 
dictated a more delicate approach on a matter involving domestic American policy. Such 
were British sensitivities to American opinion on the subsidy issue that, at the Foreign 
Office’s request and with the concurrence of the Board of Trade, a White Paper on foreign 
shipping subsidies - which had been prepared to meet British demands for official 
information on the subject - was not released between April and June 1933, to avoid 
antagonising American opinion during the World Economic Conference.67 Even after the 
failure of the Conference, the British government still depended upon American goodwill, 
and thus refused to antagonise American opinion over the question of American shipping 
subsidies. One Board of Trade official informed the Foreign Office that on the question of
65. A. Shaw, 11 December 1932, Peninsular and Oriental Steam Navigation Company: Report o f the 
Proceedings at the Ninety-Second General Meeting o f the Proprietors, 1932, p. 17.
66. T. V. O' Connor, Chairman of the United States Shipping Board, and Senator Copeland of New York, in 
Lindsay (Washington) to Simon, 6 January 1933, FO371/16601,A556/29/45.
67. Craigie, Foreign Office minute, 5 April 1933, FO371/16601,A2723/29/45.
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the proposed introduction of British shipping subsidies care must be taken not to offend 
American opinion, because of the ’’delicate negotiations [which] are in progress with the 
United States for the settlement of debts,... obviously a policy of economic unfriendliness to 
the United States is not to be encouraged".68 Following this line, when Britain finally 
introduced its own shipping subsidy special care was taken, on Foreign Office advice, not to 
enrage American opinion by giving the impression that British subsidies were imposed in 
retaliation to American subsidies.69 Consequently, the Board of Trade changed the name of 
the tramp subsidy from a ’fighting subsidy’ to a more modest ’defensive subsidy'.70 In a 
continuation of this policy, British shipowners recognised that the desire not to offend 
American opinion was a major factor in the British government's refusal to extend subsidies 
to specific liner services that were suffering from subsidised American competition.71
The reluctance of the British government to criticise American shipping policy did 
not halt shipping leaders from continuing their attacks upon the American threat to specific 
British liner services, or demands for government action in defence of these services. Even 
after the introduction of the tramp subsidy liner operators remained concerned that specific 
British services not entitled to the tramp subsidy were still threatened by grossly over- 
subsidised foreign competitors. In regard to unfair American competition in the Pacific 
British resentment focused upon the American owned Matson Line, that was in direct 
competition with the British owned Union Steam Ship Company on the New-Zealand- 
Australia-Canada-United States trade route.72 Led by Alexander Shaw, whose P&O group 
owned the Union Steam Ship Company,73 the British complained that this subsidised service
68. Baker (Board of Trade) to Leigh-Smith (Foreign Office), 16 September 1933,
F0371/F17328/W10596/5461/50.
69. Lindsay (Washington) to Foreign Office, 20 June 1934, FO371/18486,W5979/291/50.
70. Marder (Board of Trade) to Foreign Office, 28 June 1934, FO371/18486,W6346/291/50.
71. Annual Report: Chamber o f Shipping o f the United Kingdom, 1935-1936, p. 60.
72. As an indication of the importance British shipping attached to the need to deal with the Matson Line 
issue, in the Shipping Policy Committee o f the Chamber of United Kingdom Shipping, the question of 
the Matson Line was considered as important as the formation o f a low tariff group and the reservation 
of intra-imperial trade, Recommendations of the Shipping Policy Committee o f the Chamber of 
Shipping of the United Kingdom, 28 July 1933, FO371/17328,W9491/5461/50. In contrast British 
complaints over various other specific shipping issues never received such prominence, for example, 
complaints by British shipping interests over the manipulation o f the German exchange control law to 
favour the shipment of North American apples in German vessels to the United Kingdom did not 
received such a formal display of concern, Foley (Board of Trade) to the Foreign Office, 13 December 
1934, F0371/17774,C8555/8555/l 8.
73. Sturmey S. G., p. 131.
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was a direct threat to the continued existence of the British service upon this important 
imperial trade route. Since 1928 the Matson Line had been in receipt of an annual operating 
subsidy of $800,000per annum, however, when this subsidy was increased to $ 1 million per 
annum in 1932 together with a low interest government loan for the completion of two 
modem vessels,74 British complaints increased dramatically. From 1932 Shaw led a 
campaign, which had widespread support within the British shipping industry,75 that 
emphasised how an important unsubsidised British service was threatened with extinction 
by a subsidised American competitor. Furthermore, he noted that the American exclusion of 
foreign vessels from its coasting trade meant that while the Matson Line vessels could ply the 
British trans-oceanic imperial trade routes between Canada, Australia, and New Zealand, 
British competitors were barred from similar trans-oceanic American coasting routes, e.g. 
Hawaii to San Francisco, and San Francisco to New York. Consequently, the combination of 
the operating and building subsidies together with American shipping policy restrictions 
demanded some form of British government retaliation, in the form of a subsidy to the 
British line or the exclusion of the Matson Line from these imperial trade routes.76
Even though the shipping industiy ran a vociferous campaign against the Matson 
Line the British government remained reluctant to intervene to aid the Union Steam Ship 
Company. Calls for the exclusion of the Matson Line from imperial trade routes were easily 
dealt with by the British government, especially because the shipping industry remained 
equally unwilling to give its wholehearted endorsement to this policy. Although the 
Chamber of Shipping ofthe United Kingdom had advocated the barring of the Matson Line it 
accepted that this should not be done at the risk of American retaliation against British 
shipping, since "the disadvantage arising from a general conflict in which British ships were 
excluded from American trades would exceed the advantages to be derived from 
counteracting a specific evil in the Pacific".77 Thus in September 1933, because of these
74. Imperial Shipping Committee, The Possibilities o f a British Passenger and Cargo Service between
Western Canada and Australia and New Zealand (HMSO, London; 1936), p. 12; Sturmey S. G., p.
131.
75. A. Shaw, 11 December 1932, Peninsular and Oriental Steam Navigation Company: Report o f  the 
Proceedings at the Ninety-Second General Meeting o f the Proprietors, 1932, p. 17; Memorandum of 
the Chamber of Shipping of the United Kingdom, 8 August 1933, F0371/17328,W9491/5461/50;
Annual Report: Chamber o f Shipping o f the United Kingdom, 1935-1936, pp. 60-61.
76. The Times, 7 December 1933; Memorandum of the Chamber of Shipping of the United Kingdom, 8 
August 1933, FO371/17328,W9491/5461/50; Peninsular and Oriental Steam Navigation Company: 
Report o f  the Proceedings at the Ninety-Fifth General Meeting o f the Proprietors, 1935, pp. 27-31.
77. Recommendations of the Shipping Policy Committee of the Chamber of Shipping of the United 
Kingdom, 28 July 1933, FO371/17328/W9491/5461/50.
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precise fears, the Board of Trade firmly rejected demands for the exclusion of the Matson 
Line from the Australia, New Zealand, and Fiji trade routes.78 On the question of providing a 
counter subsidy to the Union Steam Ship Company the British government's reluctance to 
provide the financial backing for such a measure79 and refusal to appear to be engaged in a 
subsidy war with the United States,80 was compounded by a similar reluctance by the 
respective Dominion governments.81 Neither the Australian, Canadian* nor New Zealand 
governments displayed any strong desire to subsidise a British shipping line against its 
American competitor. Both the Canadian and Australian governments had shown an 
inclination to develop domestic shipping services,82 whilst various Dominion authorities 
showed an increased hostility to British competition with their own domestic shipping 
industries.83 Moreover, the American subsidised Matson Line offered the significant 
advantage to Dominion traders and passengers of a superior below-cost service, paid for by 
American taxpayers, which was more than could be offered by free competition in the 
Australasian-North American service.84 Thus the British and Dominion governments 
showed no inclinationto offerthe Union Steam Ship Company any counter subsidy to enable 
it to compete with the subsidised Matson Line vessels.
However, attitudes towards the need to support the Union Steam Ship Company 
began to change when the British owners combined the withdrawal of their Australia-New 
Zealand-San Francisco service in 1935 with the threatened withdrawal of the British 
Australia-New Zealand-Vancouver service.85 In response to this display of British 
commercial retreat Runciman accepted, "now the threat especially on the Pacific is so grave
78. Baker (Board of Trade) to Leigh-Smith (Foreign Office), 16 September 1933,
F0371/17328, W10596/5461 /50.
79. Annual Report: Chamber o f Shipping o f the United Kingdom, J935-1936, p. 60; The Shipping World,
26 February 1936, p. 244.
80. Minute by Shuckburg, 26 June 1934, FO37l/18486,W6428/291/50.
81. Cabinet Conclusions, 27 June 1934, CAB 23 26(34)9.
82. Annual Report o f the Liverpool Steam Ship Owners* Association, 1929, p. 15; Sturmey S. G., pp. 100-
101.
83. The Shipping World, 10 June 1936, p. 639.
84. The Shipping World, 1 July 1936, pp. 1-2.
85. Peninsular and Oriental Steam Navigation Company: Report o f the Proceedings at the Ninety-Fifth
General Meeting o f the Proprietors, 1935, p. 28; The Shipping World, 26 May 1937, pp. 639-640.
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that something will have to be done”,86 a concern that was echoed in both New Zealand and 
Australia.87 Consequently, in July 1936 the Matson Line issue was put before the prestigious 
Imperial Shipping Committee,88 which concluded that successful British competition was 
only possible with some form of state assistance.89 Furthermore, the Australian and New 
Zealand governments began preparations for the introduction of legislation to exclude 
foreign shipping from the Tasman Sea, pending negotiations with the American 
government.90 Nevertheless, even after this consensus had been reached, British shipowners 
found a general reluctance to take the recommended action. In February 1937 The Shipping 
World, which had offered powerful support for Shaw's campaign, regretted that the proposal 
to introduce a subsidy to the British line still awaited Parliamentary approval, while the 
attitudes of the Australian, Canadian and New Zealand governments on the subsidy and to 
the reservation of the Tasman Sea also remained unclear.91 Thus the British and Dominion 
governments' response to the Matson Line question once again indicated the unwillingness 
of British imperial authorities to become deeply involved in specific commercial issues 
within the shipping industry.
86. The Shipping World, 26 February 1936, p. 244.
87. The Shipping World, 15 April 1936, p. 450, and 17 June 1936, pp. 664, 667.
88. The Shipping World, 1 July 1936, pp. 1-2.
89. The Imperial Shipping Committee recommended an annual subsidy o f £372,00 for two 25,000 ton 21 
knot vessels, thought it did not suggest which governments should pay the subsidy, The Shipping 
World, 9 December 1936, pp. 617-618.
90. The Shipping World, 4 November 1936, p. 453, and 17 February 1937, p. 205.
91. Annual Report: Chamber o f Shipping o f the United Kingdom, 1937-1938, p. 80; The Shipping World,
17 February 1937, pp. 205-206, and 26 May 1937, pp. 639-640.
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British shipping interests and the rise of Japanese competition in the Pacific-East Asia 
region.
Although the British shipping industry faced numerous competitive challenges in the 1930s, 
by the latter half of the decade Japanese shipping emerged as one of its most dangerous 
rivals. In the twentieth century Japanese owned merchant tonnage increased spectacularly, 
from 1.7 million tons in 1914, to 2.99 million tons in 1920, and4.3 million tons by 1930.92 By 
the mid-1930s, despite some scepticism,93 the British were acutely aware of the competitive 
advantages held by the Japanese shipping industry. One was the depreciation of the yen 
(although the British denied that the depreciation of the pound had given them any unfair 
advantage against German and Dutch competition) which, backed by a low standard of 
livingand comparatively low wage inflation, gave the Japanese a substantial cost advantage 
over British operators in both the building and operation of vessels.94 Another was the 
vertical integration of the Zaibatsu merchant-shipping enterprises which gave the Japanese 
greater organisational flexibility over the numerous independent British shippers.95 A third 
was the high quality of management in the Japanese shipping industry, and its close 
cooperation with the Japanese government.96 Finally, changes in trade patterns in the 
Pacific-East Asia region favoured shipping based in Japan: one resulted from Japan's rapid 
recovery from the Depression which benefited Japanese shipping and which made Japanese 
shipping services more cost effective;97 the second was the role of Japanese shipping firms in
92. Chida T., and Davies P. N., Appendix, table H., p. 205; see table 5.6.
93. Some British commentators suggested that the British merchant fleet was superior because of the 
relative modernity of British vessels when compared to the Japanese merchant fleet, table 5.7.
94. Of course such wage advantages would not apply if the British were operating non-British crews in their 
British registered vessels, and the advantage in building costs was available to British shipowners if they 
placed orders with Japanese yards, but presumably in the 1930s considerations of national pride made 
this politically unacceptable. Imperial Shipping Committee, British Shipping in the Orient, pp. 64-72; 
see table 5.8.
95. The British claimed the Zaibatsu could build, operate, fuel, insure, supply with cargo, warehouse the 
cargo, and supply the banking credit for its shipping operations, Imperial Shipping Committee, pp. 72- 
75; Tatsuki M., Intensifying Competition and Streamlining o f Japanese Shipping Companies: The 
Pacific Routes between the Two World Wars', Business History (1993), p. 89.
96. For example in the interwar period Japanese firms were some of the first to pioneer time charter 
management for cargo vessels, Chida T., and Davies P. N., pp. 41-3; Mance O., p. 93. The Shipping 
World admired the cooperation between business and government in the success of the Japanese 
shipping industry, The Shipping World, 21 October 1936, p. 105; see tables 5.5 and 5.9.
97. Japanese trade volumes increased from 1.18 billion yen in 1914, to 3.6 billion yen in 1918, 4.37 billion 
yen in 1929, and 6.69 billion yen in 1937, further, in the 1930s Japan's trade recovered quickly from the 
Depression, Chida T., and Davies P. N., p. 29; Imperial Shipping Committee, British Shipping in the 
Orient, pp. 4, 10, 31-33; Annual Report o f  the Liverpool Steam Ship Owners'Association, 1937, pp.
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the 1930s in developing trans-oceanic cargo services that captured much of the carrying 
trade between Asia and America which had formerly gone in European vessels via the Suez 
canal.98 Thus in the 1930s the Japanese shipping industry emerged as a formidable 
international competitor, no longer solely concerned with the carrying trade of Japan.
British shipping interests had every reason to be gloomy. Not only had Japan 
developed an efficient shipping industry which had made substantial inroads into British 
shipping's Pacific-East Asian carrying trade, but future Japanese expansion plans threatened 
a further retreat of Britain's still unsubsidised liner services. The British shipping industry 
was furious that state subsidised Japanese vessels now dominated several shipping routes 
that had been pioneered by British shipping interests in the nineteenth century. In 1936 the 
British complained that the Japanese now carried 73% of the Bombay-Japan trade, and 79% 
of the Australia-Japan trade, on routes which until 1914 had been dominated by British 
vessels.99 However, despite these successes, it was the future government-sponsored 
expansion plans for the Japanese merchant fleet that added to the industry's worries. The 
British anticipated that this expansion of shipping services would be in the Pacific-East Asia 
region, and in direct competition with established British shipping services. In 1936 the 
Japanese Diet proposed a further 'scrap and build’ scheme to expand the Japanese merchant 
fleet by 2 million tons to a total of 6 million tons. Japanese plans focused upon the building 
of large and fast cargo liners which were considered particularly suited to exploiting the long 
haul routes of the Pacific-East Asia region.100 These expansion plans posed a considerable
18-19. Moreover, Japanese trade was dominated by Japanese shipping, in 1936 66% of all Japan's trade 
was carried by Japanese vessels, Imperial Shipping Committee, British Shipping in the Orient, pp. 4,
33; Tatsuki M., pp. 89-90.
98. Le Canal de Suez, Bulletin Decadaire de la Compagnie Universelle du Canal Maritime de Suez, 25
April 1937; The Shipping World, 12 May 1937, pp. 582-583; Wray W. D., TSTYK and the Commercial 
Diplomacy of the Far Eastern Freight Conference, 1896-1956', pp. 296-297; Radius W. A., United 
States Shipping in Transpacific trade, (Stanford University, California; 1944), pp. 111-128; Goto S., 
The Progress o f Shipping Operators Belonging to Trading Companies: The Scheduled Services to 
North America of the Shipping Division of Mitsui Trading Company Between the Two World Wars', 
Japan Yearbook on Business History (1986), pp. 68-69; Tatsuki M., pp. 88-107.
99. The Shipping World, 24 June 1936, p. 639; Annual Report: Chamber o f Shipping o f the United 
Kingdom, 1936-1937, pp. 62-36; Imperial Shipping Committee, British Shipping in the Orient, pp. 19- 
20.
100. Between 1931 and 1935 only 64.3% of British ocean-going merchant ship construction (by tonnage 
and excluding tankers) consisted o f cargo liners, while for the same period 88.9% of all Japanese ocean­
going merchant ship construction (by tonnage and excluding tankers) consisted of cargo liners, see table 
5.10. Further it was rumoured that the Japanese government was encouraging Japanese shipowners to 
order +20 knot cargo liners, The Shipping World, 12 August 1936, p. 151, 23 December 1936, pp. 675- 
676, and 9 June 1937, p. 687; The Shipping World, 24 June 1936, p. 639, and 24 March 1937, pp. 364- 
365; Annual Report: Chamber o f Shipping o f the United Kingdom, 1936-1937, pp. 60-63; Chida T. and
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threat to Britain's still profitable and extensive carrying trade in the region. The Chamber of 
Shipping of the United Kingdom estimated that in 1936 British shipowners earned £33 
million, some 25% of total shipping earnings, from external and internal trade in the Pacific- 
East Asia region. Moreover, £21 million, or 63.6% of this total came from liner freight 
earnings.101 Consequently, further intensified competition in the region was unwelcome to 
the British, especially since cargo volume and rates were described as so low.102
The fears of the expansion of the Japanese merchant fleet prompted a sudden change 
in attitude to Japanese competition between 1936-37, especially after December 1936.103 
Japanese competition was now portrayed as the new menace to British shipping.104 
However, there remained a strong element of continuity in the British position, which 
followed the same pattern of hostility that had been displayed towards subsidised American 
liner competition. First came demands for government support for British shipping services 
threatened by subsidised foreign competition, and as in the case of subsidised American 
competition, the British shipping interests launched both a general attack on Japanese 
subsidy practices and specific attacks upon particularly threatening Japanese operations. 
The similarity between the Japanese and American shipping threat was explicitly linked in 
the early stages of the British anti-Japanese campaign. For the British the emergent Japanese 
competition followed the example of previous American predators: the Japanese like other 
nations saw British Empire trade routes as an easy target, as The Shipping World stated, 
"Like all other maritime powers seeking new trade routes, she has cast her eyes on the 
expanding trade of the British Empire".105 The same article put American and Japanese 
competition under the same banner: each was part of the same threat to British Empire trade, 
"both countries subsidise their shipping, both concentrate on the development of liner
Davies P. N., pp. 44, 47-49; Nakagawa K., Japanese Shipping in the Nineteenth and Twentieth 
Centuries: Strategy and Organisation', in Yui T., and Nakagawa K., (eds.), Business History o f  
Shipping: Strategy and Structure (University of Tokyo, Tokyo; 1985), pp. 12-15; Tatsuki M., p. 91.
101. Imperial Shipping Committee, British Shipping in the Orient, p. 10.
102. Apart from the expansion of Japan's foreign trade most countries' foreign trade in the Pacific-East Asia 
region was slow to recover from the Depression, Imperial Shipping Committee, British Shipping in the 
Orient, p. 10; The Shipping World, 17 July 1935, pp. 50-51.
103. The Shipping World, 9 January 1935, p. 48-9, 5 June 1935, p. 653, and 30 October 1935, p. 443; Lord 
Essenden, chairman of the Prince Line, address to shareholders, in The Shipping World, 21 October 
1936, p. 105.
104. A  Shaw, chairman of P&O, annual address to shareholders, in The Shipping World, 16 December 
1936, pp. 641-643.
105. The Shipping World, 4 December 1935, p. 597.
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services and are little interested in tramp shipping, and both are Pacific Powers”. 106 Thus 
from the viewpoint of British shipping there was a strong continuity in its demands for 
government support to combat both American and Japanese competition in the Pacific.
Faced by the threat of increased Japanese competition British shipping interests once 
again demanded government support in defence of their vital commercial interests: little 
interest was displayed in reducing commercial friction through cooperation.107 Moreover, at 
a time of increased concern over the ability of the British merchant fleet to maintain imperial 
communications in time of war,10S the British shipping industry bolstered its demands for 
government support by implying that Japanese competition posed a threat to Britain's 
imperial defence interests. In wartime the speed and size of a cargo liner offered distinct 
tactical and strategic advantages, and thus "it is not without significance that the three 
principal liner owning countries of the world - Great Britain, the United States and Japan - 
are also the three principal Naval Powers”.109 Therefore it was a disadvantage to Britain’s 
rearmament programme and intra-imperial communications, if British cargo liners were not 
replaced due to subsidised foreign competition.110 Thus in response to the needs of British 
shipping and British imperial defence interests towards the end of 1936, again led by 
Alexander Shaw and the Chamber of Shipping of the United Kingdom, British shipping 
interests launched a campaign to denounce subsidised Japanese competition.111 Demands of 
these shipping interests again focused on the need for government subsidies to specific liner 
services and the possible exclusion of Japanese services from British imperial carrying 
trade. In Parliament W. H. G. Gritten, the Conservative MP for The Hartlepools, demanded 
that the British government coordinate the various imperial authorities in restricting 
Japanese competition in imperial waters.112 To further these demands, on 21 December
106. The Shipping World, 4 December 1935, p. 597.
107. Annual Report: Chamber o f Shipping o f the United Kingdom, 1936-1937, p. 150. The Shipping 
World did state that the termination of the Anglo-Japanese alliance was a matter of regret, since it had 
led to Japan's pursuit of her own forceful foreign and shipping policies, however, there was no 
suggestion that a new political understanding could offer a solution to the current shipping problem, The 
Shipping World, 23 December 1936, p. 695.
108. One of the tasks of the 1937 Imperial Conference was to see if the British Empire had a adequate 
merchant marine to meet wartime requirements, Annual Report: Chamber o f Shipping o f  the United 
Kingdom, 1936-1937, pp. 57-60.
109. The Shipping World, 29 April 1936, p. 495.
110. Annual Report: Chamber o f Shipping o f the United Kingdom, 1936-1937, pp. 150-154.
111 .Annual Report: Chamber o f Shipping o f the United Kingdom, 1936-1937, pp. 61-63.
112. House of Commons Debates, 25 November 1936, Parliamentary Debates. Official Report, 5th Series,
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1936, the President of the Chamber of Shipping led a delegation to the India Office to 
complain of Japanese shipping in Asia.113
Within the shipping industry the demand for the exclusion of Japanese shipping was 
more modest than previous demands for the exclusion of foreign shipping from British intra- 
imperial trade. In 1935 Shaw had demanded that any foreign shipping restriction should be 
met by a similar British restriction.114 However, the following year, while he complained of 
the injustice of the fact that while British vessels were excluded from the Japanese Empire 
coasting trade, he only suggested that Japanese vessels should be barred from various British 
Empire coasting trades, and notBritain’s intra-imperial trade routes.115 Nevertheless, despite 
the claim that Shaw's remarks had widespread support within the shipping industry,116 even 
his modest proposal incurred the wrath of the still considerable free trade shipping lobby. 
The Liverpool Steam Ship Owners' Association thundered against any suggestion that 
success of Japanese competition should be used as some form of pretext for the reservation 
ofBritain's intra-imperial trade,
The Association finds it difficult to envisage any proposal more destructive than this 
of its main object in view, or more certain to create another and drastic barrier to the 
resumption of normal economic commercial relations, or more capable of 
increasing international embitterment.117
Ironically this view that the recovery of the British shipping industry depended upon the 
removal of barriers to trade had widespread support in the Chamber of Shipping.118 The 
Association was equally dismissive of claims that subsidies had played a prominent part in 
the expansion of the Japanese shipping industry. Not only did it now consider fears of the 
detrimental effect of foreign subsidies on British shipping to be exaggerated,119 it also
volume 318 (HMSO, London; 1937), p. 500.
113. Annual Report: Chamber o f Shipping o f the United Kingdom, 1936-1937, pp. 60-63.
114. Peninsular and Oriental Steam Navigation Company: Report o f the Proceedings at the Ninety-Fifth 
General Meeting o f the Proprietors, 1935, pp. 32-34.
115. Annual Report: Chamber o f Shipping o f the United Kingdom, 1936-1937, pp. 60-63.
116. The Shipping World, 16 December 1936, p. 644, and 3 February 1937, p. 150.
117. Annual Report o f the Liverpool Steam Ship Owners'Association, 1938, p. 15.
118. Annual Report: Chamber o f Shipping o f the United Kingdom, 1935-1936, pp. 136-139, 1936-1937, 
pp. 55-57, 154-157, and 1937-1938, pp. 168-171.
119. Annual Report o f  the Liverpool Steam Ship Owners' Association, 1936, pp. 8-24.
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dismissed claims that the Japanese shipping industry was heavily subsidised.120 In the view 
of the Association there was no easy solution to the problem of Japanese competition.121 
Thus the force of the British shipping interests’ demand for government support was severely 
weakened by divisions within the British shipping industry over the appropriate response to 
Japanese competition.
In campaigning for assistance against Japanese competition the British shipping 
industry also focused upon the various imperial authorities that it would have to rely upon for 
the grant of any counter-subsidies or the enforcement of anti-Japanese measures. The 
Chamber of Shipping of the United Kingdom based its plea for joint imperial action against 
Japanese shipping on the grounds that the defence of imperial sea communications was vital 
to all imperial authorities. "The communications of the British Empire are a vital Common 
interest and an attack by foreign subsidised competition upon both Empire and inter-Empire 
[sic] routes concerns the Empire as a whole and calls for joint consideration by all its 
Governments. "l22 However, the British shipping interests had well-founded fears, as the case 
of the Matson Line had demonstrated, over the willingness of the British and Dominion 
governments to cooperate over the question of subsidised foreign shipping competition. In 
1936, while underlining the threat of Japanese competition, the Chamber of Shipping 
ruefully noted that in the four years since the initiation of the anti-Matson Line campaign 
little had been done by the various imperial governments to support the Union Steam Ship 
Company.123 Again, as in the case of the Matson Line, the Dominions had no incentive to 
match Japanese subsidies or exclude low cost Japanese services from its ports. In December 
1935 the New Zealand Minister of Industries and Commerce warmly welcomed the 
introduction by a Japanese company of a new Japan-New Zealand service, since it would 
improve the competitive position of all New Zealand industries in the world market.124 Once 
the campaign against Japanese competition began, complaints about the extent of British, 
Dominion and Indian government support quickly surfaced. The Shipping World deplored 
the indifference of the British, Dominion and Indian governments. "The apathy of the
120. Annual Report o f the Liverpool Steam Ship Owners’Association, 1937, pp. 18-19.
121. Annual Report o f the Liverpool Steam Ship Owners'Association, 1937, pp. 18-19.
122. Annual Report: Chamber o f Shipping o f the United Kingdom, 1936-1937, pp. 60-63.
123. Annual Report: Chamber o f Shipping o f the United Kingdom, 1936-1937, pp. 60-63; The Shipping 
World 26 May 1937, pp. 639-640.
124. Shipping World, 4 December 1935, p. 597.
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Government of India towards the interests of British shipping - an apathy which it shares 
with the Government of this country and the Dominions, with the possible exception of New 
Zealand - is one of the distinguishing facts of to-day.”125 Consequently, this indifference 
indicated that even if the British government was willing to initiate vigorous action in 
defence of British shipping interests it might receive only limited support from the various 
Empire authorities.
125. The Shipping World, 23 December 1936, pp. 672-673. In keeping with this line o f attack, The
Shipping World called the report of the 1937 Imperial Conference on shipping a 'colourless document', 
and branded the Dominions as having no interest in shipping, The Shipping World, 23 June 1937, pp. 
737-738.
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The failure of the British shipping industry fs campaign against Japanese competition.
With the start of the anti-Japanese campaign in 1936, while the British government was not 
hostile to the shipping industry's demands for support there was little evidence that it 
regarded the threat of Japanese shipping competition as a priority. In disseminating 
information on Japanese shipping competition the Board of Trade gave no indication that an 
urgent resolution of this question was required. There were no hurried consultations 
between the Board and various other departments on the need for an immediate response to 
the demands of the shipping industry. Furthermore, this general disinclination to do 
anything in the short-run was reflected in other departments. One Foreign Office official 
noted that many of the British complaints against Japanese shipping practices were 
exaggerated. The effect of the 1931 devaluation of the yen upon Japanese shipping costs was 
now exhausted, in economic terms the reservation of Japan's coasting trade was 
unimportant, while annual Japanese operating subsidies, at £640,000 in 1936, were 
considerably less than the £2,000,000 British subsidy paid to tramp shipping.126 A similar 
disinterest to the plight of British shipping was shown by the India Office. While it agreed 
that it was prepared to preserve the relatively unimportant Indian coasting trade as an Anglo- 
Indian preserve, even though it did not regard Japanese participation in this carrying trade as 
jty. detrimental to Indian interests,127 it informed the Foreign Office that it was reluctant to see 
India’s more important overseas carrying trade as a purely British preserve.128 Thus, given 
this official disinterest in Japanese shipping competition, the whole question of Britain's 
response was handed over to the Imperial Shipping Committee,129 which relieved the British 
government of the need to undertake any general response to the demands of the British 
shipping industry. Consequently, there was no immediate need for the Foreign Office to 
consider the implications for Anglo-Japanese relations of British restrictions upon Japanese 
shipping.
However, while the Imperial Shipping Committee was delegated the responsibility
126. Memorandum by Scott-Fox, 15 February 1937, FO371/21032,F949/63/23.
127. Carter (Board of Trade) to Ronald (Foreign Office), 25 February 1937, FO371/21032,F1208/63/23.
128. Memorandum by Scott-Fox, 17 February 1937, F0371/21032,F949/63/23.
129. Memorandum by Scott-Fox, 15 February 1937, FO371/21032,F949/63/23.
130. Minute by Ashton-Gwatkin, 6 February 1937, FO371/21032,F949/63/23; Minute by Orde, February 
1937, FO371/21032,F949/63/23.
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of defining Britain's overall response to Japanese shipping competition, British shipping 
interests maintained pressure upon individual imperial authorities for an immediate 
response to the inroads of Japanese competition. In December 1936 concerns were raised 
over the need to restrain Japanese shipping's penetration of Singapore's carrying trade, and in 
particular Japanese penetration, partially at British shipping's expense, of the Singapore to 
North America rubber carrying trade.131 Between 1934 and 1935 Japanese vessels had 
increased their total share of these rubber shipments from 3% to 27%, while at the same time 
Britain's share of these shipments had fallen from 58% to 41 % 132 The Japanese success was 
attributed to their willingness to offer higher prices for rubber in Malaya, and yet still being 
able to sell at a fair price in New York.133 In response to this challenge, the shipping lines of 
the Straits-American Shipping Conference, all of whom were non-Japanese, sought an 
agreement with Mitsui - which was not a member of the Straits Conference but was 
responsible for the Japanese penetration of the North American rubber carrying trade - over 
its volume and share of the Malaya-North America rubber trade. While the Straits 
government was prepared to impose a quota arrangement upon rubber shipments - that 
would have given Mitsui a 25% share of the North American trade134 - the Straits Conference 
lines and Mitsui were also on the verge of reaching a voluntary arrangement that would have 
given Mitsui a slightly smaller share of the North American rubber trade. However, this 
voluntary agreement fell apart due to the opposition to the Malayan rubber dealers. 
Nevertheless, the collapse of this voluntary arrangement did not result in further demands 
for the restriction of Japanese shipping as the outbreak of the Sino-Japanese War led to 
friction between the Japanese and their Chinese rubber suppliers,135 while other commercial 
commitments for Mitsui's vessels from the start of 1937, and then Japan’s needs for merchant 
shipping during the war, reduced the availability of Mitsui's vessels for the Malaya-North 
America rubber trade.136 Thus the problem of Japanese penetration of the Malaya-North
131. The Shipping World, 23 December 1936; The Times, 24 December 1936.
132. Hartland (Office of H. M. Trade Commissioners, Straits Settlement) to Braddock (Department of 
Overseas Trade), 15 October 1936, F0371/20288,F6909/728/23; Weston (Board of Trade) to Ronald 
(Foreign Office), 30 March 1937, FO371/21032,F1912/63/23; Imperial Shipping Committee, British 
Shipping in the Orient, p. 88; Radius W. A,, p. 113; Wray W. D., TNYK and the Commercial Diplomacy 
of the Far Eastern Freight Conference, 1896-1956'; See tables 5.11, and 5.12.
133. The Shipping World, 23 December 1936, pp. 695-696; The Times, 24 December 1936; Imperial 
Shipping Committee, British Shipping in the Orient, p. 89.
134. Imperial Shipping Committee, British Shipping in the Orient, p. 88.
135. Imperial Shipping Committee, British Shipping in the Orient, p. 90.
136. See table 5.13.
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America rubber trade was resolved without the need for intervention on behalf of British 
shipping by the Straits government.
At the same time as fears of Japanese penetration of the Malaya-North America 
rubber trade surfaced, demands were raised in Singapore over the need to exclude 'foreign', 
that is to say Japanese, shipping from the Malayan coasting trade. For example, Mr* J* Dick, 
of the Malayan Chamber of Commerce, while urging British manufacturers to improve their 
methods to deal with Japanese competition, at the same time demanded the protection of the 
Malayan coasting trade: "I consider it would be a timely action if the Straits Government 
arranged with the Home authorities that the coasting trade of Malaya should be reserved for
137 138British tonnage only”, a view shared by The Straits Times. However, this campaign 
quickly petered out as British shipping had little interest in the reservation of the Malayan 
coasting trade, and there was little attempt to sustain the campaign into 1937. The Shipping 
World took a sanguine view of the calls to restrict the Malayan coasting trade; it rejected the 
need to discriminate against Japanese shipping and merely called for the improvement of 
British shipping organisation to meet the Japanese challenge.139 Indeed there was little 
benefit to British shipping by excluding Japanese vessels from this coasting trade. In 1936, 
despite worries in Singapore, no Japanese ships engaged in the Malayan coasting trade from 
Singapore, whilst in 1935 only one Japanese vessel of 2,900 gross tons, under 1% of all 
foreign vessels, had engaged in the Malayan coasting trade out of Singapore.140 Thus, given 
the small scale of Japanese participation, there was virtually no commercial incentive to 
exclude Japanese shipping from the Malayan coasting trade.
In contrast with Malaya, British shipowners mounted a much stronger campaign 
over Japanese shipping competition in India's carrying and coasting trade. In December 
1936 Alexander Shaw complained to the P&O shareholders that due to subsidised Japanese 
competition the outlook for British shipping in Indian waters was bleak and that effective 
counter measures had been stifled by the indifference of the Indian government.141 By 1936 
the British lines participating in the Bombay-Japan and Calcutta-Japan Shipping
137. The Straits Times, 30 September 1936.
138. 'Trade War', The Straits Times, 1 October 1936.
139. The Shipping World, 23 December 1936.
140. See tables 5.13, and 5.14.
141. The Shipping World, 16 December 1936, pp. 641-643.
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Conferences - collectively part of the Far Eastern Freight Conference - were worried that in 
the near future Japanese competition might force them to withdraw from both conferences. 
They complained that the present conference arrangements did not protect the non-Japanese 
members, and that the Japanese had refused to respond to British attempts to negotiate new 
conference arrangements that were more favourable to the British lines.142 British shipping 
interests now wanted the Indian government to pressure the Japanese government into 
forcing Japanese shipping interests into a compromise.143 In regard to the Indian coasting 
trade, British shipowners complained that the March 1934 Indo-Japanese Gentleman’s 
Agreement or the Sawada Agreement - in which the Japanese government undertook to 
dissuade Japanese vessels from participating in the Indian coasting trade144 - was being 
breached by the increased Japanese tonnage operating in Indian coastal waters.145 
Furthermore, Indian shipping interests also mounted a separate campaign, based on Japan's 
violation of the same 1934 Gentleman's Agreement, to exclude Japanese vessels from the 
Indian coasting trade.146 However, as with Malaya, Japanese involvement in the Indian 
coasting trade was insignificant when compared to Japanese involvement in India's carrying 
trade with Japan. In 1936 some seven Japanese vessels engaged in the former, while over 
200 Japanese vessels engaged in the latter.147 Consequently, the formal exclusion of
142. Annual Report: Chamber o f Shipping o f the United Kingdom, 1936-1937, pp. 60-63; Carter (Board of 
Trade) to Ronald (Foreign Office), 25 February 1937, FO371/21032,F1208/63/23; Imperial Shipping 
Committee, British Shipping in the Orient, pp. 80-85.
143. Carter (Board of Trade) to Ronald (Foreign Office), 25 February 1937, FO371/21063,F1208/63/23; 
Mackinnon, Mackenzie & Co., to the Bengal Chamber of Commerce, 14 April 1937, Report o f the 
Committee o f the Bengal Chamber o f Commerce, 1937, pp. 512-514.
144. There was in fact no formal undertaking by the Japanese government, however, the Japanese 
negotiators of the 1934 Indo-Japanese Trade Agreement had given a verbal undertaking that the 
Japanese government would attempt to ensure Japanese vessels did not participate in the Indian 
coasting trade, Carter (Board of Trade) to Ronald (Foreign Office), 25 February 1937,
F0371/21032,FI208/63/23; Sir F. Stewart (India Office) to A. Shaw (Foreign Office), 19 March 1937, 
FO371/21032,F1208/63/23.
145. Mackinnon, Mackenzie & Co., to the Bengal Chamber of Commerce, 14 April 1937, Report o f the 
Committee o f the Bengal Chamber o f Commerce, 1937, p. 513.
146. Indian Chamber of Commerce, Calcutta, to the Indian government, 27 January 1937, and 29 May 1937, 
Indian Chamber o f Commerce, Calcutta: Annual Report o f  the Committee, 1937, pp. 390-393, 396- 
397; Annual Report o f  the Indian Merchants' Chamber, 1937, p. 5.
147. In 1935 Japanese involvement in the Indian costing trade amounted to 1 vessel carrying 8,000 bags of 
groundnuts: between January and June 1936, 3 vessels carrying 4,000 bags o f wheat flour and 3,600 
steel bars: between June and December 1936, 4 vessels carrying 6,035 bags of wheat flour and 600 bags 
of wheat. A further vessel, the Alice Moller, on charter to the Japanese firm, Yamashita Kisen Kaisha, 
carried some 6,700 tons of rice in the Indian coasting trade. However, despite the limited number of 
Japanese vessels, the Indian shipping interests were worried that following this upward trend there 
might be an explosion of Japanese involvement in the Indian coasting trade, especially since Mitsui were 
reported to be canvassing among Burmese rice merchants for their carrying trade with Bombay, Indian
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Japanese shipping from the Indian coasting trade would be more of a symbolic gesture than 
providing practical support from Japanese competition to British and Indian shipping.
However, as in the case of British demands for tariff preference against Japanese 
competition in the Indian cotton piece-goods market, British demands for the reservation of 
the Indian coasting trade caused greater friction between Anglo-Indian shipping interests 
than between Anglo-Japanese interests. Since the mid-1920s Indian shipowners had 
mounted a campaign to encourage native shipping, and had consistently sought the 
reservation of the Indian coasting trade for 'indigenous' shipping. This campaign gained 
credibility with the approach in April 1937 of the enforcement of the new Indian 
constitution, and the emergence of British demands for the exclusion of'foreign' shipping 
from the Indian coasting trade. Indian shipping interests angrily pointed out the injustice of 
India’s coasting trade being reserved for British vessels, and the subordination of India's 
shipping interests.148 Spurred on by the approach of the new constitution and a new Bill to 
control India’s coasting trade, the Indian shipping interests put forward their own proposals 
which envisaged little room for British participation. It was proposed that: after the 
separation of Burma from the Indian Empire in 1937, the Indian government should press the 
Burmese government into accepting that alt non-Indian shipping should be excluded from 
the Indo-Burmese carrying trade; and that 50% of the Indian coasting trade should be 
reserved for vessels owned and operated by Indian nationals.149 Worried by the Indian 
campaign150 the British responded that these demands were not viable. Native Indians 
possessed no ocean-going tonnage from which to benefit from the reservation of coastal 
shipping, and lacked the necessary capital with which to develop such tonnage. Further, the
Chamber of Commerce, Calcutta, to the Indian Government, 27 January 1937, Indian Chamber o f  
Commerce, Calcutta: Annual Report o f the Committee, 1937, pp. 390-393; See table 5.15.
148. Indian Chamber o f Commerce, Calcutta, to the Indian government and the Imperial Shipping 
Committee, 18 January 1937, 20 March 1937, 22 April 1937, and 29 April 1937, Indian Chamber o f  
Commerce, Calcutta: Annual Report o f the Committee, 1937, pp. 388-389, 393-395, 416-417, 418- 
421; Indian Merchants* Chamber to the Indian government, 8 January 1937, 4 February 1937, 8 March 
1937, 21 April 1937, Annual Report o f the Indian Merchants' Chamber, 1937, pp. 1-5, 107-111, 112,
114-115, 117, 117-120; Speech of Walchand Hirachand, Chairman of Scindia Steam Navigation 
Company, The Shipping World, 13 January 1937, p. 46; Address of B. M. Birla, to the Indian Chamber 
of Commerce, Calcutta, The Shipping World, 17 February 1937, p. 213.
149. Annual Report o f  the Indian Merchants’ Chamber, 1937, pp. 6-7; Indian Merchants* Chamber to the 
Government of Bombay, 6 January 1937, Annual Report o f  the Indian Merchants’ Chamber, 1937, pp. 
121-124; The Shipping World, 24 March 1937, pp. 364-365, 23 June 1937, pp. 741-742, and 30 June 
1937, p. 762.
150. The Shipping World, 24 March 1937, pp. 364-365.
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exclusion of British shipping from the Indian coasting trade violated the clause in the 
Government of India Act which precluded Indian discrimination against British goods and 
services.151 Thus the separate British and Indian campaigns for the exclusion of Japanese 
shipping interests from India's coasting trade led to far greater friction between Anglo- 
Indian shipping interests than it did between Britain and Japan.
However, while the British shipping industry mounted its campaign for government 
support against Japanese shipping competition from both the British and Indian 
governments, both proved extremely reluctant to endorse any measure that would seriously 
reduce Japanese shipping’s access to Indian waters. In regard to the British shipping 
industry’s demand for the reapportionment of the carrying trade in the Far Eastern Shipping 
Conference, neither the British nor Indian government foresaw any need for immediate 
government involvement. Intervention in the dispute was only envisaged after the report of 
the Imperial Shipping Committee. Within the British government, only the Board of Trade 
remained keen to involve both governments in the commercial negotiations of the Far 
Eastern Conference. However, since it refused to contemplate any action until after the 
report of the Committee in the summer of 1937,152 a view shared by the Indian government,153 
there was no possibility of an immediate intervention on behalf of British shipping. 
Furthermore, the Indian government's unwillingness to raise this shipping issue until after 
the conclusion of the Indo-Japanese Trade Agreement,154 ruled out the use of these trade 
negotiations as a lever in the Far Eastern Conference dispute.155 A final constraint on the 
Indian government was that domestic shipping interests now demanded that their 
government should secure for them a certain percentage of the Indo-Japan carrying trade,156 
thus any involvement by the Indian government in the Far Eastern conference negotiation on 
behalf of British shipping would be seen as a betrayal of Indian shipping interests. Like the 
Indian government and the Board of Trade, the Foreign Office also displayed a similar
151. The Shipping World, 1 July 1936, p. 3, 23 June 1937, pp. 741-742, and 30 June 1937, p. 762.
152. Carter (Board of Trade) to Orde (Foreign Office), 2 February 1937, FO371/21032,F681/63/23; Minute 
by Scott-Fox, 10 February 1937, FO371/21032,F681/63/23.
153. Sir F. Stewart (India Office) to A  Shaw (Foreign Office), 19 March 1937, FO371/21032,F1787/63/23.
154. See chapter 3.
155. Carter (Board of Trade) to Orde (Foreign Office), 2 February 1937, FO371/21032,F681/63/23.
156. Annual Report o f the Indian Merchant's Chamber, 1937, pp. 6-7; Indian Merchants' Chamber to the 
Government of Bombay, 6 January 1937, Annual Report o f the Indian Merchants' Chamber, 1937, pp. 
121-124.
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caution over the question of Anglo-Japanese rivalry in the Far Eastern Conference. It 
endorsed the view that no government involvement should precede the report of the Imperial 
Shipping Committee, and added the mild suggestion that any action against Japan should be 
considered together with the general question of restrictions on Japanese trade.157 
Consequently, the British and Indian governments refused to offer immediate support to the 
British shipping industry's attempt to renegotiate more favourable commercial terms with its 
Japanese competitors in the Far Eastern Conference. Indeed, in a similar fashion to the 
Malayan-North American rubber carrying trade, British concerns over Japanese 
competition in the Indian overseas carrying trade ended with the reduction of Japanese 
shipping capacity for commercial operations following the outbreak of the Sino-Japanese 
War,158 and not as a result of British and Indian government intervention on behalf of the 
British shipping industry.
On the less important issue of Japanese participation in the Indian coasting trade, the 
Indian government was prepared to restrict Japanese access to this trade. The Indian 
government was already pressing the Japanese to ban the involvement of Japanese vessels in 
the Calcutta-Japan conference in this trade. Furthermore, despite the Foreign Office's belief 
in the need for caution in the Indo-Japan conference issue, they had no qualms over 
excluding Japanese vessels from the unimportant Indian coasting trade. Sir Robert Clive, 
the British ambassador in Tokyo, was authorised to back up Indian government efforts to 
gain Japanese acquiescence.159 In April 1937, Clive presented the British and Indian case to 
the Japanese Vice Minister of Foreign Affairs, in which he stated that: since both 
governments attached great importance to the stability of the Indian coasting trade they 
urged the Japanese government to arrange that its shipowners enter talks with their British 
and Indian counterparts with the aim onsome form of voluntary restriction of Japanese 
shipping.160 Unfortunately, the Japanese reply gave little room for optimism, as they stated 
correctly that Japanese vessels were not barred from the Indian coasting trade and it was up 
to the various commercial concerns to reach an agreement. Further, they pointed out that an 
earlier and reasonable proposal of the Japanese shipping industry had been rejected by their
157. Minute by Ashton-Gwatkin, 6 February 1937, FO371/21032,F1787/63/23; Minute by Orde, 8 February 
1937, FO371/21032,F1787/63/23.
158. See table 5.15.
159. Interdepartmental meeting, the Foreign Office, the Board of Trade, and the India Office, 1 March 1937, 
F0371121032,FI 298/63/23.
160. Clive (Tokyo) to the Foreign Office, 9 April 1937, FO371/21032,F2512/63/23.
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British and Indian counterparts. However, the Japanese government did indicate that any
agreement reached between the British and Japanese Far Eastern Conference members -
over their non-participation in the Indian coasting trade - would not be breached by anyy
Japanese shipping concern that was not partjjo the same shipping conference.161 With no 
further progress made over the issue, the Indian government took unilateral action, and in 
August 1937, it decided to repeal the 1850 Indian Coasting Trade Act in order to exclude 
foreign shipping - i.e. Japanese shipping - from the Indian coasting trade.162 The Foreign 
Office was not alarmed by this action, and expected no Japanese reaction since the banning 
of Japanese shipping would have only a limited impact on the Japanese shipping industry.163 
Thus the exclusion of Japanese shipping from the Indian coasting trade represented the only 
victory for British shipping in its campaign for government support in its fight against 
Japanese shipping, a victory of little consequence given the relative scale of Japanese 
participation in this trade.
Following the failure of this piecemeal approach to Japanese shipping competition, 
the report of the Imperial Shipping Committee, British Shipping in the Orient, in December 
1938, confirmed the unwillingness or inability of the British, Dominion, and Indian 
governments to take collective action against Japanese shipping competition in British 
imperial waters. On the question of subsidies to British lines suffering from subsidised 
Japanese competition, the Committee struck a cautious note and confirmed that, since 
shipping subsidies were dependent upon individual imperial authorities, there could be no 
imperial counter-subsidy policy.164 The Committee also took a cautious line over the 
restriction of Japanese shipping's participation in British imperial waters, and saw little 
advantage in the use, or threatened use, of either the exclusion of Japanese shipping from 
imperial coasting trade or the apportionment of Japanese participation in imperial overseas 
carrying trade, as a means of controlling Japanese shipping competition in imperial waters. 
With regard to the reservation of coasting trades, the report noted that most of the Empire 
coasting trades were still dominated by British vessels, and therefore the threatened 
withdrawal of this trade would hardly be an effective bargaining counter in shipping 
negotiations with Japan. The Committee explained:
161. Dodds (Tokyo) to the Foreign Office, 25 May 1937, FO371/21032,F3746/63/23.
162. Turner (India Office) to the Foreign Office, 17 August 1937, FO371/21032,F5339/63/23.
163. Orde to the India Office, 27 August 1937, FO371/21032,F5339/63/23.
164. Imperial Shipping Committee, British Shipping in the Orient, pp. 101-103, 107-109.
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such action would not materially alter the present position, and a threat to reserve 
coastal trades in eastern waters to the British flag would obviously be of little or no 
value in negotiation for a proper division of the overseas trades between the British 
territories concerned on the one hand and Japan on the other.165
In regard to apportionment of Japanese participation in imperial overseas carrying trade, the 
Imperial Shipping Committee noted that since this measure risked similar Japanese 
retaliation it offered only a limited improvement for British imperial shipping.166 
Furthermore, this measure had no support within the British shipping industry, as it ran 
counter to both the Liverpool Steam Ship Owners' and the Chamber of Shipping of the 
United Kingdoms' now categorical commitment to the reduction of world trade barriers.167 
Finally, the Committee also rejected unconditional government intervention in shipping 
conference negotiations on behalf of British shipping. The Committee argued that there was 
little evidence to suggest that such intervention could restore the fortunes of British shipping 
in shipping conferences which had already witnessed substantial inroads by Japanese 
shipping.168 Thus the Imperial Shipping Committee confirmed that there would be no 
immediate government intervention to counter Japanese shipping competition in British 
imperial waters in the Pacific-East Asia region.
165. Imperial Shipping Committee, British Shipping in the Orient, pp. 104-105.
166. Imperial Shipping Committee, British Shipping in the Orient, p. 107.
167. Imperial Shipping Committee, British Shipping in the Orient, p. 105.
168. Imperial Shipping Committee, British Shipping in the Orient, pp. 85-87, 105-107.
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Conclusion.
Like other commercial issues of potential importance to Anglo-Japanese relations, the 
question of protecting the British shipping industry from Japanese competition illustrated 
the reluctance of the British government to play an antagonistic role within this commercial 
dispute* A combination of international and domestic constraints, together with deep 
divisions within the shipping industry, were the foundation of the British government's 
rejection of extensive aid to the shipping industry. The fear of economic retaliation, 
especially from either America or Japan, led the government to consistently reject any 
measures to restrict subsidised foreign shipping's access to British imperial waters, a view 
that had widespread support within the shipping industry. On the question of counter- 
subsidies to British shipping, the British government proved equally reluctant to take any 
decisive action against specific subsidised services that were in competition with British 
shipping. While tramp subsidies were introduced in 1935 for the benefit of the British 
shipping industry, the government consistently refrained from extending operational 
subsidies to specific liner services. A combination of the fear of foreign resentment - 
particularly American - to such countermeasures, and the need to avoid increased 
government expenditure, led the government - as in the case of the Union Steam Ship 
Company - consistently to avoid extending subsidies to liner services. Thus, for commercial 
and economic reasons, the British government proved equally reluctant to support the 
sections of the shipping industry that demanded support for their commercial operations 
against Japanese competition.
Aside from the reluctance of the British government to support the shipping industry, 
the issue also illustrated the lack of unity within the British Empire over imperial economic 
and commercial questions. Clashes within the Empire between various imperial economic 
interests were a huge constraint upon the development of an organised imperial response to 
the needs of the British shipping industry. Initially, none of the major British territories in 
the Pacific-East Asia region had any interest in incurring the economic burdens that would 
result from subsidising British shipping services or ousting subsidised non-British services 
from their overseas carrying trade, while the Indian government remained concerned over 
the effect of its support upon nationalist opinion. Only slowly did Dominion opinion change 
as the need for British and imperial rearmament raised the question of imperial economic 
and military security in wartime. However, before 1938 these shifts in sentiment did not
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result in substantial support from the Dominions or the Indian government for the British 
shipping industry’s fight against Japanese competition. The Indian government’s exclusion 
of Japanese shipping from its coasting trade in 1937 was little more than a symbolic act, 
while the Australian government’s support of the Eastern & Australian Steamship Company 
against its Japanese competitors, did not result in the Australian company's recapturing a 
large proportion of the Australia-Japan carrying trade.169 Thus the absence of an effective 
consensus on the role of the various British imperial authorities prevented a concerted 
imperial response to Japanese shipping competition.
As a result of British and imperial indifference, Japanese shipping competition had a 
minimal impact upon Anglo-Japanese relations. Because there was no attempt to restrict 
Japanese shipping access to British imperial waters, the question of the political and 
economic impact of these measures was never debated within either the British government 
or the Foreign Office. The only exception to this trend was the exclusion of Japanese 
shipping from the Indian coastingtrade. However, given the insignificance of this measure it 
never prompted fears of a substantial Japanese response within the Foreign Office. Thus 
despite the importance of the shipping industry to Britain and the British Empire, and the 
scale of the Japanese competitive threat within the Pacific-East Asia region, before 1938 
Anglo-Japanese shipping rivalry never emerged as a substantive issue within Anglo- 
Japanese relations.
169. Tsokhas K., 'The Eastern & Australian Steamship Company and the Shipping dispute between Australia 
and Japan, 1936-39', Business History (1992), pp. 50-66.
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Table 5.1: Indices of world trade, shipping and freight rates, 1920-1938 (1913=100).
Year Index o f  
world sea­
borne 
trade
Index o f shipping ton­
nage
Indices of freight rates
Total Active The Econ­
omist
German
liner
German
tramp
Norwei-
gian
1920 83 122 438.7
1921 82 132 158.4
1922 92 135 119 122.0
1923 94 139 126 109.7
1924 106 134 126 113.4 103 247
1925 114 136 128 102.2 96 206
1926 115 136 128 109.7 110 178
1927 127 139 133 109.6 120 99 170
1928 130 143 137 98.8 113 96 152
1929 135 145 141 96.8 117 100 151
1930 126 148 140 79.1 112 77 125
1931 112 150 130 79.6 95 73 102
1932 101 148 122 75.4 69 60 107
1933 103 145 123 72.7 66 49 110
1934 112 140 126 74.2 62 48 120
1935 118 136 130 74.4 63 50 125
1936 124 139 134 84.6 66 62 140
1937 141 141 140 128.3 73 86
1938 135 144 142 97.6 77 64
[Source: Sturmey S. G., British Shipping and World Competition (Athlone Press, University of London; 
1962), table 4, p. 65. J
305
The British shipping industry and Japanese competition 
Table 5.2: British and world shipping tonnage, 1914-1939 (millions of gross tons).
Year UK registered 
tonnage
World tonnage UK registered 
tonnage as a 
percentage of 
world tonnage
1914 19.3 49.1 39.3
1921 19.3 58.8 32.8
1922 19.1 61.3 31.2
1923 19.1 62.3 30.7
1924 19.0 61.5 30.9
1925 19.3 62.4 30.9
1926 19,3 62.7 30.8
1927 19.2 63.3 30.3
1928 19.8 65.2 30.4
1929 20.0 66.4 30.1
1930 10.3 68.0 29.9
1931 20.2 68.7 29.4
1932 19.6 68.4 28.7
1933 18.6 66.6 27.9
1934 17.6 64.4 27.3
1935 17.3 63.7 27.2
1936 17.2 64.0 26.9
1937 17.4 65.3 26.6
1938 17.7 66.9 26.5
1939 17.9 68.5 26.1
[Source: Hope R_, A New History o f British shipping (John Murray, 
London; 1990), figure 9, p. 359.]
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Table 5.3 : Changes in the tonnage of the principal merchant marines between 1914 and 
1931 (millions of gross tons).
Country 1914 1931 Percentage 
change be­
tween 1914 
and 1931
Britain (and Empire) 20.5 23.1 +12
USA (Sea) 2.0 10.3 +415
Japan 1.7 4.3 +153
Itlay 1.4 3.3 +136
Holland 1.5 3.1 +107
Norway 2.0 4.1 +105
France 1.9 3.5 +84
Germany 5.1 4.2 -18
[Source: Board of Trade memorandum, 'Ships and Shipping Policy1, 31 May 1933, 
F0371/17328, W9190/5461/50. ]
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Table 5.4 : Percentage changes in shipping tonnage of the principal maritime nations be­
tween June 1931 and June 1932.
Country Percentage change Country Percentage change
United Kingdom -3 Greece +5
Holland +5 Denmark c.+3
USA +1 Norway c.+3
Germany +2 Italy +1
[Source: Board o f Trade memorandum, 'Ships and Shipping Policy1, 31 May 1933, 
FO371/17328,W9190/5461/50-l
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Table 5.5 : Financial performance of selected companies in the Japanese shipping indus­
try (percentage of profit on paid up captital) compared with the financial performance of 
the British tramp shipping industry* 1932-1937.
Shipping company Year
1932 
1st 2nd
1933 
1st 2nd
1934 
1st 2nd
1935 
1st 2nd
1936 
1st 2nd
1937 
1st 2nd
Yamashita Kisen 
Daido Kaisen 
Kawasaki Kisen
0.94 
10.32 
loss 1.0
loss 
22.04 
4.7 loss
11.6 
29.56 
6.4 9.0
11.6 
16.8 
10.5 12.8
8.5 
32.44 
23.7 26.5
15 
169.48 
30.7 n/a
British tramp shipping
companies
(on a different basis)
5.1 loss loss 1.3 3.3
[Source: Chida T., and Davies P. N., The Japanese Shipping and Shipbuilding industries: A history o f  mod­
em growth (Athlone Press, London; 1990), table 2.2, p. 4.]
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Table 5.6 : Changes in tonnage of the principal merchant marines, 1914-1935 (millions 
of gross tons).
Country Year
1914 1922 1929 1931 1934 1935
Britain 19.9 19.1 20.0 20.2 17.6 17.3
British Dominions 1.6 2.5 2.8 2.9 3.0 3.0
Total British 20.5 21.6 22.8 23.1 20.6 20.3
Denmark 0.8 1.0 1.0 1.1 1.1 1.1
France 1.9 3.5 3.3 3.5 3.3 3.0
Germany 5.1 1.8 4.0 4.2 3.7 3.7
Greece 0.8 0.7 1.3 1.4 1.5 1.7
Holland 1.5 2.6 2.9 3.1 2.6 2.6
Italy 1.4 2.7 3.2 3.3 2.9 2.8
Japan 1.7 3.6 4.2 4.3 4.0 4.0
Norway 1.9 2.4 3.2 4.1 4.0 4.0
Spain 0.9 1.2 1.1 1.2 1.2 1.2
Sweeden 1.0 1.0 1.5 1.7 1.6 1.5
USA (Sea) 2.0 13.6 11.0 10.4 9.8 9.7
Others 3.6 3.5 4.4 4.9 5.5 5.6
World total 43.1 59.2 63.9 66.3 61.8 61.2
[Source: The Shipping World, 31 July 1935, pp. 113-114.]
310
The British shipping industry and Japanese competition
Table 5.7 : Average age of merchant vessels of over 100 tons gross for Britain, the Brit­
ish Dominions, and Japan, in 1935.
Country Age of merchant fleet by percent
Under 10 years 
old
10 to 20 years 
old
Over 20 years 
old
Britain 34.4 46.1 19.5
British Dominions 29.1 30.7 40.2
British average 33.6 43.9 22.5
Japan 24.7 50.7 24.6
World average 26.5 45.5 28.0
[Source: The Shipping World, 31 July 1935, pp. 113-114.]
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Table 5.8 : Monthly crew and victualling expenses on British and Japanese cargo liners 
in 1936.
Expense by crew type and other 
costs
British cargo liner Japanese cargo liner (ii)
Number Cost Number Cost
£ s. d. £ s. d.
Middle seniority rates 13 334 15 0 13 108 11 2
Deck crew 26 58 10 0 18 62 18 10
Engine crew 28 50 18 6 24 82 6 2
Saloon crew 10 29 11 0 6 23 14 10
Messing 132 8 3 66 12 4
Leave pay (i) 49 7 6
Crew expense per month 77 655 10 3 61 344 3 4
[Source: Imperial Shipping Committee, British Shipping in the Orient (HMSO, London; 1939), Appendix 
Vni, pp. 123-125 ]
Notes : (i) One sixth of pay rates, for officers and engineers only.
(ii) Official wage lists increased by 25% to accomodate unspecified allowances and to 
allow for a 'reasonable liner standard’.
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Table 5.9 : Proportion of principal maritime nations' merchant fleets laid up or idle in 
February 1931.
Country Per­
cent
Country Per­
cent
Country Per­
cent
USA 20 Germany 22 Denmark 16
France 29 Italy 19 United Kingdom 16
Holland 26 Norway 17 Japan 5
Sweden 17
[Source: Board of Trade memorandum, 'Ships and Shipping Policy', 31 May 1933, 
F0371/17328, W9190/5461/50. ]
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Table 5.10 : Type of ocean-going tonnage built between 1931 and 1935, owned by the 
principal maritime nations at the end of January 1936.
Country Type of vessel
Liners (i) Cargo vessels 
(tramps)
Tankers Total
Num
ber
Tons Num
ber
Tons Num
ber
Tons Num
ber
Tons
Denmark 15 87,579 2 7,612 1 10,517 18 105,708
France 22 260,208 6 30,275 5 53,917 33 344,400
Germany 19 141,469 2 8,892 1 8,117 22 158,478
Greece - - - - - - - -
Holland 10 82,791 1 4,652 19 136,024 30 223,467
Italy 6 155,627 2 10,584 3 27,122 11 193,333
Japan 48 304,336 10 38,075 6 56,903 64 399,314
Norway 19 105,305 9 39,170 67 546,027 95 690,502
Spain 5 45,942 - - 8 51,412 13 97,354
Sweden 9 44,801 2 6,632 5 38,973 16 90,406
USA 28 280,097 • 8 69,777 36 349,874
Total 181 1,508,155 34 145,892 123 998,789 338 2,652,836
UK 53 630,873 72 349,723 49 374,081 174 1,354,667
World total 234 2,139,028 106 495,615 172 1,372,870 512 4,007,513
[Source: The Shipping World, 29 April 1936, p. 495.]
Note : (i) Liner defined as a vessel of greater than 12 knots.
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Table 5.11: Japanese shipping penetration of the Malayan export trade, 1933-1936 
(thousands of piculs).
Route January-June
1933
January-June
1934
January-June
1936
January-June
1936
Total
volume
Percent­
age of 
total 
volume 
carried 
in Japa­
nese 
vessels
Total
volume
Percent­
age of 
total 
volume 
carried 
in Japa­
nese 
vessels
Total
volume
Percent­
age of 
total 
volume 
carried 
in Japa­
nese 
vessels
Total vol­
ume
Per­
centage 
of total 
volume 
carried 
in Japa­
nese 
vessels
Penang to Britain 371.9 11.3 518.8 12.5 600.5 12.8 395.4 16.2
Penang to Europe 534.3 4.4 579.8 4.0 460.3 5.7 21.1 5.1
Penang to North America 729.2 1.6 949.1 1.6 914.7 25.1 1,041.1 23.3
[Source: Hartland (Office of H. M. Trade Commissioner, Straits Settlement) to Braddock (Department of 
Overseas Trade), 15 October 1936, F0371/20288,F6909/728/23]
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Table 5.12 : Volume of rubber exported from Malaya and Singapore to North America, 
carried in British, American, Dutch and Japanese vessels, 1930-1935 (in piculs).
Year Nationality of vessels
British American Dutch Japanese
Volume Percent­
age of 
total 
volume
Volume Percent­
age of 
total 
volume
Volume Percent­
age of 
total 
volume
Volume Percent­
age of 
total 
volume
1930 198,197 70 77,432 27 8,386 3
1931 196,904 67 85,044 29 12,261 4
1932 149,516 65 73,529 32 5,419 3
1933 165,730 57 103,994 36 22,011 7
1934 176,212 58 104,992 34 14,835 5 10,680 3
1935 113,365 41 75,752 28 10,574 4 73,395 27
[Source: Weston (Board of Trade) to Ronald (Foreign Office), 30 March 1937, FO371/21032,Fl 912/63/23.]
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Table 5.13 : Comparison of the number and tonnage of British, American, Dutch, and 
Japanese vessels engaged in the overseas carrying trade of Singapore(i), 1933-1938.
Year British American Dutch Japanese Total
Numb Ton­ Numb Ton­ Numb Ton­ Numb Ton­ Numb Ton­
er nage
(mil­
lions)
er nage
(mil­
lions)
er nage
(mil­
lions)
er nage
(mil­
lions)
er nage
(mil­
lions)
1933 1,628 4.53 42 0.23 2,122 3.11 639 2.56 5,634 13.93
1934 1,797 4.97 46 0.24 2,212 3.27 591 2.45 5,982 14.59
1935 1,718 4.81 43 0.23 2,199 3.32 623 2.63 5,932 14.79
1936 1,701 4.73 38 0.19 2,008 3.43 657 2.77 5,753 14.88
1937 1,889 5.31 40 0.19 2,159 3.77 597 2.53 6,031 16.08
1938 1,803 5.16 23 0.10 2,201 3.87 425 1.87 5,886 15.35
[Source: Straits Settlements: Blue Book (Department of Statistics, Singapore; various years).]
Note : (i) including repeated voyages, entrances and clearances, and vessels in cargo and 
ballast.
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Table 5.14 : Comparison of the number and tonnage of British, Dutch, and Japanese ves­
sels engaged in the coasting trade of Singapore(i), 1933-1938.
Year British Dutch Japanese Total
Number Ton­
nage
(thou­
sands)
Number Ton­
nage
(thou­
sands)
Number Ton­
nage
(thou­
sands)
Number Ton­
nage
(thou­
sands)
1933 583 243.1 111 10.5 795 283.6
1934 631 265.9 115 17.1 1 2.9 840 312.7
1935 625 286.9 130 16.5 1 2.9 866 338.2
1936 538 255.4 145 18.5 780 298.6
1937 567 296.6 99 14.7 701 317.9
1938 507 267.9 47 7.9 586 279.0
[Source: Straits Settiments: Blue Book (Department of Statistics, Singapore; various years).]
Note : including repeated voyages, entrances and clearances, and vessels in cargo and 
ballast.
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Table 5.15 : Comparison of the number and tonnage of British, British Indian, and 
Japanese vessels engaged in the overseas carrying trade of India(i), 1931/32-1938/39.
Year British (other 
than British In­
dian)
British Indian 
(other than na­
tive Indian)
Japanese Total foreign 
(excluding Brit­
ish, British In­
dian, and native 
Indian)
Total (includ­
ing British, 
British Indian, 
native 
Indian,and total 
foreign)
Numb
er
Ton­
nage
(mil­
lions)
Numb
er
Ton­
nage
(mil­
lions)
Numb
er
Ton­
nage
(mil­
lions)
Numb
er
Ton­
nage
(mil­
lions)
Numb
er
Ton­
nage
(mil­
lions)
1931-32 1,803 5.49 30 0.06 171 0.59 733 2.65 3,428 8.27
1932-33 1,737 5.29 16 0.03 168 0.58 641 2.46 3,258 7.85
1933-34 1,775 5.41 21 0.02 154 0.56 704 2.82 3,309 8.31
1934-35 1,865 5.69 14 0.02 179 0.68 787 3.01 3,630 8.81
1935-36 1,905 5.97 23 0.04 199 0.78 792 3.06 3,600 9.16
1936-37 1,973 6.12 23 0.07 218 0.84 821 3.18 3,742 9.45
1937-38 2,272 7.09 156 0.41 169 0.65 774 3.23 4,263 10.80
1938-39 2,305 7.33 132 0.37 171 0.69 754 3.26 4,370 11.05
[Source: Review o f the Trade o f India: Annual Statement o f the Sea-Borne Trade o f British India with the 
British Empire and Foreign Countries (Department of Commercial Intelligence and Statistics, Delhi; various 
years).]
Note : including repeated voyages, entrances and clearances, and vessels in cargo and 
ballast.
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Between 1933 and 1937 Anglo-Japanese commercial friction, outside China, emerged as a 
substantial issue in the already strained Anglo-Japanese political relationship. Japanese 
success in the world cotton textile market and shipping industry contrasted with the relative 
failure of their British counterparts* while state intervention in the Japanese and 
Manchukuoan oil markets undermined Royal Dutch Shell's operations. In the former 
instances this success reflected Japanese economic achievement, and in the latter it was 
largely due to changes in the international oil market that favoured the adoption of import 
substitution of refined petroleum products. However, at a time of world economic 
depression this commercial friction spilled over into political tension between Britain and 
Japan, as British industrialists sought government assistance to combat Japanese 
commercial success and interference in British oil operations.
In response to these demands the British government introduced trade 
discrimination against Japanese cotton textiles in the British Crown Colonies in 1934; 
sought to increase trade preferences for Lancashire in the Dominion, Indian and third 
country markets; supported Royal Dutch Shell in its attempt to evade Japanese and 
Manchukuoan oil policies; and after December 1936 debated methods of supporting the 
British shipping industry in the Pacific-East Asia region against Japanese competition. 
Nevertheless, these measures had only a limited impact in restraining Japanese competition 
and economic encroachment. Both the British government and industry shied away from 
extensive trade discrimination against Japan on the grounds that: Japanese economic 
retaliation would make such measures counterproductive; it would be difficult to achieve 
outside the limited scope of the British colonies without substantial international 
cooperation; protection of Royal Dutch Shell was impossible without American 
cooperation; and the greater British trade discrimination against Japan the greater was the 
risk of Japanese political and military retaliatioa Consequently, the limited extent of trade 
discrimination and British interference in Anglo-Japanese economic problems resultedjonly 
modest foreign policy friction. As 'traditionar diplomatic histories have emphasised, 
economic friction proved to be only a secondary factor in the already difficult Anglo- 
Japanese political relationship and not a fundamental element that propelled Britain and 
Japan into political confrontation.
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However, for British business interests, given domestic and world economic 
problems, the emergence of Japanese competition in the 1930s provoked a strong response. 
Not only was Japanese export success resented, it was also perceived as a peculiarly sinister 
threat to British industry and society. The combination of 'western' technology and 
industrial methods with an ’Asiatic’ standard of living terrified British industrialists, and led 
to fears that, nthe competition of Japanese standards of life could reduce industrial Britain to 
a shambles".' Industrialists were equally resentful of the 'aggression' of Japanese export 
expansion during the post-1929 Depression, and the perceived links between Japanese 
business and their government in the promotion of industrial expansion. In May 1933 the 
Federation of British Industries condemned the recent surge in Japanese exports, at a time of 
global economic depression, as both 'reckless' and part of a national sales policy that had 
been disastrous for British industry.2 While such sentiments were prevalent in the cotton and 
shipping industries, Royal Dutch Shell similarly perceived itself a victim of Japanese 
industrial policy, which was hellbent on driving foreign oil companies out of the Japanese 
and Manchukuoan petroleum markets or bending them to the needs of Japan’s militarists. 
Thus not only was Japanese competition a menace to British industry and society, the 
relationship between the Japanese government and business contrasted unfavourably with 
the perceived indifference of the British government to domestic industries suffering from 
this new source of overseas competition. Consequently, given the fear of Japanese 
competition and the perceived close cooperation between government and industrial policy, 
the initial British response to Japanese trade competition appeared to foreshadow demands 
for extensive support from the British government.
Even prior to the identification of the new Japanese threat, British industrialists had 
already abandoned free-trade principles and turned to the government, which introduced 
domestic protection in 1931 and imperial preference in 1932. British demands for trade 
discrimination against Japan now coincided with the broad protectionist strategy of British 
commercial policy. However, the failure of the British government to extend trade 
protection to industries threatened by Japanese and other competitors led to a radicalisation 
of business opinion on the question of Japanese competition. Radical demands for trade 
protection via treaty denunciation and export and operational subsidies reflected not only a
1. The Manchester Chamber o f Commerce, Monthly Record, February 1933, p. 36.
2. Cited in Hubbard G. E., Eastern Industrialisation and its Effect on the West (Oxford University Press,
London; 1935), p. 97.
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disenchantment with government but also the failure of more traditional means of business 
pressure to secure government support. In the cotton industry it was the failure of the 
Manchester Chamber of Commerce's private talks with the government over the summer of 
1932 that spurred on the foundation of the Cotton Trade League and the instigation of a 
highly public campaign for trade protection via treaty denunciation. In the shipping industry 
the failure of the June 1933 World Economic Conference split the industry over the question 
of the exclusion of subsidised foreign shipping from Britain's carrying trade and the demands 
for a counter-subsidy policy. This division was again reflected with the beginning of the 
December 1936 campaign against Japanese shipping competition in the Pacific-East Asia 
region. It was only in Royal Dutch Shell’s fight against Japanese and Manchukuoan 
intervention that there was no public criticism of government support. The government's 
sympathetic attitude obviated the need for more forceful representations. However, in 
general Japanese competition not only resulted in increased demands for government 
support; it also split industries over the means of pressuring the government and achieving 
protection from Japanese competition. In the early stages of the cotton industry's, and to a 
lesser extent the shipping industry's, anti-Japan campaigns radicalism held sway, which 
proved critical of government inaction and insistent upon strong measures of support.
The development of Japanese competition had an important effect upon the form of 
British industries' demand for trade protection. Particularly in the early-1930s, when the fear 
of Japanese competition focused upon the Lancashire cotton industry, anti-Japanese 
sentiment spread rapidly throughout the industry. The inauguration of the Cotton Trade 
League in December 1932 posed an enormous challenge to the Manchester Chamber of 
Commerce's claim of leadership of the cotton industry. In response the chamber not only 
publicised its own earlier demands, for trade protection via treaty denunciation, but 
established a 'Special Committee on Japanese Competition’, which reflected the League's 
belief that the failure to place effective pressure on the government was solely responsible 
for government indifference to Japanese competition. Nevertheless, radicalism on trade 
questions proved a short-run phenomenon, as industry leaders recognised that for export 
orientated industries treaty denunciation was a double-edged sword. In 1934 the Federation 
of British Industries and the Chamber recognised the dangers of the denunciation of the 1911 
Anglo-Japanese Trade Treaty as a prelude to trade discrimination against Japan.3 Not only
3. The Federation of British Industries Report on Japanese Competition, 13 June 1934,
F0371/18172,F3293/159/23; The Manchester Chamber o f Commerce, Monthly Record, June 1934, p.
167.
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did treaty denunciation risk more substantial Japanese retaliation, it would do little for 
British goods in important markets outside the British colonies. Thus, after Colonial quotas 
were introduced in 1934, Lancashire virtually abandoned calls for trade protection against 
Japan via treaty denunciation. Similarly, even before the emergence of Japanese 
competition, the hostility of the Liverpool Steam Ship Owners' Association to carrying trade 
reservation and treaty denunciation provided a critical counterweight to the Chamber of 
Shipping of the United Kingdoms demand for the exclusion of subsidised shipping from 
Britain’s overseas carrying trade. This division became even less pronounced during the 
shipping industry's anti-Japan campaign as the Chamber of Shipping recognised the threat to 
world trade recovery through an extension of British protectionism.4 Rejection of outright 
confrontation with Japan was also prevalent in Royal Dutch Shell's response to Japanese and 
Manchukuoan oil policies. Once the chance of an oil embargo threat had evaporated the 
company prepared to endorse any acceptable modus vivendi, since it had always recognised 
that the equally undesirable withdrawal from the Japanese and Manchukuoan oil markets 
was the only sanction it had against Japanese interference.5 Thus the rejection of excessive 
confrontation and trade discrimination by the majority of British business moderated 
pressure on the British government and neutralised the radicals. By 1934 the 'ginger group' 
of radical Lancashire MPs were isolated, while in the later-1930s the Chamber of Shipping, 
which had always recognised the inherent dangers of an exclusion policy for shipping, re­
endorsed support for a reduction of barriers to world trade. Therefore the moderation of 
business attitudes to commercial friction with Japan meant that business itself acted as a 
fundamental constraint upon the exacerbation of Anglo-Japanese commercial friction.
While the long-run moderation of business attitudes eased pressure on the 
government, short-run business fears of Japanese competition jolted government policy in 
two respects. Demands for trade discrimination against Japan ran counter to the 
government's desire to avoid further political confrontation against Japan. British officials 
took the view that with an unstable situation in Europe and the unpredictability of Japanese 
foreign policy, British trade discrimination was an unwarranted distraction for Anglo- 
Japanese relations. Secondly, following the introduction of domestic protection and 
imperial preference the British government, led by Sir Walter Runciman, the strongly pro- 
free trade President of the Board of Trade, had rejected a further radicalisation of trade
4. Imperial Shipping Committee, British Shipping in the Orient (HMSO, London; 1939), p. 105.
5. Starling (Petroleum Department) to Randall, 20 July 1934, F0371/18189,F4477/1659/23.
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policy. In 1932 Runciman defeated demands for the widespread abrogation of trade treaties 
as a prelude to the renegotiation of the most-favoured-nation clause, on the grounds that it j 
would be more damaging to British trade. Thus while the British government had strong j 
political reasons for avoiding economic confrontation with Japan, it was the Board of 
Trade’s fear of the commercial dangers of excessive trade discrimination that proved the 
main long-run determinant of the British government's response to business pressure.
The demands of the Lancashire cotton industry in early 1933 for extensive imperial 
and third market trade discrimination against Japan proved to be the most critical challenge 
to the British government's desire to avoid further economic and political confrontation with 
Japan. Not only did the extent of Lancashire's demands threaten radically to expand the 
extent of British trade barriers, it also occurred at a critical time in Anglo-Japanese political 
relations. Political tensions had increased significantly following the solitary imposition by 
Britain of the League of Nations inspired embargo of military exports to Japan and China 
while the two powers were in conflict. However, even during this acute phase of Anglo- 
Japanese relations, foreign policy considerations proved less important than the Board of 
Trade's outright hostility, on commercial grounds, to extensive trade discrimination against
Japan. In keeping with Foreigi^CJffice recommendations, the debate on discrimination 
 against Japanese cotton textilesjcolonies was delayed until the repercussions of the arms
embargo had evaporated, yet throughout the course of this debate foreign policy 
considerations proved secondary. The prime determinant of the government's response to 
Lancashire was the Board's rejection of extensive trade discrimination and treaty 
denunciation on the grounds that possible Japanese commercial retaliation would render 
such measures counterproductive. In cabinet meetings in March 1933 and April 1934 
Runciman firmly rejected any notion of treaty denunciation (a view that only received the 
limited endorsement of the Colonial Secretary Sir Philip Cunliffe-Lister),6 excessive trade 
discrimination, or the promotion of trade discrimination against Japan in Dominion and 
third country markets.7 Thus it was fears over Japanese commercial retaliation and not 
political retaliation by Japan that formed the cornerstone of the government’s rejection of 
extensive trade discrimination against Japanese cotton textiles. Lancashire would be
6. Memorandum by the Colonial Secretary, 'Japanese Competition in the Textile Trade', 3 March 1933, CAB
24 CP. 54(33).
7. Memorandum o f the President of the Board of Trade, 'Japanese Competition in the Textile Trade', 6
March 1933, CAB 24 CP. 55(33); Memorandum of the President of the Board of Trade, March 1934, 
CAB 24 CP. 81(34).; Cabinet Conclusions, 18 April 1934, CAB 23 16(34)4.
325
Conclusion
appeased through limited trade discrimination in the relatively unimportant British colonial 
markets which the Foreign Office considered unlikely to provoke any Japanese response.8 
Similar concerns, aided by deep divisions within the shipping industry, lay behind the 
government's rejection of the Chamber of Shipping of the United Kingdom's demand in 
1933-34 for the exclusion of subsidised foreign shipping from Britain’s overseas carrying 
trade and imperial shipping routes. For the Board and the Liverpool Steam Ship Owners’ 
Association the exclusion of foreign shipping from British and British imperial carrying 
trade was unwarranted because of the risk of more substantial foreign retaliation against 
British shipping outside of imperial waters.9 This view was again endorsed by the Imperial 
Shipping Committee in 1938 over the question of excluding Japanese shipping from British 
Empire carrying trade.10 Thus like the cotton industry it was principally concern over the 
damaging effect of commercial retaliation to any measure of British trade discrimination 
that determined the government's rejection of excessive trade discrimination against Japan.
While the British government strove to avoid excessive trade discrimination against 
Japan^ bothj Indian trade discrimination against Japan and Britain’s response to state 
intervention in Japan and Manchukuo's oil markets veered towards confrontation with 
Japan. However, there were important limits to the role of the British government's 
involvement in these disputes. In regard to India the British cabinet’s endorsement of the 
denunciation of the 1904 Indo-Japan Trade Convention and imposition of penal tariff rates 
reflected its desire to appease Indian nationalist demands for protection of the Indian cotton 
industry from Japanese competition. As Samuel Hoare, the Secretary of State for India, told 
the cabinet, a failure to agree to these measures would do irreparable damage to Anglo- 
Indian relations.11 The abrogation of the Trade Convention was a necessary price for a 
government whose prime concern was the preservation of Indian cooperation with British 
rule. In contrast both the British and Indian governments undertook only limited support of 
Lancashire’s interests in India. Despite strong protests from Lancashire, and threats to 
sabotage Indian constitutional reform, neither governments was prepared to reduce
8. Lindley (Tokyo) to the Foreign Office, 13 March 1933, F0371/17153,F1720/583/23; Foreign Office
Memorandum, 12 March 1934, F0371/18177,F1278/347/23; Lindley (Tokyo) to the Foreign Office, 6 
April 1934, F0371/18178,F1938/347/23.
9. Memorandum of the President of the Board o f Trade, The Position of British Mercantile Marine', 25 June
1934, CAB 24 CP. 161(34); Cabinet Conclusions, 27 June 1934, CAB 23 23(34)9, and 5 December 
1934, CAB 23 45(34)12.
10. Imperial Shipping Committee, p. 107.
11. Cabinet Conclusions, 29 March 1933, CAB 23(33)4, and 24 May 1933, CAB 23 36(33)11.
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Lancashire's rate of tariff preference against the wishes of Indian nationalist opinion until 
1936. During the Indo-Japanese trade negotiations, despite the ostentatious intervention by 
Neville Chamberlain, the Chancellor of the Exchequer, in the Cabinet Committee on Indian 
Cotton, the defence of Lancashire's bleached piece-goods exports proved an irrelevance to 
the long-term decline of its commercial interests in India. Thus the main reason for Indian 
treaty abrogation and trade discrimination against Japan stemmed from Indian demands and 
was not due to pressure from British commercial interests on the British and Indian 
governments.
It was in regard to the defence of Royal Dutch Shell that the British government 
appeared most willing to confront the Japanese government. Despite warnings over the 
seriousness with which an oil embargo would be viewed in Japan, in November 1934 the 
British government began to explore the possibility of supporting this request from Royal 
Dutch Shell and Stanvac as a means of pressuring the Japanese and Manchukuo authorities. 
It was the Foreign Office that had always cautioned against strong economic measures 
against Japan that proved the champion of this policy in cabinet. Board of Trade and 
Admiralty fears over Japanese economic and military retaliation were brushed aside on the 
grounds that a failure to offer concrete resistance to these measures, particularly the 
Manchukuo Oil Monopoly, would encourage assaults by China and Japan on other British 
economic interests in East Asia. Nevertheless, there were clear limits to the Foreign Office's 
support for this measure. For both practical and political reasons Royal Dutch Shell would 
only be allowed to pursue the oil embargo if American support was forthcoming; the 
application of this policy would be the responsibility of the two companies; there would be 
no direct involvement of either the American or British governments in the oil embargo 
against Japan; initially the two companies, as in the case of similar confrontation against 
German oil policies, would only use the threat of an oil embargo to pressure the Japanese to 
back-down; if this failed, the authorisation of an oil embargo would have to await the 
sanction of the British and American governments. However, by December 1934 this whole 
policy had to be abandoned once the American government stated that, because of the 
refusal of the independent oil companies to cooperate, an oil embargo against Japan would 
be impracticable. Thus this potential confrontation against Japan was avoided not because 
the Foreign Office feared Japanese retaliation but because the American government was 
unable to interfere in the operations of its domestic oil companies.
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The course of Anglo-Japanese trade friction revealed several important aspects of 
business-govemment relations. While business-govemment relations were dominated by 
periods of rancour, in the final analysis there were very few who were prepared to say that the 
government had not done everything reasonably within its power to defend British business 
from Japanese competition. The decline of radical demands for treaty denunciation and 
intervention in third markets revealed the industrialists' appreciation of the limits of British 
power and influence on specific trade questions. Furthermore, while the government was 
prepared to endorse only limited measures of trade discrimination against Japan, it equally 
recognised that British business could not be forced into unworkable cartels and commercial 
compromises with their Japanese counterparts. Although Runciman and Cunliffe-Lister, 
with full cabinet support, forced the reluctant Lancashire cotton industry into cartel 
negotiations with Osaka, as the price of colonial trade discrimination, at no time did they 
demand a settlement with Osaka on any terms. As Sir Horace Wilson, the economic advisor 
to the cabinet, told the Lancashire delegation prior to its departure for the tripartite 
negotiations in India in the summer of 1933, while Britain had a desire for friendly relations 
with Japan there was no pressure on the Lancashire delegates to reach any compromise 
agreement with the Japanese.’- When cartel negotiations broke down in London, aside from 1W- 
jjY Chamberlain and the Foreign Secretary, Sir John Simon|, to delay colonial protection
in the hope of receiving another Japanese proposal, no pressure was put on the Lancashire 
delegates to continue negotiations in the vague hope of securing a Lancashire-Japan 
understanding. After the introduction of Colonial quotas both the Board of Trade and 
Foreign Office proved, in deference to Lancashire, unwilling to consider its modification 
unless the Japanese put forward concrete proposals prior to any new set of trade talks. Sir
/
Frederick Leith-Ross, the Chief Economic Advisor to the British government and head of the 
British Economic Mission to China and, the Japanese Ambassador, Yoshida Shigeru, mad 
separate suggestions for the improvement of Anglo-Japanese relations through th 
modification o f Colonial quotas, which were regarded with dismay in the Board of Trade 
and Foreign Office. Not only were both proposals regarded as politically unworkable, the> 
would almost certainly be rejected out of hand by Lancashire.13 Similarly the British 
government proved unwilling to direct Royal Dutch Shell’s negotiations with the Japanese 
and Manchukuoan authorities. In early-1935, when talks with the Manchukuo authorities
12. Meeting o f the Lancashire Textile Delegation to India at the Board o f Trade, 24 August 1933, 
F0371/17162,F5839/1203/23.
13. Draft o f letter to Leith-Ross, to Brenan (Shanghai), 30 May 1936, F0371/20290,F3095/1391/23; Aide 
Memoire from Eden to Yoshida, 18 January 1937, FO371/21029,F357/28/23.
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indicated that Royal Dutch Shell's subsidiaiy, Asiatic Petroleum, could continue operations, 
the Foreign Office raised no objections in spite of the oil monopoly’s overt breach of the 
Open Door.14 The Foreign Office was equally content to allow Royal Dutch Shell freely to 
conduct negotiations with the Japanese authorities over the fulfilment of the Petroleum Law, 
and once again, despite Admiralty reservations, acquiesced in Royal Dutch Shell and 
Stanvac's offer of the rights to their hydrogenation process to the Japanese.” Thus in the 
substantial talks between British cotton or oil industry representatives and the Japanese, the 
British government showed no desire to direct the course of negotiations for the benefit of 
wider British industrial and political interests.
In regard to policy formulation within the British administration, unlike Britain's 
policy to China, the question of Anglo-Japanese commercial friction revealed no substantial 
internal divisions. Both the Board of Trade and the Foreign Office were left to conduct 
commercial and political relations with Japan, without any interference from the Treasury 
Group. On only one occasion did Chamberlain and Simon, both members of the Treasury 
Group, seek to use the resolution of commercial friction as a means of improving Anglo- 
Japanese relations. In April 1934 in the cabinet committee on Japanese competition, both 
men preferred to wait for a final Japanese proposal in the hope that Anglo-Japanese political 
difficulties would not be exacerbated through the imposition of Colonial quotas.” This 
proved untenable as the Japanese had already accepted some form of British colonial trade 
discrimination in preference to an unworkable Lancashire-Japan cartel agreement. Thus the 
resolution of Anglo-Japanese friction in the cotton piece-good market provided no basis for 
the improvement in Anglo-Japanese relations, and left the various government departments 
free to manage Anglo-Japanese commercial friction without reference to this separate 
foreign policy agenda.
The government departments involved were able to establish a broad consensus over 
the management of Anglo-Japanese commercial friction. This consensus ensured that 
although the Foreign Office might not be at the forefront of policy making, shared objectives
14. Minute by Orde, 12 February 1935, F0371 /19350,F2125/94/23.
15. Meeting between Agnew, Godber, Darch (all Royal Dutch Shell), Starling (Petroleum Department), and 
Gascoigne (Foreign Office, 4 December 1935, F0371/19353,F7651/94/23; Royal Dutch Shell (New 
York) to Royal Dutch Shell (London), 6 December 1935, FO371/19353,F7780/94/23; Royal Dutch 
Shell (London) to Rising Sun Petroleum (Yokohama), 9 December 1935, F0371/19353,F7787/94/23; 
Minute by Orde, 12 December 1935, F0371/19353,F7787/94/23.
16. Cabinet Committee, 'Japanese Trade Competition', 27 March 1934, CAB 27/568.
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ensured that foreign policy considerations were always manifest in the government's 
response to Anglo-Japanese commercial rivalry. In particular the Board of Trade and the 
Foreign Office established a close working partnership that witnessed the coalescence of 
departmental policy. The Board's desire to avoid excessive trade discrimination neatly 
complemented the Foreign Office’s desire to minimise Anglo-Japanese political friction. 
While the Foreign Office appreciated the domestic pressures that resulted in limited colonial 
trade discrimination against Japan, the Board also recognised the need to ensure that the 
timing of British trade discrimination did not disrupt Anglo-Japanese relations. This was 
most clearly shown during the government's response to Lancashire in 1932 to 1933. The 
Board consulted the Foreign Office to ascertain if the political situation was stable enough to 
introduce limited colonial trade protection, while the Foreign Office accepted that some 
form of trade discrimination would have to be introduced to appease Lancashire. There were 
occasions when divergent departmental policy challenged this consensus, yet such 
occasions did not reveal the eclipse of the Foreign Office in policy formulation. The most 
notable example was the success of the Foreign Office's pursuit of the oil embargo threat, 
where despite Board of Trade and Admiralty opposition, it gained cabinet approval for the 
further evaluation of this policy.17 Other examples included the suspension of increased 
duties on silk and artificial silk for the duration of the London cartel negotiations despite the 
opposition of the Board and the silk and artificial silk industries. Friction on other issues, 
such as the India Office's conduct of the 1936-37 Indo-Japan trade negotiations,1* proved 
relatively minor, and reflected little more than a bureaucratic concern for the lack of due 
process. Indeed the major departmental dispute, between the India Office and the Indian 
government on the one hand, and the Board of Trade on the other over the defence of 
Lancashire's bleached piece-good interests did not even involve the Foreign Office. Thus 
between 1933 and 1937 the question of Anglo-Japanese commercial friction was managed 
within the economic and foreign policy consensus of the Board of Trade and Foreign Office, 
and there was no sustained eclipse of the Foreign Office in policy formulation.
Critical to the British government’s desire to minimise the impact of commercial 
friction on Anglo-Japanese relations was the response of Japan. The rejection of managed 
commercial friction through limited trade discrimination by Japanese government and 
business would have destroyed British attempts to minimise its political impact. However,
17. Cabinet Conclusions, 21 November 1934, CAB 23 41(34)4.
18. Minute by Orde, 30 March 1937, FQ371/21031,FI632/52/23.
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the Japanese government, and in particular the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, displayed an 
equal desire to minimise commercial tensions. Like their British counterparts the Japanese 
government feared the commercial effect of the radicalisation of trade issues, in particular 
the abrogation of the 1904 Indo-Japan Trade Convention, and the impact commercial 
friction had upon political relations. The Ministry took a leading role in ensuring that 
business resentment over British and Indian discrimination against Japanese cotton piece 
goods did not affect political relations. Cotton industrialists were persuaded to participate in 
the various trade negotiations while in December 1933 both the Foreign Ministry and the 
Ministry of Commerce and Industry played the key role in forcing Osaka to accept the Indo- 
Japanese trade agreement.19 Only in regard to the Manchukuo Oil Monopoly did the Foreign 
Ministry fail to moderate Anglo-Japanese commercial friction. As the Foreign Office 
perceived, the Japanese military leaders in Manchukuo rejected Foreign Ministry advice that 
the oil monopoly should be modified in order to reduce British and American resentment.20 
The long-run acceptance by Japanese industrialists of foreign trade restraint proved a key 
element in enabling the Foreign Ministry to divorce commercial and political friction. In 
1933 Japanese industrial interests were outraged by India's denunciation of the trade treaty, 
the imposition of penal tariffs, and the new Indo-Japanese Trade Convention. Against the 
wishes of their government they initiated a boycott of Indian raw cotton in June 1933, and 
proved consistently obdurate during the subsequent trade negotiations. However, by 1936 
and 1937 these same cotton interests had reconciled themselves to foreign trade 
discrimination. Prior to the departure of the Kadono mission in 1937, Sir Robert Clive, the 
British Ambassador, reported that Japanese cotton interests preferred trade restraint to 
voluntary agreements, and thus there was little prospect of a Lancashire-Japan cartel 
agreement.21 Similarly, the renegotiation of the 1934 Indo-Japanese Trade Convention 
between 1936 and 1937 provoked little outcry in Japan, as the Japanese now accepted 
limited trade restraint as a facet of international trade. Thus the common desire of the British 
and Japanese governments to minimise commercial friction together with the belated 
recognition by British and Japanese business of the limits of government intervention in 
economic disputes, resulted in the progressive disengagement of Anglo-Japanese 
commercial rivalries from political relations. Although economic friction certainly had
19. Snow (Tokyo) to the Foreign Office, 12 December 1933, FO371/17165,F7690/1203/23.
20. Minute by Allen, 10 April 1935, F0371/19351,F2323/94/23; Butler (Mukden) to the Foreign Office, 2 
March 1935, F0371/19351,F2323/94/23.
21. Clive (Tokyo) to the Foreign Office, 22 April 1937, FO371/21039,F2313/277/23.
331
Conclusion
political implications, mutual desires to manage commercial rivalry and the moderation of 
business opinion ensured that commercial friction had no sustained impact upon Anglo- 
Japanese relations.
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